



STUDIES IN THE MAKING OF CITIZENS





MODERN GERMANY

A Study of Conflicting Loyalties



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO
THE BAKER & TAYLOR CO., NEW YORK; THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS, LONDON; THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA, TOKYO, OSAKA,
KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI; THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LIMITED, SHANGHAI

MODERN GERMANY

A Study of Conflicting Loyalties

CHECK

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO · ILLINOIS

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COMPOSED AND PRINTED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A.

IN MEMORY OF MY MOTHER

EDITOR'S PREFACE

Broadly speaking, the common purpose of these inquiries in eight modern states has been that of examining objectively the systems of civic education, of determining the broad trends of civic training in these nations, and of indicating possibilities in the further development and control of civic education. In two of these cases, Italy and Russia, striking experiments are now being made in the organization of new types of civic loyalty. Germany, England, the United States, and France present instances of powerful modern states and the development of types of civic cohesion. Switzerland and Austria-Hungary are employed as examples of the difficulty experienced in reconciling a central political allegiance with divergent and conflicting racial and religious elements.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

The Duk-Duks, by Dr. Elizabeth Weber, Professor of Political Science, Hunter College, New York City.

The Making of Citizens, by Professor Charles E. Merriam, Professor of Political Science in the University of Chicago.

Wide latitude has been given and taken by the individual collaborators in this study, with the understanding, however, (1) that as a minimum there would be included in each volume an examination of the social bases of political cohesion and (2) that the various mechanisms of civic education would be adequately discussed. There is inevitably a wide variation in point of view, method of approach, and in execution of the project. Investigators differ as widely in aptitude, experience, and environment.

Of the various investigations the questions may be asked: What part do the social groupings play in the spirit of the state? What is the attitude of the economic groups which for this purpose may be considered under certain large heads, as the attitude of the business element, of the agricultural group, or of labor? What is the relation of the racial groups toward the political group whose solidarity is in question? Do they tend to integrate or disintegrate the state? What is the position of the religious factors in the given society, the Catholic, the Protestant, the Jewish? How are they related to loyalty toward the political unit? What is the place of the regional groupings in the political unit? Do they develop special tendencies alone or in company with other types of groupings already mentioned? What is the relation of these competing loyalties to each other?

It cannot be assumed that any of these groups has a special attraction or aversion toward government in general; and the analysis is not conducted with any view of establishing a uniformity of interest or attachment in any type of group, but rather of indicating the social composition of the existing political units and authorities. It may well be questioned whether there is any abstract loyalty, political or otherwise. These political loyalties are determined by concrete interests, modified by survivals that no longer fit the case and by aspirations not yet realized. The cohesion is a resultant of conflicting forces, or a

balance of existing counterweights, a factor of the situation. All these factors may change and the balance may be the same, or one may change slightly and the whole balance may be overthrown. It is the integration of interests that counts, not the special form or character of any one of them.

Among the mechanisms of civic education analyzed are those of the schools, the rôle of governmental services and officials, the place of the political parties, and the function of special patriotic organizations; or, from another point of view, the use of traditions in building up civic cohesion, the place of political symbolism, the relation of language, literature, and the press, to civic education, the position occupied by locality in the construction of a political loyalty; and, finally, it is hoped that an effective analysis may be made of competing group loyalties rivaling the state either within or without.

In these groups there is much overlapping. It would be possible to apply any one or all of the last-named categories to any or all of the first. Thus the formal school system may and does utilize language and literature, or symbolism, or love of locality, or make use of important traditions. Symbolism and traditions may and do overlap—in fact, *must* if they are to serve their purpose; while love of locality and language may be and are interwoven most intimately.

In the various states examined, these devices were traced and compared. The result by no means attains the dignity of exact measurement but supplies a rough tracing of outlines of types and patterns in different cities. It is hoped, however, that these outlines will be sufficiently clear to set forth some of the main situations arising in the process of political control and to raise challenging questions regarding the further development of civic education.

It may be suggested that the process by which political cohesion is produced must always be considered with reference to other loyalties toward other groups in the same society. Many of the devices here described are common to a number of competing groups and can be more clearly seen in their relation to each other, working in co-operation or competition, as the situa-

tion may be. The attitude of the ecclesiastical group or the economic group, or the racial or cultural group, or any of them, profoundly influences the nature and effect of the state's attempt to solidify political loyalty; and the picture is complete only when all the concurrent or relevant factors are envisaged.

These devices are not always consciously employed although they are spoken of here as if they were. It often happens that these instrumentalities are used without the conscious plan of anyone in authority. In this sense it might be better to say that these techniques are found rather than willed. At any rate, they exist and are operating.

These eight or nine techniques are only rough schedules or classifications of broad types of cohesive influences. They are not presented as accurate analyses of the psychology of learning or teaching the cohesive process of political adherence. They presuppose an analysis of objectives which has not been made, and they presuppose an orderly study of the means of applying objectives; and this also had not been worked out in any of the states under consideration.

Nowhere is there available richer material for the study of civic cohesion than in modern Germany. This volume by Professor Paul Kosok is based on six years' study of the nature of political allegiance in that nation. Some two years were spent in Germany in the assembling of data, and the remaining part of the time, in preparation and revision of the manuscript. The background of the study was laid, indeed, by Dr. Lasswell who made a preliminary review of the field in 1924, and who has assisted in putting the material in final form.

The study of Professor Kosok differs from some of the others in this series in the strong emphasis placed on the economic factors in the system of political cohesion, and in the greater attention to the growth of communist civic education as distinguished from the identical process of cohesion in other groups. From this point of view the German system as described in Kosok may well be read alongside of Harper's study of *Civic Training in Soviet Russia*, where the elaborate efforts to develop civic education in the Soviet state are fully described and analyzed.

In Germany, competing systems of civic education—democratic, fascist, and communist—may be seen in operation side by side, battling for position within the limits of the existing political order, and struggling for mastery in the same society. Obviously the task of producing national cohesion and loyalty in a situation where two of the three important groups profess the desire to overthrow the existing political order presents many difficulties, and it is precisely these conflicts which Kosok has undertaken to describe. A particularly pertinent chapter written by Isidor Ginsburg is that dealing with the struggle of the competing groups for the creation and operation of a dominating symbolism (chap. xvi).

CHARLES E. MERRIAM

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

Fascism has triumphed in Germany. Its victory has brought to a close the short-lived parliamentary régime established in 1919. While the present dictatorship marks a new step in the historical development of Germany, it is at the same time the logical outcome of various forces at work during the parliamentary régime—forces which were rooted in the structure of pre-war German society. What characterizes the development of these forces is the increased emphasis upon loyalty to the national state, that is, the increased subordination of all other loyalties to this supreme central loyalty. A study of the forces that have brought about the establishment of the present Fascist dictatorship thus becomes identical with the study of all those forces that have strengthened or weakened national and civic loyalty in the past. Such a study the present volume attempts to present. The procedure has been not merely to present a cross-section of the methods of civic training of the post-war period but to examine the historical origin and development of the concept and contents of civic and national training. To this end it has also been necessary to analyze the anti-civic and anti-national forces against which civic training is employed.

This study is based upon material gathered during a stay of two and a half years in Germany. A further understanding of the problem, as well as additional material, was derived from an earlier unpublished study of the German Revolution of 1918–19, which was made by the author during a previous two-year stay in Germany. Much material was gathered in various German libraries, of which the Preussische Staatsbibliothek in Berlin proved most useful. The New York Public Library likewise contributed much material. Additional information was gained through contacts with officials of numerous organizations who gave generously of their time. Information gained in these ways was supplemented by conversations with private German citi-

zens of all classes. To all of these the author wishes to convey his sincerest thanks.

The original draft of this volume was written in German on a much larger scale. Later developments made it necessary to publish the volume in English, to condense it considerably, and to re-write it from the viewpoint of the American rather than of the German reader. As a result it was found necessary to write what practically amounted to a new book on the basis of the original material. Further exigencies of space caused a considerable shortening of many of the chapters of this English version. As a result, much factual material had to be eliminated. This gives to many of the generalizations found in this volume an apparently didactic character which they originally did not possess. Other chapters had to be entirely eliminated. These dealt with such subjects as sports organizations, charitable organizations, the rôle of German women and the German home, music, literature, etc., as well as a theoretical and historical analysis of the problem of civic training itself. The author hopes to publish this material separately in the near future. The bibliography presented lists only a small portion of the books and pamphlets consulted. Many important works had to be omitted and it was often difficult to decide upon which books should be listed.

Throughout the recasting of this volume in English the author has had the good fortune to have the collaboration of Mr. Isidor Ginsburg of the College of the City of New York. He not only gave of his time without stint, but laid aside his own research activities to see the work through. His thorough understanding of German history and German affairs and his exceptional analytical powers were of great aid to the author, who discussed with him at length the theoretical problems entailed in the study as well as the organization and presentation of the material. The author has a pleasant memory of the often heated but fruitful discussions of every aspect of the problem—discussions which have given the volume its present character. Many of these discussions were conducted pencil in hand, following a pre-arranged outline. In this respect the work may be called a

complete collaboration. Since it was not possible to arrive at a complete agreement in all of these discussions, however, the author cannot avoid the responsibility for the interpretations here offered.

In addition to this general collaboration, Mr. Ginsburg contributed the trenchant chapter on national symbolism, in which he has utilized a new approach to this involved problem.

Thanks are due to my colleagues Professor Philip D. Jordan, for his reading and criticism of the completed manuscript; and Mr. Rubin Gotesky for his general criticisms as well as for his assistance in the final drafting of chapters viii and ix. The book owes a great deal to the continued encouragement of Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes of Columbia University and to the pains-taking examination which he made of the entire manuscript. To Professor Charles E. Merriam, editor of the series, the author tenders his thanks for his constant advice and guidance and his endless patience. Professor Harold D. Lasswell, who planned the original project, also gave many valued suggestions as a result of his careful scrutiny of the manuscript and aided in the final editing of the volume. Thanks are also due to Leonard Mins for many of his criticisms and suggestions.

I owe much to my wife, whose research and secretarial assistance during the entire work was indispensable.

PAUL KOSOK

INTRODUCTION

The present volume has been divided into three parts. In the first, a study is made of the objective social and economic conditions that produce a civic or anti-civic mentality. In conjunction with this, various economic measures are taken up that have been passed to weaken disloyalty or strengthen loyalty. The second part is a study of the character of the present state and the various organizations by which it attempts to inculcate loyalty. In the third section the different non-state organizations and elements are considered in relationship to our problem. These, as will be seen, often co-operate with the state in their activities.

The method of approach used in the first section has been to make a historical analysis of the rôle of the various social and economic classes of German society in developing civic loyalty. The necessity for this need hardly be stressed; the class nature of German society and of German civic training as we have just indicated it makes this indispensable. Such an analysis shows the existence of two main classes, the upper or ruling class—the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie—and the lower or ruled class—the industrial and agricultural proletariat. The middle classes in town and country have likewise been given separate treatment because of their size as well as their strategic position between the upper and lower classes.¹

Each class in turn shows the presence of many different strata, though these cannot always be treated separately because of lack of space. Furthermore, differences between certain strata of one class and those of another cannot always be as sharply distinguished in actual life as this study might indicate.

¹ The term "middle classes" is used throughout this book to correspond to the German term "*Mittelstand*" or the French term "*petite bourgeoisie*." It is not used in the same sense as the English term "middle class" which would also include the bourgeoisie. For a discussion of the character and the composition of the middle classes see chap. iii.

Nevertheless, these class differences are not exaggerated. The main class lines and even the distinctions between the various strata are very clearly marked and observed by the classes themselves. For these class differences are not merely of an economic nature but pervade the whole structure of German society.¹ They are present in the army, the police, the bureaucracy, the schools, the church, the sport organizations, the youth movement, and many other social and cultural activities. In fact, there is hardly any form of activity in which they are not present. They color the whole of German life in a way unknown in this country. And, what is most important, their existence is not denied by anyone. Not only is a man's position in life definitely determined by his class affiliation, but he is made conscious of it in his daily life. Railroads, subways, hospitals, burials, and even public comfort stations are openly labeled first, second, and third class.

What may be most important of all is that these class divisions are quite rigid. It is very difficult for a member of a lower class to rise to a higher one. Such changes do take place, but they are of a slow, protracted nature. This gives German society a semi-caste-like nature. All these factors must be continually kept in mind, for they profoundly affect the character of civic training in Germany.

¹ See, in general: Paul Mombert, "Die Tatsachen der Klassenbildung" in *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, Jahrgang 44, pp. 93-122; Georg Albrecht, *Die sozialen Klassen* (1926); Karl Kautsky, "Klasseninteresse, Sonderinteresse, Gemeininteresse" (in *Neue Zeit*, XXI², p. 240 ff.); August Pieper, *Berufsgedanke und Berufsstand im Wirtschaftsleben*.

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PART I.

**THE MAIN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ALIGNMENTS**

CHAPTER I

THE BOURGEOISIE

Of the various classes of society it will be necessary first to take up the bourgeoisie for it is the class which has evolved the status of the "citizen" and the concept of "civic" training. An attempt will be made to show how the objective (i.e., the social and economic) conditions of the early bourgeoisie produced a civic concept which forced it to negate feudal state and society and to support the growth of absolute monarchy. It will then be necessary to show how the further growth of the bourgeoisie brought it into conflict with the feudal elements of this absolute state and how it gradually transformed the latter into a bourgeois state. And, finally, an attempt will be made to indicate how the bourgeoisie has then made use of the state not only directly to further its economic interests but also to suppress all attempts to destroy the existing régime.¹

In making a short analysis of the interests of the bourgeoisie we must first distinguish between those of the industrial, the commercial, and the financial bourgeoisie, even though they have become increasingly integrated during the last decades. Common to all is, of course, the basic prerequisite of bourgeois private property (*bürgerliches Privateigentum*) as opposed to both feudal property and socialized proletarian property. The secondary prerequisites for the growth and expansion of the bourgeoisie center around the problems of production and marketing. It must be able to get sufficient capital, cheap labor power, and sufficient cheap raw material to be able to develop production. It must further be able to secure as large as possible a market for its goods and to sell them at a price which will yield maximum profits. The commercial bourgeoisie is interested in these demands in so far as increased production also means in-

¹ See *Grundrisse der Sozialökonomik*, Vol. IX¹ and Vol. IX² (1924). These two volumes contain a series of important sociological studies of the various classes and strata of society.

creased commercial activities. Nevertheless, it has often come into conflict with the industrial bourgeoisie, especially concerning the demand of the latter for protective tariffs, which are, of course, a hindrance to increased international trade. Bank capital is also interested in these conditions in so far as they increase the opportunities for new investments.

The early struggle of the bourgeoisie against feudal society¹ was a struggle for the establishment of the security of bourgeois private property (*bürgerliches Privateigentum*) and for the accumulation of capital as against the arbitrary rule of the feudal lords—a struggle which necessarily forced the bourgeoisie in its early stages into an alliance with the monarchy in order to establish a state with absolute powers over these lords. The absolute state was a fulcrum from which the bourgeoisie could better oust the feudal nobles from their position of political power and establish a *bürgerliche Rechts- und Wirtschaftsordnung*. It is well known that up to the end of the eighteenth century the various absolute rulers of Germany favored the development of commerce and industry, and thus helped to strengthen the bourgeoisie without, however, granting it political rights or detracting from the privileges of the nobility.

During this whole period, when the absolute monarchy was being aided by the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the dominance of feudal forms of property as well as in its struggle against foreign competitors it is quite obvious that the civic concept of the bourgeoisie contained as an integral part the support of the absolute monarchy. Even though the bourgeoisie possessed no political rights in the absolute monarchy, nevertheless it gave its political allegiance to it, just as the monarch gave considerable support to the economic development of the bourgeoisie. While feeling themselves as *citizens* in their relationships among themselves, the members of the bourgeoisie

¹ For details see, among others, Oskar Schwebel, *Deutsches Bürgertum. Von seinen Anfängen bis zum Jahre 1808* (1883); Heinrich Johann Sieveking, *Grundzüge der neueren Wirtschaftsgeschichte vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart* (1923); Gustave Huard, *L'évolution de la bourgeoisie Allemande* (1919); Werner Sombart, *Der moderne Kapitalismus* (1924); Werner Sombart, *Der Bourgeois. Zur Geistesgeschichte des modernen Wirtschaftsmenschen* (1923).

nevertheless accepted their position as *subjects* to their respective absolute rulers.

By the end of the eighteenth century, partly through the aid given by the state, the bourgeoisie of Germany had overcome the economic setback of the previous two centuries. It now showed signs of a revived economic, political, and cultural growth. This, in turn, brought it into conflict with the ever increasing control and regulation of economic affairs by the absolute monarchs. The existence of a prosperous industry meant increased income through taxation, which was needed to pay for the upkeep of the luxurious court life of the various princes, the army, and civil administration. Income was largely needed to meet the expense of the many wars, especially those of Frederick the Great.¹ As taxes on industry and commerce increased, the whole economic policy of the absolute state gradually turned into an obstacle to the further development of the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the maintenance of the monopoly rights of the medieval craft guilds was a hindrance to the development of the new forms of industrial production that were spreading to Germany from England. Also, the monopoly rights of the landed aristocracy to the possession of land were blocking the attempts of the bourgeoisie to expand.

The increasing self-assertiveness of the bourgeoisie was more clearly manifested after the outbreak of the French Revolution. When the French troops occupied Germany they were often received by the bourgeoisie as friends and allies. This feeling of a common cause with the French bourgeoisie was strengthened by the many bourgeois reforms instituted in Germany, either directly by Napoleon or as a result of his victories, such as destruction and reduction of the many tariff frontiers, the abolition of part of the confusing and oppressive system of taxation, the abolition of the landowning privilege of the nobility, and the abolition of the monopolistic privileges of the numerous craft guilds. Trade and industry developed rapidly, aided by the Continental Blockade.²

¹ See the interesting study of Werner Sombart, *Krieg und Kapitalismus* (1913).

² See Robert Höniger, *Die Kontinentalsperre und ihre Einwirkung auf Deutschland* (1907).

The continuation of Napoleonic rule in Germany, however, gradually began to weaken the allegiance of the German bourgeoisie to the much stronger French bourgeoisie which had developed during the first decade of the nineteenth century. The most important economic factors that brought about this change of attitude were the increasing requisitions of Napoleon and the resulting increase in taxes, which began to fall heavily on the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the tariff wall erected by Napoleon around France reacted unfavorably upon the industrialized parts of Germany, i.e., the Rhineland and Saxony. The continuance of the Continental Blockade, while helping certain industries, had the effect of weakening or destroying others, such as the shipping interests of Northern Germany. In addition, the general policy of Napoleon toward the end of his régime increasingly favored the German aristocracy at the expense of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry; and this helped to strengthen the increasing dissatisfaction with his régime. Finally, the German bourgeoisie was less developed than the French, and many of the measures that had been an absolute necessity for the French bourgeoisie and which had been introduced into Germany were of relatively less importance to the German bourgeoisie. All of this led to a reaction against France, bringing the bourgeoisie of the German states into line with their state governments and causing them to accept their state governments as champions of German patriotism and German freedom. This was a rôle which these governments had never occupied before, and which they dropped with alacrity upon the defeat of Napoleon.

In this period of reaction the bourgeoisie definitely but slowly left the first stage of its historical evolution, in which it had accepted the increasing power of the absolute monarchy as a means to combat the overpowering feudal forces of society. It now entered a second stage, when it definitely began to oppose the absolute monarchy as being harmful to its economic, social, and political interests. It demanded a check on this absolute monarchy. With the growth of the bourgeoisie, this check necessarily had to lead to a control over the monarchy and, finally, after 1918 to the eventual destruction of the remaining feudal

elements in the state, i.e., the establishment of a republic.¹ The reason for this gradual change lay, of course, in the slow but persistent economic growth of the German bourgeoisie, which had been accelerated by the French occupation. Another factor was the political and ideological impetus given the German bourgeoisie by the French bourgeoisie all the way from the period of the Enlightenment down through the French Revolution. The economic and the ideological factors definitely changed the meaning of the concept *staatsbürgerlich*. From the anti-feudal, *pro-absolutist* concept of the eighteenth century, it had turned into the antifeudal, *anti-absolutist* concept of the nineteenth century.²

The ideals adopted and the steps taken as a result of this general movement are exceedingly difficult to encompass in a short space. Throughout Germany different stages of political maturity clashed with different stages of economic development and varying geographic and social conditions to form an ensemble. The bourgeoisie was relatively weak. The oppression of the German bourgeoisie by the French bourgeoisie and Napoleon had thrown part of it temporarily into the arms of the German absolutist state, from which it only gradually freed itself. Most important, however, was the fact that the bourgeoisie of this period was able to satisfy some of its economic demands within the framework of the existing political order. While the absolute state jealously guarded all its political privileges, nevertheless it was willing to make sufficient economic concessions to the bourgeoisie to strengthen the latter. For the agrarian absolutist state was able to aid the development of the commercial bourgeoisie, the strongest element of that class, without running counter to its own interests.

¹ What might be called the third period of the bourgeoisie (which will be treated later) is characterized by attempts to destroy its own creature, parliamentary democracy, by resort to a fascist dictatorship.

² For the actual economic development of the bourgeoisie see such standard works as Werner Sombart, *Die deutsche Wirtschaft im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (1913); Sartorius von Waltershausen, *Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1815-1914* (1920); W. Wygodzinski, *Wandlungen der deutschen Volkswirtschaft im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (1912); Wilhelm Mayer, *100 Jahre deutsche Wirtschaft (1815-1914)*.

It was Prussia which took the lead in this policy, first by the abolition of internal customs, second by the reform of her complicated revenue system, third by the passage of a uniform and low tariff, and finally by the initiation of the Zollverein.¹ The Zollverein became the increasingly powerful bourgeois economic force within the body politic of the absolutist states.²

These various economic measures taken by the absolutist governments of Germany naturally weakened the anti-monarchical element in the civic concept of the bourgeoisie. This undoubtedly helps to explain why the bourgeoisie in the Revolution of 1848 was unwilling to exert all its power to destroy the existing monarchical state. Another reason for this attitude was the presence of a new class, the industrial proletariat, which in England and France had already shown a definitely hostile attitude toward the bourgeoisie.

Although the Revolution of 1848 was virtually a failure, the struggle between the anti-state and the pro-state elements in the civic concept of the bourgeoisie continued. On the one hand, the political ideal of the German bourgeoisie, namely, a united democratic national state, had not been achieved. On the other hand, the continued growth of the Zollverein, together with the general wave of prosperity that set in after 1850, gave the German bourgeoisie the necessary prerequisites for its rapid growth. Thus the period leading up to the formation of the North German Federation and the German Empire was one during which the bourgeoisie came closer to the achievement of its economic and political aims than it had ever done before. This is true in spite of the struggles of the bourgeoisie (National Liberals) in the sixties and seventies against the policies of Bismarck. In

¹ See Wilhelm Gerloff, *Die deutsche Zoll- und Handelspolitik von der Gründung des Zollvereins bis zum Frieden von Versailles*; Weber, *Der deutsche Zollverein*; Hermann von Festenberg-Packisch, *Die Geschichte des deutschen Zollvereins* (1879); see also Heinrich Dietzel, "List's Nationales System und die 'nationale' Wirtschaftspolitik," in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialforschung*, XXXV, 306-417.

² The importance of the Zollverein in tying up the economic interests of a considerable portion of the German bourgeoisie with the framework of the existing state cannot be too strongly emphasized. For it gave a very definite color to the civic concepts of the German bourgeoisie of this period.

fact, the character of this struggle showed definitely that the bourgeoisie, just as in 1848, was not willing to go to the limit in carrying out its policy against that of the semi-absolutist régime.

To the bourgeoisie the formation of the North German Federation and then of the Empire was only the logical result of the general development of the Zollverein. The new Empire satisfied its economic interests at the same time that it fulfilled a great many of its political desires. Most of the economic legislation from 1867 to 1877 was nothing more than a continuation of the economic legislation of the Zollverein.¹

With the formation of the German Empire in 1871 civic training by the bourgeoisie now no longer was aimed essentially against such feudal elements as still existed; to use the German terms, civic training was no longer *staatsverneinend*, but definitely *staatserhaltend*. While certain sections of the bourgeoisie still refused to accept the compromise with the feudal elements of the government, the gains made were sufficient to bring the majority within the fold of the monarchy.

It is, of course, impossible within the limits of this study to make a thorough analysis of the many methods by which the state apparatus was used in the interests of the bourgeoisie. The whole financial and economic legislation of the Empire and the various states was aimed to permit the freest and fastest accumulation of capital. Production was aided by various means in order to enable German manufacturers to compete with the British manufacturers. Concentration and centralization of industry, as is well known, were definitely favored by the government, itself a member of the Rhenish-Westphalian coal syndicate. The state also did much to advance the industrial arts and sciences by the establishment of various kinds of technical schools as well as by the moral and financial support it extended to various scientific societies. Economic contact with the government² was maintained through the chambers of commerce.

¹ For details see Karl Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*; also William Harbutt Dawson, *The German Empire and the Unity Movement*.

² See Friederich Schornerus, *Die freien Interessenverbände für Handel und Industrie und ihr Einfluss auf die Gesetzgebung und Verwaltung*.

These had already come into existence during the Napoleonic period. During the forties they were established throughout Prussia as semi-official bodies.¹ Further contacts existed through the Ministry of Commerce as well as through the various local, state, and national committees and officials whose activities lay in the economic sphere.

This general policy was also carried out in German foreign relationships. Beginning with the compromise tariff of 1879, the German bourgeoisie showed its growing strength during the following decades by managing continually to raise the tariff on industrial products.² This, of course, increased not merely the domestic market for German goods but also helped to increase profits and consequently raise the rate of accumulation of capital. Colonies were acquired for the same purpose, though their actual economic value was never of great importance. The foreign interests of the bourgeoisie were also furthered by the various commercial treaties that the government succeeded in negotiating. After 1879 these treaties became more and more a means of strengthening the bourgeoisie at the expense of the agrarians. This was especially the case with the commercial treaties negotiated by Caprivi in 1892 and 1894. Furthermore, the network of German consulates existing throughout the whole world was an important means of securing information on the necessary markets for the ever increasing industrial exports of the nation. A strong merchant marine was built in a relatively short time, partly with the aid of government subsidies, while the creation of a powerful German navy was due mainly to the desire to defend the foreign interests of German business abroad.³ The whole anti-British foreign policy that gradually evolved after 1900 was essentially in the interest of the German

¹ See Richard Zeyss, *Die Entstehung der Handelskammern und die Industrie am Niederrhein während der französischen Herrschaft* (1907); also Herens, *Die deutschen Handelskammern als Glied der Verwaltung; ihre Geschichte, ihr Wesen und ihre Zukunft*.

² Details of German tariff history, which, of course, bear directly upon this problem, may be found in any of the works on modern Germany history.

³ Rudolf Wittmer, *Deutschlands Taten zur See; die deutsche Betätigung zur See von ihren Ursprüngen bis zum Weltkrieg* (1915), pp. 16-17, mentions twenty cases between 1872 and 1897 in which the German fleet was used to protect German property abroad.

bourgeoisie whose foreign expansion was being hindered by the older and more powerful British bourgeoisie. In fact, one might say that by 1914 the whole foreign policy of the German Empire represented much more the foreign interests of the German bourgeoisie than those of the German aristocracy. For the World War as far as Germany was concerned was not a war of the Kaiser, the Junkers, and the militarists; these were merely useful allies or, perhaps better, useful agents by which the German bourgeoisie hoped to achieve its economic aims.

Relating all of this to our main problem of civic training, we can see how the greater part of the bourgeoisie was so tied up with the semi-absolute monarchy that its civic allegiance to this state was as firmly cemented as possible. But it went much farther. It tried by various means—economical, political, social, and cultural—to inculcate the same allegiance among the middle and lower classes of society. Thus during this period, 1870–1914, the concept of civic training of the bourgeoisie was almost identical with the concept of state loyalty as inculcated by the various governments; in short, patriotism and class interest had become practically identical for the bourgeoisie. Civic training meant training the rest of the population in the economic, social, and political ideas necessary to the bourgeoisie.

During the latter part of this period the content of civic training underwent additional modification. This was due to the growth of imperialism, i.e., the acquisition of colonies and over-sea markets, the expansion of commerce, the exportation of capital, the ever increasing army and navy, and the accompanying concept of the world-mission of German Kultur. These new needs of bourgeoisie came to be incorporated as an integral part of its civic and national concept. But more than that. Because of the dominant position of the bourgeoisie these new ideas were disseminated so effectively among the rest of the population that the outbreak of the World War found the great mass of the population ready to defend a national ideal which included the concept of imperialism.

Since the bourgeoisie was in such a large measure identified with the existing state, the outcome of the World War was of

fundamental significance to it. With the economic and military breakdown of Germany in 1918 and the consequent political revolution, an entirely new situation arose for the bourgeoisie. A tremendous blow had been struck at its economic power. Large territories with valuable raw materials and valuable capital investments had been lost; colonies had been confiscated. Most of the foreign investments had been seized. The merchant marine had been taken away. German patent rights in foreign countries had been annulled. Foreign markets had been lost. A huge reparation charge, as well as control of German industry by the Allies, seemed inevitable.¹ Besides this, the monarchical government of the bourgeoisie had vanished. When, to cap the climax, revolutionary elements of the working class attempted to overthrow the stop-gap government of the Socialists and to erect a Soviet government with its certain abolition of private property, the outlook for the bourgeoisie seemed hopeless.²

This, however, proved to be the turning point; it roused the bourgeoisie to energetic action to regain its former position of economic and political power.³ All forces were rallied, from the Junkertum to the Social Democracy, to suppress revolutionary uprisings and safeguard the fundamental factor of private property. During the winter of 1918–19 the entire bourgeois press of Germany put forth the slogan: “For the National Assembly —against the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.”

After having suppressed the various internal revolts of the left elements, the bourgeoisie tried to regain its former control over the new republican government. Although the socialists had proved an invaluable ally in defending the existing social order during the crisis of 1918–19, the bourgeoisie objected to the new state of affairs for a number of reasons. In the first place, the leadership of the new government, the Weimar Coalition, made up of the Democrats, the Social Democrats, and the

¹ Hans Bachmann, *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft vor und nach dem Weltkriege* (1921).

² See the two volumes of Moritz Julius Bonn, *Die Krise des deutschen Kapitalismus* and *Das Schicksal des deutschen Kapitalismus* (1930).

³ Erich Eyck, *Des deutschen Bürgertums Schicksalsstunde* (1919); Erwin Steinitzer, *Bürgertum und Revolution* (1919).

Catholic Centre, lay more or less in the hands of the former enemy of the bourgeoisie, the Social Democracy. Although the war and the revolution had proved that the latter was not intent upon the destruction of capitalism, nevertheless fear existed among the bourgeoisie, at least at first, that the pressure of the revolutionary workers might force the Social Democracy to socialize or at least to attempt to socialize some of the basic industries. Then again it feared that its economic status might be weakened by means of high taxes on industry and property as well as through the increased rights of the workers in the factories. When, however, it turned out that the government made no serious attempts to interfere with the reconstruction of the bourgeois economic life, confidence in the republican government increased. In fact, the bourgeoisie soon found that it was not merely able to regain its former control over the state but also to exercise this power more directly. For the whole paraphernalia of semi-feudal monarchy had been swept away; the bourgeoisie was now the dominant element in the state. It made use of this new government to improve its economic relationships with foreign countries, first of all by pushing the Weimar Coalition forward to sign the peace treaty without itself taking the moral and political responsibility for it. It saw to it that the new government reopened the former foreign economic and political relationships and busied itself securing raw materials and attempting to regain old markets.¹ It led further to the flotation of a large series of foreign loans, continuing down to the present time. Finally, it has used the German government in a partially successful war of attrition to have reparations reduced.

Internally, the post-revolutionary governments have likewise been of service. They have established credits for industry;² they have subsidized a new merchant marine; they have to some extent repaid business men for losses suffered abroad as well as in occupied territory; they have continued to foster concentra-

¹ This has led to a number of commercial treaties, the first of which was the Treaty of Rapallo with Russia.

² Rudolf Dalberg, *Deutsche Währungs- und Kreditpolitik 1923-1926*; Salin "Staatliche Kredit politik" (in *Recht und Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Vol. LVII [1927]).

tion in industry, commerce, and banking, on a national and even a world-wide scale; they have fostered business research in universities and government institutions;¹ they have kept up the tariff on industrial products, raising it continually during the last decade in order to keep up prices and maintain the internal market; they have stabilized the currency and revalorized the national debt to some extent. Besides, they have taken many steps to reduce the price of labor; they have practically abolished the formerly legal eight-hour day, both in government and private industries; they have helped enforce compulsory arbitration in labor disputes; they have assisted the rationalization of industry. Furthermore, their method of taxation has been such as to shift the burden to a considerable extent from the bourgeoisie to the shoulders of other classes.²

In spite of all these things for which the bourgeoisie has used the post-war governments, certain fundamental factors have prevented a full economic recovery; in fact, German society has been in a permanent and growing crisis since 1924. This crisis has been so severe that it has increasingly undermined faith in the Republic on the part of all classes of society. As a result, there have been serious discussions within the bourgeoisie as to the most suitable form of government for aiding its own economic growth as well as for maintaining and strengthening its control over the rest of the population. The German bourgeoisie which, at first, though rather skeptical of the Republic, had very little use for Fascism, has in the last few years increasingly supported this element. The movement for a Fascist dictatorship, with or without monarchical trappings, has been, on the whole, increasing. Internally and externally such a dictatorship seems to promise to at least certain elements of the bourgeoisie a

¹ The establishment of the Institut für Konjunkturforschung, as part of the Wirtschaftsministerium. The government forced the formation of a potash syndicate that included 100 per cent of the German production.

² Kurt Singer, *Staat und Wirtschaft seit dem Waffenstillstand* (1924). The bourgeoisie has been able to present a more or less united front in its economic demands from the government through its organization the "Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie." For material see, among others, Heinrich Lechta, *Die deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, ihre volkswirtschaftliche Funktion und ihre soziologischen Grundlagen* (1926).

stronger position. But the entire bourgeoisie has not yet come out completely for a Fascist dictatorship, because there is doubt whether such a dictatorship can be successfully established in the face of the growing revolutionary elements among the working class, and, furthermore, because the establishment of such a dictatorship might cause at least a temporary setback to the industrial development of the country. On the other hand, economic depression and misery together with the growth of radicalism force the bourgeoisie toward more energetic and dictatorial forms of control over both the economic and the political life of the nation. The dictatorial decrees of Hindenburg and the minority government of von Papen are important steps in this direction.

From the point of view of the bourgeoisie, the concept of civic training in the post-war period means more than ever a training in allegiance to bourgeois property, bourgeois society, and bourgeois state. For these are basic. Whether this state takes on the form of absolute monarchy, limited monarchy, republic or Fascist dictatorship, is of secondary importance, for the form of government depends upon historical necessities. If the bourgeoisie can maintain control over society by the democratic republic it will do so. If, however, circumstances make a dictatorship necessary, it will drop the democratic republic from its civic concept and substitute for it the element of Fascist dictatorship. And it will attempt, as has already been partly done, to detach the spirit of patriotism from an allegiance to the republic and attach it to some form of Fascist dictatorship. Whether this dictatorship is established "legally" or by an "illegal" overthrow of the present government, whether it will possess a republican form or have a puppet monarch at its head, are merely questions of political necessity. Whether, however, it can develop and maintain sufficient allegiance among the rest of the population to transform such dictatorship into a stable and accepted form of government is, of course, a matter which the future will decide.

CHAPTER II

THE INDUSTRIAL PROLETARIAT

The bourgeoisie, as we have seen, originated the concept of civic training as a weapon in its struggle against the feudal nobility. While the bourgeoisie of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries emphasized the civic *rights* which it sought to wrest from the semi-feudal absolutist state, the emphasis has shifted to the civic *duties* which the middle and lower classes owe to the present bourgeois state. It is toward these classes, then, that most of the present civic training is directed, and particularly toward the industrial proletariat.

But by definition the industrial proletariat is the negation of the bourgeois concept of citizen, for the basis of the bourgeois civic concept is the right of owning private property as a source of income, and the proletariat by definition is propertyless. For the proletariat, then, this fundamental civic right is virtually meaningless. On the other hand, the existence of a propertyless class which must live by wages is a basic prerequisite for the existence of the bourgeoisie and our whole present industrial society. While thus an integral part of society, and as such possessing nominally the same civic rights and duties as the bourgeoisie, the economic status of the proletariat makes it impossible for it to exercise this right. This contradiction between his nominal and his actual status makes the workingman in reality a pseudo-citizen (*Scheinbürger*). The problem of civic training in regard to the industrial working class centers around the problem of attaching its loyalty to the existing state and society by other means than that of private property. The problem of developing civic loyalty is the problem, therefore, of assuring the proletariat an economic status which will make it satisfied with the existing state of affairs. This status depends principally upon its wages and the stability of its employment.

Besides the use of various measures to attach the industrial

proletariat to the existing state, it has been found increasingly necessary to combat the spread of the concept of social forms of property. The inability of the industrial proletariat to acquire its means of production necessarily has led to a rapid spread of the concept of socialized ownership of the means of production. This, of course, means the abolition of private property in the means of production and consequently the abolition of the capitalist régime. As a result, besides the positive methods used to attach the industrial proletariat to the state, the negative problem of combatting this demand for socialized property has become of increasing importance in the whole process of civic training.

Before 1871 the industrial proletariat was comparatively small in size, though with the growth of industry in the sixties it began to assume some importance. Nevertheless, from the point of view of this study this period is of special interest, for it was then that portions of the German working class first came under the influence of the principles of socialism.¹ The theory of socialism as laid down in the Communist Manifesto of 1848 showed the need for the creation of a new social order based upon the destruction of the bourgeois state and society. Furthermore, it appealed directly to the working class to wage the battle for this new society. It emphasized the antagonism of interests between industrial proletariat and bourgeoisie, and linked up the economic interests of the former with the struggle for the establishment of socialism on the ruins of the existing social order.

Two organizations of workingmen were formed: the one under the influence of Marx and Engels, who emphasized the revolutionary element; and the other under Lassalle, who was willing to carry on his struggles, at least partly, within the framework of the existing state. These organizations engaged in active propaganda with the result that they soon gained a definite foothold among some of the most active elements of the working class. After the unification of Germany, and especially after the crisis of 1873, the two socialist groups made rapid headway. In

¹ For the history of socialism see the standard work of Franz Mehring, *Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, 4 vols. (11th ed., 1921).

1875 they united to form the Social Democratic party, which grew more or less steadily until 1914, when it could claim the support of one-third of the entire population of Germany.

This period witnessed the growth of a powerful socialist movement which began as the avowed enemy of the state and ended by supporting this same state in the greatest of nationalist wars.¹ There are really two phases to the problem of fostering loyalty to the state among the proletariat. The one phase is the problem of preventing non-socialist workers from accepting the socialist philosophy; the second is how to destroy the anti-state elements of the socialist movement—in other words, how to turn it from a revolutionary into a reform movement. The first phase proved less successful than the second, for an increasing number of workers supported the socialists; but the socialists themselves were gradually drawn into an attachment to the German state. How was this accomplished?

As socialism began to grow during the seventies—a movement which not only theoretically opposed the existing state but which also declared its solidarity with the French Commune of 1871—Bismarck recognized the danger to the state of this movement and tried to destroy it. On the one hand, he attempted forcibly to suppress the Social Democratic party and the free trade-unions, which had been created by the former. At the same time he tried to create an allegiance to the existing régime by his various measures of social legislation.² While paternalism did not prevent the growth of socialism, it undoubtedly was an accessory factor in helping to prevent wavering groups of workers from supporting socialism, and it helped subtly to

¹ For the history of the German socialist labor unions see such standard works as Siegfried Nestriepke, *Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung*, 3 vols. (1919-23); Zweig, *Geschichte der deutschen Freien Gewerkschaften*; Theodor Cassau, *Die Gewerkschaftsbewegung, ihre Soziologie und ihr Kampf* (1926). The latter work, which takes up many problems, important from the point of view of this study, was written by a "left" Social Democrat. See also Jacob Reindl, *Die deutsche Gewerkschaftsbewegung. Koalitionsrecht und Koalitionen der Arbeiter seit der Reichsgewerbeordnung 1869* (1923).

² In a conversation with Dawson he formulated this policy as follows: "My idea was to bribe the working class, or shall I say, to win them over to regard the state as a social institution existing for their sake and interested in their welfare" (Dawson, *Modern Germany*, II, 349).

weaken the revolutionary element among those workers already supporting the Social Democratic party. It provided a point of economic and administrative contact between the proletariat and the state which had not existed before, and which in time was to be reflected in the ideological attitude of the latter toward the state.

Furthermore, the state tried to prevent economic conflicts between employers and employees, by arbitration arrangements, but these proved unpopular.

More effective than these governmental measures and proposals were the activities of the employers themselves. Although at first opposed to wage agreements between employers and employees, the former soon found that by peaceful settlements, as well as by wage agreements over a long period of time, they were able to carry on production more regularly and make plans for the future with greater certainty.

A more direct method for preventing the workers from falling under the control of the Social Democrats and the free trade-unions was the organization or support of such trade-unions as emphasized the basic national unity and common interest between employers and employees. The most important of these were the Christian trade-unions formed by the Catholic party.¹ Of importance also were those trade-unions organized by Hirsch-Duncker, the economic and social program of which was similar to that of the Christian trade-unions.²

When the problem of creating trade-unions had at first arisen among the socialists, fear had been expressed by many of them that these unions would center the interests of the workers around increase of wages and improvement of their economic

¹ See Müller, *Die Christliche Gewerkschaftsbewegung Deutschlands mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bergarbeiter- und Textilarbeiterorganisationen*; see also *25 Jahre christlicher Gewerkschaftsbewegung (1899-1924)*, published by the Christian trade-unions.

² See Gustav Hartmann, *Fünfzig Jahre deutsche Gewerkschaften (Hirsch-Duncker) 1868-1918* (1920). For "company unions" see Karl Vorwerck, *Die wirtschaftsfriedliche Arbeitnehmerbewegung Deutschlands in ihrem Werden und in ihrem Kampf um Anerkennung (1927)*; Opolant, *Die wirtschaftsfriedliche Arbeitnehmerbewegung Deutschlands; Werden, Wesen und Wollen der gelben Organisationen*.

conditions within the existing order and thus draw them from the great revolutionary struggle against the existing régime. But after the union of the two socialist groups into the Social Democratic party in 1875, it was definitely decided to support the growth of trade-unions to the fullest extent, and to use them as a training ground for socialism. Furthermore, the use of the strike as a means of improving conditions was to be supported on the ground that every struggle of the workers against the bourgeoisie was bound to strengthen their self-confidence and class consciousness. The suppression of the free trade-unions and the Social Democratic party in 1878 helped to keep alive this revolutionary concept within the trade-unions. Thus we find that the reorganization of the free trade-unions in 1890, when the anti-socialist laws expired, still showed a rather revolutionary concept of trade-unionism. It was only during the following decade that the character of these unions definitely changed, as they were able to obtain for themselves a certain portion of the profits arising from the expansion of German industry.¹

Within the free trade-unions this transformation showed itself in several ways. There was an increased tendency to make themselves, both in ideology and in policy, independent of the theoretically more radical Social Democratic party. The free trade-unions successfully opposed the tactics of calling strikes for revolutionary purposes. Furthermore, even strikes of a purely economic nature which brought into action large masses of workers came to be frowned upon.

Increasing attempts were also made to avoid strikes of individual unions by means of so-called wage agreements. These had been made as early as 1872 by the printers to cover a period of three years and had aroused tremendous opposition among the socialists. In this move they saw a form of class collaboration instead of class struggle, and they feared that such action on

¹ For an analysis of the forces and forms in which this took place see, among others, Maura Zarchi, *Die ökonomische Kausalität des Sozialpatriotismus*; Cassau, *op. cit.*; see also the introduction written by Paul Frölich to Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, III, 1-90 (1930).

the part of the workers would withdraw them from the revolutionary struggle and tie them up ideologically with the existing régime. Nevertheless, other trade unions followed suit. With the re-establishment of the free trade-unions in 1890 the policy of forming wage agreements was again adopted in face of the opposition of the Social Democratic party. By 1914 it had become a definite mode of procedure.

The consumers' co-operatives had been formed in the sixties as part of the general co-operative movement under the leadership of Huber, Pfeiffer, and Schultze-Delitzsch. While at first essentially middle class organizations, consumers' co-operatives consisting purely of workers were formed in the eighties in Saxony, partly because of the suppression of the Social Democratic party and the free trade-unions. At first affiliated with the Schultze-Delitzsch co-operatives, these workers' co-operatives were soon accused of socialist leanings and in 1902 ninety-eight of them were expelled from the central organization. During the following year they formed an organization of their own, called the Zentralverband deutscher Konsumvereine. They stood in close relationship with the free trade-unions, and in 1913 a common relief organization (Volksfürsorge) was founded. The Zentralverband grew rapidly, having at the outbreak of the war well over a million members. In addition to these, there were workers' co-operatives which had remained within the old Schultze-Delitzsch organization, the Allgemeiner Verband. The original purpose of founding workers' co-operatives had been to aid the proletariat in general in its economic struggle against the bourgeoisie, and in particular to help the trade unions during strikes. But under the influence of the general development characteristic of the rest of the labor movement they gradually turned into organizations which, by selling at lower prices to members, helped to increase their real wages and make them more satisfied with the existing conditions.

To sum up: in the decades prior to 1914 the objective conditions in German capitalism had permitted some of the more skilled and better organized portions of the working class to raise or at least maintain their economic status. The general

economic conditions were strong enough to counteract or revise the former revolutionary teachings of both the Social Democratic party and the free trade-unions.¹ Thus the socialist free trade-unions came more and more to resemble the non-socialist trade-unions which from the outset had accepted the existing social and economic order as the basis of their activities.²

The outbreak of the World War showed that "civic training" among the working class had been a success. The whole nation seemed united. All the workers' organizations gave their undivided support to the fatherland.³ But a small section of workers who had remained faithful to their revolutionary ideals began to resume their activities. In this they were aided by the objective conditions of the country, for as the war continued the economic condition of the working class went from bad to worse. In the trade-unions, the dissatisfaction of the working class was strongest and most clearly expressed among the metal workers organized in the free trade-unions. During the war the metal industry had become the key industry, and the morale of its workers was of great economic, political, and military significance. An "Opposition" within the German Metal Workers' union had begun to take shape rather early during the war period.⁴ Its aims were, however, not very clear. To a large extent the dissatisfaction with the war resulted merely in a kind of pacifism, that is, there was essentially an interest in ending the war without necessarily favoring a destruction of the exist-

¹ See chapter viii.

² It must not be overlooked that considerable portions of the working class, namely, the unskilled and unorganized elements, did not participate to any considerable extent in the economic prosperity brought about by the expansion of German industry and commerce. Though inarticulate on the whole, these elements became the basis for the left wing within the Social Democracy which was headed by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, the later founders of the Communist party.

³ Walter Kiegel, *Die soziale Hilfsarbeit der deutschen freien Gewerkschaften während des ersten Kriegsjahres* (1917); Paul Umbreit, *Die deutschen Gewerkschaften im Weltkriege* (1917); August Winnig, *Die deutschen Gewerkschaften im Kriege* (1917).

⁴ For the development of this "Opposition" see Richard Müller, *Vom Kaiserreich zur Republik, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der revolutionären Arbeiterbewegung* (1924); also Emil Barth, *Aus der Werkstatt der deutschen Revolution* (1919). Both authors were leading organizers of the "Opposition."

ing régime. The "Opposition" stood in close relationship with the Independent Socialists. Besides these there was the small active Spartacus group, which had close connections with the Bolsheviks from the very beginning and which carried on its activities under the slogan: "Turn the imperialist war into a civil war. For the establishment of a Dictatorship of the Proletariat." It wanted peace; not a peace between the various governments of Europe as they then existed, but a peace established by the working class after it had overthrown these governments. This group, although very small, was the only one which came out definitely for the overthrow of the existing régime. As such it was the predecessor of the present Communist party.

The "Opposition" staged a number of strikes during the war, most important of which was that of January, 1918. It embraced over a million workers throughout the country. The central strike committee in Berlin put forth a number of political demands, though these were not of a revolutionary nature. These strikes were, however, suppressed by the government with the aid of the Social Democratic and free trade-union leaders, and hundreds of the strikers were sent to the front. Besides this, the preparation and the initial successes of the Ludendorff offensive in the spring of 1918 had the effect of temporarily bolstering up the hopes for a victorious peace. Its ultimate failure and the consequent retreat of the German army under the continued attack of the Allied forces destroyed the last hope of victory. Economic, social, and political disintegration set in with full force even though all the state-supporting parties, from the Social Democrats to the extreme Nationalists, did everything possible to check it. The attempts of the Social Democratic leaders to counteract this disintegration went so far as to insist upon the maintenance of the monarchy even a few weeks before the revolution.

The leaders of the free trade-unions naturally supported them in their efforts to pacify the workers. In the fall of 1918, when the military debacle seemed imminent and the radicalization of the workers was growing at a rapid rate, the employers began to

fear the dangers of a revolution which would be not merely political but also social and economic. One of the leading German industrialists, Dr. Reichert, later on described this situation in the following terms:

Actually the situation was already clear in the first days of October. The problem was: How can industry be saved? Also how can the employers be saved from socialization which was threatening to sweep over all branches of economic life, from nationalization, and the coming revolution? Only the working class seemed to have a predominant influence. From this the conclusion was drawn: In view of this general uncertainty, in view of the decline of the power of the state and the government, the only strong allies for industry are to be found among the workers, that is, the trade unions.¹

In this situation it was obviously necessary to come to some kind of agreement with the trade-union leaders, especially those of the free trade-unions. And since these trade-union organizations were tied up with the existing régime, relatively little difficulty was found in forming labor agreements which granted the workers certain rights and at the same time served to make them an ally of the industrialists. The most important parts of these agreements were as follows: recognition by the employers of the trade-unions as the representatives of the workers, with the exception of the "yellow" trade-unions which were no longer to be supported by the employers; no attempts on the part of the employers to hinder the organization of the workers into trade-unions; the formation of wage agreements (*Tarifverträge*) in all industries; differences arising between employers and employees were not to lead to strikes or lockouts, but were to be settled by conciliation boards (*Schlichtungsinstanzen*), which were to be composed of an equal number of employers and employees; employment agencies were to be run jointly by employers and employees.²

Finally, despite the efforts of the leaders of the trade-unions and the Social Democrats, the revolution did come. In every city, town, and hamlet, as well as in the army, workers' and

¹ From a speech made in Essen, December 30, 1918, by Dr. Reichert, who was the secretary of the Society of German Iron and Steel Industrialists; quoted in Nestriepke, *op. cit.*, II, 46.

² C. Hoff, *Der Aufbau der Arbeitsgemeinschaft* (1920).

soldiers' councils were formed to take over the reins of the government. The revolutionary elements among the workers, namely, the Spartacists and the left wing of the Independent Socialists, sought to use these councils as organs for the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship similar to that of Soviet Russia. The Social Democrats, realizing on the one hand the potential dangers of such councils and on the other hand recognizing their great hold upon the popular imagination, soon managed to gain control of many of these councils and transform them into harmless adjuncts of the provisional government. In other words, the provisional government, consisting of Socialists and at first also of Independent Socialists, tried to take from the councils the political and administrative powers which they had seized and to transfer them to the provisional government whose administrative functions lay in the hands of the old administrative machine. Where the councils were in the hands of the Social Democrats or of middle-class elements, they succeeded. Where, however, the radical elements got control, the councils offered resistance and in a number of cases attempted to set up a proletarian dictatorship. These attempts were, however, suppressed by the provisional government with the aid of bourgeois and reactionary military forces.

Parallel with the attempt to suppress the efforts of the radical elements to establish a Soviet form of government, other attempts were made to quiet the workers by the introduction of various economic and social measures. The eight-hour day was proclaimed not only for all government officials but also for all industrial workers. Attempts were made to prevent strikes by officially accepting the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft* that had been agreed to between the employers' organizations and the various trade-union organizations. In fact, the government as well as the press of these trade-unions and of the Social Democratic party continually emphasized that with the establishment of the new government all strikes were against the interests of the workers and would only assist the counter-revolution. Again, the demobilization of the vast army was carried out in such a way as to avoid as much as possible the demobilization crisis typical of

every country, when within a short period of time millions of workers from the army had to be transferred back into an industrial world where there was no place for them.

Economic conditions not only remained bad but grew even worse, partly as a result of the continued blockade. At the same time the new government made no attempts to oust the capitalists and socialize at least the key industries. On the contrary, it attempted to suppress the workers' and soldiers' councils, the exponents and carriers of the revolution, and issued the call for a National Assembly which would include all the bourgeois elements of society, and, in fact, probably be controlled by them. The call for a National Assembly led to an outburst of political and economic strikes which demanded socialization of industry, and to actual revolutionary attempts to set up a proletarian dictatorship. A law permitting the socialization of key industries was passed. No attempts were, however, made to socialize any of the industries. Moreover, the demand of the workers for control of factories and mines led to the enactment of the well-known Works-Council Law (*Betriebsrätegesetz*). This law established works councils in each factory, to be elected by all the workers of that factory. But the only advantage of these councils over the compulsory works councils established during the war has lain in the power of the works councils to decide upon employment and discharge of workers. Even here their power has depended not so much upon their legal rights as upon the energy and aggressiveness of the workers.

The suppression of the various uprisings had robbed the revolutionary movement of many of its most important leaders, and suppressed its organizations. Moreover, the establishment of the works councils and the promise of socialization had led workers to hope that some form of socialism would eventually be the outcome of this whole development, not in Russia's violent way, but by peaceful means. With the signing of the peace treaty and the consequent ending of the blockade in 1919, food conditions began to improve and the gradual inflation of German money combined with other factors brought about an artificial prosperity.

The same period witnessed the strengthening of the economic and political power of the industrialists. This was evidenced among other things by the refusal of the employers to continue the *Arbeitsgemeinschaften* which they had accepted in 1918, when they had been on the defensive. By 1922 they had gained sufficient strength to abrogate them. The eight-hour day was successfully attacked in various branches of industry and in the government service.

But while the growing inflation had at first helped to revive production and increase employment, the cataclysmic rapidity which it soon reached brought disaster. The crisis reached its climax in October, 1923, when a government of Communists and left-wing Socialists was formed in Saxony. Although this was suppressed by government troops, the revolutionary spirit among sections of the working class remained widespread, as can be seen in the election returns of May, 1924, when the Communists increased their votes to over four million.

The stabilization of the currency during the winter of 1923-24 and the introduction of the Dawes Plan, together with the consequent rationalization of industry, ushered in the general economic crisis which continues down to the present. Real wages were very low in 1924 as compared with the pre-war level, while prices were high. Although the following years witnessed an increase in real wages, they did not reach pre-war levels. At the same time the rationalization of industry which set in with full force in the spring of 1924 and which has continued since then brought about the most severe and protracted unemployment crisis Germany has ever experienced. Unemployment increased cyclically until in January, 1932, it reached the staggering total of over six million workers.

Another factor helping to destroy the faith in the present régime has been the virtual abolition of the eight-hour day in many industries, especially since the eight-hour-day law had been considered one of the important achievements of the revolution of 1918. The speeding-up of labor, which has progressed steadily since 1924, as part of the program of rationalization, is also helping to strengthen this negative attitude toward the ex-

isting régime. The increasing severity and long duration of the post-war crisis, coupled with the hopeless prospects of improvement, have caused many workers to lose their faith in the ability of the present state to better conditions. This loss of faith in the existing régime is being transformed by the Communist party into a positive movement for the destruction of this régime and the erection of a proletarian dictatorship. This the Communists carry on in the free trade-unions where they have formed an "Opposition" including the unorganized elements of the working class. The existence of this force is an indication that within one section of the working class there is a definite break with the allegiance to the existing state, an allegiance which has been replaced by one to the international revolutionary working class and to Soviet Russia.

Within other sections of the working class this dissatisfaction has not yet reached such a point. Those groups of workers which follow the Fascisti are violently opposed to present conditions and to the present form of government, but hope to bring about a change, not by the abolition of the national bourgeois state, but by modifying its political form. The majority of organized workers are dissatisfied with their economic and social conditions, but this dissatisfaction has not yet become so strong as to bring about a definite ideological break with the existing régime. This is partly due to somewhat better economic conditions among certain sections of the organized workers, i.e., the labor aristocracy, and partly due to the many economic, social, political, and cultural influences emanating from the state, the bourgeoisie, the trade-union leaders, political parties, the church, the press, cultural organizations, sport organizations, etc., which are aiming to develop a spirit of civic and national loyalty among the working class.

Various ameliorative measures are still in effect in present-day Germany. The various forms of social insurance have been continued down to the present. As a result of the discontent arising out of the mass unemployment existing since 1924, unemployment doles were at first given by the government. This has been changed into an unemployment insurance which is in

operation at present. As a result of rigid government economy, national unemployment insurance and other forms of unemployment relief have been considerably reduced. This has had the effect of further weakening the allegiance of the proletariat to the existing state.

Besides these measures, the general policy of the bourgeoisie, the state, and the various trade-union leaders of preventing any interruption of or interference with economic life by strikes continues stronger than ever. The outbreak of any strike under the conditions existing since 1914 has always meant a strengthening of the revolutionary forces among the working class. The various methods used, such as wage agreements, have already been discussed. Since stabilization, compulsory arbitration of labor disputes has been introduced.¹ In a number of cases the opposition against the decision of the arbitration committees has been so great that it has led to the outbreak of so-called "illegal" strikes among the rank and file, directed not only against these decisions, but also against their own trade-union leaders.

Thus a whole network of institutions and legal enactments has gradually grown up in Germany to counteract the negative economic tendencies which are much stronger now than they ever were in pre-war days. How successful it will be in the future depends basically upon whether the existing order can lead the workers out of their present misery. Mere economic dissatisfaction, as has been pointed out before, does not necessarily mean the existence of an anti-state or even anti-bourgeois mentality; but in the Germany of the post-war period the whole economic and political situation is so tense that every economic crisis shows a definite strengthening of the revolutionary forces opposed to the existing régime. Mere quantitative increase of the already existing dissatisfaction with economic conditions is sufficient to bring about a qualitative change in the mentality

¹ A whole network of labor courts has gradually been established for the purpose of settling all kinds of labor disputes. See among others Jahdesohn und Pottoff, *Rechtsprechung des Arbeitsrechts 1924-1925*; E. Milsbach, *Deutsches Arbeitsrecht*; W. Silberschmidt, *Das deutsche Arbeitsrecht* (1923); Walter Kaskel, *Das neue Arbeitsrecht* (1920).

of many workers, a qualitative change which is expressed in the further weakening of the already none too strong national sentiments and the strengthening of the already existing revolutionary spirit, so that the latter becomes a predominating and decisive force. These reactions reveal themselves in a general way by an increase or decrease of the influence of the Communists and to a certain extent of the Fascists.

CHAPTER III

THE MIDDLE CLASSES (MITTELSTAND)

Wedged in between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are various strata of society which can be called collectively the middle classes or the petty bourgeoisie. They consist of strata ranging from the upper layers of the proletariat to the lower layers of the bourgeoisie and include the greater part of the local, state, and federal officials. As such they are useful in making less evident the antagonisms between proletariat and bourgeoisie.

The middle classes form a series of social and economic strata to which new layers of a different character have been added by the industrial revolution. We may classify them as follows:

A. The "old" middle classes

1. Artisans or craftsmen
2. Small business people and shopkeepers
3. Property owners in town and country (the peasantry is treated separately in chap. vii)
4. Independent professional people
5. *Rentiers* and pensioned people

B. The "new" middle classes

1. Non-independent professional people
2. National, state, and local officials
3. Office and clerical workers of all kinds
4. Foreman and better-paid workers (the labor aristocracy)
5. *Rentiers* and pensioned people.

The members of the first group enjoy a certain external economic independence which the members of the second group do not possess; at bottom the latter are nothing more than employees and better-paid workers. The old middle classes reflect the old society based upon small-scale production and local economic life; the new groups are in essence the products of modern large-scale industrial development.

The craftsmen form the kernel of the "old" middle class of the

towns and were once organized in powerful guilds. They possess a seeming independence in production which distinguishes them from the industrial proletariat, although they are economically sometimes worse off than the latter. They have certain interests in common with big business—cheap credits, cheap raw materials, abundant markets, high prices, low wages, etc. Through these interests they come into conflict with the industrial proletariat and regard themselves as one with the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, their chief interest lies not in the accumulation of large masses of capital and in a feverish enlargement of their business, but in the effort to maintain as far as possible their economic self-sufficiency. This, however, brings them into conflict with big business, which has the tendency to ruin these craftsmen through the competition of mass production. The struggle of the crafts for economic independence expresses itself, therefore, in the attempt to maintain their old conditions of economic existence intact, thereby insuring themselves a position in society between the upper and the lower classes.

The economic and social position of the small shopkeeper is similar to that of the craftsman. He too strives for a position of economic security in a world which is making this increasingly difficult. The professional elements of the old type—many lawyers, doctors, dentists—conduct their practice on an individual basis. Their education gives them a prestige above that of the rest of the middle classes.

The house owners form another important group of the middle classes. Unlike the groups already mentioned, they do not carry on productive activities but live essentially on income derived from ownership of property. In Germany the ownership of town real estate is not concentrated in the hands of big corporations. For the most part, people with a comparatively small amount of capital have bought houses with the aid of a highly developed system of real estate credits and are content with a comparatively small return.¹ They are consequently ranked among the middle classes rather than among the bourgeoisie.

The *Rentiers*, who before the war formed a fairly important

¹ *Mittelstandsjahrbuch*, 1927.

element, live likewise on income from ownership. Here, too, the size of their income, together with their social position, places them among the middle classes rather than among the bourgeoisie.

The so-called "new" middle classes do not possess even the appearance of an economic independence. Of these the most numerous are the clerical workers of all types. During the last decade their rate of growth has been considerably more rapid than that of the industrial proletariat. These employees differ from the proletariat in a number of ways. They usually come from the families of the middle classes both "old" and "new" and from the better-paid working-class families which have been able to give their children a somewhat better education. Moreover, as a "white collar" group they lead a life socially superior to, and distinct from, that of the manual laborers. As members of the middle classes they feel that they have a better chance of social and economic advancement. They do not feel the social distinction between themselves and their employees as keenly as do the workers, and show, on the whole, greater loyalty to them. Before the war their economic position was often better than that of the working class. Since the war the "proletarization" of the middle classes has gone forward at a rapid pace, with the result that the great mass of them have sunk to the same, if not to a lower, economic level.

The abolition of guild restrictions on production in Germany during the Napoleonic era had dealt a severe blow to handicraft.¹ The period of reaction brought no change in this respect, and the crafts had a share in the Revolution of 1848. On July 15 the "General Congress of Craftsmen" (Allgemeiner Handwerker- und Gewerbekongress) met at Frankfurt am Main. Among their demands was a proposal to lay a heavy tax on machinery.

After the failure of the revolution the Prussian ministry in order to mollify the craftsmen called upon them to send dele-

¹ For the history of the artisans see among others the following: I. Goldschmidt, *Die deutsche Handwerkerbewegung bis zum Sieg der Gewerbefreiheit* (1916); Bernhard Lehnert, *Das deutsche Handwerk in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (1926); Gümpel, *Die Entwicklung der deutschen Handwerkerorganisationen seit der Mitte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*.

gates to a conference. This resulted in the Ordinance of November 9, 1849, on the Reform of the Crafts, which embodied many of their demands.¹ Although these regulations were ineffective, the artisans, because of the general economic prosperity, became friendly to the state in the decades following the revolutionary debacle of 1848-49.

The rapid rise of large-scale production in Germany after 1871 tended to hasten the disintegration of the "old" middle classes. In order to hinder the rapidly increasing disintegration of German society into two classes, the government attempted to aid the artisans by a partial restoration of the guild system. On the basis of the Ordinance of 1869 the guilds had been allowed to exist merely as private organizations. As a result they had developed only slowly.² This situation, however, changed when, under the pressure of the various organizations of the artisans, reform measures were passed in 1881. The guilds were again transformed into "corporations of public law" (*öffentlich-rechtliche Körperschaften*). They were given certain judicial rights; they were allowed to form guild arbitration courts; they were also permitted the establishment of a whole system of guild organizations. Finally, they were given certain rights to pass binding regulations concerning the system of apprenticeship. Three years later certain types of employers who were not members of the guild were not allowed to employ apprentices. New regulations of 1887 further increased the powers of the guilds.

Later, membership in a guild was made compulsory for all independent artisans if the majority of members of a certain trade in any locality voted in favor of such compulsion. This still holds true. At the same time, chambers of artisans were formed, based upon the guilds, similar in nature to the chambers of commerce, chambers of agriculture, etc.

Other attempts were made to strengthen the economic position of the artisans. Of importance was the establishment of co-

¹ See Hugo Wendel, *The Evolution of Industrial Freedom in Prussia, 1845-1849* (1918).

² Werner Sombart, *Gewerbewesen*, 2 vols. (1929).

operatives for artisans.¹ The father of these co-operatives was Schulze-Delitzsch, who had been active along this line since 1849. When Schulze-Delitzsch died in 1883, the General Federation of Co-operatives embraced 3,688 member co-operatives. The total individual membership was about 1,200,000, the business capital 650,000,000 marks, while total business transactions amounted to over 2,000,000,000 marks.²

Up to then the state had given no direct assistance to these co-operatives. In 1898 the Prussian government organized the Central Co-operative Bank, which was to furnish the co-operatives with cheap credit. But the leaders of the General Federation, which had remained faithful to the general principles of Schulze-Delitzsch, namely, self-aid without government assistance, refused to co-operate with this Prussian bank. Many of the artisans, especially the poorer ones, who were in great need of cheap credit, were, however, willing to accept this state aid and they broke away from their old organization and formed a new "Central Federation of German Crafts Co-operatives" (Hauptverband deutscher Gewerklicher Genossenschaften).³ The Prussian Co-operative Bank, furthermore, strengthened its position by inducing many of the artisans chambers to acquire membership in the bank.⁴

By these various means both the artisans and the government succeeded in retarding the disintegration of the handicrafts. Although the measures were not always of avail, the number of artisans did not seriously decline during the period from 1871 to 1914. For while industry on the one hand destroyed many of the handicrafts, on the other hand it opened many new fields of activity in which small-scale production could exist as a successful accessory. Furthermore, the personal supervision and training offered by master craftsmen enabled them to secure apprentices who, upon completion of their train-

¹ See Robert Deumer, *Das deutsche Genossenschaftswesen*.

² Ernst Grünfeld, "Das Genossenschaftswesen des städtischen Mittelstandes" (in *Die deutsche Wirtschaft und ihre Führer* [1925], Vol. VIII, 181 ff.).

³ Wilhelm Kulemann, *Die Genossenschaftsbewegung*, 2 vols. (1922-25).

⁴ See, in general, Hugenberg, *Bank- und Kreditwirtschaft des deutschen Mittelstandes*.

ing, could receive employment as skilled workers in large-scale production. In general, we may say that all of these factors tended to create a feeling of economic satisfaction and thus to form the basis for an allegiance to the existing social order as well as to the existing state. In spite of all this, the economic independence of the artisan was disappearing, and he was being drawn into the control of commercial capital.¹

The small merchant and shopkeeper did not fare quite so badly during this period, for concentration in retail trade had not progressed so rapidly as in industry.² Nevertheless, various large department stores arose which were a continual source of anxiety to the small shopkeeper. Chain stores, however, were of very little significance. It was against the department stores that most of the activities of the small shopkeepers were directed. As a result, most of the state governments of Germany introduced a tax on department stores, while a federal law of June 7, 1909, gave the government power to regulate certain of their business activities. The independence of the small shopkeepers was, however, threatened more seriously by their dependence upon the wholesale merchant, and thus, like the artisans, they were being brought under the influence and control of commercial capital. The retail merchants tried to counteract this by the formation of co-operatives which, however, did not prove very effective.

The position of the house owners was less endangered than that of the artisans and shopkeepers.³ Since most houses carried mortgages, however, the owners became dependent upon bank capital. Most house owners belonged to real estate societies which were united into a Central Federation of Urban House- and Landowners Societies of Germany (Zentralverband der städtischen Haus- und Grundbesitzervereine Deutschlands).

¹ See Alfred Striemer, *Zum Kampfe um die wirtschaftliche Selbständigkeit der Klein- und Mittelbetriebe* (1914).

² See Johannes Wernicke, *Warenhaus, Industrie und Mittelstand* (1911); also Biermer, *Die Mittelstandsbewegung und das Warenhaus*.

³ See Alfred Baron, *Der Haus- und Grundbesitzer in Preussens Städten einst und jetzt* (1911).

House owners were also organized in a Protective Society for Landownership and Real Estate Credit (Schutzverband für Grundbesitz und Realkredit).

While the economic position of the professional elements showed no downward trend, the changing conditions of production served to undermine their independence and to render them more dependent upon the state or upon big business.

The middle classes felt themselves the most patriotic elements of society. And quite logically, for any change in the social and economic system would have weakened or destroyed their somewhat privileged position in society much more easily than that of the bourgeoisie. They felt themselves a special group, a "classless" group, which had the advantage of having a social, and sometimes economic, position superior to that of the common workers. An influence working in this direction was the fact that the middle classes, especially the "old" middle classes perpetuated themselves, drawing new elements only to a slight extent from the lower classes. It was extremely difficult for a factory worker to elevate himself into this group. They were in the good graces of the ruling classes and they came to regard themselves as the chief defenders of German *Kultur*, not only against the envy of other nations, but also against the increasing power of the "unpatriotic" international socialist elements of the working class. This feeling of being a specially privileged group above the mass of the population, with a special mission to fulfil, was the basis for the powerful and even violent patriotism of the middle classes.

The war period, with victory always lurking just around the corner, intensified their patriotism. Their relationship to the state, both in regard to economic dependence and organizational contacts, became closer. The co-operatives and the various artisans' organizations became semi-official bodies, obtaining contracts for the furnishing of war supplies. The possibility of defeat never entered their minds, for their faith in Germany's future seemed unshakable, and was strengthened by every new German victory.

This illusion was rudely shattered by the disastrous end of the

war and the outbreak of the revolution. Great portions of the middle classes were dazed. The whole economic, political, and social system, as well as the achievements of German *Kultur*, seemed to have broken down with a tremendous crash.

The new government tried to gain at least the passive support of the middle classes.¹ It did nothing to disturb the economic basis of the middle-class existence. On the contrary, it guaranteed the rights of private property, the basis for the existence of the old middle classes, and supported the whole system of middle-class economic organizations that had come down through the war. It tried furthermore to get the middle-class elements to support the National Assembly against the attempts of workers to erect a Soviet dictatorship. In this it was on the whole successful. Among the "new" middle classes, the bureaucracy tolerated the new government because it continued paying salaries to the officials just as the old monarchical government had done. Such contacts as had already existed between the clerical and the industrial workers became closer. Trade-unions among both officials and clerical workers increased at a rapid pace and became affiliated with either the Socialist, the Christian, or the Hirsch-Duncker (Democratic) trade-unions, thus providing additional support for the new government.

But inflation played havoc with the "old" middle classes. The *Rentiers*, as well as the pensioners, who depended upon a small fixed income, were practically wiped out. Rents were held almost at their pre-war figures by regulation, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that the house owners managed to exist through the period of inflation, often depending upon some form of employment to make a living. Because of the continuing inflation, shopkeepers were unable to replenish their stock with the depreciated paper money which they received from their customers. Artisans likewise were often forced to pay more for the new raw materials than they had received for their finished products. Furthermore, the whole system of middle-class co-operatives, which had been built up so laboriously during the Empire, lost its effectiveness. The "new" middle classes, that

¹ See Thomas, *Was bringt die sozialistische Republik dem Handwerker?*

is, the non-independent layers of the middle classes, suffered less, for, like the workers, their nominal salaries were increased with the decline of the value of the mark.

Thus a great part of the "old" middle classes was disintegrated, if not entirely destroyed as a middle class, by the inflation period.¹ This naturally brought them into violent conflict with the government, which they claimed was sacrificing the middle classes for the benefit of the workers. As pointed out in the previous chapter, inflation had produced an artificial prosperity in German industry which had succeeded in clearing the workers off the streets and drawing them into the factories, thus checking the growing radicalism among the workers. The government was willing to sacrifice the unorganized and less powerful middle classes in order to bring about a spirit of passivity among the workers. Whether this was done purposely or not is unimportant from the point of view of our problem. What is important is that the inflation did have this effect. This explains the very strong hatred of the government on the part of the middle classes, which in the elections of May, 1924, began to support the Fascists.

Not until the inflation was halted by stabilization were the middle classes able to take stock of their position. At the end of 1924, they found themselves with only about 10 per cent of their pre-war capital.² On the other hand, the new stabilized currency became the basis for a partial recuperation of the "old" middle classes. In the meantime a reorganization of the co-operatives has given them a more exclusively middle-class character. The whole system of guilds and artisans' organizations built up before 1914 and growing in power during the war has continued to maintain itself. Together with the National Association of Co-operatives they have been united into a central federation called the National Association of German Crafts (Reichsverband des deutschen Handwerks). Even more than the crafts, the house owners, who suffered considerably

¹ See *Die Vereinigung des Mittelstandes*, herausgegeben vom Bayerischen Statistischen Landesamt; also Heinrich Beythien, *Die Lage des gewerblichen Mittelstandes* (1922).

² Ernst Grünfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

during the war and the post-war inflation, were benefited by the stabilized currency. The rents, which had been held to absurdly low levels during inflation, have gradually been raised by government permission until they have passed pre-war levels.

But even though the "old" middle classes gained a temporary respite, the growing severity of the present crisis has jeopardized their economic status more than ever before. The various strata of the "old" middle classes are coming to depend increasingly upon commercial and bank capital, a process against which they seem to be struggling hopelessly.

With the "new" middle classes this economic dependence upon capital or the state is complete; they are merely salaried employees. As such, they are suffering from the crisis just as are the industrial workers. But since their organizations are weaker, they are even less able than the workers to offer resistance. They rebel not merely against their loss in social prestige but also against what has been called their progressive "proletarization." Their faith in the existing parliamentary government has been rapidly declining. They refuse, however, to accept social equality with the workers as the basis of their common liberation, but insist on regaining their social superiority.

And so the majority of both old and new middle classes have turned not to the Communists but to the Fascists, who propose to lead them out of their "Republican Captivity" back into the promised land of Canaan, where they will regain their lost privileges and position. For the National Socialist Labor party (the Fascists) promises them a new world, a world without international socialism, without labor supremacy, and without Jews.¹

The superheated nationalism of the Fascist movement is largely an ideological compensation in nationalist terms for this "proletarization." To what extent this rebellion against their economic and social status will remain within the limits of the existing national form, and to what extent their increasingly proletarian status will lead them to proletarian rebellion in the future will decide.

¹ For further details concerning the relationship of the middle classes to the Fascists see chapter viii.

CHAPTER IV

THE LANDED ARISTOCRACY

Large estates, most of which belong to the aristocracy, embrace over 20 per cent of the arable land of Germany, rising to as high as 40 per cent in the region east of the Elbe.¹ The amount owned by the nobility is actually larger, since many of the large estates lease some of their land in small portions to neighboring peasants.²

Historically, the landed aristocracy represents an element which has been carried over from the feudal period and, as such, has been a social, economic, and political force of society against which the fight for civic ideals has been directed by the bourgeoisie. Feudalism knew no citizens; it knew only lords and serfs, rulers and subjects. And it was this economic and social system against which the bourgeoisie struggled and which it tried to replace by a bourgeois form of society. Consequently, since the rise of the bourgeoisie the feudal landed aristocracy has carried on a continuous intensive struggle against the whole system of bourgeois economy, as well as against the "civic" (*staatsbürgerlich*) concepts attached to it.

¹ The following table, based on the findings published in the *Statistisches Jahrbuch des Deutschen Reiches*, gives a picture of the distribution of land in Germany 1925:

Classification of Holding	No. of Acres in Holdings	No. of Holdings	Percentage of Total Number	Percentage of Total Area
Diminutive (Parzellenbauer).....	1½-5	8,027,481	59.4	6.2
Small (Kleinbauer).....	5-12½	894,454	17.6	11.4
Medium (Mittelbauer).....	12½-50	956,155	18.7	35.8
Large (Grossbauer).....	50-250	199,825	3.9	26.4
Landed estates (Gutsbesitzer).....	over 250	18,668	0.4	20.2

The inequality of ownership is actually somewhat greater, since the table is based on the number of peasant holdings irrespective of ownership. 12.4% of the land is rented either as small parcels or as complete holdings. Most of it is rented by peasants from the owners of large estates.

² Walter Schiff, "Die Agrargesetzgebung der europäischen Staaten vor und nach dem Kriege" (in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialforschung*, Vol. LIV [1925]).

But just as the bourgeoisie made use of the absolute state to further its interests, so the landed aristocracy, once absolutism was established, made use of the same state to defend its own economic, social, and political position. During this whole period the attachment of the aristocracy to the state was due to a large extent to the feudal or rather "feudaloid" elements of the state which allowed the landed aristocracy to retain many of its feudal pre-capitalistic privileges. This attachment of the aristocracy to the state was therefore of a non-civic character; its relationship to the state was that of a feudal ruling class for whom the state was a means of exercising its power over the rest of the population.

In addition to this the feudal soul of the landed aristocracy became infected by the spirit of capitalism. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries represent the gradual transformation of feudal agrarian production into agrarian capitalism, a process which had already begun before that time and which has not yet quite reached its conclusion. The landed aristocrat began to become a "citizen," at least in his economic status; that is, he became an integral part of capitalist economy. As such he naturally developed "civic" concepts. Thus during this whole period, down into the twentieth century, the position as well as the psychological attitude of the landed aristocracy has contained two conflicting elements, the feudal anti-civic and the bourgeois pro-civic.

However, both elements contained within them the pro-state attitude of a ruling class. Before 1870, when the bourgeoisie was still the weaker element, the aristocracy was the ruling class in the absolute or semi-absolute state. After 1870, with the growth of industrial capitalism, as well as with the more thorough capitalistic exploitation of its estates, it became a co-ruling class with the urban bourgeoisie. This is the position which it has maintained down to the present, even though it has been gradually shorn of many of its social and political privileges since 1918.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the relationship between state and aristocracy was naturally close and in-

timate. During this period the nobility, especially of Eastern Germany, was steadily extending its landholdings at the expense of the peasantry, which was reduced to a serflike, or semi-serflike condition.¹ In spite of this growing exploitation of the peasantry, however, the nobles were falling more and more into indebtedness. This was due partly to the desire of the German nobles to imitate the luxurious court and home life of their wealthier brethren in France. By the time of Frederick the Great, many of the nobles had become so hard-pressed that they sought to sell some of their land.

It was in order to meet this situation, which had been much aggravated by war and invasion during his reign, that Frederick the Great introduced the so-called "Landschaften."² All of the estates of the nobility in a given district were combined into a kind of credit co-operative and pledged collectively for debts contracted by the co-operative. In this way the credit of each individual estate was increased. At the same time, the sale of portions of landed estates for the purpose of payment of debts was forbidden, a step which prevented the breaking-up of the large estates. The acquisition of new land was, however, permitted.

Closely related to this were the "Fideikommisse." These consisted of certain estates, especially of the upper nobility, which were bequeathed in entail, being legally protected in such a way that they could never be sold. Various attempts were made to abolish them by the bourgeoisie during the nineteenth century, but they have continued and grown in number and size down to the present.³

These measures obviously consolidated the landed aristocracy against any attempts of the bourgeoisie to undermine their economic position, and enabled them to present a united economic front against the bourgeois interpenetration of the

¹ Gustav Aubin, *Zur Geschichte des gutsherrlich-bäuerlichen Verhältnisses in Ostpreussen von der Gründung des Ordensstaates bis zur Steinischen Reform* (1910).

² See the interesting study of M. Tcherkinsky, *Les Landschaften et leurs opérations de crédit hypothécaire en Allemagne 1770-1920* (1922).

³ Willy Wygodzinski, *Agrarwesen und Agrarpolitik* (1920), I, 80; see also the article on "Fideikommisse" in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*.

ranks of the nobility by the acquisition of landed estates. Thus, with the aid of the state, the aristocracy of Prussia strengthened its economic position. Indeed, it secured a much firmer economic position than the nobility of Western or Southern Germany, and was thus able to maintain its estates intact in the transformation from feudal to bourgeois economy. This was, of course, not foreseen by the Prussian monarchy. From its point of view it was essential to maintain the semi-feudal aristocracy as a military and economic bulwark for a semi-feudal state; for the bourgeoisie of Prussia was as yet far too undeveloped to serve as the main basis for the monarchy.

The impact of the French Revolution and the conquests of Napoleon naturally affected the whole position of the landed aristocracy of Germany, for wherever Napoleon spread his conquests the serfs were changed into a class of free peasants. The more direct and more intense influence of the French Revolution, together with the more advanced state of economic life in Southern and Western Germany generally, led to the subdivision of the estates among the peasants in return for money payments. In Eastern Prussia, because of the absence of these factors, the liberation of the peasants really resulted in strengthening the position of the aristocracy. True, the peasants had been liberated by the edicts of 1808 and 1811. But the opposition and the power of the nobility in Prussia was so strong that it forced the government to appoint a commission of nobles to "revise" these edicts. The nobles thus managed to hold the entire subject in abeyance until the overthrow of Napoleon and the triumph of reaction. Then only did the Commission issue the final edict of 1816, which transformed the liberation of the peasantry into a measure for strengthening the position of the aristocracy.

The Edict of 1816 on the Liberation of the Peasantry (the so-called *Bauernbefreiung*) confirmed for all peasants the status of free citizens granted in 1808 and 1811. Only those peasants, however, who possessed land above a certain area could retain a portion of their land; but for this they were required to make payments in money or kind covering a long period of years. The

other former serfs were deprived of all landholdings by the aristocracy and thus came to constitute a new class—the landless agricultural proletariat.¹ Over 2,500,000 acres of land were obtained by the landed aristocracy of Prussia as the result of the Bauernbefreiung.² At the same time the aristocracy absorbed many of the common lands still in existence. As a result of this transformation, the aristocracy was able to carry on large-scale production on a capitalist basis by means of free wage labor. These new conditions of production gradually inculcated in the landed aristocracy a capitalist point of view, which, in the course of a century, was to change their attitude toward the bourgeoisie and toward the bourgeois concept of the state.

This transformation from a feudal form of production to that of agrarian capitalism was hastened by the rapid growth of foreign and domestic markets. More peasant lands were absorbed into the capitalist economy of large estates. In this the nobles were aided by a system of credits, partly state, partly private. According to an estimate of the well-known economist, Sering, the large estates of Prussia bought up about 1,600,000 acres of land during the period 1816-59.

During this period a rapid improvement in agricultural technology took place.³ As early as the previous century the subject "Agriculture" had been introduced at most German universities, but it had been designed principally for training administrators of farms owned by the state. The first agricultural college, the Royal Academic School for Agriculture (Königliche Akademische Lehranstalt) was founded in Prussia in 1806 by Albrecht Thaer for the purpose of training agronomists for private estates. Closely related to the spread of instruction in agronomy was the growth of agricultural societies, which

¹ See Karl Grünberg, *Die Bauernbefreiung*, 2 vols (1893-94); Georg Knapp, *Die Bauernbefreiung und der Ursprung der Landarbeiter* (1887); Johannes Ziekursch, *Hundert Jahre schlesische Agrargeschichte. Vom Hubertusfrieden bis zum Abschluss der Bauernbefreiung* (1915).

² Schiff, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

³ Joseph Rybark, *Die Steigerung der Produktivität der deutschen Landwirtschaft im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (1905).

sought to improve production. The first of these had been formed in 1762 in Thuringia, to be followed soon after by similar groups in other states.

As already pointed out, the freeing of the peasantry provided an agricultural proletariat which depended for its existence upon working on the large estates. Besides this, many of the smaller peasants living near the estates could be drawn in as additional labor. To insure the labor supply, the aristocracy found two measures of great assistance. The first was the Servants' Ordinance (Gesindeordnung) of 1810, which remained in force until 1918, binding the agricultural workers on the estate by yearly contracts. The landowner, however, was practically free to break them. Another law of April 4, 1854, prohibited workers from striking. Labor organizations were declared illegal. Finally, the institution of manorial local governments (Gutsbezirke), which had continued from the previous century, gave the owner of the estate various forms of administrative control over the inhabitants of the district in which his estate lay.

Thus we see that during this period the nobility not merely had at its disposal a free¹ laboring class for whose welfare it was not responsible but retained semi-feudal control of this labor force, which remained subservient in actual position and in psychological attitude. We have thus a semi-feudal landed aristocracy free from foreign wars and invasions, developing under peaceful conditions into a class of agricultural capitalists and possessing control of the government, a control which made these historic conditions possible.

The Revolution of 1848 showed that while the aristocracy controlled the government, and continued to control it, it was forced in Prussia to make concessions to the bourgeoisie. Loath to lose or to weaken the old governmental machine which expressed their interests, the nobles showed little interest in the growing cry for German unification. From the economic point of view the Prussian nobility had no special interest in political unification, since its economic bonds with the rest of the country

¹ Free, i.e., not only because they were "free" citizens, but because they had been "freed" from their lands.

were not very strong. Such common economic interests as existed were being guarded by the Zollverein. Nevertheless, it came to accept the unification, especially in view of the increased prestige accruing to Prussia as the leader of Germany. This was the more easily done as the early seventies saw German agriculture, the basis of the landed aristocracy, driven into the defensive, and forced to turn to the state for protection. Food-stuffs from America and from Russia offered keen price competition on the German market.¹ This drove the nobles to realize that their economic prosperity from now on depended upon the erection of an artificial economic barrier around Germany, a task impossible without the aid of the bourgeoisie. This situation, continuing down to the present, has served as one of the factors in keeping the nobility tied up with a state in which the bourgeois influence was steadily increasing. Besides, this same state was not merely interested in maintaining the prosperity of German agriculture, but also in maintaining agricultural self-sufficiency as a military measure.²

The rapid growth of industry in Germany accentuated the flight of the agricultural workers to the cities. In order to satisfy the complaint of the agrarians of scarcity of labor (at the prevailing low wages), the government allowed the seasonal immigration of agricultural laborers from Poland. By 1914 about half a million workers were thus employed. Moreover, in 1891 the Conservatives (the agrarians) introduced a bill in the Prussian diet which was passed and by which the Prussian government gave additional aid to the agrarians in securing sufficient cheap agricultural laborers.³

¹ For a short sketch of tariff developments written from the agrarian point of view, see Gerber, *Deutschlands Zoll- und Handelspolitik seit Einleitung der Zoll- und Handelspolitik durch Bismarck im Jahre 1879*.

² Karl Marchionini, *Geschichte der Landwirtschaft* (1925), pp. 126-27. Incidentally the peasants also benefited from these governmental measures, and they were an important economic factor in tying up certain layers of the peasantry with both the agrarians and the government. See also Fritz Beckmann, *Einfuhscheinssysteme. Kritische Betrachtung mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Getreideeinfuhscheine*; Max Schippel, *Die deutsche Zuckerindustrie und ihre Subventionierten*.

³ For details see William Harbutt Dawson, *The Evolution of Modern Germany* (1918), pp. 281-82.

While the aristocracy was receiving many benefits at the hands of the government, the steady growth of industry strengthened the bourgeoisie and led the latter to attack the economic privileges of the aristocracy. Thus the fall of Bismarck brought the appointment of Caprivi, who, with the aid of the National Liberal party, concluded a number of commercial treaties and put through the tariff of 1892, which favored industry at the expense of agriculture. So incensed were the agrarians at this neglect of their interests that the League of Agrarians (Bund der Landwirte) was formed in 1893. Under the influence of this concerted action, the government of Prussia in 1894 began to establish a whole series of chambers of agriculture, a measure which was followed by most of the other German states. These chambers of agriculture were constituted as semi-official bodies to work in conjunction with the already existing Landes-Ökonomie-Kollegium and were given a wide range of powers for the purpose of aiding agriculture.¹

Largely through the effort of the Agrarian League, the tariff of 1902 was passed, which raised the rates on agricultural produce. Thus the economic and political equilibrium between bourgeoisie and landed aristocracy was felt to be restored, and the privileges of both classes were considered safeguarded. The establishment of this equilibrium was also necessary in view of the rapid growth of socialism.²

This closer association of bourgeoisie and aristocracy was, however, merely the expression of an interrelationship which had been growing since 1870 and which has continued down to the present. From the agricultural crisis of the seventies on, the German aristocracy found it less profitable to invest its surplus in the acquisition of additional peasant lands than to invest it in industry, commerce, and banking. This closer eco-

¹ See Wittig, *Die Landwirtschaftskammern nach dem Gesetz vom 30. Juni 1894* (1895); Obery, *Über die Organisation und Zuständigkeit der Preussischen Landwirtschaftskammern*.

² For various aspects of the agrarian problem in pre-war Germany see Bund der Landwirte, *Agrarisches Handbuch* (several editions); Gothein, *Agrarpolitisches Handbuch* (from the liberal point of view); Curt Bürger, *Die Agrardemagogie* (1911). The latter volume, a violent attack on the agrarians, contains many interesting quotations.

nomic relationship between bourgeoisie and nobility was also furthered by the acquisition of large estates by some of the members of the bourgeoisie, who thereby hoped to be raised into the aristocracy by the Kaiser.¹ These social ambitions of the bourgeoisie were also expressed by the increasing intermarriage of some of the nobility with daughters of wealthy businessmen.

A more potent factor in bringing the classes together was the economic needs of the large estates as capitalistic enterprises. Credits and mortgages, so necessary for the carrying on of agricultural production, were naturally furnished by banking interests, which gained a growing control over the economic fate of the landed aristocracy.² These forces, bringing the landed aristocracy into the system of bourgeois economy, developed among it a more bourgeois concept of the state and an increasing readiness to further the civic training expounded by the bourgeoisie. These changes did not, however, destroy its feeling of aristocratic superiority, or its insistence on the maintenance of social and political privileges.

The agrarians had special interests in the war of 1914. They desired the defeat of Russia as one of their greatest agricultural competitors. Furthermore, they hoped through annexation or control of parts of Poland and the Baltic states to strengthen their position as agricultural producers, to increase their ability to meet foreign competition, and to strengthen their position at home in regard to the bourgeoisie. In addition, of course, the nobility had control of the army, and therefore, the retention and increase of their political power and prestige depended upon the successful conclusion of the war. During the war the economic position of the agrarians was, on the whole, good. Although the tariff on agricultural goods was suspended, the ab-

¹ This process had already gained considerable proportions in the period before 1870, as is pointed out in Erich Jordan, *Die Entstehung der konservativen Partei und die preussischen Agrarverhältnisse von 1848*.

² Altrock, "Der landwirtschaftliche Kredit im deutschen Reiche" (in *Deutsche Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft*, pp. 90-124); Altthausen, *Denkschrift zum 25 jährigen Bestehen des Landwirtschaftlichen Kreditvereins im Königreiche Sachsen. Mit einem Überblick über die Organisation des ländlichen Bodenkredits in Deutschland*.

sence of foreign competition created a great demand for German foodstuffs. Profits increased even though governmental measures attempted to regulate prices. Moreover, a labor supply was assured by various means. Agricultural laborers were forbidden to leave the estates to go to the munition factories, where they could get higher wages, and great masses of prisoners of war were placed at the disposal of the agrarians.¹

With the outbreak of the revolution the landed aristocracy, like the bourgeoisie, was overwhelmed by the formation of workers' and soldiers' councils which sought to take over the government. Their greatest fear, however, was that these councils would make use of their political power to confiscate their property. When, however, they saw that the Social Democrats were able to make themselves leaders of the new government and oppose the power of these councils, they found that they had a useful though unexpected ally in the protection of their own interests.

Realizing, however, that dissatisfaction was existing among the mass of the peasants and farm laborers, as well as that the idea of councils had also seized hold of the rural population, they tried to gain a foothold in this movement. To gain their end they pretended a complete change of heart, as the following quotation shows:

The League of Agrarians, formerly denounced as the citadel of reaction, enters with wholehearted determination into the new era. It will not only support any government, therefore also a Social Democratic government, which will guarantee law and order, a food supply and an immediate peace, but it will also support the political rights of the agricultural workers, the councils of peasants and agricultural workers, and an active participation of women in political life.²

While large portions of the disbanding army were under control of the soldiers' councils, the nobles in their rôle as army officers were able to maintain control and discipline over a portion of the troops, and even to form new volunteer corps. These

¹ *Geschäftsbericht des deutschen Landarbeiter Verbands für die Jahre 1914 bis 1919*, p. 29.

² *Hamburger Nachrichten*, December 8, 1918.

they placed at the disposal of the Social Democratic government, which used them for the suppression of radical elements. The bulk of the aristocracy supported the general movement for a National Assembly, in which they saw a form of government which would not only dam the rising revolutionary tide, but within which, at least for the time being, they could defend their interests. The more aggressive elements of the officers and the aristocracy, however, refused to be in any way connected with this new parliamentary régime and worked for its immediate abolition. Their attempts culminated in the unsuccessful Kapp *Putsch* of 1920.

The basic economic necessities of the aristocracy as agricultural capitalists were not attacked by the republic. All private property in land was protected by the new government.¹ Peace brought about a gradual abolition of the rationing system and government control of prices on foodstuffs. Then, again, the inflation period brought to the aristocracy, as to the peasantry, the end of their indebtedness. All this indirectly made them passive supporters of a régime which from an economic point of view was a continuation of the old.

The stabilization of the currency in 1924 struck a blow at the agrarians as well as at the peasantry.² A number of things now became apparent. First of all, German agriculture, with its rundown land and equipment, was unable to compete against foreign grain in Germany. Money was very scarce and commanded very high rates of interest. The agrarians as well as the peasants were in bad need of short-time loans for the coming season and long-time loans for renewing their machinery and reorganizing

¹ The Gutsbezirke were only abolished in 1926 by a Prussian ministerial decree. The Fideikommisse still exist.

² A whole flood of articles and pamphlets and even books has appeared since the war, dealing with the agricultural crisis. See, among others, Max Sering, *Die deutsche Wirtschaftskrisis* (1926); W. von Altrock, *Die Krisis in der Landwirtschaft und Mittel zu ihrer Behebung* (1924); Fritz Beckmann, *Die weltwirtschaftlichen Beziehungen der deutschen Landwirtschaft und ihre wirtschaftliche Lage 1919-1926* (1926); Deutsche Landwirtschaftsgesellschaft Heft 332, *Mittel und Wege zur Besserung der Wirtschaftslage in Arbeiten der deutschen Landwirtschaft* (1925); Gerhard Albrecht, *Zur Krisis der Landwirtschaft* (1924). Several important articles have also appeared in the *Vierteljahrsschriften zur Konjunkturforschung*.

their estates to put them on a profit-producing basis.¹ In this situation, the government stepped in and issued a whole series of agricultural credits, the greater part of which was absorbed by the agrarians.² But in doing this they went heavily into debt, and in a few years German agriculture, both large scale and small scale, was under a burden of debt greater than that of pre-war days.

This condition led the agrarians to pursue a twofold policy. On the one hand, in the attempt to cut production costs, they began to follow German industry in introducing rationalization, using more machines and less help. In this they were aided by special governmental credits for farm machinery, etc. In addition, they have begun to replace their relatively large permanent staff of laborers by a small permanent staff of technicians and a skeleton staff of skilled workers, which are augmented at planting and harvesting time by a large force of relatively unskilled, seasonal workers. It is noted that a similar method of rationalization cannot be carried on to any great extent by most peasants, with their small holdings, as they cannot afford machinery and cannot cut down their labor supply. Consequently, in the general agrarian crisis, the agrarians have suffered less than the peasants, since they have been better able to lower production costs in the face of lower prices.

The other policy which the agrarians have pursued since 1924 has been to attempt to raise prices by a tariff on agricultural products.³ In order to do this they were forced to compromise

¹ Herbert Mahnke, *Das Entstehen der Kreditnot in der deutschen Landwirtschaft beim Übergang von der Inflation zur Stabilisierung, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Kreditbedarfs* (1926).

² See *Vierteljahrsshefte zur Konjunkturforschung*, Sonderheft 3: "Die Agrarkredite"; also Fritz Beckmann, "Kreditpolitik und Kreditlage der deutschen Landwirtschaft seit der Währungsstabilisierung" (in *Die Kreditwirtschaft*, Vol. I [1927]).

³ The tariff on agricultural products, as has been pointed out above, had been suspended in 1914. Between 1918 and 1924 some items of the tariff had been gradually put into force again. This however did not satisfy the agrarian interests. For the tariff problem in post-war Germany see, among others, Max Sering, *Agrarkrisen und Agrarzölle* (1925); Fritz Beckmann, *Agrarkrise und Agrarzölle* (1925); Kurt Ritter, *Zum Problem der Agrarzölle in Deutschland* (1924); Friederich Aeroboe, *Zur Frage der Agrarzölle* (1925).

with the hated Republic, for it controlled the state machinery through which alone such changes could be made. This change of front was made in 1926 when the German Nationalists, the party of the agrarians, entered a government coalition, under the leadership of the German Volkspartei, the party of big business.

Besides this, their economic organizations, especially the League of Agrarians (Landbund, now the Reichslandbund), have grown considerably during the last decade. The relations of these organizations with the government, by means of the semi-official chambers of agriculture of federal and state governments, have grown closer.¹ Their attitude toward the present form of state, the parliamentary republic, is therefore more or less similar to that of the bourgeoisie.

But in spite of all the economic advantages which they continue to enjoy, certain fundamental factors have prevented their full economic recovery. In fact, German agriculture, like German industry, has been in a permanent crisis since 1924. As a result, the aristocracy, even more than the bourgeoisie, have been looking toward a Fascist dictatorship as a form of government more suitable to the carrying out of the economic program. As the aristocracy has now become definitely integrated in the economic sphere with the bourgeoisie, its civic concept has become more and more identical with that of the bourgeoisie, namely, allegiance to capitalist property and the capitalist state; for these are basic. The form of the state is a matter of expediency.

¹ According to a detailed statistical compilation made in 1926 by the Archives of the Reichslandbund, this organization had then over 22,000 members who had been elected or appointed to various local, state, or federal governmental bodies.

CHAPTER V

THE AGRICULTURAL PROLETARIAT

The agricultural proletariat is a non-possessing class and occupies the same position in the economic life of society as the industrial proletariat. Before the freeing of the peasantry at the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was no agricultural laboring class in the present sense of the term. The people in the country who worked for a wage were craftsmen, who, besides cultivating their land, worked at their trade for the landlord. Through the liberation of the peasantry, the so-called Bauernbefreiung at the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, a large portion of the peasantry of Prussia found itself "freed" of the land it had cultivated for generations. The bound labor of the feudal period, without personal freedom but with the customary rights to its own land, was now changed into capitalistic free labor with personal rights but no land.¹

The economic explanation for the change must be sought in the fact that, with the development of agriculture into a capitalistic enterprise, it was more profitable for the landlord to hire labor as he needed it than to be dependent upon a class of permanent serfs. In Southern and Western Germany emancipation did not take place in the same form, for there the landlords found it more profitable to have the emancipated peasants buy off their feudal obligations. In Prussia, Mecklenburg, and parts of Hanover the stronger position of the aristocracy and the monarchy, together with the less highly developed state of economic life, brought it about that much of the land of the emancipated serfs went to the upper classes, thus creating a new class of landless agricultural workers. In the hundred years since then, the agricultural proletariat has not only increased steadily

¹ See the standard works of Georg Knapp, *Die Bauernbefreiung und der Ursprung der Landarbeiter* (1887); also Georg Knapp, *Die Landarbeiter in Knechtschaft und Freiheit* (1909); Freiherr von der Goltz, *Die ländliche Arbeiter-Klasse und der preussische Staat* (1893).

in number but has also, generation after generation, produced workers who have no prospect of ever becoming independent landowning peasants.

An examination of the agricultural workers reveals differences in economic status and in their relation to their employers. In the first place, there are the "free" agricultural workers. These are paid chiefly in cash, but receive some produce. Closely related to the "free" agricultural workers are the seasonal workers. These, like the former, receive money wages and board. They are either small peasants or town and village dwellers who have another occupation in winter but who depend partly upon what they earn in the summer. They come from various parts of the country and work mainly upon the large estates of northeastern Germany, of Hanover, and the Rhineland. Included are the foreign seasonal workers, mostly Poles, who come across the border every season and return home in the fall. The Republic has limited their number to 100,000 a year.

The Deputatsarbeiter are another type of agricultural laborer. These receive, besides cash wages, produce and a dwelling place, a fact which naturally increases their dependence upon the owner of the estate. This group is to be found throughout Germany wherever there are large estates.

The Insteute are a less common type of agricultural worker. These are agricultural workers who lease house and barn with several acres of land from the estate owner, supplying some of their needs by their own exertions on the rented lands. The major part of their time they work on the estate of the lord, which the latter, however, does not administrate himself. He leases the estate to an agricultural entrepreneur who carries on large-scale production, hiring for this purpose the Insteute. This form of laborer-tenancy is to be found in Schleswig-Holstein and in Mecklenburg. A similar group, renting houses and lands in exchange for labor on the estate, may be found in Westphalia, where they are called Heuerlinge.

Peasants with small and diminutive holdings form a connecting link between the landed and the landless peasantry. They furnish part-time labor on estates, working as seasonal day-

laborers because their own holdings are not large enough to support them. For the most part they are dependent upon the owner of the neighboring estate, as they cannot change their job without selling their holding and moving.

In addition to this, wherever there are medium- to large-sized peasant holdings we find also a class of farm hands. Although a part of the agricultural proletariat, they differ from the free landless workers in that they are members of the peasant household, receiving part of their pay in food and lodging.¹ They are often the sons of neighboring peasants and expect to become landowners themselves through inheritance. A portion, however, either remain in their status or drift off to the cities and become members of the industrial proletariat.

We thus see that the agricultural proletariat, while a wage-earning class like the industrial proletariat of the cities, possesses certain characteristics which somewhat modify its position as well as its outlook upon life. In the first place, part of the agricultural workers are themselves owners or prospective owners, through inheritance, of small holdings which furnish them with part of their subsistence. Again, part of their wages is paid in kind and often includes lodging. This necessarily also hinders the freedom of movement which is so characteristic of the "purer" type of proletariat, the industrial. Furthermore, in their relationship to their employers many pre-capitalistic elements have still remained.

Nevertheless, one must not allow these differences to obscure the basic similarity between the industrial and the agricultural proletariat. The basic economic factors affecting the civic allegiances of the agricultural proletariat are similar to those affecting the industrial proletariat: wages, hours, and working conditions.²

¹ A. Konnecke, *Rechtsgeschichte des Gesindes in West- und Süddeutschland* (1912).

² See Alexander von Lengerke, *Die ländliche Arbeiterfrage, Beantwortet durch die bei der Königlichen Landes-Oeconomie-Collegium aus allen Gegenden der Preussischen Monarchie eingegangenen Berichte landwirtschaftlichen Vereine über die materiellen Zustände der arbeitenden Classen auf dem platten Lande* (Berlin, 1849); see also *Die Lage der ländlichen Arbeiter im deutschen Reich. Bericht an den vom Kongress deutscher Landwirthe niedergesetzte Kommission zur Ermittlung der Lage der ländlichen Arbeiter in deutschen*

There are no reliable government statistics available concerning the wages of the mass of agricultural laborers before 1914. Individual estimates, however, have been made which show that there was a steady increase in wages during the period of the German Empire.¹ But this increase came not as a result of the struggle of the agricultural workers themselves but as a result of the increase of wages in the cities. This gradual increase, which came without any effort on their own part, brought about a sort of acquiescence in their conditions by the more lethargical elements of the agricultural workers. On the other hand, the wages always lagged considerably behind the wages in industry, with the result that the more energetic elements of the agricultural workers wandered off into the cities or to foreign countries.

What caused dissatisfaction among many of the agricultural workers was rather the hours and the conditions of labor. The workers were virtually at the mercy of employers, who arranged these matters arbitrarily. Wages, hours, and working conditions were usually confirmed by yearly contracts, extremely difficult for the worker to break. Besides, agricultural workers in Prussia were forbidden to organize or engage in strikes, under penalty of fine and imprisonment.

One of the greatest grievances of the agricultural proletariat was the bad housing conditions from which it suffered. One might refer here to the well-known statement of the former Kaiser Wilhelm II when he took over the royal estate at Cachinen in West Prussia, quoted by Marchionini in *Geschichte der Landwirtschaft*, p. 181: "The beautiful stable of the estate Cachinen is a real palace in comparison to the workers' dwellings. Care must be taken that the pigsties are not better than the homes of the workers." While improvements have been made in the general housing conditions, these have been of a more or less sporadic nature and did not affect the general situation.

Reich (Berlin, 1875). Another old but very detailed study of labor conditions is the three-volume study, *Die Verhältnisse der Landarbeiter in Deutschland*, published in 1892 by the Verein für Sozialpolitik as Vols. LIII-LV of its *Schriften*.

¹ See Walter Asmis, *Zur Entwicklung der Landarbeiterlöhne in Preussen* (1919).

The workers were expected to show extreme respect for the owner of the estate, his family, and his steward. Cases were often reported where physical violence was used upon workers, against which the latter had little recourse. It was customary for the laborer to bring wife and children to help him in the fields; though, to be sure, this was often indispensable because of the low wages of the husband. Much of the strict control of the life of the agricultural workers by the estate owners of Prussia was made possible by the institution of "Gutsbezirke."¹ This institution, which made the owner of the estate practically the administrator of governmental affairs in his district, enabled him to maintain certain of his feudal privileges.

Thus the agricultural worker on the large estate was a pseudo-citizen, not merely in the sense already expressed, but also in the sense that his economic and social status still contained elements of a passing feudal stage. Theoretically in full possession of civic rights, in practice he lacked not merely property but also freedom of contract, freedom of person, and the right to govern himself.

In view of these conditions, one would expect that the agricultural proletariat, like the industrial proletariat, would make concerted efforts not merely to improve its economic conditions but also to develop the concept of socialized property, together with a definite antagonism toward the existing state. This was, however, seldom the case. In the first place, the most energetic and discontented of this group went to the cities where they became industrial workers.² Sering has estimated that from 1885 to 1905 about 1,800,000 people, most of them agricultural workers, emigrated from the provinces of East Prussia, West Prussia, Pomerania, Posen, and Silesia.³ Secondly, where the desire for property arose among the landless proletariat, it took the form of a desire for individual peasant holdings similar to those sur-

¹ For details see chap. iv.

² A. Rieger, *Die Landflucht und ihre Bekämpfung unter besonder Berücksichtigung der ländlichen Arbeiterfrage* (1914).

³ August Skeilweit, "Gutsherrschaft und Landarbeiter in Ostdeutschland" (in *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung*, 35 Jahrg., N.F., p. 322).

rounding the large estates. There was, however, no interest in dividing up the large estates, as the resultant strips of ground without buildings and machines would have been of little value. Such demands as existed for the break-up of the estates came only from the land-poor peasant (not the landless worker) who wished to enlarge his holding. And the idea of the taking over of the estates by the agricultural workers, as their brothers in industry hoped to take over the large industrial plants, was too radical a concept; for the agricultural workers in Germany formed and still form the lowest cultural strata in society. Besides, they were under the constant eye of the employer, who was able to control their daily life through church, school, court, local officials, etc.

Nevertheless, there were definite signs before 1914 that the agricultural laborer was beginning to make attempts to improve his condition. Reports by trade-union organizers before the war indicated that the landed worker was becoming more and more responsive to their appeals, but that his timidity, his lack of practical, political, and organizational experience, as well as the hostile attitude of his employer, made it very difficult to maintain activity in local organizations, though there had been little trouble in starting them.¹ During the war agricultural labor shared to only a small extent the general improvement of the rural population. The pressing necessity for food caused the government to issue a series of regulations preventing agricultural workers from leaving their positions and forcing them to accept existing wages and conditions of labor under penalty of martial law. This naturally created dissatisfaction, in view of the fact that independent peasants, especially on small holdings, were able to go to nearby cities to earn the high wages paid in the war industries, while their wives took care of the holdings.² Although they did not suffer from the food shortage as did the town workers, the agricultural laborers shared the general dis-

¹ *Geschäftsbericht des deutschen Landarbeiter Verbandes für 1912 bis 1913.*

² *Geschäftsbericht des deutschen Landarbeiter Verbandes für die Jahre 1914 bis 1919*, pp. 29-32; see also Wygodzinski, *Die Landarbeiterfrage in Deutschland* (1917); Gerlach, *Die Landarbeiterverhältnisse in Ostpreussen 1913-1922*.

satisfaction with the war, which seemed increasingly purposeless. They consequently greeted the end of the war with satisfaction. While not participating in the revolution very actively, they nevertheless showed a benevolent neutrality to the new régime which promised them some improvement in their condition.¹

The new government immediately sought to win the active support of the agricultural proletariat by repealing the semi-feudal Servants' Ordinance (*Gesindeordnung*). But the Socialist government, since it depended upon the reactionary military aristocracy to suppress uprisings of revolutionary workers, failed to abolish the much more important *Gutsbezirke*, which kept the agricultural workers under the dominance of the aristocracy. These, in fact, were not abolished until January, 1927. However, the government accepted a whole series of minor demands which had already been drawn up jointly by the Socialist and the Christian Agricultural trade-unions in the spring of 1918. Later on, as a result of the Works-Council Law, councils of workers were also created on the large estates. All this helped to make the agricultural workers a force definitely supporting the newly established republican government in the rural districts. Workers everywhere flocked to join the Socialist or the Christian trade-unions, hoping thereby to better their economic conditions. Thus the Socialist Deutsche Landarbeiterverband, with a membership of 19,077 in 1913 which had dropped to 7,167 in 1916, found itself with a membership of 624,935 in 1919.² The membership figures for the Christian Zentralverband der Landarbeiter were: 1913—3,177; 1915—1,904; 1919—55,753; 1921 (April)—ca. 150,000.³

¹ For post-war problems and developments see Hermann Kranold, *Was bringt die sozialistische Republik dem Landarbeiter?* S. Rosenfeld, *Das neue Landarbeiterrecht* (1919); Wilhelm, *Die Fragen des Gesinderechts nach Aufhebung der Ausnahmegesetze* (1920); Friederich Aeroboe, *Vergangenheit und Zukunft der Löhnmethode in der deutschen Landwirtschaft* (1920); Walter Pross, "Untersuchungen über die Interessierung des Landarbeiters am Betrieb des Arbeitgebers" (in *Landwirtschaftliche Jahrbücher*, [1927], 185–244); Friederich Aeroboe, *Die ländliche Arbeiterfrage nach dem Weltkriege* (1922); J. Anbühl, *Landflucht, ihre Ursachen und Folgen* (1920).

² C. von Dietze, *Die ostdeutschen Landarbeiterverhältnisse seit der Revolution* (1922), pp. 28–29.

³ Dietze, *ibid.*, p. 35.

With this rapid increase, the organized agricultural laborers, growing conscious of their power, began to press demands for better wages, hours, and working conditions. Under the pressure of the revolutionary situation, these demands were acceded to by the owners of the large estates. But the rapidly growing radicalization of the workers in the towns also affected the countryside. The new government, however, proved no friend of this increasing radicalism; in fact, as is known, it made use of all forces to suppress the growing discontent in the cities. Backed up by this policy of the government, the landed aristocracy regained some of its powers and rapidly began to parry the attacks of the agricultural workers. This conflict culminated in a series of large strikes of the agricultural workers in Eastern Germany in 1923. The strikes were lost partly because of the antagonistic attitude taken by the government, as well as by the trade-union leaders.

As a result of this defeat the power of the agricultural workers began to decline. Trade-union membership decreased almost as rapidly as it had grown. By 1927, the Socialist union had only 150,000 members left; the Christian union had declined correspondingly. The new-found hope of the agricultural workers that the government and the trade-unions would better their conditions was badly shaken. Although theoretically able to use the strike weapon, in practice it became valueless. To prevent any further outbreak of strikes the trade-union leaders had made so many provisions regulating the calling of a strike that it was almost impossible for the members to do so. When, in 1924, the government introduced compulsory arbitration, the strike was given its legal death blow. Furthermore, it became clear that the works-councils established after the revolution served less to aid the workers' interests than to stimulate their interest in production.

The power of the workers' organizations thus being broken, the landed aristocracy began to lower wages, while conditions of labor again tended to reach the pre-war status. The state, on the whole, has done less for the agricultural workers than for any other class of society. In every respect the agricultural

workers have been the last class to be considered by the government.

The main reason for this general attitude has been that, of all classes, the agricultural proletariat occupies the least strategic position in the social structure of Germany. This unfavorable position is due to a number of factors. While not a small class, it is widely dispersed in small units, which makes its economic and political organization difficult. Furthermore, it is the class which is the least cultured, the least aggressive, the least exposed to those elements of modern life and thought which might stir in it a spirit of revolt.

This does not mean that the agricultural workers have been or are reactionary. Large sections supported the new government and in particular the Social Democrats after the outbreak of the revolution in 1918; but not so much because of any definite revolutionary aim as because they hoped that this new régime would somehow alleviate their conditions. While making use of this support, the Social Democrats nevertheless felt quite safe in suppressing the more radical tendencies which culminated in the agrarian strikes of 1923. The trade-unions both Socialist and Christian, have been important agencies in tying up the agricultural workers to the existing régime. They have done this by maintaining a policy of social peace. They have fostered an allegiance to the state similar to that of the Socialist and Centre parties to which they are related. In other words, the grievances of the landless proletariat have been harnessed to the political and state ideology of all these parties, instead of being left to gather strength as disrupting anti-state forces.

The general agrarian crisis, however, has also hit the agricultural worker in recent years. With the rationalization of large estates, laborers are being displaced by machines, and year-round employment tends to give way to seasonal employment. For the first time there is evidence of acute agricultural unemployment. In the face of the tremendous industrial unemployment crisis they cannot escape their condition by migrating to the towns or to foreign countries. In fact, since the economic status of the agricultural worker has in the past been influenced by the

economic status of the industrial worker, the chronic crisis in industry has naturally reacted upon the status of the former. As a result, a definite spirit of revolt against the existing régime is beginning to manifest itself. This is shown partly by the fact that the Fascists are able to make headway with their propaganda among these workers. What is perhaps even more significant is that during 1930 a series of "illegal" strikes broke out in Eastern Germany, under the leadership of the Communists. These were called in defiance of the Social Democratic Landarbeiter Verband and show that a spirit of rebellion is in the process of formation.

In other words, the prolonged economic crisis following on the political upheaval of the German state is at last prying the agricultural worker out of his inaction. He is becoming more and more politically minded and is now a fair prospect for the Fascists and the Communists. Like the rest of the German population, he too is in the throes of the inner conflict between the traditional national and cultural complex which leads him in one direction and the economic forces which drive him in the other. As the general crisis of present-day German society continues, this inner conflict will necessarily grow. This naturally must lead to a steady weakening of his allegiance not merely to the present government but also to the present state and society, and the growth of his allegiance to those forces working for its destruction.

CHAPTER VI

THE PEASANTRY

The existence of a modern free peasantry is, as we have seen, an outgrowth of the rise of the bourgeoisie and the consequent breakdown of the feudal social and economic order.¹ The freeing of the peasants, which took place in the first half of the nineteenth century, abolished most of the feudal relations between serf and lord, and gradually transformed the feudal forms of production of the landed aristocracy into a form of agrarian capitalism. But, on the other hand, it transformed many of the serfs into a large class of free peasants, based on a pre-capitalist form of production. For the capitalist form of production, that is, production for the accumulation of capital, could not be the basis of production for the millions of peasants whose holdings were often barely large enough to maintain their own existence. The establishment of the bourgeois form of private property in land thus succeeded in producing in extensive sections of Germany a large agrarian middle class, the peasantry. Its interests and psychology are essentially the same as that of the "old" middle classes of the towns, namely, conservative or even reactionary.² Its ideal is to maintain its own private property and to carry on a form of production which will enable it to make a living without very serious thought of the accumulation of profit for further investment. In other words, the essential feature of capitalism, continuous growth and expansion caused by the accumulation of surplus, is of minor importance.

In seeking to maintain the existing status quo, the peasantry has necessarily been opposed to the development of agrarian

¹ For the history of the peasantry see, besides the standard works mentioned in the two preceding chapters, Heinrich Gerdes, *Geschichte des deutschen Bauernstandes* (1910); Adolf Bartels, *Der Bauer in der deutschen Vergangenheit* (1900).

² For the psychology of the peasant see, among others, Gerhard Albrecht, "Das deutsche Bauerntum im Zeitalter des Kapitalismus" (in *Grundrisse der Sozialökonomik*, IX¹, 35-69); also A. L'Houet, *Zur Psychologie des Bauerntums* (1920).

capitalism. The antagonism against the landed aristocracy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which continually absorbed and annexed peasant holdings, continued through the greater part of the nineteenth century, during which the now capitalist aristocracy increased its holdings by purchases, foreclosure of mortgages, etc., of neighboring peasant holdings. In Western and Southern Germany, where large estates were liquidated at the time of the liberation of the peasants, this antagonism was relatively non-existent; where it prevailed it took the form of antagonism of the small south- and west-German peasantry against the Prussian landed aristocracy.

This antagonism against the landed aristocracy, however, diminished toward the close of the nineteenth century, for the capitalist form of agriculture ceased to absorb peasant holdings after 1870. The very rapid expansion of German industry at home and abroad offered a more profitable field for investing the surplus obtained by the large estates, and the increasing competition of Russian and American agricultural products diminished the surplus usually reinvested by the large land-owners. Placed on the defensive, large and small agriculturists were forced to make common cause, and the large landholder was able to pose as the champion of general agricultural interests.

Thus the property-owning peasantry of the country became for the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy the mass bulwark against the rapidly growing socialist forces of the industrial centers. And since every government, including that of the Republic, has been a staunch defender of private property, the peasantry has always been at least passively on the side of the bourgeois state.

While, in this outlook upon life, the economic factor takes a definitely preponderant place, the peasant's attitude toward political life and political issues has not been very clearly crystallized. The efforts of the peasants to formulate a political program and build up an agricultural political party have been even less successful than those of the urban middle classes. Instead, they have, on the whole, followed in the wake of those political

parties which put forth an agrarian program apparently favorable to their interests.

The size of his holding has direct influence on the civic attitude of the peasant.¹ Grouped by size of holding, there are the following: (1) large (Grossbauer); (2) medium (Mittelbauer); (3) small (Kleinbauer); (4) diminutive (Parzellenbauer).²

Many of the Grossbauern carry on their activities on a capitalistic basis, and as such their interests are in many ways the same as those of the landed aristocracy who own most of the large estates. The most typical peasants are those with medium- and small-sized holdings. They make up 36.3 per cent of the landholders, cultivating 47.2 per cent of the land. The majority of the landholders are, however, the Parzellenbauern, who own only a very small section of the land. They are found mainly in Western and Southern Germany. Their holdings, and in some cases those of the Kleinbauern, are too small to furnish their owners a livelihood. These groups seek to acquire more land; but this desire has not become so strong that they demand confiscation of large holdings. The property which they have has kept them within the framework of society and has kept their demands within the legal limitations of private property. However, since they are dependent to a considerable extent on wages earned in industry or in agriculture, they also have proletarian interests. They are a connecting link between the peasantry and the agricultural, as well as the industrial, proletariat. This hybrid character makes them less dependable as supporters of the existing régime than the rest of the peasantry.

Overpopulation might have become a very disturbing factor among the rural population of Germany during the nineteenth century, but the greater part of the surplus population was absorbed by the rapidly growing German industries at home or by the lure of economic opportunity in America. These two safety valves were important factors in removing energetic and dissatisfied elements from the peasantry, thus aiding conservatism.

¹ Max Sering, *Die Verteilung des Grundbesitzes und die Abwanderung vom Lande* (1910).

² For figures, see Reichszentrale für Heimatdienst, *Gewerbe und Landwirtschaft im Spiegel der letzten Betriebszählung*, Richtlinie Nr. 150 (July, 1927), p. 8.

The passage of the compromise tariff of 1879, as well as of other tariffs on agricultural goods, made the peasant feel that the government was protecting his economic interests. But his surplus very often took the form of selling livestock to the nearby towns or villages, and livestock was much less protected than grain.

In order to secure credits cheaply and when needed, to reduce costs of machinery and to strengthen their position on the market, many peasants organized co-operatives.¹ The first of these peasant co-operatives was formed in 1872 by Friederich Raiffeisen; in 1883 various independent co-operatives were combined into the Reichsverband deutscher landwirtschaftlicher Genossenschaften. Some legal and also financial assistance was given by the government.

Besides this, peasant agriculture was stimulated to a certain extent by the various agricultural societies, agricultural schools, agricultural exhibitions and contests, which often received the support of the local, provincial, and even state governments.

The peasant, on the whole, was definitely pro-state in his pre-war mentality.² He felt himself a citizen, for he was a property owner. But while the small property owner and the small producer in the cities were being threatened by the increased concentration of capital, and therefore came in opposition to certain of the civic concepts of the upper bourgeoisie, the peasant suffered much less in this direction. He was, therefore, probably the most stable, dependable mass element of the population from the point of view of the state.

During the war the condition of most landowners improved. Cut off in large measure from foreign food supplies, Germany depended almost entirely upon the German farmer. Although the government regulated prices and rational supplies, it could not prevent the bootlegging of food on a vast scale, with in-

¹ Most of the information concerning the co-operatives will be found in the works mentioned in chapter iv. See also Otto Gennes, *Das deutsche landwirtschaftliche Genossenschaftswesen* (1925).

² See Erich Keup and Richard Mührer, *Die volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung von Gross- und Kleinbetrieb in der Landwirtschaft* (1919); also Karl Bernhard von Oertzen, *Wie erhalten wir unseren Bauernstand?* (1914).

creasing profits to the farmer. Many peasants were thus able to improve their economic condition considerably. But as the war went on, the shortage of manufactured goods, the increasing scarcity of labor despite the use of war prisoners, the appalling casualty lists, and the general loss of morale created disaffection with the war.

Consequently, the breakdown of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic found the peasants willing to accept the new régime, for they hoped that it would bring peace at last. Peasants' councils were formed, which came partly under the leadership of the Socialists and partly under the leadership of the agrarians, who pretended to have accepted the new state of affairs. These councils, however, played no important rôle, except in Bavaria where, during the period of the Soviet Republic, their leader, Gandorfer, pledged the support of the councils to the Soviet régime.¹ With the overthrow of the latter, the councils reverted to their previous position of secondary importance, being used, however, to organize the reaction in the agrarian districts.

Though the peasants had no particular love for the Republic, especially when headed by the Socialists to whom they had been inimical, the general economic development of the post-war period made them passive supporters of the new régime. Indeed, without the tolerance of the great mass of the agrarian population the new government might scarcely have survived the critical post-war period. This tolerance was gained by guaranteeing the continuance of private property in land. Furthermore, the inflation, already begun during the war, continued at an increasing rate of speed. As a result, the peasants were able to wipe out nearly all their indebtedness by valueless fiat money. As fast as they could, they turned this fiat money into all kinds of material possessions, providing themselves with new farm equipment, improving their dwellings, buying new furniture, piling up dowries for children yet unborn.

The stabilization of the currency in 1924 destroyed the artificial basis on which the prosperity of the peasantry had rested

¹ See Wilhelm Mattes, *Die bayrischen Bauernräte* (1921).

since 1914. But it did more. It seems to have been instrumental in reviving a development which had been taking place steadily for a century preceding 1870 and which, as described above, had come to a temporary halt during the period of the German Empire. This was the gradual destruction of small-scale agriculture by the growth of agrarian capitalism. Such a change covers a period of decades, and it is naturally too early for this new development to have manifested itself on a large scale.

It is necessary to analyze these basic forces and see to what extent they have been effective. Fundamental is the problem of the efficiency of small-scale production. It has been shown that the large estates have made great strides in increased efficiency of production. This, however, has not been so easily possible on small holdings, especially those of the small and diminutive peasantry. The general post-war agrarian crisis in Germany, as throughout the world, though met fairly successfully by the large landholder, has put the small peasant at a great disadvantage.

With stabilization it was difficult to introduce immediately the more efficient methods of production, which had been adopted immediately after the war in countries with a more stabilized currency. The world agricultural crisis, which had begun shortly after the war, and which had been delayed in Germany by the inflation, now broke upon the peasantry with full force. Suddenly the German peasant found himself in a position where it was extremely difficult to get credits in the new stabilized currency, and where very high money rates prevailed. At the same time, the fall of agricultural prices made it impossible for many of the peasants to repay their loans. Under these conditions, the government and the various banks were forced either to extend the loans or to convert them into long-term loans. Thus German agriculture, freed from indebtedness by the inflation, was again forced into the contraction of debts. Indeed, its present indebtedness even exceeds that of pre-war days. Furthermore, since the interest rates of this new debt are considerably higher than those before 1914, the actual interest burden per acre of land has become much heavier.

These post-inflation difficulties have been further aggravated by the tax situation. The regulation of the reparations problem, first by the Dawes Plan and later by the Young Plan, as well as the stabilization of the currency, have forced the German state to impose heavier taxes. Furthermore, the peasants are no longer able to pay taxes in worthless paper money, but have to hand over gold currency. The peasant has come to feel that the government is now not merely passive toward his economic distress but is actually increasing it by heavy and, to him, unjustified taxation. Very often the tax collections have been carried out ruthlessly, even to the extent of auctioning off the peasant's cow.

The owners of large holdings have to a large extent been able to weather the storm. The owners of small and diminutive holdings, on the other hand, have often been worsted in their attempt to survive the chronic crisis in agriculture. In addition, those who were dependent for additional income upon their earnings in nearby industrial centers have suffered from the tremendous unemployment in industry.

The attitude of the state toward the peasant is dictated by two contradictory motives.¹ Being dominated by large agrarian and finance-capitalistic interests, the state has no interest in trying to prevent the destruction of the small peasantry by the growth of agrarian capital. On the other hand, from the point of view of maintaining the politico-economic control of these classes over society, the state has an interest in keeping alive a strong and fairly well-satisfied peasantry as a counterweight to the increasing radicalism within the industrial proletariat.

Most of the aid that the government has given to agriculture has necessarily been of help to the large estate and large peasant holdings. Government credits have been to a considerable extent absorbed by these groups. Moreover, certain credits which have gone to small peasants have had the effect of increasing the indebtedness of the latter. Improvements in agricultural machinery necessarily benefit the larger holdings. Nevertheless, under

¹ Karl Schmidt, "Bauernschutzpolitik" (in *Grundrisse der Sozialökonomik*, IX² [1927], 1-32).

pressure of the agricultural crisis, the Reichstag in 1927 adopted a resolution to the effect that funds voted by the Reichstag for scientific and technical improvements in agriculture should be used mainly for helping medium- and small-sized holdings. To what extent the government has acted upon this resolution has not been ascertained.

The number of peasant seats in the chambers of agriculture has been increased since 1913. The increasing economic dependence of the owners of small holdings upon large agricultural enterprises has had the effect of keeping the control of the chambers in the hands of the latter.

The peasants themselves, as already mentioned, have in the past tried to improve their conditions by the formation of co-operatives which have received state aid. This has continued since the war; at the end of 1928 there existed 39,946 agricultural co-operatives. These were organized into four central groups.¹ These co-operatives, which receive considerable financial aid from the government, are an important factor in maintaining the economic standing of the peasantry. But they are essentially controlled by the wealthier peasants and indirectly by the banks.

The peasantry is further united into peasant organizations for the purpose of defending its interests. These, however, show definite political lineups, and it might more properly be said that they have been formed by the various political parties in order to gain a firmer control over the peasantry. A large number of peasants are members of the Reichslandbund, the agrarian politico-economic organization of the landed aristocracy. The numerous peasant organizations in many respects accentuate the differences within the peasantry.² Participation in organized associations has tied the peasantry to the existing order by keeping the expression of dissatisfaction within legal bounds.

While the small peasant suffers most from the crisis, his economic destruction is not to be viewed as something that comes

¹ Otto Gennes, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

² See among others, Eugen Varga, *Materialien über den Stand der Bauernbewegung in den wichtigsten Ländern* (1925).

automatically. Although harassed by the rationalization of the large estates, the peasant can to a certain extent compete with the former by carrying on a more intensive form of agriculture. He can work longer hours and exploit still more than heretofore the labor of his family. Moreover, he is primarily interested in feeding himself and his family; his production for the market is of only secondary importance. In view of the corresponding crisis in industry, he will try by every means possible to hold on to his land, for its loss means being thrown penniless into the great mass of the unemployed in the cities.

In conclusion, we may say that the allegiance of the peasantry to the existing state is even from the economic point of view a complex matter. As the owner of private property he naturally supports a state and society based upon private property. On the other hand, the chronic agrarian crisis since 1924 has definitely begun to jeopardize his economic security. A larger number of peasants have been losing their lands by foreclosures than was the case heretofore. All this has resulted in an antagonism against the present form of the state, in which the peasants are beginning to lose faith rapidly. This situation has caused large numbers of the peasants to support the Fascist movement, which promises to help the peasantry without destroying the present social order. The pressure of the general economic crisis has, however, not led the peasants to support the Communists, even though the latter promise not to socialize small peasant holdings. Only among the owners of diminutive holdings, where proletarian interests predominate, can any such anti-state sentiments be found. The war and post-war developments have thus thrown the peasantry into a situation unknown since 1870. That this violently affects their attitude toward the government is quite obvious. Whether this will help to develop an anti-state attitude in the future depends upon a whole series of factors, the essential one of which is the crisis which tends to deprive them of their property and transform them into proletarians, either agrarian or industrial.

PART II. THE STATE

CHAPTER VII

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

The birth of the German Empire in 1871 found in existence the three main political parties, representing the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat, whose relationships to one other and to the existing state have formed the content of the major political and social struggles since that time.¹ These major political forces, however, did not continue to exist merely as three distinct political parties. Conflicts among the various strata of each class, differences in traditions, religion, and culture, brought about a process of political differentiation resulting in the splitting of the original parties or in the formation of additional political parties. Thus when the National Liberals made their compromise with Bismarck, the left wing of this party definitely broke off and constituted itself a more radical group which tried to maintain some of the liberal traditions of the pre-Bismarckian era. Furthermore, those Conservatives who accepted the newly formed Empire of Bismarck split off to form a political party supporting Bismarck. Largely in opposition to the autocratic power of Protestant Prussia which had become the dominating state of Germany, the Catholics, who

¹ For information concerning German political parties in general see Wilhelm Mommsen and G. Franz (eds.), *Die deutschen Parteiprogramme 1918-1930* (1931); Felix Salomon (ed.), *Die neuen Parteiprogramme mit den letzten der alten Parteien* (1919); Walter Sulzbach, *Die Grundlagen der politischen Parteibildung* (1921); Herbert Sultan, "Zur Soziologie des moderne Parteisystems" (in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialforschung*, LV [1926], 91-140); Hermann Rehm, *Deutschlands politische Parteien* (1912); Friederich Naumann, *Die politischen Parteien* (1913); D. Hesuard, *Les Partis Politique en Allemagne* (1923); Hermann Heller, *Die politischen Ideenkreise der Gegenwart* (1926); Ludwig Frank, *Die bürgerlichen Parteien des deutschen Reichstags* (1911); Rudolf Bartel, *Lehrbuch der Demagogik* (1905); Ludwig Bergsträsser, *Geschichte der politischen Parteien in Deutschland* (1926); W. Thomas, *Hohenzollern-Monarchie und das deutsche Parteiwesen* (1899); Walther Kamm, *Abgeordnetenberufe und Parlament* (1927); I. Rosenbaum, *Beruf und Herkunft der Abgeordneten 1847-1919* (1923); Gustav Reptau, *Das System der politischen Korruption* (1927); E. Eichhorn, *Parteien und Klassen im Spiegel der Reichstagwahlen* (1925); Walter Lambach, *Die Herrschaft der 500* (1926).

formed a minority in Germany and who were found mainly in Southern and Western Germany, organized a political party of their own, the Centre party. Unlike the Liberals and the Conservatives their center of gravity lay in the middle classes of Catholic Germany, both in town and country. Finally many smaller parties were formed, such as those of the Poles, the Danes, and the Alsatians, which represented mainly cultural or racial differences.

All these various parties were able to develop because the existence of a parliament which was based on universal suffrage and which functioning in a period (1871-1914) of general European peace permitted economic, social, and cultural differences of a secondary nature to be crystallized in separate political parties. But all these parties, with the exception of the Social Democrats, had a common bond and rested on a common basis, namely, bourgeois society. This became quite evident when they were driven into the defensive by the attacks of the Socialists against private property.

With the introduction of universal suffrage in Germany in 1867 it became obvious that the parties of the ruling classes, which themselves were a small minority of the population, were forced to appeal for support to the large mass of the population. To do so they had to camouflage their own class interests in various ways. Even the aristocratic Conservative party was forced to use quite unaristocratic methods to appeal to the unaristocratic layers of the population in order to defend the interests of the landed aristocracy. These parties presented themselves to the lower and middle classes as defenders of the interests of the "nation" and the "people."¹ These parties also appealed to them on innumerable other grounds, playing upon existing traditions and prejudices of a national, cultural, regional, social, or religious nature. As a result, the various political

¹ This policy finally led even to a change in the names of some of the parties when in 1918-19 they tried to retain their hold on their followers by calling themselves "Volkspartei." (The term "Volk" contains within it both the concept of "people" and that of "nation.") Thus the Conservative party became the "German Nationalist People's party," the National Liberals became the "German People's party," and the Catholic Centre party became the "Christian People's party."

parties of the upper classes, while being directed by a relatively small group, found as their adherents elements in all classes of society. They were aided in this by their control or influence over the press and by many social and cultural organizations already in existence which thus became, indirectly, auxiliary forces that helped to strengthen the control of these parties over the rest of the population.

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

While these political parties accepted and emphasized the national bourgeois elements of society, the Social Democracy began its history by rejecting—or seeming to reject—these elements. At first regarded as a menace to the Empire, it proved by 1914 to be a bulwark of bourgeois state and society. The economic and social forces that helped to bring about this change in attitude have been indicated in the chapter on the “Industrial Proletariat.” It will suffice to indicate some of the political manifestations of this development.¹

One of the roots of the Social Democracy goes back to the attempt of Liebknecht and Bebel to organize the industrial workers on the basis of the revolutionary principles of Marx and Engels. This was the only party in the Reichstag of the North

¹ The literature on the development and problems of the German Social Democracy is of tremendous proportions. A few of the volumes used in connection with this study are: Franz Mehring, *Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie*, 4 vols. (11th ed.; 1921); Walther Croll, *Die Entwicklung der Anschauungen über soziale Reform in der deutschen Sozialdemokratie* (1915); Paul Ostholt, *Das Verhältnis des Marxistischen Sozialismus zum deutschen Staatsgedanken im Weltkriege unter Berücksichtigung seiner Entwicklung in der Vorkriegszeit* (1926); L. Radloff, *Vaterland und Sozialdemokratie* (1915); Gustav Noske, *Kolonialpolitik und Sozialdemokratie* (1914); Herrmann Heller, *Sozialismus und Nation* (1925); Konrad Häniisch, *Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie* (1916); Friedrich Lenz, *Staat und Marxismus*, 2 vols. (1921-23); Scheidemann, *Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Krieg*; Paul Lenzsch, *Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie* (1915); H. M. Calmann, *Die Finanzpolitik der S.P.D., 1867-1914* (1922); Arthur Dix, *Sozialdemokratie, Militarismus und Kolonialpolitik* (1924); Charles Andler, *La décomposition politique du socialisme allemand, 1914-1919* (1919); Werner Sombart, *Der proletarische Sozialismus* (1924); Siegfried Marck, *Marxistische Staatsbejahung* (1925); Eduard Bernstein, *Von der Sekte zur Partei* (1911); Robert Michels, “Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie, Parteimitgliedschaft und soziale Zusammensetzung” (in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*, XXIII, Part II, 515 ff.); Ernst Drahns, “Die Sozialdemokratie” (in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 4th ed., Vol. VII [1925]).

German Confederation to oppose the war credits for the Franco-Prussian War. Another of its roots goes back to Ferdinand Lassalle and his German Workingmen's Association. Unlike Marx, Lassalle was more or less willing to work for the liberation of the working class within the framework of the existing state, thus hoping eventually to modify it. The union of these two Socialist organizations at Gotha in 1875 resulted in a compromise. While advocating in principle the abolition of bourgeois society and emphasizing the international solidarity of the working class, it failed to define clearly its attitude toward the existing state.¹

The suppression of the Social Democratic party from 1878 to 1890 had partly the effect of strengthening the revolutionary elements, for it forced the party to carry on its activities by illegal means. It is, however, interesting to note that while its organization and activities were suppressed, the Social Democratic party was permitted to elect members to the Reichstag. This was done partly with the hope that while the Social Democratic party would be hindered in its propaganda among the workers, it would turn from a party intent upon the destruction of bourgeois society into a party of parliamentary opposition working within the framework of that society. While this policy undoubtedly helped to strengthen the parliamentary character of the Social Democracy, it nevertheless hindered its growth only temporarily. Thus, while it received 9.1 per cent of the total popular votes in 1877, its drop to 6.1 per cent in 1881 had been more than overcome by 1887 when it reached a new high level with 10.1 per cent of the total votes cast. The legalization of the party in 1890 caused a sudden jump in the Socialist vote. In the elections of 1890 this was practically doubled, rising suddenly to 19.8 per cent. Each succeeding election, with the exception of the strongly patriotic one of 1907, registered a Socialist increase. By 1912 the Social Democratic party, with 34.8 per cent of the popular vote and 112 members in the Reichstag, was the largest party in the Empire.

¹ Incidentally, Marx criticized the compromise Gotha Program very severely. His criticism was, however, suppressed by the Social Democracy; see Karl Marx, *Randglossen zum Program der deutschen Arbeiterpartei* (1922) published by Viva.

In the meantime, however, it had been losing more and more of its revolutionary character. As already pointed out, the tremendous economic expansion of Germany and its conquest of more markets, especially after 1890, allowed the organized elements of the working class to gain definite economic advantages. In this period, then, it seemed to many Socialists no longer true that "the rich get richer, the poor get poorer." Furthermore, now that the party had become legal and was the only real party of opposition, it gained many adherents among those elements who had only a platonic interest in the socialist aims. These elements saw in the Social Democrats rather Democrats than Socialists and thought that the strengthening of this party would result in the abolition of some of the more undesirable features of the militaristic semi-absolute monarchy. To these elements the revolutionary aims of Socialism meant little. The steady drawing away from revolutionary ideals, which developed among an increasing number of elements within the party, was strengthened by the continuation of international peace among the major powers of Europe, which seemed to preclude the possibilities of a revolutionary situation. The establishment of a Socialist dictatorship seemed out of question; even the establishment of a bourgeois republic was not taken seriously.¹

It was under these conditions that during the nineties the famous controversy broke out between the "Revisionists," led by Bernstein, and the rest of the party. Bernstein openly derided the idea of revolution. "The goal is nothing, the movement is everything" was his slogan. Although the theories and practices of the revisionists were repeatedly voted down, the teachings of Bernstein took hold on the party, which while retaining its old revolutionary program came more and more to accept the existing state. In some of the southern states the leaders of the party began to vote the state budgets and came in closer contact with both the state and the non-Socialist parties. In the elections of 1912 the party made an election agreement with the

¹ In fact, when Rosa Luxemburg in the Prussian election campaign of 1910 proposed to put the establishment of a republic on the campaign program, she not only met violent objection on the part of the right and center of the party but found that even her ally, Franz Mehring, thought this proposal "quite impossible."

democratic "Freisinnige Partei" in order to increase the number of its representatives in the Reichstag. But more important, the party voted for the national military budget on the technical ground that thereby it could use its influence in shifting the new taxes from the working class to the bourgeoisie. In international affairs such as the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the various Moroccan crises, many of the Social Democratic leaders indicated plainly where they would stand if the fatherland were attacked. The attitude of the right wing toward German colonies was clearly expressed by the well-known volume of Noske on colonial policies.

The outbreak of the World War showed clearly how far the greater part of the party leadership had drifted. Against a small minority, the Social Democratic members of the Reichstag voted the war credits. Nor did the party leave unanswered the appeal to the Kaiser, "I know no longer parties, I know only Germans." As the war continued, not only did patriotism grow, especially among its leaders, but the party as well as the free trade-union machine became more and more closely tied up with the state apparatus. Strikes, called by the revolutionary Spartacus group, and by the pacifistic Independent Social Democrats who had broken away from the party because of their opposition to its support of the government, were suppressed by the government with the aid of Social Democrats. Even at the time when the German army was driven back through France in September and October of 1918, and the Imperial government was tottering, the Socialist leader, Ebert, while demanding the abdication of the Kaiser, refused to come out for the establishment of even a bourgeois republic.

It was only when, to the astonishment of everyone, the Kaiser fled to Holland, and the workers' and soldiers' councils threatened to take over the government of Germany, that the Social Democrats came out in favor of the establishment of such a republic. This action came not as a climax of their struggles to overthrow the semi-absolute monarchy but was dictated by the desire to prevent the establishment of a Soviet dictatorship in Germany. In order to accomplish this they managed to get con-

trol of a majority of the councils, turning them into bodies supporting the new provisional government of Social Democrats and temporarily also of Independent Socialists. Where the workers' and soldiers' councils got into the hands of the revolutionary elements, they were suppressed, sometimes with the aid of the old monarchical troops. When dissatisfaction even within their own ranks grew rapidly, the Socialist leaders promised the workers to socialize at least the key industries, but made no serious attempts to carry out this promise. In fact, they suppressed the widespread strikes for socialization. And when, finally, the National Assembly was elected to formulate the constitution for the Republic, the Social Democrats, who did not receive the expected majority, willingly shared the new government with the Democrats and the Catholic Centre.

The Social Democrats have been among the staunchest defenders of the Republic as well as of the present form of society which is the basis of the Republic. In practice they have done little to show that they are Socialists, but much to show that they have been good citizens of the state and the nation.¹ And they have defended both, not so much against the right, which more or less accepts the present state and society, but against the left, the Communists, who are their bitterest enemies. In fact, one can say without exaggeration that the leaders of the Social Democracy and of the free trade-unions have done more than any other party to prevent Germany from turning Bolshevik.

Although the Social Democratic leaders admit that present society is still fundamentally a bourgeois society, they believe that by participation in the government they are able to transform the character of both this state and society. They maintain that the present state is no longer a "pure" bourgeois state but that, through their participation and that of the free trade-unions, they have already transformed it into a *Sozialstaat* or a

¹ In the post-war period the composition of the Social Democratic party has shown definite changes. It has lost considerable portions of the workers in the large industrial centers to the Communists. This loss has been made up by drawing in elements from the lower middle classes as well as working-class elements from the smaller industrial centers.

soziale Republik in which the workers' rights are safeguarded. And they maintain that eventually by peaceful parliamentary means this *Sozialstaat* will "grow into" the socialist state. Consequently the more closely they participate in the state the sooner they will achieve socialism. It was therefore possible for one of their leaders to state:¹ "I find that in all of our activities we manifest a love for this state which is hardly equalled by any other social group at present."

This participation in the state led them to form in 1919 not merely the "Weimar Coalition" with the Democrats and Centre but led them in 1923-24 into the so-called "Large Coalition" which included the People's party, the party of the industrialists. Moreover, during the periods when they were not in the government they at no time formed an active opposition. On the contrary, they at times expressed a spirit of friendly neutrality. While in their propaganda they are violently opposed to the National Socialists (Fascists), one questions whether, if the necessity should arise, the Socialists, or at least a section of them, would not find some working agreement with them, in order to be able to retain some hold on their state, the *Sozialstaat*. While this is tactically impossible at present, such a policy would not be contrary to their concept of the *Sozialstaat* and their relation to such a state.

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The Democratic party, since 1930 the State party, is the republican successor of the Fortschrittliche Volkspartei, an organization of the more radical wing of the Liberals of the nineteenth century and of the carriers of the more liberal (and even republican) traditions of the Revolution of 1848. It was before the war the party of the liberal intellectuals and business interests who to a certain extent sought to preserve the ideals of the Frankfurt Assembly and as such never completely accepted the Bismarckian Empire as the last word in German unification. It stood for democratic reforms, even making election agree-

¹ Richard Seidel, "Staatsverneinung—Staatsbejahung" (in *Arbeit*, October, 1926, p. 633).

ments with the Social Democrats in 1912, hoping to achieve these reforms, however, by legal means.

Upon the outbreak of the revolution, the Progressive People's party reorganized, absorbing the left wing of the old National Liberals and taking the new name of Democratic party. It stood upon the basis of the Republic and strove to organize all liberal elements of the bourgeoisie and the middle classes so as to prevent a Socialist majority in the elections for the National Assembly in 1919. At the same time it struggled to gain support for the Republic against the reactionary groups. Backed by the influence of such respected papers as the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the *Berliner Tageblatt*, and the *Vossische Zeitung*, it polled over 18 per cent of the vote in the elections to the Weimar Assembly, practically the same as the Centre party and half that of the Social Democrats.

The party played an active part in the formation of the Weimar Constitution. In addition, it entered the Weimar Coalition, where, together with one wing of the Centre party, it represented the bourgeois elements of society. As a result, it shouldered the responsibility, for the signing of the Versailles Treaty and for the governmental policies of the first years of the peace. Unpopular as they were on this account, the Democrats became even less popular with the middle classes because of their continued co-operation with the Socialists—to combat whom they had originally planned. The result was that in the elections of 1920 they lost more than half of their votes. Torn between the desire to maintain their old liberal principles and the fear of losing more support, they have been unable to pursue a definite policy. Their strength has steadily declined, and their reorganization in 1930 as the "Staatspartei" has not prevented them from sinking to a representation of twenty in the Reichstag.¹ They preach loyalty to the national state and to the Republic, but emphasize its democratic and liberal character. Their former powerful position as a member of the Weimar Coalition has, however, disappeared, and they are now a party of slight im-

¹ In the elections of November, 1932, their representation has fallen to two members.

portance. Their decline is a definite reflection of the decline of liberal and democratic ideas among the bourgeoisie and the middle classes.

THE CATHOLIC CENTRE PARTY

The Centre party, as has been pointed out, was formed to represent that part of the Catholic population which consciously tries to protect Catholic interests in a state predominantly Protestant.¹ Having at its disposal centuries of experience in organization on the part of the Catholic church, it has become one of the best organized parties in Germany. Its effective discipline is achieved not by semi-military methods but by means of its appeal to the religious unity of the Catholic church. That is, the discipline is exerted not by the party itself but rather through the church along non-political lines. Through both the church and the state and by its emphasis upon the *Volksgemeinschaft*, it tries to develop the feeling of social and religious unity. The party, however, rests not merely upon the church proper but also upon the many auxiliary organizations affiliated with the latter.

The adherents of the Centre party are found mainly in the Catholic sections of Western and Southern Germany. Its basis is the middle classes of town and country. While from the outset it contained members of the Rhenish bourgeoisie, the industrialization of Germany gave it, furthermore, a foothold among the industrial proletariat. At the same time the increasing social and economic antagonisms of German society have had their effects upon the Centre party. Catholic workers slowly began to leave the leadership of the party. Furthermore, many Catholic peasants' sons, who went to work in the industrial centers, came under the influence of other parties. Thus we notice that while in 1874 the Catholic Centre received 27.9 per

¹ Karl Bachem, *Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik der deutschen Zentrumspartei*, 8 vols. (1927-31); Ludwig Bergsträsser, *Der politische Katholizismus, Dokumente seiner Entwicklung*, 2 vols. (1921-23); J. Meerfeld, *Die deutsche Zentrumspartei* (1918); Karl Heidemann, *Bismarcks Sozialpolitik und die Zentrumspartei 1881-1884* (1930); Martin Spahn, *Das deutsche Zentrum* (1907); Peter Maslovski, *Was ist die deutsche Zentrumspartei? Klerikalismus und Proletariat* (1925?); Josef Joos, *Die politische Ideenwelt des Zentrums* (1928); Georg Schreiber, *Zentrum und deutsche Politik* (1924).

cent of the total popular vote, by 1912 this had dropped to 16.4 per cent, the loss having been absorbed mainly by the Social Democrats.

During the World War the Centre, like all the other parties, did everything possible to carry on the war to a successful conclusion. As the continuation of the war seemed, however, to lead to no definite victory, the Centre party proposed the well-known peace resolution which was violently attacked by the nationalist elements throughout the country. Shortly after the outbreak of the revolution the Centre party pushed forward its leaders from the working-class elements, changed its name to the "Christian People's party" and came out in support of the Republic and the National Assembly. This it could do all the more easily for it had always been the carrier of south and west German opposition to the Bismarckian solution of a united Germany. Furthermore, due to its religious character it considered governmental forms as of secondary importance, and consequently could accept the Republic just as easily as it had accepted the Monarchy. Under the leadership of Erzberger it helped to form the Weimar Coalition with the Democrats and Social Democrats. Because of its participation in the newly formed government, the more conservative and particularistic Bavarian elements of the Centre party split off in 1919-20 to form the Bavarian People's party. This party co-operates with the Centre party on religious questions, maintaining, however, an independent position on certain economic and governmental issues.

The continuous participation in all governmental coalitions on the part of the Centre Party, as well as the continued economic crisis of the country, have, however, decreased the number of supporters of both clerical parties. Thus, while the Centre gained 18.9 per cent of the total popular vote in 1919—an increase over 1912—the combined clerical parties received only about 15 per cent in November, 1932, the lowest percentage of votes ever polled. Nevertheless, its losses are not so great as those of other governmental parties, partly because of its efficient organization and its close connection with the Catholic

church. Although slowly losing its foothold among the population, its political position is stronger now than before the World War, since it can exercise its influence in shaping national policies more directly and more effectively. In fact, the appointment of one of its leaders, Brüning, as chancellor gave it a power and influence never exercised before. Furthermore, as a middle party it has been able to join every coalition whether it was the Weimar Coalition with the Social Democrats or with the Nationalists, exercising at the same time a moderating influence upon the parties with which it has happened to be in coalition. Although important antagonisms of mainly a cultural nature exist between Fascists and the Centre, a future coalition is not impossible, especially in view of the fact that the Fascists have also parliamentary possibilities. Furthermore, the political philosophy of the Centre party is not tied up with any particular form of state, though at present it of course supports the parliamentary republic. Among its adherents it propagates the idea of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, the unity of the people and the nation. Thereby it tries to compromise all class antagonisms, on the basis, however, of the present bourgeois state and society.

GERMAN PEOPLE'S PARTY

The German People's party, before the war the National Liberal party, has always been the chief party of German big business.¹ It had its root in the liberal discussions and ideals of the early nineteenth century which eventually became crystallized in the form of the National Liberal party. As such it struggled for the rights of the bourgeoisie and became the chief protagonist of civic rights and national unity. Due to lack of space it will be impossible to make an analysis of the ideological development of this party.² All that can be pointed out is that after the com-

¹ Oskar Stillich, *Die politischen Parteien in Deutschland*. Vol. II, *Der Liberalismus* (1911); Oskar Klein-Hattingen, *Die Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus* (1911); Otto Westphal, *Die Welt und Staatsauffassung des deutschen Liberalismus* (1919); Hermann Goldschmidt, *Sterben und Werden des liberalen Bürgertums* (1919); Heinrich Beythien, *Der gewerbliche Mittelstand und die deutsche Volkspartei* (1921); Eduard Dingeldey, *Kampf und Politik der deutschen Volkspartei* (1931). See also the numerous *Flugschriften* published by the deutsche Volkspartei.

² For the economic forces that molded this ideology see chap. ii.

promise with Bismarck, the National Liberals became one of the mainstays of the Empire and as such were interested in civic ideals, mainly from the point of view of developing the concept of civic and national duties among the middle and lower classes. This attitude was still more emphasized during the World War when it was the chief protagonist for carrying on the war to a successful finish in order to give German industry new territories, new markets, and greater freedom for economic expansion.

The outbreak of the revolution of 1918 saw the National Liberals discredited. A split in the party took place, the left wing helping to form the new Democratic party. The remaining portion reorganized as the German People's party and participated in the elections for the Weimar Assembly, receiving, however, only 4.4 per cent of the total vote, as compared with 13.6 per cent of the vote in 1912. Its political program stood midway between that of the Democrats and that of the German Nationalists. While accepting much of the program of the former it refused to take a definite stand on the form of government, sympathizing, however, with the monarchy. As a result of the general dissatisfaction with the policies of the republican government, the People's party gained considerably in the elections of 1920, chiefly at the expense of the Democrats. The developments of the ensuing years, coming to a climax in the occupation of the Ruhr, and the almost complete disintegration of German economic life led the party to modify its attitude toward the Republic. To get a more direct control over the government the People's party decided to join the Weimar Coalition, composed of Centrists, Democrats, and Socialists, to form the "Large Coalition" under its leader, Stresemann. This policy of participation in a republican coalition which has continued down to the present forced the People's party to give up its monarchist sympathies and to become one of the supporters of the Republic. Its leader, Dr. Stresemann, instituted a foreign policy which has attempted to gain as much as possible for German industry at home and abroad. The party, however, relies less upon dramatic patriotic appeals, so characteristic of the Fascists, than upon a policy of diplomatic negotiations. In other words, it car-

ries on, for the time being, a policy of pacifist imperialism. Since the German economic crisis has increased rather than diminished, the popular support of the party has declined until in the elections of July, 1932, the representation of the party in the Reichstag was reduced to seven with a popular vote of a little over 1 per cent of the total. It staged a slight revival in the elections of November, 1932, when it was able to capture eleven seats.

THE GERMAN NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY

This party, representing the conservative and reactionary forces of the nation, is a continuation of the Conservative party of pre-republican days.¹ It originated to protect the interests of the conservative aristocracy of Prussia against the attacks of the bourgeois liberals. While being a political party it has always been against parliamentary government, preferring to exercise its political power by means of its control over the Prussian army and administrative bureaucracy.

With the introduction of universal suffrage under the Empire, the Conservatives were forced, against their will, to appeal to other classes for support. In the rural districts this was made possible by their claim to represent the "conservative and healthy" interests of agriculture against the industrialists and the radical workers in the cities. In their influence over the agricultural districts they were aided by their economic and social control over the agricultural workers as well as over the peasants dependent upon the large estates. The best means of consolidating their political influence upon the peasantry was by means of the Landbund, which was formed in 1893 to counteract the growing power of the bourgeoisie. Within the towns they could depend upon a portion of the bureaucracy, who, like the aristocracy, were accustomed to exercising authority in the state without the interference of a parliament. They could likewise look for support among the Protestant clergy. The Conservatives

¹ Oskar Stillich, *Die politischen Parteien in Deutschland*. Vol. I, *Die Konservativen* (1908); Kuno Westarp, *Die Regierung des Prinzen Max von Baden und die konservative Partei* (1921); See also the *Flugschriften der deutschnationalen Volkspartei* of which over 300 have been published since 1918 and which present in great detail the policies of the German Nationalists.

also found support among those sections of the old middle classes who were most firmly attached to the privileges and traditions of the "good old days," and who found themselves overshadowed by the new classes that were arising in the cities. Among the industrial workers, the Conservatives found support among two elements. In the first place, there were those who had recently come from the country and were still bound to their conservative ideas; secondly, those who found themselves in an opposition to the bourgeoisie not strong enough to bring them to Socialism, and who could consequently be brought into the ranks of the Conservatives. Though no serious attempts were made to create trade-unions, the Conservatives were nevertheless successful in organizing many of the shop clerks of Northern Germany into the *Deutschationale Handlungsgehilfenverband*.

With the gradual transformation of the landed aristocracy into a class of agrarian capitalists, the Conservatives gradually came into closer relations with the National Liberals. But the Conservatives continued to maintain their old political philosophy. They felt themselves as the only party which stood for "God, King, and Fatherland," for monarchy and autocracy, for the social and political privileges of the aristocracy, and for the glorious German traditions of the past, which were being endangered by all kinds of "modern" ideas. They did not stand for German patriotism but for Prussian, not for the citizen but for the subject, not for self-government of the nation but for autocracy, not for the intelligent free activity of the citizen but for the discipline of the soldier-subject, not for parliamentary government but for the powers of an administrative bureaucracy, not for religious freedom but for the state church as an organization in support of absolutism, not for freedom and rationalism but for authority and tradition.

It is quite clear that such a concept of patriotism would bring them into violent opposition with the revolutionary government of 1918. All their political and social privileges seemed in danger of being wiped out. They reorganized themselves, however, into the German Nationalist People's party and made an attempt to retain their hold over their old supporters. While favoring the

creation of the National Assembly in 1919 as a dam against Bolshevism, they nevertheless came out for the re-establishment of the monarchy. This caused them a loss in popular support, but the general dissatisfaction with both the foreign and domestic policy of the new republican government made many turn to the monarchist Nationalists to lead them back to the "good old days." In the December elections of 1924 they more than doubled their vote over that of 1919; receiving, together with the Landbund, 22.1 per cent of the total popular vote.

Their success as well as their need for higher agricultural tariffs finally forced them to compromise with their political ideals. They entered the government, forming a coalition with the People's party and the Centrists. Although politically monarchist, their economic ills required republican treatment. Since that time, however, they have rapidly lost in popularity for reasons that are not hard to find. Their participation in various government coalitions had apparently no influence in stemming the growth of the crisis of German economic life. Their partial support of the Young Plan, which they had condemned while out of office, destroyed the faith of many of their patriotic supporters. Then again, their program of re-establishing the monarchy lost them popularity.

By 1930 the Nationalists had lost over half of their adherents, being able to muster together with several small reactionary groups less than 10 per cent of the popular vote. Most of those who have supported the Nationalists have thrown their support to the Fascists who promise them a better world based upon destruction of the present reprehensible form of government, into which the Nationalists have allowed themselves to be lured. Due to the deadlock of the Reichstag in 1932 the Nationalists under the leadership of von Papen gained an extraordinary strategic position which they have utilized to dominate the government.

THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN LABOR PARTY (FASCISTS)

One of the most interesting political parties of post-war Germany is the National Socialist German Labor party (National

sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei), popularly known as the "Nazis."¹ Formed by officers and middle class elements during the period of inflation, it suffered an eclipse in the premature and much ridiculed "Beer Hall Revolt" of Munich in 1923. It, however, staged a dramatic and spectacular revival with the result that, in the elections of July, 1932, it secured nearly fourteen million votes and 230 seats in the Reichstag. In the elections of November of the same year the "Nazis" lost about two million votes. While this turn may indicate that they have passed the climax of their popular support, it still leaves them the strongest single party in Germany.

The rise and rapid growth of the "Nazis" is an expression of the crisis of post-war Germany and the failure of the bourgeoisie to solve it by ordinary means. During this period the power and influence of the bourgeoisie over the rest of the population has been strongly undermined. With the coming of the revolution and the establishment of parliamentary government its direct control over the government has depended more than heretofore upon popular support and upon parliamentary coalitions. In particular, the bourgeois parties have often had to share their power with the Social Democrats and free trade-unions whom they had to grant concessions. This they have done because they have felt that they needed the friendly support of the Social Democrats to keep the workers attached to the existing régime. For behind the Socialists has loomed the very real threat of the Communists, whose program is not to rehabilitate German capitalism but to overthrow it. Since this party has been steadily growing till it now numbers its adherents in millions who look upon Soviet Russia for inspiration and support, it has become

¹ Artur Dinter, *Ursprung, Ziel und Weg der deutschvölkischen Freiheitsbewegung* (1924); Alfred Rosenberg, *Wesen, Grundsätze und Ziele der nationalsozialistischen deutschen Arbeiterpartei* (1930); Weigand von Miltenberg, *Adolf Hitler; Wilhelm III* (1931); Wilhelm Frick, *Die Nationalsozialisten im Reichstag 1924-28* (1928); Karl Trossman, *Hitler und Rom* (1931); Alfons Wild, *Hitler und das Christentum* (1931); Lewis Wyndham, *Hitler* (1931); Emil Langyel, *Hitler* (1932); Nordicus (pseud.), *Hitlerism. The Iron Fist in Germany* (1931); Ernst Ottwalk, *Deutschland erwache! Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus* (1932); Margarete Wiener, *Vom nationalsozialistischen Wirtschaftsprogramm* (1931); Theodor Heuss, *Hitlers Weg* (1932); Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (1931); Erich Czech-Joehberg, *Hitler, eine deutsche Bewegung* (1930).

a real danger to the continuation of the existing régime. Moreover, the middle classes of town and country, one of the chief bulwarks of the bourgeoisie before the war, are being hit as hard if not harder by the crisis than the proletariat. They are showing definite signs of disintegration and revolt and are in danger of being drawn into the train of the Communist ideology of revolution. Finally, the German bourgeoisie is itself in an economic struggle to hold and improve its position in the world-market, requiring it to lower its cost of production among which wages and salaries form an important item. Confronted by its own economic problems as well as by a growing spirit of desperation and revolt among these classes against the present ruling parties and against the present form of state, the bourgeoisie has been forced to attempt to gain a more direct control over the government in order to rehabilitate itself. In fact, it aspires to gain dictatorial control which will enable it to consolidate its position in world capitalism at the expense of the German working class. For a dictatorship would enable it to suppress the Communists and thereby lessen the necessity of concessions to the Social Democrats, many of which have been granted because of the fear of Communism.

But the bourgeoisie realizes that in a modern industrialized state it is impossible to put through a dictatorship without a certain amount of mass support. This the Fascists or "Nazis" are to furnish. Contrary to the other parties of the bourgeoisie, the "Nazis" take as their psychological point of contact the growing spirit of revolt existing among the lower and middle classes. As their name already indicates, "National Socialist German Labor party," they make an appeal to those elements of the working class who already possess a socialist psychology or who are in danger of acquiring one. They make use of the anti-capitalistic feeling among the majority of workers by attempting to divert the antagonism against German capitalism into an antagonism against "foreign" and "Jewish" capitalism. In fact, "foreigners" and "Jews" play important rôles as bogeys in the Fascist movement. According to the Fascists they are the chief causes of Germany's downfall. It is the "foreign" capitalists

who under the leadership of the "international Jewish bankers" have sought the destruction of Germany and who now through the reparation payments try to keep Germany in perpetual subjugation. But it is not merely the "Jewish" and "foreign" capitalists that are attacked but also the "Jewish" and "foreign" ideals of Marxism. This "Jewish" and "foreign" International of Marxism is likewise trying to mislead the German working class, and it is the purpose of the "Nazis" to bring to the German workers the message of the "true national socialism," a socialism which will be introduced not by the Communists but by the "Nazis" under the leadership of Adolf Hitler. Just what they mean by this has never been clearly stated. They make use of the general dissatisfaction against parliamentarism by proposing a dictatorship, but not a dictatorship of the proletariat but a dictatorship of the "Nazis" under the leadership of Hitler. In fact, they make use of many popular revolutionary slogans in order to further their political ends.

Though the "Nazis" make a strong bid for support among the working class, their success has been principally among the middle classes of town and country. These elements, hit as hard by the crisis and in some cases even harder than the proletariat, feel a keen sense of revolt against their present condition. They have lost their faith in the political parties of the right, who have, on the whole, made their peace with the existing government and merely maintain a façade of opposition which crumbles before a real crisis. Thus both the Nationalist and the People's parties, despite many grumblings, accepted the Dawes and the Young Plans for the payment of the German reparations. These middle-class elements are looking for leadership, a leadership which will show them a way out of their misery. Certain elements have been sympathizing with the Communists but most are, as yet, too tied up ideologically with the existing régime to make such a radical break. They want a change but do not know just what they want. Unlike those workers who have developed a spirit of revolt and have embraced Communism which has given them a philosophy and method of revolution, the rebellious middle-class elements have no philosophy of revolution.

The "old" middle classes in the towns as well as the peasantry still cling to their old ideals of private property. The "new" middle classes whose economic status is becoming more and more similar to that of the proletariat oppose, on the whole, a Communist philosophy because they do not want to lose the only difference which still separates them from the workers, namely, their social superiority. They want a new world but not one in which the working class will be supreme. But while they still retain these social prejudices, their increasing disintegration forces them to action. The danger of such a situation for the stability of the existing state has been fully realized by the bourgeoisie and the "Nazis" who have been able to keep most of these rebellious strata from moving to the left by promising them a new world which will revive the economic and social privileges which they formerly possessed. Moreover, they have promised the impoverished peasants more land as well as a reduction of taxes and interest rates. They explain to the middle classes just as to the workers that their economic misery is due to the oppression of Germany by the Allies, to the machinations of the international "Jewish" bankers both at home and abroad, as well as to the "Jewish" un-German and disloyal doctrines of international Marxism.

They promise to do away with the present inefficient parliamentary system by a dictatorship of the "Nazis" under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, a "German" dictatorship which will solve all foreign and domestic problems, a dictatorship which they call the "Third Empire" and which is to revive the national glories of the old German Empire of the Middle Ages as well as of that overthrown by the "Jewish Marxists" in 1918. This dictatorship is to rest on the army, the police, and the bureaucracy, which can be depended upon to carry out the necessary measures. They, furthermore, propose, though somewhat vaguely, that the future state take the form of a *Ständestaat*. According to this concept the existing class stratification of society is not merely to remain but is to be petrified. Parliament with its concept of formal democracy would be abolished and replaced by a kind of advisory economic body consisting of the representa-

tives of the various economic groups. While this economic body would, probably, be under the domination of the bourgeoisie it would help to tie up the lower and middle classes to such a dictatorship, at the same time, however, "keeping them in their place." For the "Nazis" recognize that in a modern industrial state a dictatorship is only possible if the middle and especially the lower classes are drawn into the administrative activities. This side of their philosophy is mentioned to the middle classes rather than to the workers, for it makes the former feel that in such a state their social and economic privileges would be restored and safeguarded.

The "Nazis," however, do not present any clearly worked out political or economic system. This is, of course, quite obvious since the chief aim of this party is to keep the lower and middle classes from becoming revolutionary. In order to do this they are willing to promise anything to any stratum as long as they can hope thereby to gain their support. This ideological confusion they cleverly conceal by a great outburst of oratorical energy, flag-waving, and demonstrations. They are quite nebulous about how they are to carry out all their proposals. This nebulousness, however, is not a handicap to them. On the contrary, it not only helps to cover up the ideological confusion, but the very nebulousness of the new world which they propose to establish appeals especially to those elements of the middle classes who seek to escape their present misery by a kind of political romanticism.

The almost meteoric growth of the Fascists during the last few years and their great success in the elections of 1932, however, alarmed the financial backers of the Fascists who have little desire for political disturbances that might weaken Germany's international economic position. After the elections they therefore forced the leader of the Fascists, Adolf Hitler, to make a declaration that the attempts of the Fascists to achieve the Third Empire under a Fascist dictatorship must be carried on for the time being within the framework of parliamentary government. This attitude was emphasized by the decision of Hitler and his fellow-leaders to accept the restrictions im-

posed upon both Fascists and Communists by the federal government in the spring of 1931. This, of course, has caused much opposition among those elements which took the revolutionary slogans of the Fascists seriously and has resulted in the expulsion of insurgent groups from the party, some of whom have drifted to the Communists. The future popularity of the "Nazis" depends upon how cleverly they can conceal their reactionary basis with their appeals to the lower and middle classes by means of revolutionary slogans. For it is quite obvious that the Fascists are playing a very dangerous game and their tactics are only possible where the ideological control of the bourgeoisie over state and society is so weak that it must use the slogans of its enemies to maintain its own power.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Just as the formation of the Fascists is the answer of the bourgeoisie to the deep-rooted crisis of post-war Germany, so the development of the Communist party is the proletarian answer to this same crisis. The complete success of either means the destruction of the other, and the struggle between the two is coming to occupy more and more the center of the German political stage. Of the two the Communist party is the older. Formed only after the war, it nevertheless had its forerunners in the pre-war period. As has already been shown, the Social Democratic party during the period of the Empire had gradually developed into an organization supporting the existing régime. Within the party, however, a left wing, which strove for the maintenance of revolutionary ideals, under the leadership of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht had gradually crystallized. During the World War this left wing broke away from the Social Democrats and organized the Spartacus group. It co-operated with the revolutionary groups from other countries, including the Bolsheviks, and greeted the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution of October, 1917, as the first step in the world revolution, to be followed soon by the German revolution. This ideal was formerly laid down as a policy in a conference held in September, 1918. The slogan of the Spartacists was: "Turn the Imperialist War into a Civil War."

The outbreak of the German revolution found the Spartacus group, however, numerically weak and too poorly organized to be able to seize the reigns of government. In fact, it was not definitely organized as a Communist party until December, 1918. It tried to force the Independent Social Democratic party, formed during the war and later on participating in the provisional government, into a definite revolutionary stand, but was unable to do so. As a result of the unsuccessful uprisings in Berlin in January, 1919, it lost its very influential leaders, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. It was further weakened by the unsuccessful revolts in Bremen, the Ruhr, Brunswick, and especially by the overthrow of the Soviet republic in Munich. Nevertheless, the general economic conditions immediately following the war so strengthened the revolutionary tendencies in Germany that in 1920 the majority of the Independent Socialists joined the Communist party which now represented a well-organized mass movement among the industrial workers. Its influence grew rapidly toward the end of the period of inflation. So strong did the Communists feel themselves that, by getting partial control of Saxony, they attempted to pave the way for a German revolution, which, however, did not materialize. In the elections of May, 1924, the party received the support of about four million voters, this being 12-13 per cent of the total national vote. Stabilization and the temporary return of prosperity reduced the Communist vote considerably, so that in the elections of September, 1924, its share of the vote fell to 9 per cent. With the economic crisis which set in with renewed force in 1926 and which has continued down to the present, the Communists have grown steadily, until in 1930 they received over four and a half million votes, or about 13 per cent of the total vote cast. In November, 1932, their total vote was almost six million or about 17 per cent of the total.

The program of the German Communist party is the same as that of the Communist International of which it is a section. It advocates the destruction of the existing state and society together with the various forms of its administrative machinery, and the establishment of a proletarian state which is to make

the form of a proletarian dictatorship. This state, however, is not to be a permanent institution, but is gradually to die off after it has performed its duty of bringing about a classless Communist society. This whole process is, however, not to take place in Germany alone, but it is to be part of a world revolution. The allegiance of the Communists is thus to the international, revolutionary working class, and particularly to Soviet Russia, which they regard as their fatherland, the first country in which the workers have achieved power, and which is on its way to the realization of the Communist ideal. They do not ignore the problem of differences in languages and national cultures but insist on relegating them to a secondary position. According to them, nationality and national cultures must be disentangled from their present integration with bourgeois society and the bourgeois state, as has been done by Soviet Russia. There, each national group is encouraged to foster its own national culture, while the economic and political life of all of these groups is directed by a central body representing all nationalities. This solution of the problem can, however, be achieved only under proletarian rule. They denounce the Versailles Treaty and the oppression of Germany by the Allies but claim that the workers are the main sufferers of this suppression and that the liberation of Germany can only be brought about by the workers themselves by means of a successful proletarian revolution in Germany and the rest of Europe if not of the whole world. In keeping with the general program of the Communist party, they participate in parliamentary elections but consider them of value only from the point of view of propaganda. Their activities in parliament are carried on from the same viewpoint, and they participate in parliamentary life only so as better to expose its defects.

The future strength depends upon the future economic development of Germany and upon their own ability to organize the discontent of the lower classes and disintegrating middle classes. They have built up not merely a well-organized and active party but a whole series of auxiliary organizations as well, with which they attempt to attach the workers to the

ideals of the proletarian revolution by other than merely political means. The support of the Communist party comes, of course, mainly from the industrial workers, especially those working in large industrial plants and in the mines. They have attempted with less success to gain a foothold among the agricultural laborers. They have also sought to gain influence among the poorer peasantry who are suffering from the agricultural crisis as well as among the lower middle classes whose economic status is in many cases hardly different from that of the industrial workers. In order to increase their influence their efforts are directed mainly against the Fascists and Social Democrats. Their hatred is especially bitter against the latter, whom they accuse of having betrayed the principles of international Socialism. Nevertheless, their struggle is directed primarily against the "Nazis" and allied groups, for these are the most aggressive and dangerous representatives of the bourgeoisie. In fact, one can say that the future struggles within Germany will center mainly around the struggle between these two parties. They are not political parties in the ordinary sense of the word. They are the most outspoken representatives of two mutually antagonistic forms of society, the one defending the bourgeois, the other fighting for the proletarian.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ADMINISTRATIVE BUREAUCRACY

Having indicated the character of the German state and its relationship to parliament on the one hand, the bureaucracy and the army on the other hand, it will be necessary to consider in greater detail the importance of both the latter in the growth of German nationalism and civic loyalty. For the bureaucracy and the army have been the chief means by which the upper classes have directly exercised their authority and power over the rest of the population. While the civil bureaucracy does not possess the external glamor and the appeal to the popular imagination which the army does, it has nevertheless been just as effective an agent and, at present, is probably even more effective in attaching the interests and ideologies of the various classes of society to the state. It has not only survived all political and economic revolts but has even emerged from each crisis stronger and more powerful. The historical development of Germany, as well as that of other nations, seems to show that a well-organized bureaucracy is one of the least destructible of all social organisms. This relative indestructibility has been of tremendous significance in carrying the German bourgeois state successfully through the various crises. The bureaucracy as a result has strongly influenced the civic and national mentality of the population.

From the very inception of the bureaucracy the development of the machinery of civil administration has stood in close relation to the development of the bourgeoisie as well as that of absolutism.¹ It represented the bourgeois element in the abso-

¹ The material dealing with the early developments of the bureaucracy has been taken mainly from Otto Hintze, *Der Beamtenstand* (1911), as well as from the chapter "Bürokratie" in Max Weber, *Grundriss der Sozialökonomie*, Sec. III. The following have also been found useful: S. Isaacsohn, *Geschichte des preussischen Beamtenstands vom Anfang des 15. Jahrhunderts bis auf die Gegenwart* (2 vols.; 1874); Albert Lotz, *Geschichte des deutschen Beamtenstands* (1914); Fritz Winters, *Abriss der Geschichte des Beamtenstands* (1922).

lute state, an element without which the latter could not have come into existence. It is true that before the rise of the bourgeoisie the various feudal rulers had carried on the administration of their territories by appointing members of the clergy or aristocracy to various posts. But these activities had not been of a systematic nature and had not resulted in the establishment of an administrative apparatus. Appointments were dependent not only upon the whims of the ruler but were also of a temporary nature. Most important, however, was the fact that most of those intrusted with administrative affairs had been drawn from the nobility and the clergy and as such were not politically reliable.

The growing importance of the bourgeoisie at the beginning of the sixteenth century brought about a change. In their attempts to make themselves independent of their vassals the various rulers began to appoint permanent officials with technical knowledge to assist them in the administration of their territory, thus forming the embryo of a permanent and centralized administrative machine. The officials were very often chosen from the bourgeoisie, partly to offset the power of the aristocracy and partly because the former had the education or experience for carrying on the administration of the absolute state in an efficient business-like manner.

With the gradual decline of the bourgeoisie toward the end of the sixteenth century, the aristocracy began to regain control of most of the leading administrative positions. At the same time the sons of the aristocracy began to attend universities to obtain the knowledge necessary for administrative work. During the following century the aristocracy succeeded in forcing the rulers to refrain from appointing commoners to the higher administrative posts. Furthermore, it succeeded in getting control over the local and provincial officials of the king, thus creating a strong aristocratic bulwark against the centralizing tendencies of the absolute monarchy, as well as against the growing infiltration of bourgeois elements into the state.

The revival of economic life at the beginning of the eighteenth century was paralleled by a renewed attempt of the various

rulers to strengthen their power over the aristocracy. In Prussia, special commissioners were appointed with extraordinary powers who proved a valuable aid in combatting the various aristocratic cliques which had entrenched themselves in the government. These commissioners were either foreigners or were drawn directly from the reliable elements of the royal army. It was under Frederick William I that the foundation of the Prussian bureaucracy was laid. In 1723 he united the various commissioners with the administrative chamber of his private royal domains into a General Directory of Finance, War and Domains (General - Ober - Finanz - Krieg - und Domänen - Direktorium) which represented the central administrative authority of the absolute monarch and had administrative control over finances, police, army, and the private estates of the king. Members of the General Directory, who appeared an hour late to the meetings announced by the king, were fined a hundred gulden, while a failure to appear at the meeting at all resulted in a fine equivalent to one-half of a year's salary. Private economic activity on the part of the officials was prohibited. Infractions against these rules were punished severely, in case of councilors of the chamber even by physical punishment. The acceptance of bribes or presents resulted in immediate dismissal. Examinations were introduced even for those candidates with academic degrees. Higher government officials were generally appointed to provinces other than those in which they resided, so that they would spend their time in carrying out the king's orders rather than attending to their own affairs. This also tended to break down the still very strong provincialism of the times. The pay was generally very low; in fact, the expression *travailler pour le roi de Prusse* came to mean work which paid practically nothing. The lower posts of local administration were filled by former non-commissioned officers who had seen a certain amount of military service. This new centralized body of officials was composed of men from the army or from the sons of the bourgeoisie who understood something of business administration, agriculture, or manufacturing. They represented the spirit of the new military state, and became the agents of absolutism and cen-

tralization. These were the officials of whom Frederick William I said in his usual drastic way: "They shall dance as I whistle or the devil take me." At the same time the universities were more and more used to train young members of the bourgeoisie and aristocracy for various government posts by means of the so-called Cameralist studies, which presented an introduction into the problems of political economy and government administration.

Frederick the Great made no important changes in the administrative machine except that he followed his general policy of favoring the nobility rather than the bourgeoisie. He proposed to have the rights and duties of his officials made part of the general law code (*Allgemeines Landrecht*) which he had ordered to be written. He died before its completion. Under the pressure of the French Revolution it was finally completed in 1794 and Part II, sec. 10, was headed: "Concerning the rights and duties of the servants of the state."¹

The reaction of the French Revolution upon Germany resulted in a strengthening of the administrative bureaucracy as well as of the position of the bourgeoisie within the bureaucracy. Through the reforms of Stein and Hardenberg, the bureaucracy was reorganized, centralized, and enlarged, and many of its upper positions opened to the bourgeoisie. This absorption of some of the more advanced elements of the bourgeoisie by giving them a chance to participate in the administrative activities of the absolute state partly helped to weaken such demands as existed for some kind of representative government. At the same time, the establishment of municipal self-government created a considerable number of "indirect" officials (*mittelbare Beamte*) who felt themselves part of the Prussian bureaucracy. Unlike the "direct" state officials, many of the city officials were

¹ It is interesting to note that the officials were no longer called "servants of the king," as had been the case previously, but "servants of the state." This was an indication that the former personal relationship between the monarch and the individual official was gradually being replaced by the more impersonal and abstract relationship between the state and the machinery of administration. During the earlier part of the nineteenth century the more bourgeois term of "official" was finally substituted for the feudal-absolutist term "servant."

elected by the voters of the community, though not by universal suffrage. Moreover, the institution of "honorary" officials (*Ehrenbeamte*) came into existence which made it compulsory for every voter called upon by the municipal administration to act as an unsalaried official. These appointments as honorary officials were very much sought after, since they gave the individual important political and economic influence as well as social prestige. Both of these characteristics of the municipal government have been maintained down to the present and have helped to bring the municipal officials into closer contact with the population.

In Bavaria the influence of the French Revolution was more direct than in Prussia. There, Minister Montgelas issued the famous Landespragmatik in 1805, which completely reorganized the administrative bureaucracy along the bourgeois lines laid down by Napoleon. This reorganization has, moreover, remained the basis of the Bavarian administrative body up to the present.

Although the power of the bourgeoisie in the administrative body of the state was reduced during the period of reaction, it nevertheless came out of this whole period of reorganization stronger than before. Moreover, the first half of the nineteenth century witnessed an increasing transformation of the administrative body into an impersonal machine which, while directed by the monarch, came, however, more and more to function as a distinct apparatus without any special attention on the part of the monarch. Thus it was during the period after 1815 that Prussia introduced a systematic regulation of the rights and duties of public officials. In 1817 an order was issued which classified government officials according to their position and income, a classification which has remained the basis to the present with this modification: that many subdivisions have been made since then within each group. In the following decade, the matter of pensions, permanency of employment, examinations, insurance, etc., were definitely regulated. These regulations became the basis for later developments and were not affected either by the Prussian constitution of 1850 or the federal constitution of 1871.

While some form of parliamentary government was demanded by a part of the bourgeoisie and the middle classes during the first part of the nineteenth century, the indirect absorption of another part into the administration contributed to weaken these bourgeois forces opposed to the existing state. Especially did this become true as the economic activities of the state increased through the extension of the postal service, the development and the later monopolization of the railroad system by the various states, as well as the development of other state economic enterprises. Indeed, some of the biggest capitalist enterprises of the country were state enterprises. As a result, a great host of officials who otherwise would have occupied administrative posts in the economic enterprises of private corporations, and who would have aided the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the semi-absolute state, now became a part of the administrative machine of that state. This weakened the political driving force of an independent bourgeoisie, at the same time reinforcing the political and ideological power of the state.

The unification of Germany and the compromise of the bourgeoisie with the aristocracy gave both classes a joint interest in making the administrative bureaucracy an unshakable pillar for the maintenance of the existing régime. With the growth of socialism the bourgeoisie together with the aristocracy began to look upon the bureaucracy and the army as the two powerful forces that would uphold the existing régime against any possible Socialist parliamentary majority.

At the same time, the formation of the German Empire created a new network of federal officials superimposed upon the bureaucracy of the states and whose duties and rights were regulated by the law of 1873. During the following decades a great increase in the size of the bureaucracy took place as a result of the extension of the administrative activities of the various states and the Empire. Thus the government came to own the railroads, canals, telegraph and telephone lines, etc., and continued to exploit to a greater extent the state forest resources, coal mines, etc., while the various cities developed a policy of municipal ownership of public utilities. Moreover, the

increasing amount of social legislation also required a new body of officials. This increase of the number of officials was particularly great among the so-called *Betriebsbeamten*, i.e., those officials working in the economic enterprises of the government, as opposed to the *Hoheitsbeamten*, i.e., those who carried on the actual administrative work of the government such as taxation, internal and foreign affairs, police, etc. Moreover, the increase among the lower officials was much more rapid than among the higher, especially among those in economic enterprises. As these came from the lower and middle classes of society the government finally decided not to extend to all of the new government employees the status of government officials (*Beamte*) which carried with it the right of permanence of employment, pensions, social standing, etc. As a result, a considerable portion of the employees of the government, especially of the railway and the post-office, were employed as "state workers" (*staatliche Arbeiter*) while others, doing clerical work, became "state employees" (*staatliche Angestellte*). This helped to preserve the feeling of superiority and exclusiveness of the bureaucracy which was composed largely of the upper and middle classes by preventing the lower classes from entering the bureaucracy in any considerable number. This tremendous army of government officials numbered over a million by 1913. To this total, several hundred thousand government "workers" must be added, so that the total number of people in the employment of the government amounted to about one and a half million, not including the army and the navy.

For the middle classes, the petty bourgeoisie, the bureaucracy has always been of great importance, especially since the latter part of the nineteenth century. In the first place, the lower and middle, as well as a considerable portion of the upper, bureaucracy were composed and still are largely composed of middle-class elements. In fact, the greater part of the bureaucracy is generally classified as belonging to the middle classes. To most of the members of the middle classes, the career of a government official was desirable, for it gave them economic security as well as social prestige. This was a most important,

though outwardly perhaps invisible, factor in making the petty bourgeoisie feel itself a part of the state. For it was not the official alone but also his family, his relatives, his friends, who were brought into direct ideological dependence upon the state and who were warmed, so to speak, by the rays of that all-powerful sun, the German state. It was as members of the bureaucracy or as friends or relatives of these members that they were best able to lift themselves socially and ideologically above the lower classes. It was, therefore, these middle classes who were the most active defenders and carriers of the tradition of the bureaucracy. It was they who felt most proud of the superiority of the German administrative machine over that of other countries.

Among the peasantry, the bureaucracy has played a less important rôle. Only a very small portion of the sons of the peasantry can look forward to a career as a lower official. Its significance to the peasantry has lain in the fact that the administrative officials of the local, state, and national government, together with the army, represented the power of the state.

For the newly arising industrial proletariat of the nineteenth century, the bureaucracy had the same political significance as the army. It was one of the outstanding physical embodiments of an apparently all-powerful state of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie.

The existence and activities of the bureaucracy had both a negative and a positive reaction upon the proletariat. That portion of the proletariat which was imbued with the feeling of patriotism and which possessed no deep-rooted antagonism toward the ruling classes was strengthened in its patriotism by the power and activities of the bureaucracy. This loyalty was strengthened by the fact that the state employed many workers and lower officials who came from the working classes. For some, therefore, the chance of getting a position as an official or "state worker" helped in developing a friendly attitude toward the state. A position with the government meant either lifetime employment with pension or, if one was appointed as a "state worker," it meant steadier employment than with a private concern. Moreover, being an employee of the state gen-

erally gave the individual a feeling of social superiority toward his fellow-workers in private industries. This factor was especially significant in small communities.

Those workers, on the other hand, who came under the influence of the Social Democrats saw in the bureaucracy merely a concrete manifestation of the detested semi-absolute state to which they were opposed. But despite the fact that the bureaucracy was in many ways an object of hatred even among non-Socialist working-class elements, the feeling of the apparently inevitable necessity of the existing bureaucracy as the administrative organ of any government was deeply rooted even among the Socialist elements. This contradiction in the attitude of the Socialists toward the bureaucracy, arising from their contradictory attitude toward the German state, led finally to a tacit acceptance of the bureaucratic machine of the existing state as a necessary administrative body. Such opposition as existed toward the bureaucracy found vent in proposals for reforming the "militaristic" and "bureaucratic" spirit of the administrative machine by bringing it under the direct control of the Reichstag and the diets of the various states. In fact, the more the Social Democracy turned away from its original revolutionary theories the more were the statements of Marx and Engels on the necessity of destroying the state machinery ignored or forgotten, while the importance of administrative duties seemed to grow continually. As a result, the outbreak of the war made it easy for the Socialists to accept the bureaucracy as a part of the national state which must be defended.

The powerful bureaucracy has in many ways the same significance for the agricultural proletariat as for the industrial proletariat. To the agricultural laborer, the administrative bureaucracy was one of the most obvious manifestations of the all-powerful state, an all-powerful force against which it was impossible to rebel. Before the war, in the eastern part of Prussia, the landlord who controlled the local government officials was often himself the local judge and administrator. The result was that in the mind of the agricultural worker the employer and the state were closely allied. The bureaucracy, therefore, was

an engine of oppression which appeared to him much more powerful than to the industrial worker. As a result, the reaction among the industrial proletariat. Instead of creating a widespread spirit of opposition against the bureaucracy as an institution, the farmer's low cultural level and consequent lack of political interest and understanding led to an attitude of hopelessness in the face of insurmountable obstacles. The existing dissatisfaction took on the form of a personal resentment against the individual officials with whom the agricultural worker came in contact. In the pre-war period the Social Democracy had succeeded in gaining support among certain elements of these workers. But since the Social Democracy itself had no clear-cut attitude toward the bureaucracy, their followers among the agricultural workers naturally had an even more confused notion of the rôle of the bureaucracy.

Having analyzed the influence of the bureaucracy upon the middle and lower classes, it will be necessary to indicate how the upper classes developed the bureaucracy into such a loyal and serviceable weapon in maintaining their power over the rest of the population. For it is quite obvious that the sociological structure, the discipline, efficiency, honesty, dependability, and general morale of the tremendous administrative apparatus necessarily had an important reaction upon the civic and national consciousness of the population.

In the first place, the state has always tried to draw its members from those strata which by their position in the framework of society were loyal to the state. However, with the increased growth in size of the bureaucracy and the necessity of taking in an increasing number of elements from the lower and lower middle classes, this became increasingly difficult. As has already been shown, the government attempted to counteract the danger inherent in such a development by refusing to a large portion of workers employed by it the rights and privileges of government officials. At the same time this had the effect of artificially dividing government employees into the more privileged elements of the bureaucracy proper and the socially and economically less privileged employees or workers.

Moreover, the government attempted to strengthen the cohesiveness and dependability of the bureaucracy by a policy of "depolitization" (*Entpolitisierung*). The government tried to develop among the bureaucracy a disinterestedness in social, economic, and political problems by making them, as representatives of the state, feel superior to the everyday problems of the ordinary citizen. Such a policy became all the more necessary with the rapid growth of the bureaucracy both in size and scope of activities during the second half of the nineteenth century and the necessity of taking in increasing numbers from the lower classes who often entertained Socialist ideas. Officials were not merely prevented from openly supporting the social democracy; but it was considered best to keep them from actively espousing the cause of any political party. The more successfully discussions of social, economic, and political problems could be kept out of the bureaucracy, the more reliable it would be as a tool of the government.

But while the bureaucracy as a body did not participate actively in the political struggles of the time, it was (as has been pointed out before), in fact, the superior political force in the nation as compared to the political parties and to parliament, and the members of the bureaucracy were to a considerable extent conscious of this. They were conscious of the fact that Prussia had grown to be a powerful state and that the unification of Germany had finally come, not as the result of the activities of political parties and of parliament but because of the power, strength, and discipline of the German and, particularly, the Prussian army and bureaucracy. They felt that, while the political parties were carrying on their propaganda and the various parliaments were engaged in lengthy discussions, it was the activity, the discipline, and the loyalty of the bureaucracy, and the army, which had made Germany a great power at home and abroad. This feeling of political superiority also served to place the bureaucracy as a cornerstone of devotion, loyalty, and power in the minds of the German people, an attitude which the government did everything to foster.

Besides developing a feeling among the bureaucracy of politi-

cal superiority, the government tried to develop a distinct loyalty among its bureaucracy by giving to all its administrative officials a conscious feeling of economic security not enjoyed by the rest of the population. For a number of reasons mainly of a financial nature the government did not keep its wage and salary above those of civil life; in fact, many categories received remunerations below that which they would have received in private enterprises. This negative fact, however, was more than balanced by security of position. Government officials were distinguished from other wage-earners by being appointed for life and they could be dismissed only after a long and involved trial before a special court. In addition, every official was entitled to a pension after he had reached a certain age, generally one-half to two-thirds of his salary, depending on the length of his service.

All of these methods tended to create a loyal administrative machine, distinct from and above the rest of the population. At the same time it maintained a high standard of honesty and a sense of duty within the officials. Cases of dishonesty on the part of public officials were rare, and where they occurred led to immediate dismissals. Dishonesty was held incompatible with loyalty to ruler and fatherland. At the same time, the government developed within the bureaucracy a feeling of objectivity in performance of their duties. The more the official suppressed his own personality and desires, the more he became an impersonal part in the administrative machine; and the better the machine functioned, the more was he considered a loyal and efficient official. The ideals which were most sacred to the official were those of *Sachlichkeit* (objectivity), *Ehrlichkeit* (honesty), and *Pflichtgefühl* (sense of duty). Thus there was created a tremendous apparatus the members of which were represented as a kind of model of what the state considered to be the ideal subject-citizen.

While the government tried by these various means to develop the bureaucracy into a unified and loyal body distinct from and above the rest of the population, the very structure of the bureaucracy showed that there was no social homogeneity.

This was shown in the fact that the members of the bureaucracy were divided into upper, middle, and lower officials reflecting more or less the strata of society from which they were drawn. Admission to these three layers of the bureaucracy depended upon educational prerequisites which corresponded to these class differences. Thus a higher education was necessary to enter the upper bureaucracy, secondary education to enter the middle bureaucracy, and an elementary-school education to enter the lower bureaucracy. As time went on, the government, while retaining these divisions, tried to counteract their disintegrative effects by subdividing each layer into many minute strata which were differentiated by petty gradations of salary, administrative rank, title, and power. While these differences were of secondary nature, they served to play off the various strata against each other and prevented a unified stand of one layer against the other or, what is more important, against the government.

Since the social composition of the bureaucracy reflected, on the whole, the economic structure of society, the growing antagonisms in society during the latter part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries were also reflected within the bureaucracy and the government employees. Thus, in 1897 the Union of German Railway Workers (Verband Deutscher Eisenbahner) was organized under the guidance of the Socialist free trade-unions. The government realizing the danger of such an organization attempted to suppress it by taking restraining measures against the functionaries of the organization. This method, however, proving unsuccessful, the government attempted in 1904 to form a counter-organization, a kind of company-union of Prussian-Hessian Railway Workers' Societies. This union was created of the already existing local, nationalist societies of a social nature which had a membership of about 170,000. Three million marks were donated by the government. Besides this union there existed a Christian National Railway Workers' Union which the government did not specially favor but which it utilized in its struggle against the Socialist Railway Workers' Union. The latter organization eventually joined the Socialist Union of German Transport Workers (Verband Deutscher Transport-Arbeiter). Several other unions were

formed, of which the Union of Middle Federal Postal and Telegraph Officials was the most important.¹ The activities of these unions were, however, of a very limited nature since not merely strike activities but also the right to organize were considered contrary to the duty of government officials.

With the outbreak of the World War all differences within the bureaucracy disappeared from the surface. Not only did the bureaucracy seem a unified body, but it grew in size and power, until it became the civil arm of the all-powerful army in the attempt to bring the war to a successful conclusion. The members of the bureaucracy retained their prestige and privileges as the civil administrators of the government, and at the same time the needs of the bureaucratic machine exempted most of them from military service.

The end of the war brought about the dissolution of the vast army and its reduction to a nominal size of a hundred thousand men, but the bureaucracy remained not merely intact but assumed a proportionately greater rôle in the eyes of the nation than ever before. It was one of the outstanding physical embodiments of the continuity of bourgeois control over society from the pre-revolutionary to the post-revolutionary period. The control of the Social Democrats over the government precipitated no attempts to destroy the old bureaucracy. On the contrary, they openly attacked those workers' and soldiers' councils which attempted to interfere with or control the activities of the administrative apparatus. They tried to maintain the bureaucracy as a system, merely changing a number of leading political officials, and giving preference to the supporters of the republican parties when new appointments were made. This was in line with the whole Socialist policy, for the Socialists did not seek to bring about any fundamental changes in state and society. On the contrary, they tried to gain as much support as possible from among the bureaucracy as well as from other forces of the old régime to combat the more dangerous threat of the proletarian revolution and dictatorship.

Even the Independent Socialists stood, in most cases, helpless

¹ Fritz Winters, *Geschichte des Verbandes mittlerer Reichs-, Post- und Telegraphenbeamten* (1915).

before the state administrative machine; for an attitude of awe, fear, and helplessness toward the tremendous administrative machine had been so strongly ingrained among them during the pre-war period that they made no serious attempts to destroy it. Their admiration for law and order and their lack of self-confidence was so great that they could not conceive of a German government existing without the trained and experienced bureaucracy that had grown up in the past. As a result, their attitude was the same as that of the Social Democrats. Where they had influence in the state workers' and soldiers' councils they dismissed a few leading officials and replaced them by men sympathetic with the revolutionary movement. Basically, the reason for this attitude was that the Independent Socialists had inherited the general attitude toward the bureaucracy from the Social Democrats from whom they had broken away during the war. Moreover, they were too busily engaged in their pacifistic campaign to end the war to recognize the tremendous political significance of the bureaucracy.

It was only as a result of the experience of the revolutionary elements in the German revolution as well as the influence of the Russian revolution that a more definite attitude was expressed in the platform of the Communist party.¹ The latter has become definitely opposed to the existing administrative machine, as being an integral part of the present state, and comes out openly in favor of destroying it. The Communists propose in the case of the establishment of a future dictatorship to break up the administrative machine as a machine, making use, however, of the various parts, especially the lower categories, in order to build up the administrative body of a future proletarian state. In the meantime they try to gain influence among certain elements of the bureaucracy by supporting the lower officials as well as the other state workers and employees in their grievances against the state or against the upper officials. It is thus that the Communists are the only portion of the working class, and for that matter, of the whole nation, which is directly working for a disintegration of the present bureaucratic machine.

¹ Important in the crystallization of this problem was Lenin's *State and Revolution*.

A great part of the Socialist workers probably retain their former ingrained distrust and dislike of the bureaucracy but still do not see any way of changing it. Furthermore, they are sufficiently controlled by their leaders to accept at least theoretically the present bureaucracy as a necessary support for the existing republican régime. One may, therefore, say that with the exception of the case of the Communist workers, the size, training, efficiency, and apparent omnipotence of the present German bureaucracy is a potent factor in helping to develop and maintain an allegiance and loyalty among the workers to the present German national state.

As has been pointed out before, the bureaucracy has been one of the most important elements to the bourgeoisie for maintaining the continuity of its control over society from the pre-revolutionary to the post-revolutionary period. There have been, however, a number of objections against certain post-war developments within the bureaucracy on the part of the bourgeoisie as well as the aristocracy. Of outstanding importance has been the fact that the bureaucracy was considerably increased in size during the war and the early post-war period, a result partly of the introduction of the eight-hour day and partly of the introduction of sympathetic elements by the Socialists. As a result, the state apparatus tended to become too "republican" while at the same time it became too costly to support. Furthermore, the existence of the eight-hour day in the government service tended to maintain an eight-hour day in private industry.

The reorganization of the whole administrative machine since 1924, however, has changed the above situation. The eight-hour day has been done away with in many cases, especially in industrial state enterprises including the railways. The number of officials has been greatly reduced so that, with the exception of the police force, it is now smaller than in 1913. The introduction of the speed-up system and other forms of efficiency has become an aid to the bourgeoisie in bringing about similar changes in its own private enterprises. Furthermore, salaries have been decreased at various times since 1924, the government thus furnishing an example which private industries have not been slow

in imitating. The greater part of the bourgeoisie now sees in the bureaucracy a powerful apparatus to carry out the policies it has helped to shape in the Reichstag and in the diets of the various states. If one adds to this the fact that the bourgeoisie now fills most of the higher posts in the bureaucracy which were formerly exclusively in the hands of the aristocracy, one can safely conclude that the bureaucracy is of greater political importance to the bourgeoisie at present than it ever was before.

The tremendous significance of the bureaucracy for the maintenance of the power of the bourgeoisie is recognized by all groups no matter whether they support the "republican" parties or the "Nazis," the National Socialists. It must be kept in mind that in spite of vitriolic attacks upon the republican government, the Fascists have no intention of destroying the bureaucracy. With the exception of certain changes in leadership they intend to leave the administrative machine intact. In fact, they rely upon it as an aid to the army in destroying the so much hated parliamentary form of government. The bourgeoisie realizes the political significance of the existing administrative machine and knows that it can function under either a parliamentary government or Fascist dictatorship, be it republican or monarchical in character.

As has been pointed out before, the administrative apparatus has remained essentially the same in form and organization. Its members still enjoy many of the privileges of pre-war days, the most important of which are certain economic privileges, not so much in regard to the size of income as in the fact that a life position is secured with the right of pension. This, of course, is of tremendous importance when millions of workers are unemployed.

The changed character of post-war society has had the effect of weakening the feeling of social superiority which, while still in existence, now no longer plays so great a rôle as before the war. On the other hand, the abolition of honorary titles by the Republic has not been extended to the abolition of *Amtstitel* (titles arising out of official positions). On the contrary, these have increased, if anything. As a result, the retention of titles

in official life, which are extended also into social life, helps to keep the "titled" officials separated from the "untitled" ordinary citizen.¹

The feeling of political superiority has been both strengthened and weakened by post-war developments. Immediately after the war, when parliamentary government was established, the administrative machine seemed to lose its position of political superiority by being placed under the control of the parliament. But as parliamentary government proved less and less successful and as emergency decrees followed in rapid succession, the importance of the bureaucracy as the organized form of the bourgeois state has steadily increased. The bureaucracy, as a consequence, has gradually increased in power and prestige in relation to parliament as the state has gradually developed from a parliamentary form into a semi-Fascist one.

While the administrative apparatus has, on the whole, remained the same in character and structure as before the war and while it still remains essentially a well-organized and strong body which exerts a positive influence in the strengthening of civic loyalty, certain developments have taken place in the post-war period which have affected its unity and cohesiveness as well as its relationship to the rest of society. As already shown, the outbreak of the revolution and the establishment of the Republic put an end to the subject-citizen relationship to the semi-absolute state and established the formal citizen of the bourgeois Republic with the consequence that the former relationship of the members of the bureaucracy to both the government and the rest of the population has been modified. An attempt has been made to break down the seclusion of the bureaucracy from the rest of the population by developing among its members an interest in political, social, and economic problems. They have been given certain rights which they were not able to exercise as the "servants" of their rulers, of which one

¹ Thus the author became acquainted with an upper official whose mail was addressed "Herr Ministerial Direktor, Wirklicher Geheimer Ober-Regierungsrat Dr. von" In this instance the part of the title "Ministerial Direktor" was his title as official of the Republic, the part "Wirklicher Geheimer Ober-Regierungsrat" was an honorary title (now abolished) from pre-war days which was retained for the sake of tradition.

of the most important is the right of freedom of expression of political opinion.¹ Not only are they permitted to express their political opinion (unless it is Communist), but they are encouraged to take an active part in political life. The government itself has established a "Hochschule für Politik" in which higher officials are given political training along republican lines. Officials are, moreover, granted leave of absence for conducting their own campaigns, should they care to run for office in the legislature. If elected, they need no special leave to perform their duties.²

The officials have furthermore received the right to organize themselves along semi-trade-union lines. As already indicated, attempts of this nature were made before the war, and during the war a federation of organizations of officials (Reichsarbeitsausschuss Deutscher Beamtenverbände) was formed. This was permitted by the government as a concession to the demands of the bureaucracy in order to further the war spirit among its members. After the revolution, the officials obtained the same rights to organize themselves as the workers. Thus on December 4, 1918, the German Federation of Officials (Deutsche Beamtenbund) was formed of the various organizations of officials; it consisted of over a million members.³ At first it appeared as if this organization would form a "Dreibund" by federating with

¹ See, among others: Adorno Colvelli, *Die politische Tätigkeit der Beamten nach preussisch-deutschem Recht* (1926); Walter Pietsch (ed.), *Aufgaben, Wege und Ziele der deutschen Beamtenhochschulen* (Festschrift zum fünfjährigen Bestehen der Verwaltungskademie) (Berlin, 1919-24); Herman L. Brill, *Der Kampf um die Erhaltung des Berufsbeamtentums* (1926); Walter Pietsch (ed.), *Jahrbuch der Verwaltungskademie; Report of Wage and Personnel Survey* (Field Survey Division, personnel classification Board).

² As a result, over one quarter of the members of the Reichstag are now officials. This incidentally helps to give the Reichstag a bureaucratic psychology and thus helps in the "bureaucratization" of parliamentary life.

³ A. Falkenberg, *Die deutsche Beamtenbewegung nach der Revolution* (1920); Kulemann, *Gewerkschaften und Beamte* (1921); *Geschäftsbericht des deutschen Beamtenbundes für die Zeit vom April, 1922, bis September, 1924; Bericht über die Verhandlungen des 4. Bundesstages des deutschen Beamtenbundes, 9.-11. Oktober, 1924*; Flügel, *Die Grundlinie der Politik des deutschen Beamtenbundes* (1924); Deutsches Beamten-Archiv (ed.), *Deutsches Beamten Taschenbuch*; Fritz Winters, *Beamtenwissenschaft* (Ein Wort zur Einführung und Begründung) (1926); Wilhelm Schröder and Paul Lockenvitz, *Der soziale Niedergang der deutschen Beamtenchaft* (1921).

the socialist General German Trade-Union Federation (Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund—ADGB) and the parallel organization of office employees, the Afa, in order to give the new government a solid basis among the masses. But class antagonisms within the bureaucracy soon made their appearance. When this “Dreibund” declared a general strike in 1910 to support the government against the Kapp Putsch, a considerable portion of the upper officials opposed it, and soon after left the Deutsche Beamtenbund to organize the National Federation of Higher Officials (Reichsbund der Höheren Beamten), under the political leadership of the parties of the Right.

The next schism appeared when the Deutsche Beamtenbund refused to support the strike called in 1922 by the more radical organization of railway officials.¹ The Beamtenbund supported the policy of the government that the right of organization granted to the officials by the new government did not include the right of declaring a strike against its employer, the government. After the strike this National Union of Railway Officials as well as other organizations left the Deutscher Beamtenbund and formed the General German Federation of Officials (Allgemeiner Deutscher Beamtenbund).² Then this latter organization under the leadership of the left-wing Socialist elements federated with the free trade-unions and the Socialist Office Workers’ Federation (Afa), to form a “Dreibund” under the political leadership of the Social Democratic party. A considerable number of officials who sympathized with the Social Democracy remained, however, within the Deutscher Beamtenbund which thus came to represent more or less those officials accepting the leadership of the middle parties, i.e., those who had originally composed the Weimar Coalition. As time went on, the social and economic antagonisms within the Deutscher Be-

¹ Fritz Winters, *Zur Frage des Beamtenstreikrechts* (1919); Ludwig Bendix, *Das Streikrecht der Beamten* (1922); Vereinigung Internationaler Verlagsanstalten (publishers), *Der Kampf der Eisenbahner* (1925).

² *Bericht über den ersten Bundeskongress des Allgemeinen Deutschen Beamtenbundes vom 12. bis 14. Januar, 1925; Protokoll der Gründungsversammlung des Allgemeinen Deutschen Beamtenbundes am 18. Juni, 1922; Geschäftsbericht des Allgemeinen Deutschen Beamtenbundes (ADB), 18. Januar, 1922 bis 31. Dezember, 1924.*

amtenbund has crystallized so that within the organization itself the upper, the middle, and the lower officials form special sections (Arbeitsgemeinschaften). Besides these organizations mentioned there exist a number of Christian and nationalist unions of government officials.

The above description of dissension in the bureaucracy indicates that the right of association procured since the revolution has not helped to unify it but has tended rather to give a more definite organized form to the social, economic, and political antagonisms already existing within the bureaucracy itself and accentuated by the post-war crisis. The political activity of the bureaucracy has also tended to increase, within limitations, the amount of political patronage in the appointments of officials. Obviously this fact has not served to strengthen the standard of honesty; and it may be the cause, together with the general disintegrative effects of post-war developments, for the larger number of cases of public dishonesty that have prevailed since 1918.

Another force, which has been responsible for weakening the loyalty of the bureaucracy to the government and the cohesive forces within the bureaucracy itself, is the wage and employment policy of the government especially since 1924. As indicated above, the government, for economic reasons, began to "rationalize" the bureaucratic machine in 1924 and, as a result, found that it could get along with several hundred thousand less officials, employees, and workers. As this rationalization process has continued, the government has continually dispensed with additional officials. Those employed by the government as workers and employees could be readily discharged just as in the case of private industry. But those who have the rank of official could not be discharged under provisions of the law concerning public officials. The consequence of this has been that the government has pensioned the older of the officials while the younger ones receive a kind of temporary pension called *Wartegeld*. Since the size of the *Wartegeld* depends upon the years of service and since most of the officials disposed of have been those most recently appointed, these temporary

pensions are very low. This has created dissatisfaction not merely among those "pensioned" but also among the great mass of officials, since this policy has had the effect, in fact, of breaking down the feeling of security of employment. Besides, when the government appoints new employees, it prefers, wherever possible, to appoint them as workers or employees rather than as officials. This is especially true among the lower officials. Where this is not possible, it prefers to a greater extent than before the war, the policy of appointing "candidates" (*Anwärter*) in place of officials. In this pre-official state, they have the same duties as officials but none of the privileges; and their salaries, too, are below those of regular appointed officials. While such appointments as "candidates" are theoretically only of a temporary nature, there are many cases where such "candidates" have continued in their positions from ten to twenty years. And finally, especially as a result of various emergency decrees, salaries of government officials, employees, and workers have been cut wholesale. While this has created dissatisfaction among all officials, it has been the lower officials, whose salaries were always very low, who have been most disastrously affected.

These recent developments indicate how the loyalty of the official to the government is being negatively affected and how his feeling of distinctness and aloofness from the rest of the population is being weakened. The growth of social and economic antagonisms within the bureaucracy has had the result of bringing various layers of officials into closer contact with those strata of the population who are likewise suffering from the general economic crisis. Certain political parties, in particular, sought to profit by this dissatisfaction by appealing to the interests of the various strata of officials in order to win them over. The Communists appeal to the lower officials on the basis of class interest, at the same time hoping thereby to disrupt the strong position of the administrative machine of the bourgeois state. The Fascists, on the other hand, aim to set up a powerful bureaucracy which, together with the army, will be the pillars of a Fascist dictatorship and will thus do away with the necessity of parliament. To achieve this end, they attempt to direct

existing dissatisfactions within the bureaucracy against the parliamentary government without playing off one layer of officials against another; they appeal to all layers of the present bureaucracy by charging that the "vacillating" and "unpatriotic" policy of the government is the cause of the present unsatisfactory conditions within the bureaucracy. But the parties supporting the government attempt to minimize internal differences within the bureaucracy and try to appeal to the bureaucracy as a unity in order to strengthen the support of the government.

In summing up, one may say that the general post-war development, and especially the crisis, have definitely affected the character and prestige of the bureaucracy. It has not merely remained intact but with the decline of parliamentary government its power and prestige have simultaneously increased even though it does not possess the external imperial glamor of pre-war days. But the disintegrative effects of the post-war crisis upon society as a whole have not left the bureaucracy untouched. On the contrary, as the social, economic, and political antagonisms within society grow, they are affecting more and more the cohesion and morale of the bureaucracy.

CHAPTER IX

THE ARMY

In Germany the army has probably played a greater rôle in developing and coloring the national consciousness of the people during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than in any other country of Europe.¹ This is partly due to the fact that in Germany national unification took place later than in the case of Western European states and that it was accomplished largely with the aid of the army. The retarded unification was due partly to the retarded economic development of Central Europe during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries and partly to the unfavorable geographic position of Germany in Europe, which made it for centuries the battleground of the countries to the east, south, north, and west of it. The consolidation and growth of Prussia was accomplished in the face of these negative factors and was possible largely through the activity of the army. While the victories of Napoleon shattered the prestige of the Prussian army, the eventual success of the Allied forces as well as the resulting large territorial additions to Prussia greatly revived the prestige and power of the Prussian army. This prestige continued during the nineteenth century and was further strengthened by the failure of the Revolution of 1848.

¹ Bärensprung, *Der Nutzen der Armee und Flotte für die deutsche Volkswirtschaft* (Beiheft zum Militär Wochenblatt, 1904, 10. Heft); Lujo Brentano and Robert Kuczynski, *Die heutige Grundlage der deutschen Wehrkraft* (1900); W. Hedler, *Werdegang des deutschen Heeres* (1909); H. Mellinthin, *Heer, Staat und Volk* (1912); *Militärstaat und Bürgerstaat* (Sonderabdruck aus der *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Erstes Morgenblatt vom 27. & 30. Januar, 12. & 14. Februar, 1914) (1914); Adolf Mürmann, *Die öffentliche Meinung in Deutschland über den Grundsatz der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht* (1909); Martin Hell, *Die Landsknechte. Entstehung der ersten deutschen Infanterie* (1914); Otto von Sothen, *Vom Kriegswesen im 19ten Jahrhundert* (1904); M. Schwartz (ed.), *Technik des Kriegswesens* (1913) (this contains an excellent section by Kersting on the influence of the army upon the civilian population); Walther Thenius, *Die Anfänge des stehenden Heeres in Kursachsen unter Johann Georg III. und Johann Georg IV.* (1912); Otto Wigand (publisher), *Zur Psychologie des Militarismus. Von einem deutschen Soldaten*.

Finally, for the first time in modern history a united, independent, and sovereign Germany was created; and it seemed on the surface that this had been made possible only because of the existence of a powerful and well-disciplined army under the leadership of Prussia. This is the lesson which was drawn from past history and which was continually drilled into the nation. The military spirit reached its climax during the World War, yet the post-war developments, as will be shown below, indicate the retention of many phases of the old military psychology, somewhat modified by the needs and exigencies of a changed internal and external situation.

The army together with the navy and the police is the ultimate physical weapon upon which the state relies to carry out its internal as well as its external policies. The study of the importance of the army as a factor in strengthening national solidarity revolves about the problems of (1) how the army is developed into a reliable organ of the government, (2) how the presence and activity of the army develops allegiance to the state among the various classes and strata of society. Since the method used in (1) depends largely upon the social composition of the army and its relation to society, the second problem will be dealt with first. Because of the different position of the army in the pre-war period the two above-mentioned problems will be treated first with regard to the pre-war situation and then with regard to the post-war situation.¹

To the landed aristocracy the army was, in the past, the chief means of maintaining its economic, social, and political supremacy. The army meant to it the ultimate force for protecting its property and its control over the whole state apparatus and over the other classes of society. Moreover, its control over the officers' corps provided lifetime positions to those sons of the aristocracy who took up the military career. It was especially Frederick the Great who recruited the officers' corps exclusively from the aristocracy. Although his two successors carried on a less rigid policy, it was impossible in 1800 for anyone to attend

¹ Due to lack of space, the rôle of the police and of the navy are merely indicated at the end of the chapter.

the royal cadet school who was not a noble. A similar policy was carried on in the other German states.¹

After the defeat of the Prussian army by Napoleon the unavoidable army reforms threatened the monopoly of the aristocracy in the officers' corps. The defeat of Napoleon and the victory of the reactionary forces at home and abroad made it possible for the aristocracy to relegate the Landwehr to a secondary position and practically to close the officers' corps of the regular army to members of the bourgeoisie, a policy which was continued during the next decades. Later on, with the increase of the army, especially after the army reforms of 1859-60, it was found necessary to take in a certain number of officers from the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, about 80 per cent of the higher officers still were members of the aristocracy. The General Staff remained, however, a complete monopoly of the aristocracy.²

It is interesting to note that while the bourgeoisie was admitted into the officers' corps the aristocracy retained almost exclusive control of the cavalry. Commissions in those branches of the service which required a considerable amount of scientific and technical training which the aristocracy did not possess, such as the engineers and to a certain extent the artillery, were opened to the bourgeoisie and middle classes. The increase of the army during the period 1871-1914 required the addition of further bourgeois officers, so that already, in 1873, 62 per cent of the infantry lieutenants came from the bourgeoisie and middle classes. By 1919 this proportion had grown to 78 per cent.

In the eighteenth century the bourgeoisie accepted the army just as it accepted the absolute monarchy, for both defended to a certain extent its economic interests in relation to foreign states. On the other hand, it did not relish the political and social superiority of the army which helped to accentuate the inferiority of the bourgeoisie as a secondary class in society.

¹ For further details see Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 821.

² For detailed statistics concerning this matter see the illuminating study of Franz Karl Endres, "Soziologische Struktur und ihre entsprechenden Ideologien des deutschen Offizierskorps vor dem Weltkriege" (in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, LVIII [1927], 282-319).

The defeat of the Prussian army by the French revolutionary troops forced the government to make concessions to bourgeois demands in order to reinforce its own position within the state and to strengthen its military power against the revolutionary forces of France.¹ In the first place the regular army was reorganized and the officers' corps was partly opened to the bourgeoisie. Secondly, a kind of volunteer militia, the Landwehr, consisting of bourgeois, middle class, and peasant elements, was organized of those between seventeen and forty not serving in the regular army and was commanded mainly by non-professional officers coming from the bourgeoisie. Even a Landsturm of those over forty was created in 1813, but its organization had not progressed far when the war ended.

This arming of the nation had an important effect in strengthening the political self-consciousness of the middle and lower classes. The natural class antagonisms between the militia and the regular army, especially their officers' corps, which had remained latent during the war broke out soon after the defeat of Napoleon. Once victorious over the foreign enemy Frederick William III gave his energies to the defeat of the internal enemy, the liberal bourgeoisie. The originally revolutionary Landwehr was turned into an appendage of the regular army. This led to violent protests on the part of the liberal bourgeoisie who came out strongly for the abolition of the standing army and the institution of the popular militia, which was to continue the traditions of the original Landwehr.²

One concession to the bourgeoisie was the institution of the so-called Einjährig-Freiwillige. According to this the educated sons of the bourgeoisie after one year of training could be appointed, as had been done during the war against Napoleon, as officers of the Landwehr up to and including the post of captain. Nevertheless the antagonism of the greater part of the Bürgertum against the regular army as well as its demand for a na-

¹ For developments in Southern Germany see Wilhelm Wendland, *Versuche einer allgemeinen Volksbewaffnung in Süddeutschland während der Jahre 1791-1794* (1903).

² For details see Freytag-Loringhoven, *A Nation Trained in Arms or a Militia? Lessons in War from the Past and the Present* (1918).

tional militia continued during the next decades.¹ During this period, the bourgeoisie of Germany began to look rather to the peaceful Zollverein than to the armies of Prussia and the other states for the protection of its economic interests.

The Revolution of 1848 again brought to the fore the demand for the organization of a national militia under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, but little was accomplished then or during the fifties and sixties. When, however, German unity finally was achieved as a result of the Franco-Prussian War, the bourgeoisie accepted the army as it was, throwing overboard its former demands for a national militia. This demand was, however, taken up by the newborn Social Democracy which thus continued the tradition of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie accepted the regular army even though it remained largely under control of the aristocracy, because as coruler of the newly formed Empire it saw in the existing army a security for the maintenance of this Empire, against both foreign and internal enemies.

With the growth of the bourgeoisie the proportion of non-aristocratic officers increased. While the chief commanding officers in 1866 and 1870 came almost exclusively from the aristocracy, eight out of eighteen commanding generals appointed during the period from 1893 to 1903 came from the bourgeoisie. Of these, six were, however, knighted to preserve the aristocratic atmosphere. The bourgeois could buy their way into the crack regiments, and even into the aristocracy.

Before the rise of the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie formed, as the largest stratum in the towns, a kind of left wing of the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the standing army and for a popular militia. During the wars against Napoleon it, together with the peasantry, formed a great part of the volunteer militia, while the educated sons of the middle classes were even permitted to become officers. After the reorganization of the army in 1814-15, the petty bourgeoisie like the bourgeoisie lost influence in the army and could no longer enter the officers' corps. As a result, it became an important ally of thebour-

¹ Pinkow, *Der literarische und parlamentarische Kampf gegen die Institution des stehenden Heeres in Deutschland in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (1912).

geoisie in its struggle for a national militia as opposed to the standing army of the absolute régime. When unity was achieved in 1871, it, like the bourgeoisie, accepted the existing army as the defender of the newly won national unity. In fact, it was the intellectuals of the petty bourgeoisie who were the ones who wrote textbooks, magazine and newspaper articles, speeches, and helped in organizations that extolled the benefits of the army and military life. It was comparatively easy to convince the naturally conservative artisan and small tradesman that it was to their interest to support the army.

With the rapid development of the industrial revolution and the growth of an industrial proletariat, certain institutions in the army became a means for the middle classes to differentiate themselves from the proletariat. The institution of the one-year volunteer, for instance, was utilized by the educated sons of the petty bourgeoisie to give them the so much desired superior standing not only in the army but also in social life. Furthermore, it was a means for them of entering the bureaucracy as "middle" officials, besides giving them other professional advantages. Another very successful method of drawing an important part of the middle class to support the state was extending the institution of the reserve officer to the upper layers. The lower layers were, however, not eligible. For instance, it was impossible for a son of a shopkeeper to become a reserve officer if his father's business was so small that he had to serve customers himself. Nor could a reserve officer marry a girl whose father actually worked in his own business. It was possible, however, for the lower petty bourgeoisie to become non-commissioned officers of the reserve. This again gave them a chance to enter the bureaucracy; if it was not possible for the son to become an officer or higher official it was at least possible for the grandson. In this way, in the course of two generations it was possible to rise into the middle or upper ranks of society and the state, a factor which helped to differentiate the middle classes from the proletariat beneath them. This possibility of lifting themselves above the masses was a strong factor in helping the army to tie the middle classes to the state and strengthen

their national concept as opposed to the international ideas propagated by the socialists. And just because the margin of differentiation between the middle classes and the proletariat was so much narrower than between the upper classes and the proletariat, it played a much greater rôle in the mentality of the middle classes, and often resulted in the development of patriotism which was more virile than that of the ruling bourgeoisie and aristocracy.

The other "middle" group in society, the peasantry, being a class of small property owners, has shown an attitude toward the army similar to that of the petty bourgeoisie of the towns, but, on the whole, less definite and articulate.

To the industrial proletariat, as to other classes of society, the army represented the physical presence and power of the state. To those who accepted the doctrines of socialism in one form or another the army represented the particular engine of their own suppression. A continuous stream of antagonisms toward the army runs from the opposition to the Franco-Prussian War on the part of Bebel and Liebknecht to the violent attacks against the army of the present-day Communists. Of course, it is not true that the whole proletariat developed this attitude; but it was only among this class that such an attitude was to be found.

One of the great triumphs of German national training was its victory over the anti-militarist and international attitude of the German Social Democracy. The basic reason for this development has lain in the fact that, while denouncing the standing army as an army of the bourgeoisie, the Social Democratic party never evolved the concept of a proletarian army in opposition to the bourgeois army. This followed necessarily from the fact that the idea of a proletarian dictatorship, a proletarian state, of which the proletarian army was a function, was never really worked out. In the Gotha program which was accepted in 1875 at the union of the Lassalle and Eisenach factions into the present Social Democratic party, the old demand of the bourgeoisie for a militia, a "Volkswehr" was revived and came to be the official party demand. Marx and Engels severely criticized this demand by maintaining that a real militia could only exist

in a classless state, and that the character of the militia as proposed by the Social Democratic party would be similar to that proposed by the bourgeoisie in previous decades.¹ These criticisms were, however, ignored. The fact that the demand for a militia remained the central military demand of the Social Democrats is of extreme importance, for, in practice, it limited the Social Democracy to agitating for a democratization of the existing army. Thus it demanded the abolition of the abuses in the regular army, a decrease in the length of service, a cessation of the control of the army by the aristocracy, the elimination of the caste-like exclusiveness of the officers' corps, and finally the abolition of the militarization of the entire civilian life of the nation. However, it did not take up the problem as to which class, the bourgeoisie or the proletariat, was to control this new democratic army or militia. In other words, its military demands just as its political demands were aimed mainly against the feudal and absolutistic remains in the form and spirit of the standing army. But these were not anti-bourgeois demands, they were merely anti-feudal ones.

The agricultural proletariat, being politically the least articulate class, has, in its relationship to the army, followed the leadership of the other classes of society. Within the army its members have seldom been able to rise to the rank of non-commissioned officer. The browbeating which it has always suffered at the hands of the Junkers disposed it to react less violently to the browbeating within the army than did the industrial proletariat. To what extent the army has had any effect upon the national and civic concept of the agricultural proletariat is difficult to judge. Probably its experience in the army gave it a wider and bigger concept of the nation. But it must not be forgotten that the agricultural proletariat always possessed much more the mentality of the obedient subject than that of the citizen.

The methods used within the army to strengthen the loyalty of the privates and officers depended to a large extent upon the social composition of the army, its relation to the civilian popu-

¹ August Bebel, *Nicht stehendes Heer sondern Volkswehr!* (1898); Karl Schmidt (ed.), *F. Engels—W. I. Lenin, Militär-politische Schriften*, 2 vols. (1930-31).

lation, and the social antagonisms within this civilian population. The antagonisms between industrial worker and employer, agricultural laborer and aristocratic landowner, were crystallized much more sharply in the differences between privates and the officer, not only by strengthening consciousness of class, but by giving it a militarized form. It therefore became a problem of developing in these two sections of the army a common loyalty to the *Oberster Kriegsherr* by creating a peculiar military mentality within both, which was distinct and superior to that of the civilian population.

The most important method by which the German state has always insured the loyalty of the officers' corps, a method which is still in use at present, is to draw it almost exclusively from the ruling classes.¹ The training for the officers' corps began in the exclusive cadet schools to which only members of the aristocracy and the upper bourgeoisie were admitted. Here scientific and cultural education was of a very meager sort. Social sciences were practically unknown, the main emphasis being put upon military training and the development of a spirit of military snobbishness in regard to civilians and civilian life. In fact, learning was looked down upon as a civilian business; the soldier was there to act. After having attended the cadet school a number of years, the cadets entered the army as non-commissioned officers from which post they quickly advanced into the officers' corps. They never came into direct contact with the actual life of the private, thus helping to strengthen the schism between officer and private. The government tried to keep the officer isolated ideologically from the private and the civilian, to prevent the intrusion of any kind of "liberal" ideals. It carried on a policy known as "depolitization," keeping the officer out of politics. He was not only deprived of the right to vote but he was kept ignorant of all economic, social, and cultural problems so as to avoid making him conscious of the various antagonistic forces existing in society.

¹ Risel (publishers), *Der deutsche und französische Offizier, eine soziale Studie* (1907); Franz Karl Endres, *op. cit.*; Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhausen, *Was danken wir unserem Offizierskorps? Zwei Jahrhunderte seiner Geschichte* (1919); Hans Leberl, *Der Offizier als Erzieher und Volksbildner, Eine psychologisch-pädagogische Studie* (1910).

The 30,000 officers of the pre-war army formed an ideological circle surrounded by a Chinese wall of ignorance. This was strengthened by forcing the young unmarried officers to eat at the officers' mess where they heard hardly anything else except stories of women, horses, dogs and future advancements. Very seldom was a social or political question brought up and if so, it was dismissed as something fit only for civilians. The advances in science and technical arts were a mystery to them.¹

There was a general political attitude that parliament was not only a useless but a dangerous adjunct to the government. All that was necessary for an officer was loyalty to the emperor. The officer felt himself as a knight who was a vassal of his lord and owed allegiance only to him. He was convinced that in the next war diplomats should be eliminated so that the achievements of the army would not be destroyed. The effect of this may have been to make the officer more loyal; but it also had the effect of creating an artificial distance between the officers and the rest of society and of petrifying class differences into caste differences.

The relationship of the officer to his civilian surroundings helped to strengthen his spirit of snobbishness, for his uniform raised him above the ordinary citizen. William II, as well as his grandfather William I, always appeared before the public in uniform; and his officers were expected to do likewise, so that the brilliance of their uniforms, often covered with military decorations, might shine out most favorably in contrast to the drab dress of the civilian. In order not to spoil the military atmosphere, high government officials were often given military appointments; thus, for instance, the Imperial Chancellor von Bülow was made a colonel of hussars, the Imperial Chancellor Michaelis, a lieutenant colonel. At court a lieutenant was considered of a higher rank than a great scientist. The officer received decorations (*Orden*) when still young to which a civilian, unless he paid high for them, could aspire only at the end of a long lifetime of service. The officers stood outside of the regular law, having their own "code of honor" which was rigorously enforced. Dueling was the method of avenging "insults" among the members of the officers' corps. Insults to civilians were not

¹ Endres, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

considered of much account, and officers were usually not held responsible for such acts. Officers who were insulted by civilians were expected to defend their honor by means of the sword. In several cases on record, an officer ran his sword through a civilian who was supposed to have made insulting remarks. Even the great popular outcry against these acts only had the effect of having these officers sentenced by a court-martial to a few months' imprisonment. But among the officers' corps the action of such an officer was upheld; in fact, the failure of an officer to defend his "honor" led to ostracism by brother officers and dismissal.

The effect of the character of the officers upon the upper and a part of the middle classes was quite different from its effect upon the lower classes. While resenting to a certain extent the snobbishness of the officer, the upper classes nevertheless regarded him as the ideal embodiment of their state, and their acquaintance with this superior type of humanity could be only of value to them. A social affair was not considered successful unless the presence of officers lifted it into the higher realm of contact with His Majesty's army. For the middle classes this factor was of great importance, for it was a means of elevating themselves into the grace of the state and what it stood for. While the composition and exclusive character of the officers' corps helped to strengthen the loyalty of the upper and middle classes, it certainly had quite the opposite effect upon the lower classes. Instead of helping to unite the nation, this exclusiveness helped to separate the nation into two camps.

The reserve officer, while granted some of the privileges of the regular officer, nevertheless did not possess the same social prestige as the latter, unless he was a member of the aristocracy or a higher state official. But in the government service only reserve officers were advanced to certain positions, and a person who had served in the army was preferred in industry and commerce to one who had not served, and who had not been made a reserve officer. Thus the reserve officer helped to carry militarism and military psychology into civilian life.

The problem of developing a strong feeling of loyalty in the

private is quite different from that of developing loyalty among the officers' corps, since the private comes from the non-ruling classes.¹

Before the introduction of universal military training the mercenary army of professional soldiers consisted mainly of discredited elements of the lower classes and aliens who were kept together rather by the threat of punishment than by a sense of loyalty to the ruler or a sense of patriotism to the state. Frederick William I of Prussia, who continually increased his army, soon found it too expensive to hire additional professional soldiers, so, by the "canton" edict of 1733 (later modified considerably in 1792 by Frederick William II), he introduced the principle of universal military duty on the part of the subjects of Prussia. Due to numerous exemptions, the cantonists consisted of the poorest classes who, due to their inferior station in society, could be easily forced into submission by the usual methods employed toward the regular troops.

When, after the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon, Frederick William III was forced to introduce universal military training, he did it only after great hesitation and with much distrust of the possible consequences of arming the people. When the wars of "liberation" came to a close, Frederick William was glad to re-organize the army in such a way that, while maintaining the principles of universal military training, the standing army was actually reduced to 40,000, consisting mainly of the lower classes in town and country.

The standing army was gradually increased in size during the course of the nineteenth century until it was forced, like the bureaucracy, to take in more and more elements of the lower classes. The recruits were cut off as much as possible from the

¹ Cochenhausen, *Die Erziehung der Soldaten* (1905); Moritz Exner, *Katechismus des deutschen Heeres* (1896); G. Gleich, *Die alte Armee und ihre Verirrungen. Eine kritische Studie* (1919); Georg Evert (ed.), "Die Herkunft der deutschen Unteroffiziere und Soldaten am 1. Dezember, 1900" (*Zeitschrift des Kgl. Preussischen Statistischen Landesamtes*, Ergänzungsheft 28); Arthur Janz, *Die staatsbürgerliche Erziehung im deutschen Heere bisher und in der Zukunft* (1919); Georg Liebe, *Der Soldat in der deutschen Vergangenheit* (1919); *Die Soldatenmisshandlungen vor dem deutschen Reichstag* (aus den Verhandlungen des Reichstags vom 10. und 21. März, 1893) (contains reprints of official stenographic reports).

civilian world from which they had come, and an attempt was made to create in them a definite military psychology which regarded the civilian as inferior. Living in barracks segregated from the rest of the population and being especially under the influence of non-commissioned officers who even controlled their conversation and reading matter, there was developed in them a psychology quite different from that of civilian life. The army did not train the soldier in citizenship; on the contrary, it tore him out of his civilian activities and concepts and tried to develop in place of these a feeling of loyalty and subservience not to the nation but to his officers and to the Kaiser as commander in chief. Because of the fact that the soldier was trained to be an obedient subject and not a responsible citizen, he received no instruction in civic problems. Sometimes he was required to listen to short talks by his superiors, but these consisted mainly of instruction on the duty of a subject to His Majesty as well as denunciations of "those without a fatherland," who were trying to overthrow the pillars of society and the state. While in civil life the soldier was a subject-citizen, in military life he was merely a subject. The main ideal which was continually held before him was that of discipline. The military sought to develop within him blind and mechanical obedience which would automatically overcome all other emotional and intellectual reactions and destroy all expressions of personal initiative. Because of the autocratic power invested in the officers and to a certain extent in the non-commissioned officers in the administration of this discipline, a number of abuses of the private at the hands of his superior followed. This absence of justice for the common soldier, together with the absolute discipline that was demanded, was one of the most important causes for developing a hatred of military life.¹

There were, however, other factors which unconsciously reacted upon the common soldier, so that he became emotionally tied up with the army and the state. Army life meant several years in which he had no economic worries. This was of im-

¹ See the stenographic reports of the proceedings of the Reichstag as well as those of the Prussian Diet for the many incidents of military abuses brought up by the Social Democrats.

portance only to certain groups and at certain times. The peasant never liked to see his son go, for it meant that he had to employ hired help during his absence. The industrial worker felt often that he could have saved money during these two years if he had worked in a factory. But during an economic crisis, army life was a means of employment. The soldier was drawn out of his relatively narrow home environment and brought into contact with men from all parts of Germany and from different social strata. He saw different parts of the country, and was made more "national-conscious." It was generally the first time in his life that the common soldier lived together with large groups of men united by a common uniform, participating in parades and maneuvers, stimulated by the rhythm of military music; and he developed a feeling of group solidarity in relation to the state which was quite distinct from anything he had ever experienced before. Very often all these factors combined to give the soldier one of the most impressive emotional experiences of his life. And returning home in his uniform on a leave of absence, he was not only the pride of the family but was generally sure to elicit the admiration of the opposite sex. After he had left the army and grew older, many of the disagreeable sides of army life seemed to disappear from his memory and a certain pride grew up in his past military life. Even many of the older Social Democratic workers, sitting together around their glasses of beer, took pride in relating their military experiences.

As time went on, the government discovered that the army was apparently not as effective an instrument for developing patriotism as it thought. Every election showed an increase of the Socialist vote, so that by 1913 over one third of the army must have consisted of future Socialists and their sympathizers. Indeed, the army unintentionally developed socialism by intensifying class differences in society.

Special attention should be paid to the rôle of the non-commissioned officer (n.c.o.). In the old army, from the time of Frederick the Great up to the present army of the Republic, they have been taken almost invariably from the lower middle

classes and the peasantry. Factory workers were excluded. The n.c.o.'s were those who broke in and drilled the raw recruits with a well-known brutality which was one of the chief causes of dissatisfaction in army life. After twelve years of hard and drab service they were eligible for life-appointment as a lower government official. The spirit of arrogance which they maintained in the civil service rendered them and the military system which they represented very unpopular among the lower classes. They personified the tragedy of the members of the lower middle classes who were glad to lift themselves above the masses, but who were never admitted to the ruling classes. The n.c.o.'s were and still are the shock absorbers between the officers' corps and the common soldiers. They were the layer which transmitted the orders of the officers to the soldiers; and they were the scapegoats for such hatred as developed among the common soldiers against the military system.

The veteran's societies or ex-service men's leagues (*Kriegervereine*) played and still play an important rôle in carrying the military spirit into the civilian population although they are now partly eclipsed by the various nationalist military organizations. Their importance lies also in the fact that they contain both officers and common soldiers, thus making use of common experience and memories in uniting the various classes of society.

Begun shortly after the Napoleonic wars, these societies gradually increased in number, and the Prussian state after some time recognized their importance in furthering loyalty to the monarchy. After the wars of 1864 and 1866, and especially after that of 1870-71, the veteran societies grew very rapidly and became important centers for developing national, patriotic, and monarchistic sentiments. Socialists as well as members of the free trade-unions were not only practically excluded from the veteran organizations but the various veterans' organizations even forbade their members to vote for this "party of destruction."

These various local societies eventually were centralized into state federations and these in turn formed a national federation

known as the "Kyffhäuserbund." This national federation was founded in 1900 when the various state federations got together to erect the famous national monument on the Kyffhäuser Mountain in Thuringia. Shortly before the World War the Kyffhäuserbund included 27 state federations and 32,000 local societies with three million members.¹

During the World War the army became the ideological as well as the physical focal point of the whole nation. As the original standing army was gradually decimated, the professional officers diminished in numbers and were replaced either by young inexperienced officers or by reserve officers whose business, home, and family ties made them less intent upon their new duties.² The type of soldier also changed. The fighting army, which in 1914 had consisted mainly of young unmarried men of the standing army and the reserves, had to be filled up by 1917 with the older levies consisting largely of married men and of those who had never had regular military training. By 1918, moreover, even boys of seventeen and eighteen were drafted. As the war dragged on from one partial victory to another without coming to an end, and as the economic situation at home became increasingly unbearable, an apathy began to take hold of the army which developed in time into a pronounced dissatisfaction and finally, at least with certain elements, into an open antagonism. This development was furthered by the reappearance of old abuses along with new ones within the army.³

As the war continued, the soldiers felt more and more that

¹ von Westphal, *Handbuch für die Kriegervereine des Deutschen Reichskriegerbundes "Kyffhäuser"* (1922); von Westphal, *Das deutsche Kriegervereinswesen* (1906) and *Kriegervereine und Arbeitervereine* (1909).

² E. Hartmann, *Handbuch für Einjährig-Freiwillige Reserveoffizier-Aspiranten und Offiziere des Beurlaubtenstandes der Verkehrstruppen. Unter Mitwirkung aktiver Offiziere* (1915); Hugo von Melchior, "Fürsorge für das geistige Leben im Heere, Wohlfahrtsseinrichtungen usw." (in *Der Grosse Krieg 1914-1918*, X, Part III, sec. VII [1923], 348-88); Adolf Matthias, *Deutsche Wehrkraft und kommendes Geschlecht* (1915); Hans Schreuer, *Die allgemeine Wehrpflicht und ihre gesellschaftliche Bedeutung* (1915); K. Schubert, *Der deutsche Soldat* (1918); Erich Ludendorff (ed.), *Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung über ihre Tätigkeit 1916-18* (1920); Constantin Altrock (ed.), *Vom Sterben des deutschen Offizierskorps. Die Gesamtverluste unserer Wehrmacht im Weltkrieg* (1922); *Der Weg zur Wahrheit. Führervertrauen und Führerhass im Kriege*. Von einem Frontoffizier (1920) (objective analysis of the officers' corps).

³ See, especially, Herman Kantorowitz, *Offiziershass im deutschen Heere* (1919).

the officers were not sharing the increasing sacrifices and sufferings required of the former. They saw that the officers lived in relative safety, comfort, and even luxury, while "theirs was but to do and die." This feeling was especially bitter against the staff officers, many of whom had seldom smelled powder. Another grievance which the soldiers had against the officers was that, when they returned to the rear after having faced death in front trenches, they were often put through endless drills of the type used to break in raw recruits, while the officers spent their time enjoying themselves. The soldiers were punished severely for the slightest breach in discipline, while the officers were permitted to act in ways which were obviously against army regulations. Furthermore, no matter how brave and experienced a soldier might be, there was rarely any chance of advance above the rank of a non-commissioned officer, while eighteen-year-old boys of the upper classes started their military career as lieutenants. Often forty-year-old married men who had seen several years of fighting were ordered around and punished by young arrogant lieutenants who had never participated in a battle. The uninfluential person, the striker, and the opponents of war were always to be found in the front trenches. It was only natural, therefore, for the soldier to feel that there was not one army, but that there were two, one to do the fighting, the other to do the commanding; the former consisting only of the lower classes, the other accessible only to the upper classes.

During the last year of the war an attempt was made to bolster up the spirit of the soldiers by the establishment of the so-called *Vaterländischer Unterricht* (lessons in patriotism). In October, 1917, courses for training officers to do this work began and during 1918 some of the soldiers were subjected to this propaganda.¹ It has, however, been maintained that this propa-

¹ A whole series of secret communications was sent to commanders describing the technical details for instruction. A considerable number of these the author found at the Bibliothèque de la Guerre at Vincennes near Paris. They are interesting to the student of propaganda but are too long and involved, as well as too unimportant in their effect, to warrant an analysis here (see W. Bäuerle, *Ziele und Wage der Truppenaufklärung. Nach einem Vortrag als Manuscript gedruckt. Stuttgart. Stellv. Generalkommando. 1. Teil. III. Heft. "Truppenaufklärung"*).

ganda often had an opposite effect to that intended. Among the other methods used to bolster up the morale of the army was the presentation of medals, especially the Iron Cross, for heroic services. As the war continued medals were showered so thickly upon the army (and even upon civilians), that it was almost as impossible to escape them as to elude the bullets of the enemy.¹

After the failure of the 1918 offensive, however, it became apparent that the forces of dissolution were tending to get beyond control.² As the collapse of the German allies became a certainty, the Army Command and the higher officers seemed to be stunned. This was equally true of part of the soldiers. The workers' and soldiers' councils that were first established contained only those soldiers in military units of the home reserve. The army at the front, however, remained passive until the Kaiser had fled and the provisional government was set up on November 9. In order to maintain control over the soldiers, especially in the Army of the West which was retreating at a rapid rate, General Headquarters under the leadership of Field Marshal von Hindenburg decided to make a concession to the revolutionary wave by ordering the election of soldiers' councils which should aid the officers' corps in the withdrawal of the troops in France and Belgium. This was accomplished. The uppermost thought of the soldiers was not to create a revolution but to stop fighting and to get home as rapidly as possible.³

¹ It is interesting to note that, even in the awarding of the Iron Cross, class distinctions were maintained. Thus the "Iron Cross First Class" generally went to officers, while the "Iron Cross Second Class" was generally awarded to privates.

² The importance of the Allied propaganda as well as that of the Independent Socialists and Spartacists in the army has been the cause of heated discussions in Germany. In connection with another study on the German revolution which the author has been carrying on, he went over all the propaganda material he could gather and talked over the matter with a number of men who played an important rôle in organizing it. As the result of that study he has come to the conclusion that its effect was relatively slight and was confined to small groups. This also came out in such minutes as were obtainable of the meetings of the soldiers' councils formed at the outbreak of the revolution.

³ Here it might be added that in connection with the study mentioned above the author worked through all accessible minutes of meetings of the soldiers' councils. All of them showed that the main concern of the soldiers' councils, besides demanding

But as the troops reached their home destination they tended to dissolve and be drawn into closer relationship with the more revolutionary workers' councils. Nevertheless, since the soldiers were more conservative than the workers, they were more or less successfully utilized by the various parties, and especially by the Social Democracy, to break down the Independent Socialist and Spartacist elements in the workers' and soldiers' councils.

When the Allies finally decided to allow Germany to have an army of 100,000 to suppress internal revolts, the volunteer corps were the source from which a large part of the army was taken. To the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy the Reichswehr represented and still represents the most reliable armed force for carrying out the policy of the state. The officers' corps is made up of aristocratic elements as well as of conservative reliable elements from the bourgeoisie and the middle classes. In 1926 fifteen of the twenty-six chief commanding officers of the Reichswehr were members of the aristocracy; and the three cavalry divisions still existing can each boast an aristocrat as commander.

While the composition of the officers' corps of the Reichswehr is similar to that of the old Imperial army, the social and political composition of the privates has changed. New members are not enlisted by the War Ministry but by the captain of each company. Since the latter are definitely nationalistic, they do not accept new recruits unless they are assured by recommendations, and in other ways, of their political reliability. Thus, while the old Imperial army contained many Socialist elements, the present Reichswehr is immune from Socialist or Democratic elements, not to speak of Communist sympathizers.

The problem of developing loyalty among the privates of the present Reichswehr is, of course, quite different from what it

abolition of certain abuses, was to bring back the troops in good discipline and to preserve "law and order." It was also interesting to note that none of the soldiers' councils of the Army of the East, which was in direct contact with the Russian bolshevist army, showed any attempt to imitate the actions of the Russian bolshevik revolution. The Russians were ignored as a people of a lower culture, and it was considered the best thing to get back home as soon as possible. In a few instances where radically inclined soldiers proposed to send messages of congratulation to the Russians this was voted down by overwhelming majorities.

was in the case of the old army.¹ First of all, the army is composed of professional soldiers who are required to enlist for a period of twenty-four years, twelve years of active service and twelve years of reserve duty during which they are employed in an administrative capacity. The professional character of the army separates the soldiers of the Reichswehr from the rest of the population much more effectively than was the case before the war. The fact that the private is assured a position for life tends to make him support the existing régime, a factor that grows more important as the chances of making a livelihood diminish in civilian life. Even more than the government official does he feel that he possesses an economically privileged position in the present order of society. The government has attempted to strengthen this loyalty to the Republic by the establishment of lectures and courses on civic training.

How reliable a weapon the Reichswehr is as a defender of the Republic is hard to state. Its dependability in defending the Republic against possible uprisings of revolutionary workers can, of course, not be doubted. How dependable it would be in case of a possible *putsch* on the part of the "Nazis" cannot be determined, as this would depend upon a whole series of conditioning factors. One may say, however, that as the policies of the government have become more and more conservative and have taken on a semi-Fascist character, the inner relationship between the Reichswehr and the government has undoubtedly been strengthened. Furthermore, there can hardly be any doubt that in the case of an establishment of a Fascist government or the coalition of "Nazis" and other right-wing elements, the Reichswehr would prove a loyal organ to such a government.²

¹ Th. Bertellot, *Kultur- und Lebenskunde für Reichswehrschulen* (nach den Lehrplänen des Reichsministeriums vom 10. Dezember, 1920); Feeser, "Soldatischer und bürgerlicher Gehorsam" (in *Wissen und Wehr*, 7. Heft [1928], pp. 385-401); Oswald Froh, *Erziehung im Heere* (ein Beitrag zur Nationalerziehung der Erwachsenen) (1926); *Leitfaden für den Unterricht Ihm Heere* (published by the Reichswehrministerium: Heeres-Inspektion des Erziehungs- und Bildungswesens, 1926) (deals with the rights and duties of soldiers, gives also a military history of the war); Fr. Schmidt, *Der Wehrmann des 20ten Jahrhunderts* (1928); von Waldeyer-Hartz, *Mannszucht bei Heer und Marine* (1920).

² Walter Hüsing, *Die neue Wehrverfassung* (1920); Bernhard Kiessling, *Deutschlands Reichsheer der Zukunft*; Rudolf Liepmann, *Die Politischen Aufgaben der deutschen Wehrmacht* (1923); Karl Oertzen, *Deutsches Reichsheer* (1922); Ludwig Märcker, *Vom Kaiserheer zur Reichswehr* (1921).

The volunteer corps who refused to accept the new government and who worked for the re-establishment of the old régime continued their existence outside of the Reichswehr. The most important of these were the Brigade Ehrhardt, Werwolf, Oberland, Rossbach, and Organisation Consul. As the economic misery of the inflation period increased, these various organizations increased in number and size, and their leaders often stood in close personal relationship with the officers of the Reichswehr. These organizations were largely responsible for many of the political murders committed against leaders of the Republic as well as against the Communists. After the stabilization of the currency in 1924 these conspirative organizations began to lose their importance, and the "Steelhelmet" (*Stahlhelm*), which attempted to work for its militaristic and monarchistic ideals within the legal frame of the Republic, began to grow rapidly and gradually absorbed most of the above organizations.¹ The "Steelhelmet," under the leadership of Franz Seldte and Lieutenant Colonel Düsterberg, now claims a membership of over a million and is the mainstay of the much weakened monarchistic Nationalist party.

Due to the military strength of the reactionary elements as well as to doubts of the political reliability of the Reichswehr, the three middle parties who originally had formed the Weimar Coalition began in 1923 to organize their followers along similar lines. Thus arose the "Reichsbanner," over 80 per cent of whose members are followers of the Social Democracy. At the beginning of 1932 the "Reichsbanner" claimed 1,500,000 members of which 150,000 constituted a well-drilled fighting corps. Its chief aim is to strengthen the military power and prestige of the existing Republic.

In order to establish a military force against both the "Reichsbanner" and the "Steelhelms," the Communists began to organize their followers in the "Red Front Fighters League" (*Rotfrontkämpferbund*). It was to be the kernel around which, in case of a proletarian revolution, the Red Guard or the Red Army was to grow. This organization was, however, suppressed

¹ Fr. Bendzular, *Der Stahlhelm* (1925); Karras and Koennecke (eds.), *Sechs Jahre Stahlhelm in Mitteldeutschland* (1926).

in 1929. It continues to exist illegally in various disguises, but its activities and growth have been hampered by this suppression.

The phenomenal growth of the "Nazis" in recent years has been paralleled by a similar growth of their military organizations, the so-called "Stormtroops." Their size has been estimated at between 200,000 and 500,000 members. In 1931 the "Nazis" and their "Stormtroops" formed, together with the Nationalist party and the "Steelhelmets," the so-called "National Opposition," directed basically against the Communists, but for the time being against the Brüning government. While this "National Opposition" was broken up during 1932, the formation of the compromise cabinet under Hitler showed the basic unity of the reactionary forces in the face of a growing radicalism in the country.

All these military organizations carry on their regular military drills and appear in military formation at the various public demonstrations and festivals. They all possess enough small arms to do fatal injury to one another, though it is doubtful whether they possess a large number of rifles and machine guns at present. In case of an improbable civil war between the "Nazis" and the present government, the Reichsbanner, however, would undoubtedly receive sufficient weapons from the government to act as an auxiliary to the Reichswehr. Furthermore, in case of a serious civil war against the Communists, the "Nazi Stormtroops" as well as the "Steelhelmet" would probably be supplied in a similar fashion. The importance, however, lies not in the amount of arms which they possess at present, but in the fact that they constitute well-drilled military units which can be utilized in case of open civil war. The intensified political and economic struggles since the revolution have taken on a military aspect which tends to transform Germany into an armed camp. Though no open civil war exists, antagonisms are so strong that the threats of civil war are always present. The intensity of the antagonisms can be measured by the fact that, in the local clashes between the various military organizations during 1932, 182 people were killed and approximately

15,000 were wounded, most of them being "Nazis" or Communists.¹

With the demobilization of the German army the officers who were World War veterans also began to organize leagues of their own. One of these, the "German Officers' League" (Deutsche Offiziersbund), was organized essentially to give economic assistance to the officers who had been dismissed from the army and who were looking for other positions. Another organization, the "National Federation of German Officers" (Nationalverband deutscher Offiziere), is actively engaged in maintaining the national traditions of the past.

Of importance are also the regimental societies (Regimentsvereine) of which there are two types—the members of one including common soldiers as well as officers, the other including only officers. Since the war a number of organizations for furthering the economic interests of those maimed in the World War (Kriegsbeschädigtenorganisationen) have come into existence.

A word must be added about the rôle of the police in cementing national loyalty.² The police is an auxiliary force to the army. Unlike the latter they come into daily contact with the population. Thus they have an immediate influence upon the life and thought of the people. This has been especially true in Germany where, besides the duties of maintaining law and order, the police have taken care of a host of other activities which in many countries are relegated to civilian authority. This continuous presence of the police as the arm of the state has strengthened the feeling of pride in the power of the German state among many sections of the state, especially among the middle classes. On the other hand, the officiousness and arro-

¹ For additional material concerning recent developments among the military organizations of Germany, see the article by H. R. Knickerbocker in the *New York Evening Post*, January 23, 1932.

² Ernst van den Bergh, *Polizei und Volk. Seelische Zusammenhänge* (1926); F. Friedensburg, *Wirtschaft und Polizei* (1926); Fritz Hellwag, *Die Polizei in der Karikatur* (1926); H. H. Houben, *Polizei und Zensur. Längs- und Querschnitte durch die Geschichte der Buch- und Theaterzensur* (1926); H. von Thiemann, *Aus den Geheimakten der politischen Polizei. Erinnerungen an ihre ehemalige Tätigkeit*.

gance of the police in the performance of their duty were in the pre-war period perhaps a more potent factor than even the army in arousing the antagonisms of the lower classes against the state. This resentment was illustrated in the use of the term "Polizei und Militärstaat"; it was a synonym for a state which suppressed civic rights and liberties.

The revolution and the establishment of the Republic did not diminish but augmented the scope and power of the police. Also, a large part of the control of the police of Prussia was taken out of the hands of the local authorities and definitely placed in the hands of the Prussian minister of the interior. These developments followed as a result of the various proletarian uprisings in 1918-19, with which the local police had been unable, and in some places unwilling, to cope. The growth of radicalism has moreover led the Prussian government to carry on a steady policy of militarization of the police. The latter has been subject to increased military drill and has been equipped with machine guns, armored cars, tear-gas bombs, etc. This militarization of the police has in various cases shown its effectiveness as a weapon maintaining the existing régime.¹

A word must likewise be added on the importance of the navy as a means of developing national loyalty.² The German navy was a product of the growth of the German Empire. It became of special importance with the growth of imperialism, the expansion of German commerce, the export of capital, and the acquisition of colonies. It was a more direct instrument of bourgeois expansion than the army. Among the great mass of the people, however, the navy played a less important rôle than the

¹ An instance in the effectiveness of the police is shown in their suppression of the May Day demonstration of the workers of Berlin in 1929, which resulted in the death of scores of workers.

² Doctor Bredt, "Der geplante Flottenvorstoß Ende 1918" (in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, CCVII [March, 1927], 189-206.); Deutscher Flottenverein (publisher), *Deutschland sei wach! Betrachtungen über Rüstungsfragen und Weltpolitik* (1912); Captain Wittmar, *Deutschlands Taten zur See von ihren Ursprüngen bis zum Weltkrieg* (1925); Arnold Fuchs, *Die deutsche Flotte* (1920); *Kalender des deutschen Flottenvereins*; Admiral Scheer, *Deutschlands Hochseeflotte im Weltkrieg* (1919); von Waldeyer-Hartz, "Entwicklungs geschichte der deutschen Seemacht und der kaiserlichen Flotte" (in *Ehrendenkmal der deutschen Armee und Marine*, pp. 451-72).

army in the building of national loyalty. As the navy, however, grew rapidly in size and importance its popularity among the nation grew likewise. As Germany was building a navy which was to compete eventually with the British navy, the nationalism of those interested in German expansion thereby began to take on also a definite anti-British coloring.

This anti-British sentiment was sharply crystallized with the outbreak of the war. The German navy was expected to defend Germany against the dominating power of the British navy. The daring and courage of individual German cruisers throughout the world, the U-boat campaign and the battle of Jutland put a romantic halo around the navy as the defender of the fatherland.

Yet within the navy discontent existed, which manifested itself more openly than in the army. The causes were, first, the existence of abuses similar to those in the army which, however, were felt more keenly due to the fact that the officers and privates on the ship lived for a long time in close quarters; second, the forced inactivity of the navy during the greater part of the war; and, finally, the absence of the moral force of a strong military tradition such as the army possessed. The Independent Socialists attempted to utilize this discontent. In 1917 a conspiracy was uncovered and two sailors were court-martialed and shot.

Unlike the army, the navy played a leading rôle in starting and spreading the revolution. As the Army of the West was driven back, rumors spread rapidly that the whole navy was to be sent out against the British, as a last desperate attempt to save the apparently hopeless situation. This rumor, which spread rapidly, so incensed the sailors that, on November 4, 1918, the crew of certain ships lying in Kiel refused to obey orders. Their attempted arrest aroused the workers in Kiel and the first workers' and soldiers' (really sailors') council was set up in this city. As the news of this revolt spread, the sailors of most of the other ships took matters into their own hands and likewise revolted. Immediately groups of these sailors began to travel to important cities in Germany initiating the establishment of workers' and

soldiers' councils for the purpose of setting up a new government and ending the war.

The provisions of the peace treaty that the German navy be handed over to Great Britain caused tremendous indignation throughout the country. This indignation was partly counteracted by the feeling of joy when news came that the German skeleton crews after delivering the German ships had scuttled them in the harbor of Scapa Flow. Under the Republic the navy has played a small rôle due to severe treaty restrictions. These very restrictions, however, are being widely used by the parties of the Right to arouse national sentiment. Moreover, the launching of such naval vessels as are permitted by the Treaty of Versailles has been invariably turned into a tremendous nationalistic demonstration.

CHAPTER X

THE SCHOOLS

The schools of a nation are undoubtedly one of the most important institutions for developing among the rising generation a conscious allegiance to the existing state. This is, of course, especially true where the whole educational system is in the hands of the state. In this connection it is worth while recalling what has been said about the changing character of the state. For, as the state changed its nature, the change affected the ideals of education, the curriculum, the methods of instruction, and the results achieved by the schools. There was no civic training in feudal society because there were no citizens, but merely rulers and subjects. The concept of civic training originated in the attempts of the anti-feudal bourgeoisie to secure a place in society and in the state, and to remodel both into the forms which were necessary for its own growth. As the bourgeoisie succeeded in these attempts to control and remodel society and the state, the problem of civic training came to center around the need of attaching the middle and especially the lower classes to the new régime.¹

The schools of Germany have always had a very definite class character. They were established either for the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, or the lower classes. As a result, the purposes and courses of these schools were naturally different, being designed to give to each class such an education as would satisfy certain of its needs and make it loyal to the existing state. At the same

¹ See: August Messer, *Das Problem der staatsbürgerlichen Erziehung, Historisch und systematisch behandelt* (1902); Franke, *Staatsbewusstsein als Erziehungsgrundlage vor hundert Jahren*; Franke, *Der deutsche Staatsgedanke in der Volksschule vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart* (1912); Franke, *Geschichte des Staatsgedankens in Schule und Erziehung* (1912). These volumes, especially Franke's detailed *Geschichte*, contain a great amount of material pertaining to the subject of civic training including many quotations from original sources. The historical material and the numerous quotations have been taken from Franke's *Geschichte* except where otherwise stated. They have therefore not been documented separately.

time, these schools have served to perpetuate each class and separate it from the others. Formerly it was almost impossible for a member of the bourgeoisie to enter those schools created for the aristocracy, while until recently it was extremely difficult for a member of the lower class to secure an education designed for the middle and upper classes. This emphasis upon the class character of education gives the ruling class a certain monopoly over higher education. At the same time it has had a negative effect upon the loyalty of the lower classes to the state, for it has continuously helped to remind these classes of their inferior position in society. This, of course, need not necessarily have been a negative factor as long as the lower classes accepted the existing order as inevitable. It was when these lower classes began to question the inevitability of the existing order in general and their position in this social order in particular, that the negative elements of this factor have come into the foreground.

Let us now consider historically how the schools have been used to develop loyalty to the existing state.¹ It is sufficient to begin with the Reformation, which gave a great impetus to lay education by placing the schools as well as the other possessions of the church in the hands of the absolute monarchs. As a result, the various rulers, small and large, became more definitely interested in the school system, for it became a means of strengthening their political position. In this they found support among Luther and his associates, who were in favor of education both of a religious and lay nature. In fact, Luther is

¹ For the general history of education see, among others: Friedrich Paulsen, *Die Geschichte des gelehrtene Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen und Universitäten vom Ausgang des Mittelalters bis zur Gegenwart* (2 vols.; 1896); Friedrich Paulsen, *Das deutsche Bildungswesen in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (1906); Heinrich Lewin, *Geschichte der Entwicklung der preussischen Volksschule und der Förderung der Volksbildung durch die Hohenzollern* (1910); Friedrich Wienstein, *Die preussische Volksschule in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (1915); J. Tews, *Ein Jahrhundert preussischer Schulgeschichte* (1914); Alfred Heubaum, *Geschichte des deutschen Bildungswesens seit der Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts*, Vol. 1 (1905); Edward Reisner, *Nationalism and Education since 1789* (1923); F. Seiler, *Geschichte des deutschen Unterrichts* (2 vols.; 1906); W. Kahl, *Zur Geschichte des Schulunterrichts* (1913); H. Heppe, *Geschichte des deutschen Volksschulwesens* (3 vols.; 1860); August Hinke, *Über die Entwicklung des preussischen Volksschulwesens* (1843).

considered by German educators to have been the founder of civic training. Leading in this desire to spread lay education was the growing bourgeoisie of the sixteenth century which established a number of Bürgerschulen.¹ But the economic disintegration of Germany, which set in soon after and continued throughout the seventeenth century, made education a luxury upon which neither the state nor the bourgeoisie could expend as much as before.

With the slow economic revival of the eighteenth century, however, both the rising bourgeoisie and the princes showed renewed interest in developing education as an aid in strengthening their position. In this they were stimulated during the whole period of enlightenment by the more advanced French bourgeoisie which put emphasis upon the spread of knowledge and education. This movement brought forth a number of pedagogical theorists among the German bourgeoisie who now definitely began to formulate the problem of civic (bourgeois) education. It is worth our while to consider some of these theorists somewhat at length, as they represent the first systematic attempts to introduce civic training.

One of the most interesting of those was Friedrich Gabriel Resewitz (1725–1805), who published among other works *The Education of the Citizen* (*Die Erziehung des Bürgers* [1773]), and *Thoughts, Proposals and Wishes for the Improvement of Public Education*, 5 vols. (*Gedanken, Vorschläge und Wünsche zur Verbesserung der öffentlichen Erziehung*). In the latter work he proposed to study the political geography of the world as well as the

¹ For the history of education before 1800 see among others the following: Biedermann, *Deutsche Bildungszustände in der zweiten Hälfte des 18ten Jahrhunderts* (1905); Julius Gallandt, *Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Geschichtsunterrichts im Zeitalter der deutschen Aufklärung* (1900); Alfred Heubaum, *Die Nationalerziehung in ihren Vertretern Zöllner und Stephani* (1904); F. Vollmer, *Friedrich Wilhelm I. und die deutsche Volksschule* (1909); Paul Rühlmann, *Die Versuche einer politischen Unterweisung in den deutschen Schulen des 17ten und 18ten Jahrhunderts* (1905); Albert Richter, *Geschichtsunterricht im 17ten Jahrhundert*; Robert Stein, *Die Schule als Staatsanstalt in Schulgeschichte und Staatslehre bis 1794* (1906); Ferdinand Strassburger, *Die Mädchenerziehung in der Geschichte der Pädagogik des 17ten und 18ten Jahrhunderts in Frankreich und Deutschland* (1911); Georg Mertz, *Das Schulwesen der deutschen Reformation im 16ten Jahrhundert* (1902); F. E. Ruhkopf, *Geschichte des Schul- und Erziehungsweises* (1794); see also Vols. I, VIII, LIII, and LIV of the *Monumenta Germaniae Paedagogica*.

form of government of the various states, placing special emphasis upon Germany. "Political newspapers are to be read with the students and explained through the findings of geographical and historical science and especially recent history." In the fifth volume he included an essay written in 1774 and entitled: "1800 a Pedagogical Dream," in which he imagines that the princes have followed the proposals of the various "patriots" and have turned nearly all the Latin schools into citizen schools (*Bürgerschulen*).

All instruction in these schools is designed for the middle class citizen. . . . In geography the various characteristics of the various continents and a closer study of the German fatherland is sufficient. History begins with the present time and goes back only to the year 1700, the rest of history being covered in a very brief time. The laws of the land, which concern every citizen, the most necessary rules of health and a set of sound maxims for use in life are to be explained and emphasized to the pupils.

While believing that this education should also be given to the peasantry Resewitz places the main emphasis upon the townspeople. This education is to be carried on within the limits of each of the petty states.

Another reformer was Johann Bernhard Basedow (1724-90).¹ In order to educate the youth to a patriotic life, Basedow advocated that every year certain festivals of the fatherland be celebrated. At these affairs, especially in the towns and villages, entertainments should be furnished expressly for children at the expense of the government and under supervision of the authorities, because such early impressions have deep and lasting effects. In the public schools for several days before and after these festivals nothing else should be discussed but the fatherland, the great examples of patriotic sacrifices, the advantages which flow from civic union in the state, the duties to the fatherland. Patriotism in the sense of Basedow carries strongly cosmopolitan features. One should serve the fatherland, because in doing so one serves humanity. The virtue of patriotism for him consists not

¹ See also A. Basedow, *Johann Bernhard Basedow: Neue Beiträge, Ergänzungen und Berichtigungen zu seiner Lebensgeschichte* (1924).

in a foolish and onesided belligerence in favor of the state in which one is born, but in a proud desire to act for the welfare of all in that state which has given us our civic rights and in which we live and enjoy freedom, honor, property and safety, a desire to avoid the turmoil of revolutions, a desire to advance the good relations between monarch and people, and in any general crisis to place ourselves among the first and most willing citizens for its alleviation.

This proposed type of civic training is characteristic of the general attitude of the bourgeoisie toward the state during the first period of its development. While attempting to develop the civic ideals of the bourgeoisie it nevertheless attempted to do it within the forms of the absolute monarchy. Its ideal was the "enlightened despot" whose self-interest would lead him to favor the more advanced educational ideals of the bourgeoisie. Consequently the absolute monarchs could utilize certain of these ideals, especially those which emphasized the necessity of loyalty to the rulers. Thus, for instance, while Frederick the Great sympathized in general with the ideal of the education of mankind, in practice he was more interested in systematizing and centralizing the schools of his country in order to strengthen his hold over the loyalty of his subjects. This systematization was accomplished by the "Royal Prussian General School Regulation" (*Königlich-Preussisches General-Land-Schul-Reglement*) enacted in 1763, which was the basis for all later school policies. The various edicts of Frederick the Great were again summarized in one part of his famous Code of Laws (*Allgemeines Landrecht*) completed in 1791 after his death, and put into effect in 1794. This Code of Laws laid down the following principles:


1. All schools are state institutions.
2. Schools are to be supported by the local communities.
3. Every child must attend the elementary schools or receive some other form of instruction accepted by the state.
4. All recognized Churches have equal rights in regard to religious instruction in the schools.

After his death more proposals for the reformation of the educational system were made but they resulted chiefly in the centralization of the whole school system by the establishment of

the Central School Commission (Oberschulkollegium) in 1787, under the direct control of the king.¹

The ideas and events of the revolution of the French bourgeoisie were mirrored in German pedagogic literature. The demand for civic education was pressed among those already interested in the matter. In addition, other writers appeared to press forward the demands for a new education. Stephani, Voss, and Rade may be considered typical representatives of the voluminous literature on this subject.

One of the most important works of Heinrich Stephani (1761-1850) was his *Outline of the Science of Education* (*Grundriss der Erziehungswissenschaft*) published in 1797. The first part of this book deals with "the education of man as man," the second with "his education as a citizen." This "civic training proposes to provide man with the knowledge and capacities which deal directly with his social relations to other people." And, of course, some of these "capacities" are necessary for "all members of the state," others only for "certain classes." The development of the former "capacities," comprising general civic training, is partly to make the student a citizen of the world, partly to make him a citizen of the state. In consequence we have the following arrangement:



Civic training is treated in more detail in the two-volume work of Christian Daniel Voss, teacher at the Halle Päd-

¹ Friederich Wienstein, *Die preussische Volksschule in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (1915), p. 37.

gogium, who published in 1799 his *Essay on Education for the State* (*Versuch über die Erziehung für den Staat*) "as a need of our time to advance the welfare of citizens and the safety of rulers." He writes:

.... If the concept of the state and its purposes, of the rights and duties of the citizen, of the necessity and the value of the reigning power etc., are more than mere fancies, if patriotism or the feeling of citizenship is no chimera, then we must be able to teach them and they can surely be imparted only by special instruction, by a specially directed effort in this direction. Such an education would therefore really be training for the state and would also be the "business of the state." In every school there should therefore be a department for instruction in civics.

This civic training, however, should not be a mere appendix to other instruction but should be closely tied up with the whole body of instruction. To be sure, Voss expresses a fear that "general civic training may foster cosmopolitanism rather than patriotism" and, therefore, this civic training should place special emphasis on one's own country.

In such an education, the state would be the main item, the aim of the state would be the aim of education. In such an education the pupil will come to understand that obedience to law and government is his first and fundamental obligation in the state.

In the interest of civic training Voss is further of the opinion that "the state should provide special public schools and then suppress all private instruction at least for boys from the age at which a public institution can be attended with profit and without danger."

Not so valuable as the work of Voss but still worthy of consideration is the work of Karl August von Rade, *Education for Civic Training* (*Erziehung des Menschen zum Staatsbürger*), which was published in 1803. The sixth chapter deals with the concept of the citizen. Here, like Voss, he tries to unite cosmopolitanism with patriotism. Civic instruction itself is to begin with the geography of Germany which should be tied up with instruction in the economic and political conditions of the fatherland. Great results were expected from such instruction. The description of the "advantages" of the fatherland will give the child a "certain preference" for it. Like Voss, Rade also

advocates civic training for girls "even though they are, because of their physical disabilities, excluded from all public affairs."

Many other writers advocated some form of "civic" training which was both national and loyal to the existing state. Jahn, the founder of the German system of gymnastics, proposed:

No child shall leave school without knowing the essentials about his father-land. The rights of the citizen may only be granted after an examination on the rights and duties of the citizen. . . . Education must aim at giving the citizen not merely mechanical abilities and a certain amount of knowledge but must arouse the civic spirit of the nation.

The defeat of Prussia in 1806 brought about a more definite crystallization of the national spirit. Under the leadership of Fichte and others the cosmopolitan element in the ideals of the new civic education was rapidly pushed into the background. The demand for a civic (bourgeois) education became definitely a demand for a national education, which concretely, however, meant a support of the various absolute monarchs in order to overthrow the dominance of the French. The hope of all these reformers was that once Germany was freed from France they would have a clear field to carry out their ideals of liberal, civic (bourgeois) education. In this, however, they were sorely disappointed.

With the defeat of Napoleon and the coming of reaction, not merely was there no introduction of the new ideals of civic training, but even the voicing of such ideals became forbidden. The various absolute governments of Germany, which had barely escaped destruction as the result of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, saw in all these new ideals of education just another of the hated manifestations of revolution. In fact, even instruction as to the organization and administration of the government as well as discussion of recent historical events was considered dangerous to the existence of these governments and was forbidden in the various educational institutions. In the elementary schools, which had been least affected by the new ideals, the old curriculum was re-emphasized. Besides the three R's, religion and obedience to the ruling prince were the prime subjects of instruction. In other words, the mass

of the people were taught to regard themselves as subjects of the ruler and not as citizens of a state in which they participated.

In the higher schools, the Gymnasia in particular, such a curriculum was obviously insufficient. Here, the subjects of instruction carefully avoided touching on any points which might lead to a discussion not merely of civic rights but also of all recent events. A wave of so-called neo-humanism set in which ignored all vital timely problems and laid emphasis upon classical languages, literature, and ideals. Since to the government patriotism had become identical with revolution, the ideal product of a higher education was not the patriot but the cosmopolitan gentleman with an aristocratic, general culture, who felt himself above the problems of the day. This was an excellent form of divertive propaganda, which continued to prove useful throughout the whole century. A similar educational policy was also laid down for the universities where all instruction was placed under censorship and where attempts to spread the new ideals caused immediate dismissal or continued persecution.

Thus, while neither the government nor the official representatives of pedagogy revealed any interest in or sympathy for civic training, the rising bourgeoisie insisted steadily upon the importance of such a training. And ideas of a new education seeped in through the teachers, most of whom came from the lesser bourgeoisie. During the July Revolution of 1830 and especially during the March days of 1848, the demands for political instruction were re-emphasized by the bourgeoisie. A number of political catechisms were written at the time, most of which had the character of political pamphlets. In pedagogical literature, too, the demand for civic training appeared.

With the suppression of the revolution reaction also took hold of the school system. In 1849, at a conference of teachers of the Prussian training schools, King Frederick William IV exclaimed:

You and you alone are to blame for all the misery which the last year has brought upon Prussia. The pseudo-education of the masses is to be blamed for it. You have been spreading it under the name of true wisdom. This sham education, strutting about like a peacock, has always been hateful to me. I

hated it from the bottom of my soul before I came to the throne, and since I became king I have done all I could to suppress it.

Attempts were made to restrict elementary education to reading, writing, elementary arithmetic, and strictly dogmatic religious instruction, while the training colleges for elementary-school teachers were bidden to give up their ambitions for liberal education. It is worth noting that, at the thirty-nine annual conferences of the directors of the secondary schools of Prussia held before 1877, no discussion of civic education ever took place. Nevertheless, the growing national patriotism did find its way into the schools, although especially in the smaller states measures were taken against such "treasonable ideas." In Prussia, however, which sought to gain control over all Germany, the teachers became more and more the apostles of a united empire.

Strangely enough, little national propaganda was officially instituted in the schools following the founding of the Empire. This may be explained by the fact that while the governmental policies after 1871 were a compromise between bourgeoisie and aristocracy, the latter retained its control of the administrative apparatus including the state school systems. It was felt that it would be best to leave things as they had been and not to acquaint the masses with "civic" ideals or the workings of the government. Furthermore, no federal educational act was passed, as the government was too much taken up with the *Kulturkampf*, the anti-Socialist laws as well as the more important legislation on economic matters. Thus the elementary schools continued their old curricula while the secondary schools retained their old cloistered humanistic ideals. Nevertheless, allegiance to the new Empire was undoubtedly inculcated in the minds of the students by the teachers themselves whose national sentiments had already characterized them before the Franco-Prussian War.

With the accession of William II, however, a definite change took place. The new Kaiser desired to strengthen the feeling of reverence for the Hohenzollern dynasty and for his own person, to integrate this with the existing national feeling, and to develop thus a mighty wave of monarchical nationalism. The

principal reason for his attempt to develop this patriotic feeling was the growth of the Social Democratic movement. Since repressive methods had failed, the fight was to be continued with intellectual weapons, and in this battle the schools were made to play their part. The Kaiser proposed that a beginning was to be made in the reform of the instruction in history:

Historical instruction must strive to give our youth the impression that the teachings of the Social Democracy not only contradict the divine commandments and Christian morals, but that they are in reality impossible of achievement and in their consequences dangerous for the individual and for society. It must include much more recent and contemporary history in the curriculum, and show that only the power of the State can protect the family, the freedom and the rights of the individual; the youth of the nation must be made conscious how Prussia's kings have continuously striven to raise the standard of living, from the legal reforms of Frederick the Great and from the abolition of serfdom down to to-day. . . . To this end the training schools for teachers will have to make corresponding additions to their courses of study.

The state ministry accordingly submitted a number of proposals which were approved by William as king of Prussia, on August 30, 1889. In order that this instruction might not lead to a discussion of Socialism in the schools, it was decreed that "the instruction on the dangers of Socialism will preclude a detailed discussion of Socialist theories and proceed on the basis of common sense."

At the School Conference on Problems of Secondary Instruction, which took place from December 4 to 17, 1890, in Berlin, the Kaiser took a determined stand against the old humanistic ideal of education:

.... We must educate young Germans and not young Greeks and Romans. But above all we must know the facts of our national history. The Great Elector in my school days was only a very hazy personage; the Seven Years War was not even considered; and history ended with the end of the last century, with the French Revolution. The Wars of Liberation, which are of the greatest importance for every citizen, were not discussed.

The conference had not expected any such aggressive and definite stand on the part of the Kaiser, but finally passed the following resolutions:

A more detailed study of our recent national history is to be secured through a reduction in the amount of other historical material studied without increasing the time devoted to instruction in history.

The effects of the Kaiser's wishes were more clearly seen in the Prussian program of instruction issued in 1892, which with some changes remained in force down to 1920. In outlining the aims of instruction in German language and literature, emphasis was placed on the arousing of patriotic sentiment, especially by acquainting the student with the world of German fairy tales and the masterpieces of German literature. For historical instruction in the fifth year of the Gymnasium, the following was prescribed:

In connection with national history and the study of the lives of the various rulers a comparative treatment of our social and economic development up to 1888 with especial attention to the services of the Hohenzollerns, particularly for the improvement of the conditions of the peasants, the middle classes and the workers.

All this, of course, refers merely to Prussia. From the viewpoint of nationalism, the problem in the non-Prussian states was to superimpose upon the patriotic feeling for the reigning princes and their governments a loyalty to the Emperor and the government of the nation. But since the schools were controlled by these various states and not the federal government, this could not be effected in any great measure from above. Patriotic feeling toward the Imperial government was developed to the degree in which the interests of the various classes of these states corresponded with the interests of the Imperial government.

In the Prussian textbooks on European history, the development of Germany in general and Prussia in particular was considered the most important phase in the history of Europe. The new German Empire seemed the culmination of history. These books as well as the general "readers" contained detailed descriptions of the virtues of the rulers and of the battles which they had won for the German people. Besides, the attention of the pupils was called by brief comments to the superior qualities of the German people and of German culture.

But in Germany schoolbooks have never been nearly as important as, for instance, in the United States. In Germany the

pupil has been influenced more by the school teacher, since he receives his information directly from him, and does not have to depend to any large extent on his text. The interest of the government was thus directed toward securing a sufficiently strict control over the teachers in regard to their national and political views. Teachers were observed to see that they expressed only loyal views in their instructions. As the teacher is a state official, this was not very difficult, for reports were given to the higher authorities not only concerning his professional duties but also concerning his private life. This inspection was exercised by a district school inspector who was very often a clergyman, and also by the district prefect (*Landrat*). By these measures it was possible to keep out of the teaching body those teachers who were regarded as inimical to the state, that is, those with Socialist leanings. In 1890 the Kaiser had declared that the rights and duties of teachers were, above all, those of state officials; consequently they were not permitted to participate in political activities unless they supported conservative parties, and even then they were forced to play a passive rôle.

This policy instituted by William II for developing national patriotism and strengthening loyalty to the Emperor paid little attention to creating an understanding of the political and administrative institutions of Germany. On the contrary, the old policy was maintained of keeping the population ignorant of all such matters; these were to remain a monopoly of the government and the ruling classes. Thus the Frenchman Jules Huret, who made a tour of Germany during 1906 and who reported his observation in the *Figaro*, could say:

I was at first astounded at the almost absolute ignorance of the German middle classes (artisans, businessmen and shopkeepers), in regard to the political institution of Germany or even of their local communities.

Similarly Stier-Somlo wrote in 1907:

The constitution of Germany and those of the member states are almost completely unknown to a large portion of the citizens. It is depressing to experience daily how few people are acquainted with even the outlines of our constitutional and administrative organizations. . . .

The famous liberal theologian Adolph von Harnack wrote likewise:

It is an evil not to be endured, that from numerous gymnasia—shall I say from most of them?—the pupils emerge after long years of instruction in history and yet do not know even the outlines of our present constitutional life and our present system of public law.

In 1908 Martin Rade, a well-known professor of theology in Marburg, stated:

To-day the governing forces of Germany seem to feel themselves most certain of their success with the coming generation if they keep it in political ignorance as long as possible or even altogether.

The view of the government and many of the conservative elements was well represented by the article by Director Prahl of the Prenzlau Gymnasium: "Civic Training and the Schools," which appeared in the *Grenzbote* for April, 1911. The main reason for his rejection of special instruction in civics lay in the fact that especially among his elementary-school teachers of the western part of Germany the younger elements were often sympathetic to the Social Democrats. Even the gymnasium teachers were held under suspicion by Prahl. Their wishes in regard to the new service regulations showed:

.... That many gymnasium teachers are full of a destructive democratic spirit, which cannot submit to discipline. Most of them come from families without any traditions. They have risen from poor circumstances to higher positions, and by their own industry have worked themselves into a wholly new sphere. For that reason they only too often lack any sense of their own significance and position. The democratic tendency among the teachers makes it more difficult for the school as a whole to exercise to the full that influence on the civic training of the students of which it is really capable.

In his distrust of the teachers, Prahl goes so far as to characterize the idea of civic training for the youth as a "dangerous fad."

Nevertheless, an increasing portion of the youth of the working class were gaining a kind of "civic" education at the hands of the Social Democrats. Among their own followers, who were growing in numbers every year, this party was spreading information concerning the organization and functions of the existing German government, not, of course, for the purpose of developing civic allegiance toward the state, but for the purpose of destroying it by showing how the machinery of the government was being used to suppress the workers. The effectiveness of

this form of "civic training" gradually aroused leaders of the middle and upper classes, as well as the government, to counteract the political education of the working-class youth at the hands of the Social Democrats by giving political education in the schools.

In 1909 a group of business-men sent a circular letter to a large number of men in high positions, in which attention was called to the importance of civic training as a means of better preparing the rising generation for its position in industrial and political life. At the same time an attempt was made to interest other circles in this problem by means of a general appeal. After these preliminary arrangements, a convention was called which met in Goslar on November 26, 1909, to found the "Association for the Civic Training of the German People," the name being changed later to "Association for Civic Training and Education" (Vereinigung für staatsbürgerliche Bildung und Erziehung). Besides this, on October 8, 1910, there was formed a "Business Committee for Introducing Civic Training into the Schools" at the head of which stood Friedrich Lange and Dietrich Meyer, the secretary of the Association of German Engineers. Numerous societies indorsed this committee. On October 22, 1909, the "German Central Organization for Youth Welfare" in Berlin arranged a conference to discuss the aims and methods of civic training. Another discussion evening was arranged in Berlin by this organization on March 23, 1912. Among other meetings and congresses we may mention that in March, 1910, a general meeting of the Prussian Training School teachers adopted a resolution to recommend the introduction of civics (*Staatsbürgerkunde*) as a branch of instruction in the teachers' training schools.

Furthermore, the state governments of Hesse, Hamburg, and Saxony made some attempts to introduce the study of civics in the schools although, as was the case in Hamburg, considerable hesitancy was shown because a considerable portion of the teachers there sympathized with the aims of the Social Democracy. In February, 1911, the Prussian Ministry of Education finally decided to introduce required courses in civics (*Staats-*

bürgerkunde) in the upper classes of secondary schools (Gymnasium, Realgymnasium, Oberrealschule) where the middle and upper classes sent their children. Lectures were to be given on the political situation and on governmental institutions, and were to be supplemented by visits to meetings of the local governmental bodies. Under direction of the teacher, the various legislative bodies and public political meetings were to be visited. In Bavaria there were no general directions in regard to such instruction. Nevertheless, civic training was given either as civics or as a general study of laws at most of the industrial continuation schools, technical schools, agricultural schools, and teacher training institutions.

All of these attempts led to the calling of the first general "Conference for Civic Training" which took place in Berlin on April 25 and 26, 1913. This important conference had an attendance of about 600, besides representatives of important societies as well as representatives from nearly all the leading newspapers of Germany. Various aspects of civic training were discussed for the purpose of developing it within as well as outside the school system.

It must, however, be remembered that the "civic training" advocated by all these groups as well as by various governmental agencies was quite different from that advocated at the end of the eighteenth century or even more clearly in the first half of the nineteenth century by various bourgeois reformers. It was not characterized by the enthusiasm of a youthful bourgeoisie attempting to remodel the system of absolutism but was a measure of defense on the part of a bourgeoisie which had come to an understanding with the semi-absolutist monarchy and aimed to prevent the spread of the destructive ideas of Socialism. It sought to instil not so much the concept of the rights of the citizen but the concept of the duties of the subject-citizen as well as a reverence for the ruling monarch.

A brief analysis of the rôle the universities play in developing civic training and national allegiance is essential. They have been the training ground for the higher officials and the intellectual leaders of the country. Still more, they have felt them-

selves the guardians of German traditions and the leaders of the cultural destinies of the nation. Such being the case the state has tried to guide the intellectual tendencies within the universities in such a way that they would become another means for spreading the ideals of the existing régime. This has been made especially easy by the fact that all universities were, and are still, governmental institutions. Thus the King of Prussia had the right to appoint the extraordinary professors. Instructors (*Privatdozenten*) were named by the faculty without confirmation by the state, but here, too, the state could make its influence felt. The government secured further influence on the teaching personnel through its granting or withholding of titles and orders. As a result, the German universities of the pre-war period had developed a patriotic and loyal teaching body which was extremely useful in spreading patriotic ideals.

The student body itself was not systematically influenced as at the Gymnasium, but certain factors had an even stronger effect. In the first place, almost all the students came from the middle and upper classes where they had grown up under the influence of family and national tradition. Secondly, most of the students wanted to secure either a state post or to fill a higher position in private life. For this purpose it was usually most advantageous to have no political ideas or else to adapt them to those of the ruling classes. In the third place, the greater part of the students were members of the so-called students corps (*Studentenkorps*) which were the guardians of old patriotic traditions. To be sure, these had once been liberal but they had gradually become bulwarks of conservatism and monarchism.

In the war against Napoleon a large part of the student body had fought for what they had hoped was the liberation and unification of Germany. Those students who refused to accept the reaction which set in after the victory joined the famous "Burschenschaften" in opposition to the already existing "Landsmannschaften," "Bursen," and other secret societies. These Burschenschaften emphasized the liberal national element in opposition to the absolutism and provincialism of the Landsmannschaften. They became rapidly popular and carried on

their liberal and national traditions even during the period of reaction. In fact, the great Wartburg Festival of 1817 showed the students of Germany among the leaders of the national and liberal movement. The murder of Kotzebue by the student Sand, however, led to the well-known Karlsbad decrees which ended these liberal, national, student activities. In their place the universities and the state officials supported the old reactionary Landsmannschaften or Studentcorps as they were now generally called. When, in 1848, the struggle for a united Germany broke out, although a number of students took part, the majority remained either passive or hostile to this movement. From then on these student associations developed a more and more conservative attitude, ignoring political and social problems, often degenerating into a stupid ceremonialism. From Huret, the Frenchman already mentioned, we have this comment based on his observation of the Göttinger Studentcorps:

The German conservatives probably approve of these associational activities because they divert the youth from politics and accustom them to discipline. . . . At this age boys often incline to liberal ideas and these are not strengthened by these fencing associations but weakened, for the members must obey unconditionally. . . . I have tried to draw some of the students into political discussion. Their ignorance is touching and their indifference disturbing.

All these factors contributed to give the student body an extremely strong and monarchistic stamp.

Despite the introduction of civic training and the increased spread of a patriotic spirit throughout the whole school system, the youth of the nation was flocking in increasing numbers to the banners of the Social Democracy.¹ This was aided no doubt by the conscious class character of the educational system. For, as has already been pointed out, the German school system reflected the existence of class differences which it tried to perpetuate. Thus, the elementary schools which furnished education from the ages of six to fourteen were intended for the lower classes, the great mass of the nation. Not merely this, but hav-

¹ Nevertheless, it might be argued that the nationalist training received at the schools was a contributing factor in strengthening the national sentiments within the Social Democracy.

ing passed through the elementary schools there was little chance for the student to enter the field of secondary education. All that he could do was to attend the compulsory part-time continuation schools for several years, where he received a certain amount of vocational training which would, however, not qualify him to become a member of the middle classes.

The secondary schools, the classical Gymnasium with its compulsory Greek and Latin, the scientific Oberrealschulen, and the partly scientific and partly classical Realgymnasium were intended for the middle and upper classes. These schools, which carried the student from his tenth to his eighteenth year, could only be entered after a special preparation which was furnished by private preparatory schools or by private instructors. This had the definite aim to keep out the great mass of the population which could not afford to pay either for the preparatory instruction or the school fee demanded by the state secondary schools.

Since matriculation in the universities or the technical high schools (equivalent to the engineering departments of American colleges and universities) required graduation from the secondary schools, it was almost impossible for the sons of the workers or poorer peasants to gain a university education. The class organization of education not merely caused dissatisfaction among the lower classes, by emphasizing their inferior status in society, but prevented the more energetic and gifted of them from rising into the middle and upper classes. Thus these elements, unable to break through the rigid caste-like system of education and social life, were thrown back upon their own class. In this way many individuals of superior ability found a substitute career as leaders of the government's most powerful body of opposition, namely, the Social Democracy.

During the war the entire school system of Germany became one of the most active agents for the dissemination of patriotic propaganda.¹ While the university students and the higher

¹ See, among others: Hans Aurhein, *Der Weltkrieg im Unterricht* (1916); O. Karstädt, *Kinderaug' und Kinderaufsatzt im Weltkriege* (1916); *Lesestücke zum Weltkrieg* (ed. by H. Kappey and H. Koch, 1915); Adolf Matthias, *Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung*

classes of the Gymnasia were given military training, the real importance of the schools lay elsewhere. They served first of all as an active agent in stimulating patriotic fervor for the war and for the defense of the nation. Later, as the war went on, the school system served as a channel through which the various war measures might be explained and justified. And toward the close of the war, the schools were used as an additional means for upholding in every possible way the morale of the German pupils and their parents. Not only were the subjects themselves taught in such a way as to strengthen national patriotism, but the schools themselves did everything possible to call forth the active participation of the pupils in various forms of military activities. Collections of food and clothing were made to be sent to the front; sewing classes devoted themselves to making garments for the troops; various metals necessary for the war were collected, such as gold, nickel, and copper, as well as old leather, rubber, and other articles. Their actual value was probably far less than the value of the activities themselves in developing a feeling of participation and oneness with the nation in this great crisis. The generation whose school life was thus saturated with patriotic training and experience has now grown to manhood, and is a contributing factor in giving a definitely nationalistic color to German political life.

The revolution exerted, at first, little influence on the schools. Although new ministers of education were appointed by the federal government and by the various state governments, the old bureaucracy continued undisturbed in its administration of the schools. The teaching personnel likewise remained unchanged, although many who had been compelled to conceal their liberal or Socialist ideas before the revolution were now

vor und nach dem Kriege (1916); *Staatsbürgerliche Belehrungen in der Kriegszeit* (für Fach- und Fortbildungsschulen) (ed. by the Königliche Preussische Landesgewerbeamt, 2 vols.; 1916); Max Engel (ed.), *Leipzigs Volksschulen im Zeichen des Weltkriegs* (1915); Rudolf Gasch, "Kriegsübungen an höheren Schulen" (in *Neue Jahrbücher*, XXXV-XXXVI [1915], 112-19); *Deutschlands Wesen und Werden* (Aufsätze zur staatsbürgerlichen Erziehung) (Kriegspresseamt, 1918); L. von Golze (ed.), *Universität und Schulen im Kriege; Schule und Krieg* (Sonderausstellung im Institut für Erziehung und Unterricht (Berlin, 1915).

able to reveal them. The outbreak of the revolution brought into power as minister of education in Prussia the Independent Socialist Adolf Hoffmann who immediately tried to introduce a Socialist policy for the schools. He met with great resistance and was soon dismissed. Following its general policy in this as in other fields, the new Social Democratic government made no serious attempt to carry out radical changes in the educational system.

The formation of the Weimar Coalition brought the problem of a general school policy to a head, as each of the three parties forming the Coalition wished to introduce its own educational policy. A compromise was reached after some difficulties which was embodied in the Constitution as Article IV.¹ The new school policy showed no fundamental changes in regard to the class system of education, subject matter, or the general spirit of nationalism. Certain modifications, however, were introduced.²

In the first place it was decided that all state and private preparatory schools for the Gymnasia were to be abolished. Everyone was to attend the first four years of the public elementary schools which were now classified as foundation schools (Grundschulen). This was done to abolish segregation of classes in elementary education and further to give all an equal chance to enter the secondary schools at the age of ten. All of the private preparatory schools have, however, not yet been abolished because many of them are religious schools, and their closing would be construed as an attack upon religion.

Furthermore, so-called "Aufbauschulen" have gradually been

¹ Walter Landé, *Die Schule in der Reichsverfassung* (1929).

² *The Reorganization of Education in Prussia* (based on official documents and publications; translated by I. L. Kandel and Thomas Alexander, 1927); Otto Boelitz, *Der Aufbau des preussischen Bildungswesens nach der Staatsumwälzung* (1923); F. J. Klein-sorg, *Das Schulwesen in Preussen: Volksschulen, mittlere und höhere Schulen* (1927); Fritz Karsch, *Die neuen Schulen in Deutschland* (1924); A. Schurnagl, *Die Schulpolitik in Bayern seit der Revolution* (1924); Alexander, Schwab, "Schulprobleme in der Revolution" (in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, XLV [1918-19], 629-59; Gertrud Bäumer, *Die Staatserziehung* (1924); Rudolf Laemmle, *Die Erziehung der Massen: Grundlagen der Staatspädagogik* (1923); *Das deutsche Schulwesen* (yearbook; published by the Zentralinstitut für Erziehung und Unterricht, Berlin, with the support of the Reichsministerium des Innern).

established which give pupils who have graduated from elementary schools six years of secondary education in order to enable them to matriculate at a university. Finally, a number of cities have introduced two voluntary additional years after graduation from elementary schools in order to give the student a standing similar to that of a graduate of a middle school (*Mittelschule*). Evening secondary education has also gained a foothold. The lower and lower middle classes have thus the possibility of giving their children a higher education. What, however, makes this possibility to a certain extent illusory is that secondary education in Germany is nowhere free. A considerable tuition fee must be paid, which varies according to the section of the country and the income of the parents. Partly to counteract this, scholarships are granted to gifted pupils of the poorer classes. Nevertheless, their parents must support them during their whole school period, thus assuming a task which has become increasingly difficult with the growth of the post-war economic crisis.

The transformation of the schools into an organ for developing loyalty to the new republican government was a more difficult problem. The Republic, as has been repeatedly pointed out, had not been established as the crowning event of a long struggle against the semi-absolutist monarchy but had been set up as a dam against the tide of proletarian revolution. The whole school system, however, had been one of the most important centers for developing loyalty to the monarch, a loyalty intensified by the experiences of the war. But more important, the republican government was made up of a coalition of parties each of which supported the monarchy throughout the war, and had become republican only after the Republic had been established. The republican ideal, looked upon with hostility by the adherents of the old régime, was something new and strange even to the parties governing the Republic. In the schools as in public life, therefore, the establishment of the Republic evoked no great emotional response from which to develop new loyalties.

In view of the emotional attachment of the school system to the old régime, the Republic at first made little attempt to give

the schools an openly republican outlook. After the suppression of the revolutionary uprisings of the radical elements among the workers in 1918-19, and the attempts of the reactionary forces under Kapp to overthrow the Republic in March, 1920, definite steps were, however, taken to tie up the school system with the new régime. This did not so much take the form of carrying on a clear-cut pro-republican and anti-monarchical propaganda in the schools. The new republican government instead tried to supplant monarchical loyalty by placing more stress than heretofore upon the unity of all Germans, their common cultural achievements in the past, and their faith in the future. At the same time, an increased amount of civic education was introduced in the schools, which gave the students a knowledge of the workings of the new government.¹ But more than that. In explaining the duties and rights of each citizen in the German states, it laid special stress upon the German rather than the republican character of the state. In this way, without doing violence to supporters of the old régime, the schools were able to place German nationalism on a higher plane than either monarchy or republic. Thus German nationalism and German unity have become an even more important element in German education than before the war. This has served not merely to tie up the reactionary elements with the new régime but it has also become an important means for the bourgeois republic to counteract the radical ideas in the children and youth coming from Communist homes.

It is only natural that the patriotism inculcated in the German schools has taken a form different from that of the pre-war period. A government shorn of military power, with its internal policy largely controlled by outside nations, and its future growth dependent rather on diplomatic than on military achievements, can obviously not teach the type of militaristic nationalism of pre-war days. Instead, German nationalism in

¹ See, among others; *Staatsbürgerliche Bildung, Entwicklung und Stand seit Inkrafttreten der Reichsverfassung* (Denkschrift des Reichsministeriums des Innern) (1924); F. Lampe and G. H. Franke, *Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung* (im Auftrage des Zentralinstituts für Erziehung und Unterricht) (1926); Arthur Janz, *Die staatsbürgerliche Erziehung* (1919); J. Boeger, *Staatsbürgerkunde als Lehrfach der Schulen* (1921).

the schools emphasizes the economic, social, and cultural achievements of the German people not merely at home but also abroad.

Our study of the steps taken under the Republic to inculcate civic loyalty may begin with the Constitution of 1919. Article 148 provides as follows:

SECTION 1. In all schools an effort shall be made to develop civic sentiment, personal and vocational activity and the spirit of the German national character and of international conciliation. . . .

SEC. 3. Civic and vocational instruction is to be given in the schools. Every pupil shall receive a copy of the Constitution at the conclusion of his compulsory schooling.

At first no serious efforts were made to carry out these provisions. The reactionary Kapp Putsch, however, speeded up various tentative plans and resulted in the calling together of a congress of educators and government officials in Berlin in 1920 to consider how to develop loyalty to the existing state by a more intensive form of civic education. The following sections from the protocol adopted by the conference pertain directly to the problem of civic training:¹

1. The basic prerequisite for success in the teaching of civics is the thorough penetration of the entire curriculum and school life of all types of schools with the spirit of civic sentiment.

3. In the graduation class of the elementary schools and in the corresponding classes of the middle and secondary schools civic instruction is to be introduced as a separate subject of instruction, with two hours a week as a general rule. A corresponding number of hours is to be devoted to the subject in the continuation schools and the trade schools.

4. Evidence of general civic education is to be required on the teachers' examinations for candidates wishing to enter the teaching profession in any type of school.

5. Special training for instruction in civics can be combined with training for the teaching of any prepared subjects. It is desirable to combine the full training for the teaching of history with the teaching of civics. . . .

8. For teachers already appointed, courses in civics lasting several weeks are to be arranged while continuation courses are to be provided later on.

¹ Zentralinstitut für Erziehung und Unterricht, *Die Reichsschulkonferenz, ihre Vorgeschichte und Vorbereitung und ihre Verhandlungen* (Amtlicher Bericht erstattet vom Reichsministerium des Innern) (1920), pp. 86-87.

These guiding principles influenced the general pedagogic development of civic training as well as the various official measures which were adopted. Prussia, Brunswick, and Anhalt passed general measures in 1920 and Württemberg, in 1922, requiring the explanation of the Constitution of Germany as well as of their respective states in the schools.

The murder of Foreign Minister Rathenau in 1922 at the hands of reactionary elements gave a new impetus to spread of civic training. The federal minister of the interior immediately called a conference of the ministers of education of the various states in order to take measures to strengthen republican sentiments in the schools. In this conference which took place in Berlin, July 19, 1922, a number of guiding principles were adopted with the single dissent of Bavaria. The most important may be summarized as follows:

1. History books are to be written from the republican point of view.
2. Civic education, according to Article 148 of the Federal Constitution, is to be introduced into the courses of study of all schools wherever this has not been done.
3. The general courses of study are to be correspondingly changed.
4. Similar instruction is to be given in teachers' training schools.
5. A committee made up of representatives of the various state school authorities, historians, instructors of constitutional law and pedagogues is to be formed in order to aid the educational departments of the various states in the task of revising curricula, planning new materials of instruction and introducing new textbooks.

This committee actually did meet on June 8 and 9, 1923.

These "guiding principles" were published by the various states in their official journals, and to a considerable extent have become the basis for state regulations. It is impossible within the limits of this study to make an analysis of these regulations in all the states of Germany. It will be sufficient for the purpose to study the Prussian system, not merely because Prussia is the predominant state of Germany, but also because the Prussian regulations have been followed by a number of smaller states.

In addition to the general regulations dealing with civic training, the Prussian minister of education issued a number of detailed "instructions" or "directions" (*Richtlinien*) in regard to

the teaching and curricula in the various types of school, which contain many items of interest to our problem. The "instructions" concerning the teaching of various subjects in the *Grundschule*, covering the first four years of the elementary school, say little in regard to the development of civic and national ideals. Here instruction centers about the problem of acquainting the child with his own locality, as well as giving him the rudiments of reading, writing, and arithmetic. In the upper four years of the elementary schools, however, the program of civic training is more definitely outlined, as the following excerpts reveal:¹

HISTORY AND CIVICS²

This instruction has for its objectives familiarizing the pupils with the chief facts in the development of the German people and the German state, and at the same time creating for them the basis of understanding the present period and the present state, and to waken in them a consciousness of mutual responsibility for the people and the state as a whole, as well as a love for people and fatherland. The highest law of history instruction must be to come as near as possible to historic truth. The history of the German people (including border and foreign Germans) organizes its material according to its different phases as a representation of the development of the political, social, economic and spiritual life of the German race. Wars are chiefly to be evaluated by their causes and results. . . . The history of other peoples is to be considered in so far as German history has been decisively influenced through it.

Civics, that is an introduction suitable to the understanding of this state of development into the political, economic and social conditions, is to be studied from the beginning in connection with history instruction as well as with other subjects. The portrayal of present political conditions, organized in as detailed and concrete a form as possible, constitutes the conclusion of the introduction.

GEOGRAPHY³

Geography instruction seeks to promote acquaintance with the home, a more intimate knowledge of Germany, a general acquaintance with foreign countries and parts of the earth, and an understanding of the position of the earth in the universe.

The instruction in the last school years, building upon the groundwork laid

¹ The "instructions" together with other valuable material concerning the Prussian schools have been translated by Kandel and Alexander in their volume *The Reorganization of Education in Prussia* (1927). All quotations are from these translations.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 212-13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

in the *Grundschule*, besides the geography of the fatherland, must also cover the studies of the other countries of Europe and other parts of the world. Predominantly those countries in which Germans live and work and with which Germany maintains important relations are to be treated in this study.

MUSIC¹

Music instruction pursues the objective of awakening joy in singing and in song, and especially in the German folk song.

More detailed instructions are found in the *Richtlinien* prepared for the secondary schools of Prussia. Among them we find such instructions as the following:

GERMAN²

In German instruction the pupils are to learn to read and write German, to feel, think, and live in German. They are to be trained to a sure command of their mother tongue and to a vital conception of the cultural values which arise from the language itself, from the literature and art, and from the resources of a living people. The prerequisite for the experience of these intellectual values is earnest, intellectual work. Hence, while German instruction must be carried on in a scientific spirit, it must not lose sight of its goal beyond the scientific—namely, education for a spiritual goal, and courageous, joyous Germanism.

LITERATURE³

The introduction into German literature shall fill the pupils with understanding and love for the characteristic creations of the German intellect in the field of literature. . . . The central point of this consideration in *Oberseeskunde* is the first golden era of German literature; in *Prima* falls the renaissance of Germanism in the idealism of our classicism and romanticism, in which the German mind drew together all the cultural forces playing upon it into a new and characteristic unity, and thereby not only influenced the intellectual history of Germany and its cultural development until the present time, but also exercised a fruitful influence upon the whole spiritual life of Europe.

FOLKLORE⁴

Folklore in the lower and middle sections is intended to acquaint the pupil spiritually with the home and through it with the fatherland. Its basis is a vivid study of the home (*Heimatkunde*) derived not from books but from observation and experience. In the home community and by excursions into the narrower and wider vicinity it permits the pupil at once to grow into the community of race, as it has expressed itself in dialect, in popular poetry, in

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

² *Ibid.*, p. 347.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 345.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

costume and in food, in special appreciation of certain plants and animals, in forms of settlement and buildings, in customs and usages, in law, in practices for festivals, in all sorts of superstitions. . . . Its field widens gradually from the home in a narrower sense to the fatherland; from the tribal characteristics to nationality, always with the purpose of allowing the pupil to see and experience that which still lives in the nation. . . .

The upper section provides comprehensive discussions concerning folk art. Proceeding from the study of German antiquity and from a study of German race, in close connection with German cultural history, the instruction seeks to lead the pupil gradually to a psychological comprehension of German art as it expresses itself in fairy tales, saga, myth, folksong and more especially in the language itself, in law, custom and usage. This instruction is based upon a reader dealing with a study of German culture or upon individual sources. Personal observation and local tradition, wherever possible, are to be turned to account. Frequently the individuality of the Germans can be made especially clear by comparison with that which is foreign. The highest purpose of folklore is to awaken in the pupils that feeling for the common racial unity which reveals itself in the variety of the individual tribes, that national unity which exists behind all changes of sex or of life forms and leaves behind it all differences in class and education.

HISTORY AND CIVICS¹

History closely correlated with the other subjects, primarily with the other core subjects, should contribute to acquainting the youth thoroughly with his own community, German nationality and the state. . . . Primarily history instruction will treat of the history, character and place of the German people. Its political, social and economic institutions and the whole richness of its culture must be brought so naturally to the pupil that the will for its preservation and development will be aroused, and be based upon historical insight. The relation of German history to world history must be revealed.

Vivid personalities as intellectual and spiritual leaders, statesmen, inventors, discoverers, heroes of faith, leaders in social movements, because of their specially educative influence, are to be cited as examples of sacrifice and devotion.

GEOGRAPHY²

Instruction in geography in cooperation with the other subjects is to awaken and cultivate in the pupils love of the native soil, the home and the fatherland, to contribute to an understanding of German civilization both past and present, and to help train the pupil for German citizenship.

BIOLOGY³

Important phases of our political economy are based upon biological foundations. So, also, are agriculture, forestry, water power, and great portions

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

² *Ibid.*, p. 366.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 418.

of our industry. What biology instruction teaches concerning cultivation of plants and animals and their utilization, what it teaches concerning the consequent but undesired results of human enterprise with nature, and what it teaches concerning the unmethodical impoverishment of the soil—all these prepare for history instruction. If the plant and animal production of colonial countries is discussed in connection with their economic value, the necessity of German colonial possessions becomes clear. A deepened appreciation of the more mature pupil for the organization of the life community will teach him to recognize the state as such a community and will point out to him the indissoluble unity of its members. If the pupil is accustomed to biological thinking, he will apply these truths to human life and seek to make them fruitful for his own personal and public life.

MUSIC¹

Finally, music instruction is to enable the youth to appreciate the importance of music in the life of the individual and society, especially in our German civilization, and to understand that music is not the affair of an individual group but a source of elevation and joy for all classes of people.

These "instructions" show how closely the national and civic concept has been woven into the curriculum. While the teaching "instructions" for the other subjects of the curriculum make no mention of how they are to be met to develop national sentiment, it is quite clear that any subject in the hands of a teacher imbued with a strong patriotic spirit can be made to foster such sentiments. To what extent this is done cannot of course be ascertained but when one considers that the national feeling is widespread among the teachers of Germany, it is quite obvious that the schools imbue the children with a feeling for pride in Germany in many more ways than the *Richtlinien* indicate.

In connection with this study the "Deutsche Oberschule" is of considerable interest. The "Oberschule" was established in 1915 as a new type of school for the purpose of providing a form of secondary education which, unlike the classical Gymnasium or the scientific Oberrealschule, should place emphasis upon "German" subjects, such as German history, German language, literature, art, etc. The purpose was to create a type of school which should develop among its students a greater knowledge of German life and the German state, and thus imbue them with a more conscious type of patriotism. Since the revolution the

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 419.

number of Oberschulen have increased considerably and their future growth seems to be assured. According to the new Prussian regulations concerning the Oberschule, less emphasis is placed upon the rôle of the state than upon German culture. Civic training is taught as a separate subject. This form of secondary school characterizes best the modern tendency to group the various subjects around the concept of national achievements and national culture and as such is an important step in developing a more conscious patriotism among the future citizens of the German nation. It might be mentioned here that the "Aufbauschulen," established after the revolution, have a curriculum similar to that of the "Oberschulen."

The establishment of the Republic in 1918-19 naturally found old textbooks used in the schools. Nothing was done at first by the state governments to replace these old textbooks that had been used to develop patriotism and loyalty to the Kaiser by new ones which would attempt to develop loyalty to the new régime. It was a general feeling that during the early years of the Republic the textbooks would somehow or other gradually adapt themselves to the changed conditions. Eventually, however, the various state governments began to take a more active stand on this matter. By the decree of January 10, 1923, the Prussian minister of education laid down as principles the following: the limiting of the history of wars and rulers, consideration of intellectual, economic, and social currents, advancement of civic training by means of history instruction in the spirit of the federal Constitution. On the other hand, the writing of these texts was left to individual pedagogues. Some of the states have themselves taken the initiative in the making of new textbooks, and others have called upon the federal Ministry of the Interior to do so. Thus, in the course of over a decade the old textbooks, especially those dealing with history, civics, literature, geography, etc., have been gradually revised or replaced by new ones. This process of replacement which was very gradual came only after a protracted struggle between the adherents of the old and of the new régime in the government and in the school system.

In going over a large number of these school books one is struck by a number of characteristics already mentioned above. In the first place one finds in the history books as well as in the "readers" neither a strong pro-republican nor a definite anti-monarchical propaganda.¹ The whole problem of the form of state, if mentioned at all, is described quite disinterestedly. Nevertheless, a steady spread of the study of civics and the constitution reveals a careful attempt to tie up the existing patriotism to the present state. The texts show a very definite emphasis upon national unity and national freedom. The type of nationalism expressed is, however, not of a chauvinistic or militaristic nature, but rather points out the cultural achievements of the people. The unity of the German people is shown to depend not so much upon the power of the state but rather on the maintenance of the common language and common cultural traditions and activities. This permits the inclusion of "border" and "foreign" Germans and thus favors a kind of cultural imperialism. Here, too, the opportunity is taken to point out the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles in disarming and crippling Germany and, in general, reducing her to a secondary position.

Another more subtle but perhaps even more effective means of developing national sentiment in the textbooks is the method of omission. The textbooks on European history take up mainly German history, treating the history of other countries generally only where they affect German history. Thus if we take the most common history texts now used in the Prussian middle and secondary schools, such as those of Gerhard Bonwetsch, Schnabel, and the various volumes of Neubauer, we find that in the treatment of both medieval and modern European history 50 to 75 per cent of the space is devoted to German history. Furthermore, foreign literature is treated almost exclusively in the study of foreign languages, thus making the acquisition of achievements of non-German literature dependent upon the

¹ See, among others: Siegfried Kawerau, *Alter und neuer Geschichtsunterricht* (1924); Siegfried Kawerau, *Denkschrift über die deutschen Geschichts- und Lesebücher*; Siegfried Kawerau, *Die ewige Revolution* (Ergebnisse der Internationalen Geschichtstagung, 2-4 Oktober, 1924); Max Fehring and Herbert Freudenthal, *Geschichtsunterricht: Deutsche Geschichte im Bilderspiegel der Heimat*.

study of foreign languages. If we glance at the much used reader *Wägen und Wirken*, by Hofstaetter-Berthold-Nickolai, published in 1924, we find the following typical divisions: (1) "German Land and People," (2) "Life in the Community," (3) "Of the German State," (4) "Labor and Economic Life," (5) "Nature," (6) "German Art," (7) "The German Soul." All textbooks used in middle and secondary schools have to be approved by the Minister of Education of the various states, which makes a more or less uniform character possible. The textbooks of the elementary schools are, however, chosen by the various districts so that a greater variety in the character of the books is quite evident.

The films which have so far been shown in the schools have helped to increase not merely the national but also the monarchical spirit. Among such films we may mention: "The Battle of Skaggerak," "Fredericus Rex," "The German Rhine," "Bismarck," "The Land under the Cross" (an anti-Polish film). In addition, historical plays are often produced by the pupils, which serve to evoke a spirit of close kinship to the national and monarchistic past. Again the classes make frequent excursions to places of historic interest, or make hiking trips to impress upon them the beauty of the German landscape. One school day a month is set aside for each class as a compulsory hiking or excursion day. School assemblies are an important factor in developing the national ideal. At the time of important national events, such as the plebiscites in the various border regions, the occupation of the Ruhr, etc., special lectures are given in order to arouse the patriotism of the children. In these assemblies, war veterans have often spoken of their experiences in the field and in captivity, in order to bring to the children the patriotic experiences of an older generation.

Holidays, too, are important, and have, indeed, a special significance for the child. The two most important pre-war national holidays, Sedan Day on September 2, and the Kaiser's birthday on January 27, have naturally been done away with, although they are still observed by the elements of the right. Besides these, there are a number of local "national" holidays: thus in East Prussia the "Battle of Tannenburg" (the first vic-

tory of Hindenburg over the Russians) is still celebrated. Many of the secondary schools of the right, like the Frederick Wilhelm Gymnasium in Neuruppin, have observed January 28, when the Treaty of Versailles was signed, as a day of mourning. The day of the Founding of the Empire, January 18 (Reichsgründungstag), is now becoming one of the important national holidays replacing that of the Kaiser's birthday. The Prussian school administration appointed a special day of mourning for the German schools when Upper Silesia was handed over to Poland, and another when the French marched into the Ruhr. In addition to all these, the three school holidays at Christmas, Whitsuntide, and Easter serve as occasions not only to explain to the children their religious nature but also to impress upon them their German character. They have become the "German Christmas," the "German Whitsuntide," the "German Easter." The only official republican holiday is Constitution Day, August 11; but as most schools are closed during this month, the holiday remained, at first, of slight significance to them.

The Reichstag, however, in 1927 requested the federal government to influence the state governments¹

- a) To promote worthy school celebrations in the republican spirit and to take steps that Constitution Day become a holiday through the organization of great popular celebrations for pupils and parents.
- b) To display the Federal flag in all schools on Constitution Day.
- c) To introduce in all schools detailed instruction in the history of the federal colors, black, red and gold.

The Prussian Ministry of Education issued detailed instructions on July 11, 1927, for the celebration of Constitution Day. It also ordered the song books to be revised in the spirit of the Republic. At the same time, teachers were warned to restrain the expression of their political opinions, and to train the young to be loyal to and to participate in the democratic state.

The decoration of the school has likewise received careful consideration. Although ministerial regulations have been issued for the purpose of making the necessary changes to fit present conditions, these regulations have often been carried out with reluctance. Some schools still retain imperial or royal

¹ *Educational Yearbook, 1927*, p. 166.

names: in the corridors and schoolrooms one may still find the old red, white, and black flags, together with pictures of the Kaiser. The Great Elector, Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Wilhelm I, as founders of the German Empire, are likewise to be found. As late as May 7, 1926, it was necessary for the Democratic delegate Wickel to defend the following resolution in the Prussian Diet, "that every publicly supported school and every private school under supervision of the state must possess a flag of the German Reich and that it must be compelled to display this flag on certain days."

As already pointed out, more important than the attitude expressed in textbooks is the attitude of the teaching personnel, as the teacher is the active element in the schools of Germany. But national holidays, national flags, textbooks, and other materials of instruction are merely various means and occasions furnished to the teacher in order to help him influence the young. The German school teacher is the pivot of German education, and it is of the highest importance to consider how the teacher regards nationalism and the existing state. In general, one may say that the political and social differences within the nation are reflected among the teaching personnel, except that communist teachers are seldom found. It is very hard to say how many of the teachers sincerely support the Republic. The older teachers naturally are the same as before the war; they are people who formerly enjoyed a certain social prestige and they naturally look back regretfully to the old days. It is rather among the younger elements, appointed since the revolution, that we find a certain amount of active loyalty to the Republic. This is especially true of the elementary school teachers in the industrial districts where one finds many of them with liberal or Social Democratic sympathies. In smaller towns where the middle-class social position of the teachers, especially those of the secondary schools, plays an important factor in emphasizing their respectability and dignity, the conservative, anti-republican teachers have much greater possibility of maintaining and expressing their view in class as well as in public. The Social Democrat Haenisch who tried to support the republican teachers while he was minister of education in Prussia declared in a

speech before the Prussian Diet that "one must talk of the martyrdom which those often have to endure who defend the republican ideal." While this reactionary patriotism among a large part of the teachers continues down to the present and leads many of them to support the Fascists, their continued economic dependence upon the government of the Republic causes them to preserve at least an outward loyalty to the new régime.

The training of the teachers of both the elementary and secondary schools has undergone changes in the direction of developing a loyalty toward the new régime. Civics is a compulsory subject in practically all training schools. Furthermore, the government tries to develop the feeling of national pride by other means. Thus in Prussia the Ministry of Education has added a new subject to the examinations for secondary-school teachers, "German Culture" (*Deutschkunde*). The course required includes among other things insight into general German characteristics and into the characteristics of the German peoples; knowledge of the chief German types of house construction and types of settlements, of the national costumes, of the art of the peasants, of German usages and customs; familiarity with the nature and characteristics of national poetry (*Volksdichtung*), of fairy tales, proverbs, etc. Teachers of the Deutsche Oberschule must give special attention to this field of study.

Before turning our attention to the universities we should mention the Parents' Councils (*Elternräte*). These were founded at the outbreak of the revolution in order to give the working-class parents a greater influence upon the reactionary teachers. But like other institutions of the revolution the purpose of these Parents' Councils has been lost sight of, and where these still exist they are often a means of giving the conservative parents an even greater influence on the schools. This has been possible especially in the secondary schools, where the great majority of parents are members of the middle and upper classes.

Although one finds certain republican currents in the German schools, the universities are essentially reactionary.¹ The faculty

¹ *Die deutschen Universitäten und der heutige Staat* (Referate erstattet auf der Weimarer Tagung deutscher Hochschullehrer am 23. und 24. April, 1926, von Wilhelm Kahl,

consists in part of members of the former administrative bureaucracy. The students come chiefly from the middle classes, which have suffered heavily from the economic conditions following the war. According to a tabulation made in 1925, in the Prussian universities, and which took in some 44,000 students, the occupation of fathers of students showed that only 367 students, or less than 1 per cent, listed their fathers as workingmen.¹ This great body of students believes with youthful enthusiasm in the day when Germany "will conquer the enemy abroad and at home." They have participated in many of the activities of the reactionary, military groups and play a part in all of the great patriotic festivals.

After the founding of the Republic all the student organizations were united under the leadership of the progressive elements into an association called "Deutsche Studentenschaft." But this organization came then under the influence of the right wing and was dissolved by the government, an act which made the latter still more unpopular among the students. The most important nationalist student organization is the "Deutsche Hochschulring" which is also the leader of the anti-semitic movement among the students. This is a "ring" or federation of various student societies. Besides these there still exists the "Deutsche Waffenring," made up of the fencing clubs, which is also extremely reactionary. The above-named associations include members of the German Nationalist People's party and the Fascists. The latter have increased their influence among the university students very rapidly in the last few years; in

Friederich Niemecke, Gustav Radbruch); J. H. Mitgau, "Sozialistische Erhebungen in der deutschen Studentenschaft nach dem Krieg" (in *Allgemeines statistisches Archiv*, XVI [1927], 446-57); *Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung an den deutschen Universitäten* (eine Denkschrift im Auftrag der Vertretung der deutschen Studentenschaft, vorgelegt vom Zentralausschuss für staatsbürgerliche Erziehung an der Universität Marburg) (1920); *Weltpolitische Bildungsarbeiten an preussischen Hochschulen* (Festschrift aus Anlass des fünfzigsten Geburtstages des preussischen Ministers für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung, Herrn Professor, Dr. C. H. Becker) (1926); Hellmut Volkmann, *Die deutsche Studentenschaft in ihrer Entwicklung seit 1919* (1925); *Die deutsche Studentenschaft in ihrem Werden, Wollen und Wirken* (1928).

¹ See: *Statistik der Landesuniversitäten und Hochschulen mit Einschluss der medizinischen Akademie zu Braunschweig für das Sommerhalbjahr 1925* (Bearbeitet vom Statistischen Landesamt), CCLXXXI (1925), 1-85.

fact, it is estimated that over half of the student body sympathize with this movement. The Democrats, the Centre, the Social Democrats, and the Communists likewise have their student organizations, although the latter have in some cases been banned. The "republican" students, however, are in a minority, and one may say that of all the educational institutions of Germany the universities are the most violent in their nationalism, exerted largely against the "Judenrepublik."

Having thus surveyed the evolution of civic and national training in the German school system it is worth while summing up certain outstanding features. During the latter part of the eighteenth century the demand for civic training as part of a national education arose, due to the need of the bourgeoisie to transform the educational system in its own interest. However, during the greater part of the nineteenth century a policy prevailed among the absolute and semi-absolute governments to exclude all forms of civic and national education from the schools as being dangerous to their own security. Beginning, however, with 1890, national education and, just before 1914, some civic training were introduced to counteract the growing influence of the Socialists upon the youth of the nation. At the same time this national training was closely intertwined with instruction in loyalty to the semi-absolute Emperor who ruled as lord over his subjects. And, finally, after the war we find an increase in both nationalism and civic training in the schools in order to counteract both the internationalism of the revolutionary proletarian elements and the political aims of reactionary and Fascist elements. On the other hand, both republican and Fascist educational ideals have as their basis the development of a strong national consciousness differing from each other merely in form and extent: the former emphasizing the cultural, the latter the military elements. And since the schools are, on the whole, more active in developing a feeling of national patriotism than in developing loyalty to the parliamentary republic, the nationalism now taught in the schools can serve to a considerable extent as a basis in the future for developing allegiance to either a Fascist or a republican state.

**PART III. NON-STATE ORGANIZATIONS
AND ELEMENTS**

CHAPTER XI

THE CHURCH

From the point of view of developing loyalty to the state, the church is naturally an institution of great importance. Its widespread organization, its historic traditions, and its emotional appeal, all combine to give it a firm hold over the minds of large sections of the people. Since in Germany membership in the church is almost coincident with citizenship, both the Protestant and the Catholic churches with their numerous auxiliary organizations can serve as a most important element in inculcating civic loyalty among the people.¹

In Germany everyone is born into the church as well as into the state; he receives religious education in the state schools according to the belief of his parents; when of age he is required also to pay church taxes which are collected by the state. He remains a tax-paying member of the church during his lifetime unless he officially declares his resignation, for which he must pay a fee. The result is that with the exception of the free-thinkers who have left the church, almost all Germans are mem-

¹ For general works see: William Baur, *Religious Life in Germany, during the Wars of Independence* (1872); Hugo Leo Cocke, *Kirchliche Welt und nationale Freiheit* (1914); M. Meinertz and H. Sacher (eds.), *Deutschland und der Katholizismus* (Gedanken zur Neugestaltung des deutschen Geistes- und Gesellschaftslebens); H. Gallwitz, "Vom deutschen Gott" (in *Preussische Jahrbücher*, XC VIII, No. 3 [1899], 385–416); Günther Holstein, *Luther und die deutsche Staatsidee* (1926); M. Lenz, "Nationalität und Religion" (*Preussische Jahrbücher* [kleine historische Schriften], No. 127); Heinrich Mayer, *Deutsche Nationalerziehung und katholisches Christentum* (1921); Martin Rade, *Vierzig Jahre christliche Welt* (1922); Adolf Fellmeth, *Das kirchliche Finanzwesen in Deutschland* (1910); Johannes Schauff, *Die deutschen Katholiken und die Zentrumspartei* (eine politisch-statistische Untersuchung der Reichstagswahlen seit 1871); Max Schreiter, *Der Einfluss des Staates auf die Verteilung kirchlicher Ämter nach geltendem Reichs- und Landesstaatskirchenrecht in Preussen, Bayern, Sachsen, Württemberg und Baden* (1925); Wilhelm Sollmann, "Religion und politischer Machtkampf" (in *Die Gesellschaft*, August, 1927); H. Weinel, *Die deutsche Reichskirche* (1915); Albert Werminghoff, *Nationalkirchliche Bestrebungen im deutschen Mittelalter* (1910); Emil Schaefer, *Der nationale Gedanke in der Predigliteratur der Rheinbundgebiete, Hessen-Darmstadt, Frankfurt am Main und Königreich Westfalen in den Jahren 1806–1813*.

bers of some religious body to which they are required to give financial support.

The population of Germany is approximately one-third Catholic and two-thirds Protestant. According to the census of 1925, the religious distribution is as shown in Table I.¹ The remainder, amounting to 3.4 per cent of the population, represents various small religious bodies or freethinkers who have left the church.

A large part of the membership of both the Protestant and the Catholic church is, however, not active. A considerable portion is even agnostic, retaining church membership merely for social reasons or reasons of sentiment, family traditions, etc. In

TABLE I

Religious Body	Number of Members	Percentage of Population
Evangelical churches (Lutheran and Reformed).....	39,481,258	63.3
Roman Catholic church.....	20,193,334	32.4
Hebrews.....	247,450	0.9

fact, the majority of those who vote Socialist and even Communist are still enrolled as tax-paying members of the church. But though the Church draws its financial support from the taxes of practically the whole population, its influence is exercised primarily upon an active minority of church members. Both the Protestant and the Catholic churches exercise their influence not merely through their respective ecclesiastical organizations but through a whole network of auxiliary organizations which cover practically every field of human activity. Beyond this, the churches exercise a less direct influence upon perhaps an even greater proportion of less active and even passive members. These, while not participating in church activities, sympathize with the general aims of the church. Obviously a large variety of attitudes is possible to those who accept the general principles of the church and find it of some value to themselves, their children, or society. Without attempting to define them in particular we may say that there is still a general feeling among

¹ See the *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich* (1929).

large sections of the population that religion and the church are necessary for the continued existence of state and society.

As is already evident, church and state are very closely related in Germany. This is especially true of the Protestant churches, which ever since the Reformation have been practically state institutions. In Prussia the state church was Lutheran, with the king at its head as *Summus Episcopus*. Since, however, the Hohenzollerns became Calvinists in 1613, an anomalous situation arose which existed for over two centuries. In 1817, Frederick William III put an end to this peculiar relationship by bringing about a union between the two churches in Prussia to form the Evangelical church.¹ A similar amalgamation was brought about in Nassau in the same year, in the Palatinate in 1818, and in Baden in 1821. The church remained a state organization, with the clergy as state officials, while certain religious differences were definitely compromised. This, of course, did not affect the Lutheran or the Reformed church in any of the other states.

The relationship between the various state governments and the Catholic church was of a more complicated nature. Under the pressure of the Napoleonic conquests, a wholesale confiscation of lands of the Catholic church had been carried out by the German states, with a correspondingly greater control of the various states over the church. After the defeat of Napoleon the church sought to regain its power and independence; but it met with opposition on the part of various rulers, who were mainly interested in extending their authority. In Bavaria, an edict was issued, embodied as a supplement to the Constitution of 1818, which considerably limited the rights and privileges enjoyed by the Catholic church.

Under the reign of Frederick William III (1797–1840), Prussia continued the policy laid down by the Prussian legal code of 1794 which asserted the sovereignty of the state over both Cath-

¹ See, H. Rost, *Die "Verquickung" von Religion und Politik in der preussisch-deutschen Geschichte* (1926); Karl Merbt, *Der Zusammenschluss der evangelischen Landeskirchen Deutschlands* (1903); Friedrich Michael Schiele, *Die kirchliche Einigung des evangelischen Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert* (1908); Joseph Werner, *Der deutsche Protestantismus* (1906).

olic and Protestant churches. Although the Catholic church refused to accept these principles, a tentative working arrangement was nevertheless arrived at and embodied in the bull Salute Animarum, issued in 1821. A similar arrangement was reached between the Catholic church and Hanover in 1828. The Revolution of 1848 brought forward a widespread demand on the part of the Catholic church for emancipating its activities from the control of the state. Catholics sought the separation of church and state, freedom of instruction and freedom of the press, but all their demands were to be achieved by legal means. We may say, indeed, that the liberal demands of 1848 coincided with the demands of the church for liberating itself from the encroachments of the state upon its own sphere of activity. For this purpose the Catholics formed so-called "Pius-Societies," named after the liberal Pope Pius IX, who came to power in 1846. In October, 1848, the first German-Catholic Convention met at Mainz, which city for the preceding decade had been the center of the movement to free the church from state control.

While the Revolution of 1848 itself did not secure fulfilment of these demands, the Prussian Constitution of 1850 gave considerable liberties to both the Protestant and Catholic churches. Every religious organization was to regulate its own affairs, and retain the possession, use, and administration of all institutions and funds necessary for carrying on its religious, cultural, educational, and charitable activities. The right of the state to interfere in the appointment of church officials was abolished, except where special provisions had been made. On the basis of these arrangements, the Catholic church lived at peace with Prussia for the next twenty years.

After the formation of the Empire the struggle between Bismarck and the Catholic church is of special interest from the point of view of this study. It shows the attempt of the state to take away from the church many of its rights and privileges, and to subordinate it definitely to the national state. All the more did this seem necessary to Bismarck in view of the fact that the Catholic Centre party, which had come into existence in the sixties, was essentially a state's rights party, being recruited

mainly from the liberally inclined provinces of Rhineland and Westphalia, and from the south German states with their traditional antagonism toward Prussian domination. Besides, the doctrine of papal infallibility, enunciated just as the German Empire was in process of formation, might mean an attempt on the part of the Pope to interfere in German matters.

We need not consider the details of the *Kulturkampf*, which closed with the repeal of most of the measures taken against the church. Of the hostile legislation, all that remained was compulsory civil marriage in Prussia and the prohibition of the Jesuits. The latter measure was repealed after 1918. The unsuccessful attempt of the state to increase its control over the church, however, definitely crystallized an important religious group into a political group, the Centre party. This party still stands ready to guard the rights of the Catholic church against government encroachment. On the other hand, this political party has been a bulwark of the national state in so far as the rights and privileges of the Catholic minority are not interfered with.

The Revolution of 1918 has resulted in giving the Protestant church a certain freedom from state control. Article 137 of the federal Constitution makes each religious body a private corporation, which has entire control of its own affairs, and which appoints its own officials without interference on the part of the state or the community. This, however, does not mean complete separation of church and state as we understand it in America, it merely means that the state does not interfere in the internal affairs of the church. For the state guarantees many old privileges to Catholic and Protestant churches which make the relationship of church and state much closer than would appear on the surface. Thus the government still considers every citizen a member of one of the churches unless he has formally resigned. Furthermore, both Catholic and Protestant churches have the right to levy taxes upon all members, which are collected and turned over to them by the state. Those taxes now generally take the form of a 10 or 15 per cent supplement to the income tax. Furthermore, various states which confiscated

lands of the Catholic church during the Napoleonic era, are still paying a certain indemnity for these lands. Similar indemnities are being paid to the Evangelical church in Prussia for the lands confiscated by the state at the time of the reforms of Stein and Hardenburg. Furthermore, the governments of the various states and communities make stated contributions to various charitable organizations run by the various churches.

The separation of church and state, formally decreed in the Constitution, has consequently meant no decrease in the economic protection and support given to the churches by the state; if anything, their position has improved. In view of this, it might indeed be asked what separation of church and state does mean in post-war Germany. The Constitution in providing for separation merely stated a general principle, as there never was any official federal church before the revolution. Separation applies only to the individual states, and there in relation particularly to the Protestant churches. In Prussia, the flight of William II left the Evangelical church without any official head. The revolutionary government, taking over the royal control of the church, appointed three commissioners (popularly referred to as the "Three Wise Men of the East"), to assume temporary charge of church matters. A final settlement was reached in 1924-25, which gave the church complete control over its own internal affairs. The old church synod which remains from pre-war days elects a church senate which takes the place which the king occupied as *Summus Episcopus*. The church now has the right to make its own church laws, and to appoint its own officials without confirmation by the government. Only in financial affairs can the state raise objections, since it is the state which collects the church taxes. Accordingly the Evangelical church in Prussia is in a better position now than it was under the monarchy, for it continues to receive financial support and protection from the state, while enjoying administrative autonomy.

The relationship between the Catholic church and the various state governments continues practically unchanged, with the exception of Bavaria. There, the Concordat of 1924 has given

the Catholic church complete freedom to administer its own affairs. The government however is to be apprised of all intended appointments, although without power to veto them. An important part of the Concordat grants the church considerable influence over the educational system of Bavaria. The state continues to recognize its financial obligations to the church, not merely in regard to collecting taxes, but also in paying the indemnities for church property confiscated during the Napoleonic period. A similar agreement was reached with the Evangelical church in Bavaria. Negotiations have been carried on to establish a Catholic Concordat with the federal government along similar lines, but these have not yet led to concrete results because of opposition by the parties of the left, and middle (with the exception of the Centre party).

Another indication of the close relationship between church and state in Germany can be seen in the school system. Before the war, religion was a compulsory subject throughout the elementary- and secondary-school systems of Germany. Denominational instruction was, however, given not by the clergy but by the regular school teachers, according to the various denominational instructions issued by the government and approved by the clergy of each denomination. The revolution has failed to achieve the Socialist program of eliminating religious instruction from the schools. The compromise arrived at eliminates the compulsory nature of this instruction for those children whose parents claim exception. Furthermore, in industrial centers where there is considerable disbelief, special schools have been provided for children whose parents are opposed to religious instruction. Since this has had the effect of segregating the children of non-believers, the result has been rather to strengthen the influence of religious instruction in other schools from which these dissident elements have been eliminated. At the same time, pupils from these non-religious schools are at a definite social disadvantage. Church influence over education in Bavaria has gone even farther, as the Concordat gives the church the right to examine and certify all teachers who give instruction in the Catholic religion.

Of especial interest is the fact that the state definitely defends the beliefs and practices of the various accepted religious bodies. According to Section 161 of the Penal Code, not merely blasphemy, but public vilification of any of the accepted religious bodies, their beliefs, institutions, or ceremonies, is punishable by imprisonment for a period not to exceed three years. This has led to numerous arrests and punishments for attacks made by Communist and Socialist freethinkers upon religion and the church. Thus the three editors, Hammer, Jans, and Lämmle, of the Communist *Süddeutsche Arbeiterzeitung* were fined 200 marks apiece because they had called the church "an institution for the spread of ignorance" (*Verdummungsanstalt*).¹ The editor, Knauf, of the *Volkszeitung für das Volkland*, was sentenced to two weeks imprisonment because he had spoken of the church as being "allied with criminal organizations."² Similar cases occur quite frequently.

In general, we may say that the revolution and the post-war revolutionary period have resulted in an increase rather than a decrease in the power and influence granted by the state to the church. This rather unexpected development may be ascribed to the weakening of the central power in Germany which was Protestant, and so checked Catholic influence, to the fear of radicalism, against which religion is regarded as a safeguard, to the continued existence of the Republic, which has granted the church a free hand so as to gain its support, and finally to the pivotal political position of the Centre party in Germany.

From the point of view of this study, this analysis of the relationship between church and state brings out a number of important things. It is quite clear that the church, although theoretically separated from the state, is actually closely related to it and, in fact, dependent on it for its economic welfare. It must necessarily develop a loyalty to the existing régime, even though it may have certain objections to the character of that régime. It is of value to note the different character of allegiance to the state inculcated by the Protestant and the Catholic churches. In most states, the Protestant churches were direct state insti-

¹ *Ulmer Tageblatt*, April, 1928.

² *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, April 11, 1928.

tutions, as we have seen. This naturally forced them to give a religious sanction to whatever the state felt it necessary to do. The church was, on the whole, as unquestioning and loyal a department of the government as any other, with its clergy and administrative staff as loyal state officials in line for a government pension. The same classes which controlled the state therefore naturally dictated the policies of the church. This explains why in the case of Prussia, for example, the Evangelical church extolled and cherished the semi-absolute, militaristic state. It explains why the religion of this church not merely emphasized the national ideal but defended it in the form of the then existing state. Especially was this true since in Prussia the backbone of the Evangelical church was not in the industrial centers but in the agricultural regions. Moreover, in the appointment of ministers, made under supervision of the government, only those would be chosen for the ministry whose attitudes and whose antecedents were proper. For a Protestant clergyman as for any other government official openly to espouse political liberalism, not to speak of Socialism, was quite rare, and was frowned upon as indicative of disloyalty. Thus the Evangelical church stood above all for God, Kaiser, and fatherland.

In the nineties, under the influence of the young Kaiser himself, there had been some interest in social reform, but the cool indifference of the Socialist workmen, which had alienated the Kaiser, had likewise weakened the liberal element in the church. Thus the Evangelical church was almost completely under the ban of the aristocratic, imperial tradition, a fact which helps to explain its violent patriotism during the war, as well as its opposition to the new régime set up after the revolution.

As an international rather than a national church, occupying definitely a minority position in Prussia and in Germany, the Catholic church possessed an organization which was not a part of the state apparatus. It was, however, recognized as an official church, with taxes, indemnities, and other funds turned over to it by the various governments. Furthermore, the Catholic church had its greatest strength in Southern Germany, in the liberal Rhineland with its definite anti-Prussian traditions and

its opposition to the centralizing tendency of the Empire. The experience of the Kulturkampf had made the Catholic sensitive to any interference by the Empire in religious matters. All these factors tended to make the Catholic church more reserved in identifying itself completely with the forces in control of the German monarchy. While this may have led the ruling elements to look with some suspicion on certain principles supported by the Catholic church, it would be wrong to assume that the Catholics were not as good citizens and loyal subjects as the Protestants.

The outbreak of the World War confirmed this, for it showed both the Catholic and the Protestant churches loyal supporters of the war, blessing the soldiers who went off to battle, and consoling those who remained at home.¹ Whether the Protestant or the Catholic clergy were more ardent in their patriotism is a question which has been often debated without conclusive results. As the war dragged on, and the possibilities of victory diminished, the Catholic Centre party as a body came out openly in favor of the peace movement initiated by the Pope, and introduced the famous peace resolution of 1917. This created an uproar among the Nationalists who accused the Catholics of disloyalty. In the same year a group of German Protestant ministers and theologians appealed to their colleagues throughout Germany to work together in the interests of peace. They felt that the spread of international ideals of freedom had been left to the anti-religious Socialists. This appeal was sent to more

¹ Otto Baumgarten, *Christentum und Weltkrieg* (1918); Schulte (ed.), *Der deutsche Katholik im Weltkrieg; Der deutsche Krieg und der Katholizismus, Deutsche Abwehr französischer Angriffe* (Herausgegeben von deutschen Katholiken) (1915); Otto Dibelius, *Nationale Erhebung* (1919); Bruno Doehring, *Krieg und Kirche* (1919); George Pfeilschifter (ed.), *German Culture, Catholicism and the World War. A Defense against the Book: "La Guerre allemande et le Catholicism"* (1916); Haller, *Wie stellen wir uns als Christen zur Kriegsanleihe?* (1917); Martin Hennig, *Fromm und deutsch* (ein Geleitwort zur Konfirmation im Jahre des grossen Krieges) (1914); L. Hoppe, *Feldpredigerfahrten an der Westfront* (1916); Franz Meffert, *Religion und Krieg* (1918); Kramer (ed.), *Patriotische sowie Kriegs- und Friedenspredigten* (Ansprachen und Reden aus älterer und neuerer Zeit, nebst einer grossen Anzahl einschlägiger Perikopen im Anhang) (1914); Martin Rade, *Dieser Krieg und das Christentum* (1915); Heinrich J. Radermacher, *Militarismus und religiöses Leben im Weltkrieg* (dargestellt an der Seelsorge einer Heimatgarnison) (1916); Martin Schian, *Evangelische Kirche und der Krieg* (1915).

than four thousand ministers and professors of theology. But only a very small portion signed this declaration in favor of international understanding, the greater portion expressing their indignation at such a move. Similarly the proposal of a group of Protestant churches to call a World Church Congress in Berlin for the purpose of working for peace was rejected by the overwhelming majority of German ministers.

The general attitude of the Catholics before the war, together with their readiness to support the movement for peace toward the end of the war, help to explain why the revolution found the Catholics ready to accept the new situation and to co-operate with the Social Democrats in forming the new republican government.¹ Another reason for this change lay in the fact that the Centre party as the political arm of the Catholic church could shift its political program to the left to satisfy the radical leanings of working-class elements among its followers. Although it had supported the monarchy, it could support a republic quite sincerely, since its nationalism was not as closely tied up to the political system of the Prussian monarchy. It was really the support of the Centre party which made the Weimar Constitution possible. Indeed, the Catholic church has become one of the main forces in supporting the new régime, for in the political life of the Republic the Centre party is able to play a much greater rôle than had been the case under the old régime.

Since the Protestant church of Prussia was so closely tied up with the monarchy, the flight of the Hohenzollern and the establishment of the Republic left the church in a state of con-

¹ Jakob Beyll, *Deutschland und das Konkordat mit Rom* (1925); Otto Dibelius, *Staatsgrenzen und Kirchengrenzen* (eine Studie zur gegenwärtigen Lage des Protestantismus) (1921); Gotthard Eberlein, *Die verlorene Kirche* (1923); Friedrich Giese, *Recht und Religion als Kräfte zum Wiederaufbau* (1924); Hans Otto Haebler, *Die rechtliche Stellung des Kirchenregiments* (1925); H. Heisler, *Kirche und Religion* (1919); Heinrich Hermelink, *Katholiken und Protestanten in der Gegenwart* (1923); Otto Kunze, *Der politische Protestantismus in Deutschland* (1926); August Pieper, *Was geht den Geistlichen seine Volksgemeinschaft an?* (1926); August Pieper, *Sinn und Aufgaben für das katholische Deutschland* (1925); G. Schenkel (ed.), *Der Protestantismus der Gegenwart*; Martin Schian, *Die Arbeit der evangelischen Kirche* (1921); Erhard Schlund, *Katholizismus und Vaterland* (eine prinzipielle Untersuchung) (1923); Georg Wieber, *Christentum und soziale Idee* (1922); Joseph Rüther, *Der katholische Staatsgedanke* (1925); Gustav Grundlach, *Zur Soziologie der katholischen Ideenwelt und des Jesuitenordens* (1927).

fusion, not knowing where to place its allegiance, although permitted the greatest freedom. By their whole nature and tradition the Protestant clergy were so tied up with the monarchy, however, that they have continued to be an important ideological center for the reactionary forces. This has been the situation down to the present and has been made possible, among other things, by the fact that the church is the only administrative body of the old régime which, though maintained by the Republican government, has been separated from the state apparatus and allowed full freedom of self-expression. It is able to maintain its old sympathy and close understanding with those other forces which survive from the past without suffering direct interference at the hand of the state. The sentimental opposition to the Republic on the part of the church is counteracted, however, by the economic advantages which it continued to enjoy. In addition, its more violent form of monarchist nationalism has nevertheless found relatively little sympathy among the masses of post-war Germany. Unlike the Catholic church, the Protestant church in Prussia has not put forth an important social program, and its influence upon its adherents has dwindled considerably. In fact, it might be said that, although there are twice as many Protestants in Germany as Catholics, the control of the Catholic church over its adherents as well as its influence on political life is greater than that of the Protestant churches.

It is the attitude of the church toward the state which interests us particularly. For we are considering the church not in its religious functions but in its relations to and in its support of the national state. It must not be forgotten, however, that even in some of its purely religious teachings the church is doing a civic work. The clergy finds it of fundamental importance to reconcile its flocks to their position in life. This is especially true in the case of the lower classes. For, although the church recognizes the existence of social and economic antagonisms, it tries to show that these are not the fundamental problems of human life. On the one hand, it stresses the value of the individual soul; on the other, it emphasizes the social unity of the nation (*Volks-*

gemeinschaft). Thus its religious teachings act as a stabilizing force especially against the disintegrating social and economic tendencies which have become so marked since 1918. Religious teaching is consequently of value to the state even where it does not touch directly upon the problems of national sentiment or of civic loyalty. In addition, both Protestant and Catholic churches have as an essential part of their religious teachings the duty of accepting secular authority in secular matters. This teaching of loyalty to the secular order is not an element external to their religious teachings but an integral part of it. They base it upon various passages in the Bible, the most famous of which is perhaps the admonition of Jesus to render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's, and unto God that which is God's. It is a religious duty for good Christians to be also loyal subjects and citizens. It follows that the church teaches loyalty to the national state. In fact, this loyalty goes so far that during war the defense of the fatherland becomes the religious as well as the civic duty of every Christian.¹ This loyalty may and does take various forms, ranging from its tacit acceptance as a necessary duty all the way to the ardent national sentiments expressed so frequently during the war, and continuing even after the war. Quite typical are the following expressions of patriotism made in 1919 by one of the leading Protestant ministers:

"To foster national life, to let it blossom anew where it has disappeared or threatens to disappear, that is one of the most wonderful tasks which God has placed before his children. . . . Among all these peoples there is one to which goes our love, our pride, our wish and our hope for the future: that is the German people."²

"Where the spirit of Jesus is united with the national idea, there the Kingdom of God becomes a reality on earth. . . ."³

The church transmits these ideas of loyalty to the state through religious services as well as through a vast network of auxiliary organizations which it has developed. In the services, sermons have always proved of great importance. They make

¹ This is true primarily of the Protestant churches. While the Catholic church leaves this question open for each individual to decide, this very neutrality permits in practice as high a degree of patriotism to prevail among Catholics as among Protestants.

² Otto Dibelius, *Nationale Erziehung*, pp. 21-22.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

a special impression upon the listener, for unlike other addresses their arguments appeal to divine authority, and furthermore are not subject to open and immediate challenge and discussion. It is, of course, not assumed that all sermons, or even the majority of them, make a direct appeal to civic loyalty and national sentiment. However, at crucial times they have been used to drive home those concepts. Prayers are said for the welfare of the nation, and the guidance of God is invoked for the secular authorities. In times of national crises this naturally takes on a more pronounced form. Moreover, services in garrison churches have a definite national note. In general, the state is represented as an organization which, while it may err, is at bottom an instrument for the achievement of divine purposes.

This attitude is, however, spread not merely through church services but through a vast network of auxiliary organizations attached to both the Catholic and the Protestant church. These organizations have been formed to include all activities and interests of their members. Thus we find that the churches have organized young men's leagues, young women's leagues, women's auxiliaries, workers' clubs, various types of educational societies, charitable and welfare institutions, asylums, etc., many of which have been treated in other parts of this volume. They are a means not merely for strengthening the power of the church but also for disseminating directly or indirectly the civic concepts and national sentiments accepted by the church proper.¹

Of special interest among the Protestant organizations is the "Gustaf Adolf Verein" which was founded in 1842, for the purpose of supporting the poorer parishes in the "Diaspora," that is, where the German Protestants were in a minority at home and abroad. This, of course, has helped to keep the Germans outside of Germany in closer connection with their old fatherland. All of the Protestant churches of Germany are now fed-

¹ For a description of the Protestant auxiliary organizations see: Schneider (ed.), *Kirchliches Jahrbuch, für die evangelischen Landeskirchen Deutschlands* (yearly since 1874). For an account of the Catholic organizations see *Kirchliches Jahrbuch für das katholische Deutschland*, published by the Amtliche Zentralstelle für kirchliche Statistik.

erated in the "Deutsche Evangelische Kirchenbund," which was formed in 1922. Its aim is to unite all German-speaking Protestants of the world and bring them into close relationship with Germany proper. As a result of its activities the Protestant church of Austria joined this Federation in 1926, thus helping to prepare the way for *Anschluss*. Furthermore, many of the German Protestant parishes, existing among the German minorities in Europe as well as among the Germans abroad, have become members of this organization. Thus the Kirchenbund is an important factor for developing the religious and cultural unity of all German-speaking Protestants of the world.

The auxiliary activities of the Catholic church are more numerous and better organized than is the case with those of the Protestant church. The young men's league numbers over 300,000 members, the young women's league, over 600,000; the women's society, about 250,000, the mothers' clubs, 500,000; the Christian trade-unions, 500,000, the workers' clubs, 300,000. Besides this, there exists a host of cultural societies representing some two million members. Most important from the point of view of our study is perhaps the "Volksverein" founded in 1890 and now numbering over half a million members. One of its aims was, and still is, to struggle against the attempts of social revolution as well as to defend the Christian order of society. The Volksverein has emphasized the basic unity of society and opposes any attempts to disrupt it. It gives courses in civic training and distributes many leaflets addressed to different social strata. The following quotations from one of those leaflets issued in 1927 states clearly its position: "In the political sphere: we affirm the democratic state (Volksstaat). . . . We defend the unity brought about by a social peace among the various groups of the nation, which is the necessary basis for a true democratic state."

Reaching into almost every branch of activity, the church through its auxiliary organizations comes to stand as a great—perhaps the greatest—auxiliary of the state. At a thousand points it co-operates until loyalty to the church in its many activities becomes almost undistinguishable from loyalty to the

state and the nation. And the political and moral duty of the citizen to the state and the nation becomes a religious one, invested with a halo of divine sanctity.

But if religion and the church have thus been called to the support of the present bourgeois state, irreligion has been utilized to attack it. Without wishing to examine this problem in detail it is, however, necessary to give a short account of the anti-religious forces in Germany.¹ Although they include only a small fraction of the population, their aggressiveness is much greater than their size would suggest. Although various free-thinking groups existed in Germany during the earlier part of the nineteenth century, ranging all the way from religious non-conformists to atheists, the definitely anti-religious forces were not organized until the period of the Empire. In 1861 the "German Freethinkers' Society" (Deutsche Freidenkerbund) was organized by left-wing groups from liberal bourgeois and middle-class elements. It stood for the ideals of "bourgeois Enlightenment" (*bürgerliche Aufklärung*), namely, a general freedom of thought and conscience. It professed no political allegiance. A parallel anti-religious movement was organized by allied elements in the form of a burial society for the purpose of carrying on propaganda for the cremation of the dead. The first crematorium was built in 1878.

With the growth of the Social Democracy an atheist movement developed among the working class. A proletarian "Verein für Feuerbestattung" was formed in 1905 which demanded resignation from all church organizations as a prerequisite for membership. Three years later a proletarian "Gemeinschaft Proletarischer Freidenker" was established with the official organ *Der Atheist*, which became the theoretical center for a

¹ W. Breitenbach, *Die Gründung und erste Entwicklung des deutschen Monistenzbundes* (1919); Georg Decker, "Katholizismus und Sozialismus" (in *Die Gesellschaft*, No. 5 [January, 1928], pp. 289-311); Theodor Hartwig, *Jesus oder Karl Marx?* (Christentum und Sozialismus) (1924); Theodor Hartwig, *Sozialismus und Freidenkerkertum* (1924); F. Siegmund-Schultze, *Sozialismus und Christentum* (1919); Karl Vorländer, "Katholizismus und Sozialismus" (in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, LI [1924], 765-90); Walter und Anna Lindemann, *Die proletarische Freidenkerbewegung* (1926); Paul Piechowski, *Proletarischer Glaube* (1927). See also the current numbers of *Der Freidenker* and *Die proletarische Freidenkerstimme*.

militant type of atheism. The church and religion were not attacked from the point of view of liberty of religious thought but as allies of capitalism in the struggle of the latter to keep the workers in a state of oppression. Although many of the Social Democratic leaders were atheists, the party officially refused to commit itself to an anti-religious platform. On the basis of the Gotha Program of 1875 and the Erfurt Program of 1890, the Social Democracy declared "religion is a private matter."

The changes that took place in the Social Democracy since the World War were also expressed in the changed attitude of the Social Democrats toward religion and the freethinker movement. While the Social Democrats before the war had refused to take an official attitude antagonistic to religion, they nevertheless had accepted the materialistic philosophy as the basis of Socialism. Since the war, however, due to the fact that they have become a co-ruling party in the government in alliance with the Catholic Centre party, they have taken a less unfriendly attitude toward religion and philosophic idealism. In fact, there is a definite group within the present Social Democracy which calls itself "religious Socialists" and which includes a number of Protestant ministers who find no place in the Evangelical church for their views on social problems. In 1920 these religious Socialists began publishing *Blätter für religiösen Sozialismus*. Moreover the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, the organ of the old Revisionists, as well as other publications of the Social Democracy, contain numerous articles which attack the materialistic basis of Marxism and emphasize the necessity for developing a religious type of Socialism which would satisfy the spiritual demands of the working class. Even among the higher officials of the party this attitude is to be found. Thus in his pamphlet *Das Program der Sozialdemokratie, Vorschläge für seine Erneuerung*, published in 1921, the Social Democratic professor, Radbruch, at one time federal minister of justice, speaks of the "unsatisfied longing" for religion among the workers. He demands, consequently, the possibility of developing a proletarian "Weltanschauung" and a religious spirit within and also outside of the existing churches.

Thus we see that the Social Democracy has opened its ranks more and more to various forms of religious thought. This, of course, has influenced the character of the proletarian freethinker organizations under the control of the Social Democracy. The anti-religious and anti-church attitude and activities have been emphasized less and less. In place we find that the leaders of these organizations emphasize freedom of thought and a policy of political neutrality. Consequently the relationship with the smaller bourgeois freethinker organizations, especially the "Monistenbund" has grown closer. On the other hand, the radical elements under the leadership of the Communists have carried on a bitter fight against this policy. We need not go into the details of the struggle which has been long and bitter, but merely point out that a break came in 1931. This did not take place merely in Germany but led to a split in the "Internationale Proletarischer Freidenker" which had been founded in 1925 and of which the German freethinkers were members. The right-wing elements under the leadership of the Social Democracy thereupon combined in September, 1931, with the long-established bourgeois freethinker International of Brussels into the present "Internationale Freidenker-Union" with an international membership of about three quarters of a million. At the opening speech of the congress establishing the new International, Professor Hartwig, secretary of the International, stated that he

wants to assure Wirth, the Federal Minister of the Interior, that no freethinker proposes to draw the faithful from the Church, no, it is proposed to win only those who no longer have faith but who are still members of the Church. Cannot the Church be happy if one takes away its unfaithful members?²¹

Moreover, as a perusal of the press and publications of the German section show, the emphasis is being placed not so much upon the development of irreligion and its aid in the class struggle as upon the struggle for freedom of thought in the religious field.

After the split of the freethinker movement the "Internation-

¹ From a report of the congress published in the *Vorwärts* of September 5, 1931.

ale Proletarischer Freidenker" was reorganized by the left-wing elements. It now claims a membership of five millions. The most important section is the "Society of the Godless" of Soviet Russia with four million members while outside Russia the German section, the "Verband Proletarischer Freidenker," is the largest with somewhat over a hundred thousand members. It carries on an aggressive struggle in conjunction with other revolutionary organizations of Germany against all forms of religion and all activities of church bodies. It likewise attacks the Social Democratic and bourgeois freethinkers' organizations for their lukewarm antagonism toward the church and their opposition to the revolutionary policy of the "Verband." Its chief slogan is that of Marx: "Religion is the opium of the people," and it looks forward to the day when, under a Communist society, church and religion will have disappeared in Germany.¹

¹ See *Was wollen die proletarischen Freidenker?* as well as *Die proletarische Freidenker-Internationale greift an*, both published by the Internationale proletarischer Freidenker.

CHAPTER XII

THE YOUTH MOVEMENT

The youth of the country is naturally one of the most important groups of the population to be considered in studying the development of civic and national loyalty, for the various influences that help affect the youth help to determine its civic and national allegiance when it enters the political life of the nation. The period from the age of fourteen to twenty-one is perhaps the most important one in determining the political mentality of the individual in his later years, and has been receiving increased attention on the part of the various agencies attempting to mold the future ideology of the nation.¹

During the greater part of the nineteenth century the vast majority of the population came under the direct influence of the state only up to its fourteenth year. In addition, the majority of the male population came under the control of the state during the two or three years of service in the army. With the increased industrialization of the country during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the corresponding spread of Socialist ideas among the working class, the problem arose, for the state as well as for the various organizations interested in maintaining the existing social order, of getting increased ideological control of the youth of the nation and especially of the youth of the industrial centers.

In this attempt to develop national patriotism various methods were and are still being used similar to those applied to the

¹ See Victor Engelhardt, *Die deutsche Jugendbewegung als kulturhistorisches Phänomen* (1923); Friedrich Wilhelm Förster, *Jugendseele, Jugendbewegung, Jugendziel*; Charlotte Lütkens, *Die deutsche Jugendbewegung (ein soziologischer Versuch)* (1925). The amount of material on the youth movement in Germany is enormous and is being increased each year by a large number of articles, pamphlets, and even books. Most of this is, however, of a theoretical or ephemeral nature; little of it deals with the history of the movement. Besides the sources quoted in this chapter, much source material has been collected by the "Archiv des Reichsausschusses der deutschen Jugendverbände," a semi-official body working in conjunction with the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

adult population. Attempts have been made by state and private agencies to alleviate some of the worst economic and social conditions of the working class and thus prevent the growth of radical ideas among the youth. This form of preventive activity comes out clearly in the various forms of youth welfare work. In addition, various forms of divertive propaganda are in use, such as different kinds of entertainments, amusements, and non-political activities as well as certain types of work in the continuation schools instituted for this purpose. And finally the direct or active form of propaganda must be mentioned which tries to arouse a direct interest in civic and national problems. This form of propaganda is found in all work carried on among the youth by various government agencies as well as by patriotic and welfare societies.

As already indicated, the youth movement is of recent origin. It is of course true that there had been youth aid organizations existing for many decades in connection with both the Protestant and Catholic churches. These, however, were loosely organized, and had no direct aim in developing national and civic loyalties, except in so far as the latter were reflections of the general attitude of these churches toward the state. Interest in the youth movement on the part of the state as well as the various upper- and middle-class organizations was at length aroused by two developments. The increase of international antagonisms after 1900 brought about increased militarization of the nation in various fields of human activities. It was quite natural, therefore, that sooner or later an attempt would be made to develop within the new generation a conscious loyalty to the nation, the state, and the emperor. At the same time the rapid growth of the Social Democracy showed that especially in industrial centers the youth of today were becoming the Socialist voters of tomorrow, and ways and means had to be found to combat this apparently hostile force.

As early as 1901 the Prussian minister of education pointed out this problem in the ordinance of November 24:

The State authorities have had long and exhaustive discussions in the past of how to protect the male youth against misuse of its leisure hours, from the

time it leaves the elementary schools to the time it enters military service; how to influence it through instruction, proper social surroundings and agreeable pastimes, and how to educate it for its place in bourgeois society [*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*].

After a number of years of consideration of this matter, the Prussian minister of commerce announced in the Ordinance of July 7, 1908, that "the continuation schools are to act as the substructure for all aid and welfare work for that part of the youth which has graduated from the elementary schools."¹ Furthermore, attempts were to be made to obtain influence over the ideology of the youth outside the continuation schools.

The aim must be to achieve an emotional influence which will be willingly accepted on the part of the youth. Welfare work can often be aided considerably if the students of the continuation schools take part in the administration of the latter.

Various suggestions in regard to youth welfare were favorably received by the different private organizations interested in developing a patriotic spirit among the workers, and soon all the activities for youth welfare were co-ordinated in the Central Bureau for Public Welfare (*Zentralstelle für Volkswohlfahrt*).² How extensive this interest was on the part of the various youth organizations can be seen from the list of speakers at the Youth Congress, held in Darmstadt from May 24 to 26, 1909. Among these were General von François as representative of the army, Municipal School Councilor Kerschensteiner as representative of the schools, military chaplain Roese as representative of the Union of German Youth Organizations (*Bund deutscher Jugendvereine*), the Rev. Dr. Weber as representative of the Protestant youth organizations, Dr. A. Pieper as representative of

¹ Since only the working class and the peasant youth went to the elementary schools and the latter were not included in the continuation school work, it is quite obvious that it was essentially the working-class youth which is meant in these ordinances.

² Heinrich Wetterling, *Staatliche Organisation und Jugendpflege* (1911); Wiemann, *Jugendpflege*; Karl Weller, *Der König der Jugendpfleger! Der Jugendpfleger unter den Königen! Kaiser Wilhelms II Sorge um die schulenlassene Jugend* (eine Festgabe zum 25. Jugendtage für alle deutschen Söhne) (1913); J. F. Landsberg, *Behördliche Jugendpflege* (1914); *Jugendfürsorge und Jugendvereine* (ein Handbuch herausgegeben unter Mitwirkung von A. Pieper) (1910).

the Catholic youth organizations, Geheimer Regierungsrat Dr. Stegemann as representative of the Chamber of Commerce and of the German Society for Commercial Education (Deutscher Verband für kaufmännisches Unterrichtswesen), Inspector Schmuck as representative of the German Gymnastic League (Deutsche Turnerschaft), and Municipal Councilor Dr. Penzig as representative of the Society for Ethical Culture. The suggestion was made to form local youth welfare groups in the various communities of Prussia who were to work in conjunction with the continuation schools and with the aid of especially trained youth welfare workers. Many local committees were formed, the members of which often consisted of eminent men who until then had taken little interest in the problem of the youth.

Less than two years later, on January 18, 1911, the anniversary of the foundation of the German Empire, the Prussian minister of education, von Trott zur Solz, issued an ordinance regulating youth aid and welfare work in Prussia. Local committees were created throughout Prussia which were centralized in the different provinces under the leadership of the Regierungs-präsident who acted in conjunction with the various private agencies mentioned above. The Prussian Diet granted two million marks to carry on this work. In the other German states similar measures were taken.

While the state and the various private organizations were thus attempting to develop civic pride among the youth by attempting to ameliorate their social and economic conditions, the existing youth organizations were active in spreading the ideals of national and monarchical loyalty.¹ These organizations had been formed to consolidate the national spirit among the upper and middle class youth and to combat the growth of Socialist ideas among the youth of the lower classes. Due to their efforts the various youth organizations finally formed the Young German League (Jungdeutschlandbund), which came into being January 13, 1911, under the leadership of General von der Goltz,

¹ "Deutsche Jugendbewegung" (in *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, No. 9, Vol. XXIII [1926]). A comprehensive summary.

and had for its purpose the preparation of the youth for military service. This League was a federation of most of the important non-Socialist youth organizations or of youth sections of patriotic societies of Germany. Some of these organizations had been organized purposely for training the youth along military lines. The oldest of these was the "Jungsturm," which had been formed as early as 1890 by army officers but which became important only after 1900. Its members were organized along military lines and trained for future service. In Bavaria a similar organization was formed in 1910, namely, the "Bayrische Wehrkraftverein." In addition, the German Boy Scouts (Deutscher Pfadfinderbund) had been organized after the American and British model. Each boy scout had to memorize a creed of ten articles the second of which reads: "A boy scout is faithful to his God, his ruler, his Emperor and his fatherland."¹ While these organizations were small numerically their influence nevertheless was considerable.

The Federation of Catholic Youth Organizations (Verband der Katholischen Jünglingsvereine) and its Protestant counterpart became members of the League. Both the Catholic and Protestant churches had founded religious youth organizations many decades before and the Catholic organizations had participated in the Kulturkampf. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, both church organizations had become important factors in aiding the development of the national and military spirit of the youth.

The presiding board of the Young German League contained among others representatives of the different ministries and twenty-seven other important officials; the executive committee, twenty-one representatives of the various youth organizations in addition to representatives, many of them officers, of the various German states, Prussian provinces, and the free cities. The League introduced various forms of military training, gave the youth organizations the right to use governmental military parade grounds, barracks, swimming pools, secured reduced rail-

¹ This was changed after 1918 to: "A boy scout loves his fatherland, is faithful, upright and honest."

road rates, worked for the establishment of youth clubs, etc. By 1913 it had established its activities in over a thousand towns and cities and was in contact with half a million of the youth of the nation.¹

One of the most interesting member organizations of the Young German League was the so-called Wandervogel (literally wanderbird), which was first organized in 1897 by students of the Steglitz Gymnasium near Berlin and represented a revolt of the more liberal middle-class youth against what seemed to them the ossified forms of bourgeois society and state, which were destroying the personality of the individual by trying to stamp everyone in the standardized mold of the grown-up subjects of German society and of the German Empire. The organization proclaimed a revolt of the youth against the adults who they claimed did not understand the peculiar problems of youth. Its members wanted to form an independent youth movement which was to manage its own affairs in contrast to the existing youth organizations which stood under the influence and often control of adult organizations. The various Wandervogel clubs thus became a fomenting-ground for all liberal and even radical ideas and, as will be seen later, broke up under the stress of the revolution into various political factions.

They expressed their independence by having meetings as well as week-end hikes to various points of scenic interest in Germany, where parents, teachers, or adult leaders were not permitted. They began to dig up old German folk lore, dances, and songs. The latter were published in the volume called *Zupfgeigenhansl*, with accompaniment for the old-fashioned lute which they again popularized. They also developed a special kind of hiking costume for both sexes which since has become very popular. Possibly the most significant and lasting effect of this whole movement has been to create a new interest among the youth in the cultural achievements of the Germany of the past.

¹ According to the periodical *Der Jünglingsverein*, 1910, p. 137, of the six and a half million youth in Germany 940,000, about 15 per cent, were organized. Of these, 450,000 belonged to the religious youth organizations, the rest to nonreligious. Of the latter, 90,000 belonged to the Socialist youth.

The Wandervogel began to become popular after 1906 and already by 1911 had 412 groups throughout Germany. About the same time similar liberal youth groups were formed and in October, 1913, the so-called progressive youth of Germany held a national conference on the Hohen Meissner (a historically important mountain in Central Germany). On this occasion the Free German movement (*Freideutsche Bewegung*) was constituted as a force uniting all autonomous liberal and radical (but non-Socialist) youth groups of Germany. But in spite of the many radical and apparently revolutionary speeches for liberty and independence, the spirit of the conference was undoubtedly well expressed in the speech of Gottfried Traub which was greeted with tremendous enthusiasm:

Thus I believe that the idea of the State stands above the love of the Fatherland. . . . Thus I believe that today the idea of the State must again become the binding force which unites all the existing factors, that the State grows within us and through us. To mould the impersonal idea of the State into a part of our own personality . . . , that I think is the finest ideal. . . ."

Parallel with and to a certain extent intensifying the patriotic youth movement was the Socialist youth movement. At first, the Social Democrats made no attempts to organize the youth directly but appealed essentially to the adult voters. In fact, at the International Socialist Congress of 1900 as well as that of 1904, the German delegation expressed a certain opposition to the political training of the youth, maintaining that the youth should be kept out of politics. In the meantime the Austrian Social Democrat Dannenberg formed the first Socialist youth organization "Jugendbund" in 1903 with a membership of one hundred. The following year the later deputy Dr. Ludwig Frank founded a "Society of Young Workers." New organizations sprang up rapidly which were united in 1906 into the "Union of the Young Workers of Germany" (Verband junger Arbeiter Deutschlands). In the meantime the party had somewhat changed its views, and in 1906 a Committee for Youth Education was appointed. Still the opposition within the party and the free trade-unions against a separate youth movement continued, partly because the majority feared that the youth would

strengthen the radical wing of the party. Thus they partly opposed the First International Conference of the Socialist Youth Organizations held in Stuttgart in 1907 under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht, the leader of the left wing of the party. In an address "The Struggle against Militarism," he stated: "The formation of youth organizations of a Socialist character means the creation of a weapon which, where there are no special legal restrictions, is especially suitable for the anti-militarist struggle." Thus while the upper- and middle-class organizations were attempting to militarize the youth, the left wing of the

TABLE I

	Number Held	In Number of Communities
Lectures.....	4,756	365
Hikes and excursions.....	5,467	343
Play afternoon.....	4,181	151
Youth homes.....	803	280
Libraries.....	35,557 (books)	47

Social Democracy was attempting to use the youth against the growth of militarism.

The Socialist youth movement seemed to the state a new dangerous development with the result that in 1908 political youth organizations (i.e., Socialist) were prohibited. Therefore, the Socialist youth organizations were changed into educational clubs which functioned under the guidance of the Socialist party which created the Central Bureau for the Working Class Youth of Germany (*Zentralstelle für die Arbeiterjugend Deutschlands*). This grew rapidly and during 1913 its activities were as shown in Table I.¹

With the outbreak of the World War the youth were also drawn into the national struggle. The militarization of the youth soon took rapid strides.² As early as August 16, 1914, a Prussian Ordinance was issued regulating the military prepara-

¹ Wilhelm Münzenberg, *Die sozialistische Jugendinternationale*, p. 13.

² Georg von Graevenitz, *Die militärische Vorbereitung der Jugend in Gegenwart und Zukunft* (1915).

tion of the youth. This was followed by similar ordinances in other states. Youth companies similar to those that had been organized by the Jungdeutschlandbund were formed everywhere, with the aid of the state as well as the various youth and adult organizations. These were of a voluntary nature, but every able-bodied youth was expected to participate in them. The general patriotic enthusiasm throughout the whole country, as well as the charm of novelty together with the chance to train and parade just as their elders were doing, made these companies very popular. The higher schools were ordered to engage in marching and drilling one day a week. (In the post-war period this has been continued as a regular monthly hiking day.)

But as the war continued much longer than had been anticipated, the enthusiasm and interest for the youth companies began to wane. This was partly overcome by the introduction of uniforms, fife and drum corps, brass bands, and the promise on the part of the government that those who had successfully served in the youth companies would receive certain advantages when called to the regular services. In 1916 the Ministry of War tried to appeal to the interest of the athletic world by the establishment of contests in military gymnastics and athletics for the youth. These contests have continued in a modified form down to the present, in the form of the Federal Youth Athletic Contests. But the general dissatisfaction that developed throughout the country as the war continued also affected the youth, especially the proletarian youth which, of course, suffered most from the food scarcity.¹ In fact, soon after the outbreak of the war an opposition of the youth against the pro-war policy of the Social Democrats became evident. This found expression in a conference of the more radical districts of the Socialist youth on October 25, 1915, at Stuttgart. Among other things it was decided to oppose the formation of the military youth companies. The growth of the opposition led to the formation of the Free Socialist Youth (Freie sozialistische Arbeiterjugend) in 1916

¹ Fr. Bauermeister, *Vom Klassenkampf der Jugend* (1916); Ebert, *Die proletarische Jugendbewegung in der Kriegszeit*; Bondi, *Die proletarische Jugendbewegung*.

which participated in the international conferences at Berne, Zurich, and Stockholm in the course of the same year. It issued ten numbers of the *Youth International*, which contained articles by Liebknecht, Lenin, Trotzky, and others, and it helped to circulate other revolutionary literature. It also managed to arrange three International Youth days from 1915 to 1917. It led several successful strikes among the youth against the military ordinance which had compelled every youthful worker to save a certain amount of his wages and invest it in war loans. On October 25 the various local groups which had so far been only in loose contacts with each other held their first national convention, which decided to put all its energies in aiding the oncoming revolution.

The outbreak of the revolution and the economic and political crisis since then have affected the youth perhaps even more violently than the adults, for the former were much less bound by traditions and mental habits and consequently reacted more directly to the immediate issues at stake. We, therefore, find that during the revolutionary period of 1918-19 many of the proletarian youth were drawn into the revolutionary struggle. In fact, the Communists drew a relatively larger proportion of youth elements to their ranks than adults. Consequently this period marked the beginning of a much sharper struggle and a tremendous increase in the size and influence of youth organizations. This was accentuated by the fact that the voting age had been reduced from twenty-five to twenty years, making the molding of the political ideas of the youth of greater immediate importance than had been the case before. Furthermore, the abolition of the standing army removed the great mass of the youth from the influence of patriotic ideals and service during some of the most important years of their lives. And, finally, the increasing economic crisis of the post-war period has helped to develop among the youth a much greater tendency toward radical thought and action. This struggle for the youth has been, on the one hand, a struggle of those adult as well as youth organizations under the ideological leadership of the bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats against the attempts of the Commu-

nists to tie up the revolutionary enthusiasm of the youth with the Communist movement. On the other hand, it has been a struggle for the youth between those organizations which accepted the republic and those which represented reactionary or Fascist ideals. The republican forces have set about to win the youth by two means. In the first place, they have attempted to increase the youth welfare work on the part of the various organizations of the state. In the second place, they have tried to tie up the various youth organizations to the state by organizational and financial means.

As already indicated, the purpose of the youth welfare work is to overcome the existing antagonism within society and to foster the idea of the unity of the nation.¹ This was pointed out by the Prussian minister of welfare when he wrote:²

Thus I believe I am acting with the consent of all political groups and parties if I maintain that all party politics be kept out of the youth welfare work. The youth welfare work can however do its share so that the German youth, no matter whether its cradle stood in a hut or in a castle, will maintain its love and faith for the fatherland in all its misfortune, as well as uphold German culture and ideals.

As a result, youth welfare work set in on a much larger scale than had been the case formerly, both on the part of private welfare organizations and on the part of the state. The work that had been done formerly by the state had broken down during the war, but soon after 1918 many efforts were made to rebuild what had been lost. On November 1, 1919, the youth welfare work was taken out of the hands of the Prussian Ministry for Education and placed into the hands of the newly formed Prussian Ministry for Public Welfare. The old system of local district and provincial committees of pre-war days was re-established and enlarged, and the number of welfare workers gradually increased. Several million marks are given each year by the Prussian state to be distributed for youth homes, play-

¹ Martin Büttner, *Die Jugendpflege in Preussen, insbesondere im Regierungsbezirk Königsberg und ihre Förderung durch den Staat* (1924); *Jugend-wohlfahrt und Lehrerschaft* (ein Handbuch für Jugendwohlfahrtspflege) (1926).

² Prussia, Ministerium für Volkswohlfahrt, *Denkschrift des Preussischen Ministeriums für Volkswohlfahrt* (1925), p. 12.

grounds, athletic fields, etc.¹ In addition, a State Advisory Council for Youth Welfare and the Youth Movement (Landesbeirat für Jugendpflege und Jugendbewegung) was created in 1922 for the purpose of tying up all state and private activities that concerned themselves with the youth.

Furthermore, the federal government began to take an active part in this work by attempting to systematize the various forms of youth welfare work carried on in the different states. This was accomplished by the Federal Act on Youth Welfare of 1922 (Reichsjugendwohlfahrtsgesetz), some of the provisions of which, however, were considerably restricted by the Savings Ordinance of March 29, 1924. According to this act, a system of youth bureaus (*Jugendämter*) was established in all municipalities and rural districts of Germany which serve as the official centers for carrying out welfare measures concerning the youth. Above these local bureaus are district, provincial, and state offices, finally centering in a Federal Youth Bureau.

These bureaus also serve as centers for co-ordinating the state welfare work with that being carried on by private organizations. According to section 9 of this act each youth bureau has besides its paid local officials an advisory committee, two fifths of whose members represent private youth welfare organizations. In addition, the bureau contains representatives of the various youth organizations. By the beginning of 1929, 714 of these bureaus had been established, of which 507 contained representatives of various welfare organizations.² The various organizations participated as shown in Table II.

These private welfare organizations carry on very extensive welfare work and have formed a national Central Commission for Independent Youth Welfare (Zentrale für die Freie Jugendwohlfahrt). They work in closest conjunction with the state, and receive financial support from the latter. In fact, they have

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

² One of these organizations is the Federation of German Youth Inns (Verband Deutscher Jugendherbergen), which gives night quarters to youthful hikers for a minimal sum. In 1928 there were 2,800 inns throughout Germany with three million visitors during the year. Since then this organization has greatly increased in size and activities.

a semi-official standing and are becoming indirectly a part of the administrative machinery of the state.

At the same time the struggle for "the soul of the youth" has been carried on by the various political, economic, and religious organizations with the result that the membership of the various youth organizations has increased from about a million in 1914 to over five million in 1928. With the exception of the Communist youth and those youth organizations with Fascist tendencies, most of the youth organizations are affiliated with the Federal Commission of German Youth Organizations (Reichsausschuss

TABLE II

Name	No. of Youth Bureaus in Which Representatives Existed	Percentage of Total Youth Bureaus
Protestant organizations.....	275	38
Catholic organizations.....	251	35
Red Cross.....	231	32
Workers' Welfare (Arbeiterwohlfahrt).....	169	24
Trade-unions.....	46	6
Other organizations.....	160	22

der deutschen Jugendverbände) which was formed in 1919 as a semi-official body in place of the youth section of the Central Bureau for Public Welfare mentioned above. The Federal Commission consists of four Socialists and seventy-five non-Socialist representatives, and its purpose is to develop "a responsible participation of the youth organizations in the state and in the nation."¹ It is a semi-official body having its office in the Federal Ministry of the Interior. It gets a financial subsidy from the government and all the members of the youth organization attached to it receive a 50 per cent reduction on the German railroads.

All of the youth organizations affiliated with the Federal Commission are exponents of national patriotism though naturally differing in the intensity and the form in which they ex-

¹ Section 3 of the Statutes of the Commission (in *Tätigkeitsbericht für die Geschäftsjahre 1926-27*, p. 50).

press it. The vast majority of them are loyal to the republic though their active support depends upon the type of their activities and the political attitudes of these organizations with whom they are affiliated. These organizations form a formidable array as Table III, compiled by the Federal Commission, shows.

It is hardly possible within the limit of this study to take up the attitudes of these various organizations, numbering almost

TABLE III
MEMBERSHIP OF THE FEDERAL COMMISSION OF GERMAN
YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

GROUP	NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS	MEMBERS UP TO TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF AGE	
		Number	Per Cent
1. Protestant organizations.....	19	457,900	10.5
2. Catholic organizations.....	8	781,000	18
3. Socialist organizations.....	6	368,800	8.5
4. Free German Youth (Bündische Jugend)	28	56,350	1.3
5. Youth sections of trade-unions and pro- fessional bodies.....	12	459,950	10.6
6. Youth sections of sport organizations...	8	1,616,900	37.5
7. Youth sections of political parties (non- Socialist).....	3	47,450	1.1
8. Other patriotic organizations.....	6	550,500	12.7
9. Others.....	6
Together.....	96	4,338,850	100

a hundred, toward the state and civic training, and it is not necessary, for they represent the same views as the adult organizations with which they are affiliated and which have been treated in other parts of this volume. Neither is it possible to show how each of these organizations tries to develop allegiance to the state and nation. All that can be done is to indicate some of the methods common to many of them.

In order to attract as large as possible a number of members the individual organizations try to cater to the diverse interests of the youth by forming groups and subsections that take care of these interests. This catering to the interests of the youth is typical of most organizations and explains to a certain extent

their rapid growth. Although the purpose of these groups has often no direct connection with national and civic training, yet they serve to bind the individual youth, otherwise left to himself, to an organization that fosters a national and patriotic ideology. Thus this participation in some form of group life on the part of the youth often becomes the first step in tying them to the state.

In these organizations, the meetings take place generally once a week. At each meeting there are generally speeches and discussions which in some form or other touch upon the relationship of the individual or the organization to society and the nation. In fact, some organizations specialize in these discussions. Often adults are called in to make an address, in which case the subject is generally of more than local importance, thus giving the speaker a chance to touch upon the relationship of the youth to the nation. The discussions following such an address give the members the chance to express their ideas about unity, the state, their particular organizations, themselves, and things in general. While at the meetings of some organizations these problems are only touched upon indirectly, nevertheless, at periods of national crises, they are certain to receive serious attention.

Among the important activities of most of the youth organizations are excursion hiking trips. These excursions are an important means of developing the love for the German countryside, as the vast majority of the trips are naturally taken to points within the German border. Very often the trips are planned to some landmark that has historical and patriotic affiliations, thus helping to stimulate the patriotism of the participant. All these hikes or trips are enlivened by singing German folk songs and in many cases patriotic songs. The value of these hikes and trips must not be underestimated, for they are so widespread as to be considered a "national" custom. The effectiveness of these excursion hikes as a form of propaganda depends upon the degree and type of national patriotism represented by the organization. But whatever type of organization it may be, such outings furnish an important emotional experi-

ence that helps much to strengthen group and national consciousness.

One very effective method for attracting a certain type of youth is the demonstrations held by the various military organizations together with their youth sections. Parades, military formations, flags, uniforms, brass bands, drum and fife corps with patriotic songs, have often proved a very effective means of attracting the aggressive type of youth. This form of propaganda is used continually by the nationalist military organizations, especially in connection either with festivals of the particular organizations or those of a national character.

The local groups of each organization generally celebrate a number of festivals every year. In addition, the district, state, and national organizations have their congresses, conferences, and festivals at regular intervals. In many cases these turn out to be great nationalist demonstrations often carried on in conjunction with adult organization. They help to attract public attention not only to the particular organization but also help to strengthen the nationalist idea among the general public.

The youth periodicals are also an important factor in developing not only the ideas of the particular organization but also the civic and national allegiance current in the various organizations. There are several hundred such magazines; each organization puts out one, the larger put out several. According to an inquiry made by the Federal Commission of the German Youth in 1928, the periodicals of the organization affiliated with it have a circulation of over a million and a half. Since, however, many of the organizations gave no answers and, moreover, those organizations that are not affiliated were not included, it would not be wrong to estimate the total circulation of youth periodicals in Germany at about three million copies. In addition, there are over a hundred periodicals for adults, dealing with youth and welfare work.

From what has been said of the youth movement of post-war Germany one might get the impression that practically the whole movement is lined up behind the present republican and parliamentary régime. But this is not the case. It is true that

the greater part of the organized youth is found in the above-mentioned organizations. But many of these organizations exist primarily for cultural, religious, or economic reasons, and as such are only indirectly interested in political problems. Consequently, while potentially an assent to the existing régime, their activity along direct political lines is often slight.

The growing economic crisis, which is driving the coming generation more and more to look for some escape out of their present misery, is tending to make them turn to those forces which promise a change by direct and immediate action. Thus the most active elements among the youth are found among the followers of the "Nazis" and the Nationalist organization on the one hand and the Communists on the other hand. The youth organized in the Fascist as well as in the Nationalist military organizations such as the Steel Helmets are the most active youth elements among the middle and upper classes. They are not so much opposed to the other youth organizations discussed above but rather attempt to become their ideological leaders in the rejuvenation of Germany. Their numbers are difficult to ascertain though they are increasing by leaps and bounds. More important than their size, however, is the fact that they are becoming the real focal points of the bourgeois youth movement (*bürgerliche Jugendbewegung*). To what extent they will dominate the rest of this movement depends upon many factors, the fundamental being the future, social, and economic conditions of Germany.

The rapid growth of the influence of the Fascists upon present-day youth is all the more remarkable if we compare it to the declining power of the Socialist youth movement, which in 1919 promised to develop among the new generation a faith in the republic. Thus the membership of the Union of Socialist Workers' Youth, the youth section of the Social Democratic party, dropped from 95,000 in 1924 to 50,000 in 1928 and has continued in the same direction since then. It carries on no aggressive political activities and is developing more and more into an educational organization. At various times an opposition has ap-

peared in this organization against the policy of co-operation with the existing state, with the demands for a more aggressive proletarian policy. This has led to a number of wholesale expulsions of the revolutionary elements who generally have joined the Communists. It is true that the Socialists still boast of over 200,000 youth in the free trade-unions. These, however, are members of the trade-unions for economic and not political reasons. Moreover, the Socialists claim the greater portion of the youth organized in the Reichsbanner, the auxiliary military organization of the republican parties. The youth section of this organization has, however, not kept up with the growth of the right-wing youth organization of a similar nature. But more important, the emotional driving force, the propagandist zeal, and the aggressive activities of the youth under Fascist and nationalist influence is far greater than that dominated by the Social Democrats.

Diametrically opposed to the Fascists, and at the same time violently antagonistic to the Socialists, is the Communist youth movement. This movement grew out of the Free Socialist Youth formed during the war in opposition to the patriotic policies of the Social Democracy. At the second national convention held on February 22, 1919, a resolution was passed in support of the recently formed Communist party, which concluded: ". . . We must stop thinking as Germans and learn to think as proletarians."¹ The following year it was decided to accept the principles of the Third (Communist) International which was followed later by changing the name of the organization to Communist Youth and by becoming affiliated with the Communist Youth International. This international relationship with the Communist Youth of other countries, especially with that of Russia, is often emphasized by sending youth delegations to Russia, presenting youth groups in Russia with flags from German groups, and being presented in return with flags and emblems from the youth groups of important towns and factories in Russia.

¹ *Proletarier Jugend*, No. 14 (1920), p. 10.

It has carried on a very aggressive fight for its principles of the class struggle within the nation and the international union of the proletariat.

The working class youth will and must take a leading part in all revolutionary actions which have as their aim the destruction of the present State; all other activities are to be subordinated to this one.¹

While this was written in 1918 it still expresses clearly the view of the present-day Communist youth and makes the latter the focusing point of all those proletarian youth elements definitely opposed to the existing state and society. Through its open and active struggle against this social order it has drawn a large following among the proletarian youth elements. In fact, its influence among the active youth is now undoubtedly stronger than that of the Socialist youth.

¹ W. Münzenberg, *Program und Aufbau der sozialistischen Jugendinternationale* (1918), p. 7.

CHAPTER XIII

LOCALISM AND SECTIONALISM

Both local and sectional loyalties have played and still play a fairly important rôle in German national life. Both types of loyalties have existed since the Middle Ages and as such antedate national loyalty. It is not merely local and sectional loyalties however which concern us, but the antagonisms which have grown out of the conflict of these loyalties. In modern times local antagonisms have been of slight political significance. Local loyalties have actually been used especially during the last decades in building up national loyalty. Sectional antagonisms, however, have played a greater rôle; in fact, it was the sectional antagonisms which helped to retard the unification of Germany and which continue in a modified form down to the present. As will be seen later, these sectional loyalties have been used both to strengthen and to weaken the national state.

Although many sectional antagonisms exist, the most important ones are those among Northern, Southern, and Western Germany. The expression "tripartite Germany" has sometimes been used to designate these sectional differences. Roughly speaking they are basically geographical expressions of social, economic, and political antagonisms within the present German state. Eastern Germany has been under the control and influence of aristocratic landholders; Southern Germany has been dominated by the middle classes of both town and country, while Western Germany, the home of heavy industry, is characterized by its bourgeoisie and its industrial proletariat. The mutual contradictions between these various social groups are the basis for much of the sectional antagonisms that exist at present. Since, however, before the war Eastern Germany furnished the political basis of Prussia and Germany, the sectional antagonisms of Southern and Western Germany toward Eastern Germany became antagonisms toward the particular form and

character of the German national state. With the defeat of the old régime the leadership of the Republic has tended more and more to coincide with the interest of industrial Germany with its center in the west. As a result, Eastern Germany as a section has tended to be antagonistic toward certain phases of the present national state, while Southern Germany has retained its opposition against both agrarian Eastern and industrial Western Germany.

Economic, social, political, and cultural differences have existed between Northern and Southern Germany ever since the Middle Ages. The indecisive outcome of the religious struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries became an additional factor preventing the unification of Germany. Although there are more Catholics living in Northern than in Southern Germany the population of Southern Germany is almost entirely Catholic, while Northern Germany (with the exception of the western parts) is predominantly Protestant. The political inertia arising out of the economic stagnation of Germany during the greater part of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries strengthened rather than weakened these sectional loyalties and antagonisms. During the period of disunion the geographical position of the South German states caused them to vacillate in their political policy between Austria and France to the detriment of the cause of a united Germany. With the growth of Prussia during the second half of the eighteenth century a new important political factor was added, however, and a policy developed of oscillating between Austria and Prussia.

During the Napoleonic era the South German states sided with the French, either willingly or under compulsion. The Bavarian crown derived particular advantages from this as it obtained Tyrol and parts of Salzburg for its support.¹ Not only the crown but also the middle classes and the peasantry profited

¹ For the Bavarian problem see, among others: Michael Doeberl, *Bayern und die wirtschaftliche Einigung Deutschlands* (1916); Doeberl, "Bayern und die deutsche Erhebung unter Napoleon I" (in *Abhandlungen der Historikerklasse der Kgl. Bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, XXIV, Part I [1906], 354-432); Doeberl, *Bayern und Deutschland* (2 vols.; 1925); Julien Rovère, *La Bavière et L'Empire allemand. Histoire d'un particularisme*.

by French rule. In time, however, the requisition of men and goods became too oppressive for these classes while the nobility was increasingly deprived of political power by the agents of France. When therefore the report of Napoleon's defeat in Russia became known, Bavaria became the ally of Prussia and Austria. After several South German rulers had given the upper classes a constitution, in 1815 this part of Germany, especially Baden, became the center of the democratic movement of the middle classes. The question of the unification of Germany put the South German liberals in a quandary. They were opposed to the Prussian Germany not so much because of its Protestantism as because of the inevitable domination of a reactionary Junker caste. On the other hand, Austria, although Catholic, was just as reactionary as Prussia, and under Metternich had become the very leader of European reaction. Furthermore, Austria was too heavily burdened with non-German states to be able to bring about German unity. In certain circles there arose therefore the idea of a Germany consisting of Austria, Prussia, and the united non-Prussian states. The clericals leaned toward Austria while the rulers of the non-Prussian states had little interest in the unification of Germany by either Austria or Prussia.

Although the endeavor to unite Germany in 1848-49 failed, the proclamation of the Prussian constitution resulted in bringing the South German liberals nearer to Prussia, the conservatives and a part of the clerical element nearer to Austria. But the general economic advantages of unification under Prussia's leadership, Austria's obvious inability to create a united Germany, as well as Prussia's political prestige after the war of 1866, compelled all classes, even the ruling princes, to accept Prussia's leadership. These rulers, who were least interested in unification, succeeded in protecting their position and preventing the formation of a centralized national state. The fact that a federal form of government instead of a centralized one was established in 1871 is partly an expression of these regional antagonisms; antagonisms which were artificially furthered by the particularist, dynastic interests of the rulers of the various

states. After the unification of Germany the regional antagonisms between north and south, which might have died out, were reinforced by the rapidly growing industrialization taking place mainly in Northern and Western Germany. The social and economic antagonism of the peasantry as well as of the middle classes of small towns against a large industrial proletariat and a powerful business class manifested itself in this case along geographic lines. Class antagonisms thus reinforced regional antagonisms.

The outbreak of the war found all of Germany united. But as the war dragged on and victory which seemed so near was always out of reach, a dissatisfaction with the "Prussian war" developed among South German peasants and townspeople. Particularism even if expressed unconsciously was not dead. In fact, Kurt Eisner, the leader of the radical Independent Socialists, thought Bavarian particularism of sufficient importance to appeal to it in his fight against the less radical Berlin government. After the overthrow of the Bavarian Soviet Republic in April-May, 1919, the reactionary forces gained control over Bavaria and used it as a basis of attack against the more liberal national government in Berlin and against recurring revolutionary outbreaks of the northern industrial workers. The antagonisms within the Catholic Centre party when it formed the Weimar Coalition with the Social Democrats grew so strong that the Bavarian elements, who represented the nationalistic and conservative peasantry and the middle classes, withdrew and formed an independent Bavarian People's party (Bayrische Volkspartei). The antagonisms of the various local Bavarian parties toward "red Berlin" grew so bitter that the question of breaking away from Germany arose. Dr. Heim, one of the leaders of the Bavarian People's party, proposed separation from North Germany with its radical proletariat and union with the neighboring Catholic Austria. A similar plan proposed the creation of a federation of Danube states. At the same time the hope was tacitly present that thereby the payments of war reparations would be avoided. That such elements were supported here, just as in the Rhineland, by France has become a matter

of general knowledge. Although these plans failed and Bavaria remained part of Germany, the opposition of Bavaria was strong enough to prevent the creation of a centralized national state (Einheitsstaat). It is quite typical that the 1919 convention of the Bavarian People's party unanimously voted against the Einheitsstaat. Only an industrialization of Southern Germany will, however, eliminate a great part of this Bavarian-Prussian antagonism. This becomes clear when we regard the industrial region of Nuremberg-Fürth in Northern Bavaria where the anti-Prussian sentiment is very weak.

The other important antagonism is that between Western and Eastern Germany. Western Germany has always been closer, economically and culturally, to its western and southern neighbors than to Prussia. During the period of the French Revolution this relationship became even more intimate.¹ The bourgeoisie, which had already developed considerably in this region, welcomed the French as friends and liberators when they occupied the Rhineland in 1792. The Code Civil was introduced, chambers of commerce were established, and in 1805 Cologne even obtained a free port. Under French rule the old

¹ Georges Blondel, *La Rhénanie. Son passé, son avenir* (1921); Julius Bachem, *Die Vereinigung der Rheinlande mit Preussen* (1916); F. Brüggemann, *Die Rheinische Republik. Die Gründe für die Entwicklung eines rheinischen Freistaates und die Vorgeschichte der Proklamation vom 1. Juni, 1919* (1919); F. Brüggemann, *Die Rheinische Republik* (ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Kritik der rheinischen Abfallbewegung während des Waffenstillstandes im Jahre 1918-19) (1919); Martin Fassbender, *Westdeutschland los von Preussen!* (1919); Joseph Hansen, *Rheinland und Rheinländer* (1925); Joseph Hansen, *Die Rheinprovinz, 1815-1915* (vols. 1-2; 1917); Joseph Hansen, *Preussen und Rheinland von 1815 bis 1915. Hundert Jahre politischen Lebens am Rhein* (1918); Justus Hashagen, *Das Rheinland und die preussische Herrschaft* (1924); Walter Kamper, *Die Rheinlandkrise des Herbstes 1923* (1925); P. Kirchem, *Landvolk und rheinische Republik* (1919); K. Krämer, *Die rheinische Bewegung, ihre Entstehung und ihre Begründung, ihre Freunde und ihre Gegner* (1919); Maas, *Die rheinische Freistaatsbewegung*; Robert Michels, "Etude sur les relations historiques entre la France et le pays du Rhin" (in *Revue Historique*, CXXXIX, Année 47 [1922], 161-201); Paul Moldenhauer, *Von der Revolution zur Nationalversammlung. Die Frage der rheinisch-westfälischen Republik* (1919); Joseph Hansen (ed.), *Die Rheinprovinz 1815-1915. Hundert Jahre preussischer Herrschaft am Rhein* (1917); Julien Rovère, *La rive gauche du Rhin de 1792 à 1814* (1919); Max Springer, *Loslösungsbestrebungen am Rhein* (auf Grund authentischer Dokumente) (1924); Aloys Schulte (ed.), *Tausend Jahre deutscher Geschichte und deutscher Kultur am Rhein* (1925).

feudal order was destroyed, the land was given to the peasants, the old guild regulations disappeared, and modern industry developed rapidly. Therefore, when Prussia "liberated" the Rhineland the joy thereat was none too great. The Rhinelanders resisted the rule of the Prussians whose reactionary militarist and agrarian policy they despised. This tension in regard to Prussia grew when part of the industries of the Rhine were destroyed by English competition after the lowering of customs duties in 1818. The feeling was first intensified by the circumstances that the government officials in Rhineland-Westphalia were all "Prussians." The Rhinelanders were treated not merely as foreigners but as defeated rebels. An effort was even made to force the reactionary Prussian Civil Code on them in place of the French Code Civile.

In the decades that followed, trade and industry developed rapidly and the bourgeoisie of Rhineland-Westphalia came more and more into conflict with the Prussian agrarians. Their representatives, among them Camphausen and Hannemann, were at the head of the constitutional movement from 1840 to 1847 and were a decisive factor in March, 1848, in Berlin. In 1848, however, they did not let this opposition grow into open armed conflict with the Prussian state, for the hard-headed sober bourgeoisie of Rhineland-Westphalia had in mind the British compromise of 1832 rather than the French Revolution in 1789. Furthermore, not only had they learned from the Chartist movement, but in the Rhineland itself, where Marx and Engels had been active, the first signs of a conflict between bourgeoisie and proletariat had already become apparent.

Until 1870 this cleft between the bourgeoisie and the Prussian Junkers remained. The Rhinelanders were Prussians simply because they had no choice in the matter. They despised the army and the Prussian official with his harsh language, his brusque manner, and his tone of command. Social life was at least outwardly very much more French than Prussian. Even marriages with Prussian officials were rarities. These officials were socially isolated. To all this there must be added the religious conflict between Catholic Rhineland and Protestant Prussia.

But after 1871 the more influential the bourgeoisie became in Germany the closer grew the bond linking the bourgeoisie of the Rhineland to that of the Prussian-German state. Now, after the establishment of the Republic, the bond with the rest of Germany has become even stronger. It should, however, be noted here, that when it appeared in 1918-19 that Bolshevism might win in Berlin, many of the Rhine industrialists were ready to establish a Republic of the Rhine to protect themselves against Berlin as well as against the burden of reparations. While the Centre party of the Rhineland opposed this plan it favored the formation of a West German Free State within the German Federal Union. The Augustiner Verein, the organization of the Centre press, issued the following instructions to its newspaper editors in Cologne on August 6, 1919: "Our goal is the unified German State, composed of federal states equally proportioned, with as equal rights and with an extensive self government as is possible. The establishment of a West German Federal State is to be aimed at."

This movement was strongly supported by the French who succeeded in having a Rhine Republic proclaimed by their agents in 1923. But as the populace showed little sympathy for such endeavors and as it soon became evident that the German Republic was safe for the time being from Communist attack, the separatist movement disappeared. With the growing dominance of German industry in German economic and political life, the antagonism still existing will probably be diminished farther.

The antagonism of the Prussian province, Hanover, toward the Prussian state is only of minor significance now, except among certain sections of the middle classes.¹ The fear of Prussia which was felt in Hanover before its annexation in 1866 turned into hatred which was, however, confined essentially to the upper and middle classes. The former duke felt most bitter against the Prussian crown, as the war of 1866 had resulted in

¹ Sozialdemokratische Partei, Bezirk Hannover (publisher), *Die welfische Partei, was sie ist, und was sie will*; G. F. Konrich, *Die hannoverische Frage in Hannover* (1919); Quart-Faslem, *Hannover einst und jetzt* (1922); Fritz Rickhey, *Die hannoverisch-niedersächsische Freistaatsbewegung* (1926).

all of Hanover being annexed and—what was worse—in the confiscation of large parts of his private estates. A Hanoverian party was formed which sent representatives to the Reichstag and to the Prussian Landtag and which demanded a separate Hanoverian state within Germany. However, this party gradually declined and the Hanoverian question seemed to be solved when in 1913 the Duke of Hanover married the only daughter of Kaiser Wilhelm II. In 1918–19 the Hanoverian party, however, gained a new lease of life. On this occasion the demand for self-government was backed up by some of the conservative elements of the population who were afraid that a radical government would be established in Berlin. With the stabilization of the Republic this party has declined in membership. Although a considerable portion of the population still feels that it is Hanoverian rather than Prussian, this feeling is not intense enough except in a small portion of the upper middle classes to become crystallized in political demands.

At present there is practically no antagonism to be found between Saxony and the rest of Germany.¹ It is mentioned here mainly for historical reasons. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century the antagonism between Saxony and Prussia was inevitable, as they were both struggling for predominance in Northern Germany, a struggle which led Saxony into a close union with Prussia's enemy, Poland. During the period of the French Revolution the country, which was already more developed industrially than Prussia, stood closer to France than to Prussia. Napoleon tried to make use of this conflict by strengthening the union of Saxony and Poland against Prussia. During the Napoleonic era the Saxon industries grew rapidly indeed. The bonds linking Saxony to France were so strong that only during the Battle of Leipzig in 1813 did the Saxon regiments go over to the side of Prussia and Austria. Later, when Saxony had to cede a large part of its territory to Prussia its dislike of Prussia was scarcely weakened. The industrial development of Sax-

¹ Curt A. Nitzsche (ed.), *Jahrbuch Sachsen, 1925–1928. Politik und Wirtschaft, Kunst und Wissenschaft im Freistaat Sachsen*; Bernhard Lange, *Die öffentliche Meinung in Sachsen von 1813 bis zur Rückkehr des Königs, 1815* (1912); Paul Rühlmann, *Die öffentliche Meinung in Sachsen während der Jahre 1806 bis 1812*.

ony, the most densely populated state in Germany, proceeded so rapidly, however, that the Saxon bourgeoisie supported the founding of the German Empire under Prussia's leadership. The more Prussia was industrialized the closer the relationships between Saxony and Prussia became. A further aid toward unification was the fact that the majority of the workers in Saxony have long been Socialists and have thus helped to overcome the existing particularism. The similarity of religion in Saxony and Prussia have also helped to strengthen the cohesive forces. The use of the national troops against Saxony in October, 1923, was, of course, due not to any regional antagonisms but to the fear that a Communist Soviet Republic would be established there.

Brunswick is mentioned here merely because it was in this state, in February and March, 1919, that endeavors were made by the revolutionary government of Brunswick, under the leadership of the Independent Socialist Sepp Oerter, to unite the various revolutionary forces into a "Northwest German Soviet Republic." This was done to establish a counterweight against the Berlin government controlled by the Social Democrats. These endeavors never were carried out, and no feeling of antagonism exists at present.

The three free cities, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, the only survivors of the Hansa period, have been almost completely assimilated with the rest of Germany. Representing, however, essentially commercial interests they have at times in the past had a different "foreign" policy than the agrarian states in Germany. During the first period of the French Revolution the merchant bourgeoisie of the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck were drawn toward France, but after the occupation, when requisitions became oppressive and trade declined in consequence of the blockade, a German "national spirit" began to develop. During the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century there have been no major differences between the Hansa cities and the other parts of Germany. True enough, Hamburg and Bremen remained outside the German Zollverein and did not enter the German customs agreement until the eighties, since they did not wish to surrender their

trading advantages as free ports. They only joined the German customs agreement on conditions that they be permitted to declare part of their harbors free ports. The traditions of the old Hansa cities are still alive today and help to strengthen the pride of the citizens of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck in their cities as well as in their German fatherland.

Within the territory east of the Elbe certain regional differences exist at present, but they are due to the presence of cities and industrial centers, like Königsberg, Breslau, Stettin, Berlin. The antagonisms here are the antagonisms between the industrial and agricultural population. The antagonisms between "red" Berlin and "reactionary" East Elbe, however, are not as tense now as they were before the war. At that time the Conservative party practically controlled Northeastern Germany while within a city like Berlin it only succeeded in getting a negligible vote. Since the war considerable parts of East Prussia and Mecklenburg, together with parts of Silesia, have shown a large Socialist vote while the Nationalist party and "Nazis" control about one quarter of the votes of Berlin. In this way the economic and political antagonisms have lost some of their regional sharpness and have spread throughout the whole territory.

ATTACHMENT TO HOME LOCALITY

(Liebe zur engeren Heimat)

While thus sectional loyalties and sectional antagonisms have definitely affected German national unity and have also given German national feeling a definite coloring in different sections of the country, local allegiances are of a somewhat different character and have played a somewhat different rôle. While sectional allegiances have at times been antagonistic to the national ideal, allegiances to the home locality have been used especially in recent decades to strengthen national pride.¹

¹ Die Heimat, *Zeitschrift des westfälischen Heimatbundes* (Monatsschrift für Landvolk und Kunst in Westfalen und am Niederrhein); Martin Kittelmann, *Schlesische Dorftage* (1925); Märkische Blätter. *Heimatkundliche Beilage der Oder-Zeitung*, October 3, 1926; Robert Michels, "Vaterlandsliebe und Heimatgefühl" (in *Kölner Vierteljahrsschriften für Soziologie*, V-VI [1925-27], 219-31); Hanna Meuter, *Die Heimatlosigkeit. Ihre*

Whether he is born in a farmhouse, a village, cottage or a city tenement, the birthplace and scene of a man's childhood inevitably becomes a kind of focal point around which early memories and reminiscent emotions are centered. For a large part of the population, especially the peasantry, the group of ideas centered around its home and neighborhood still form the largest part of its idea of the fatherland. This affection for one's home, coupled with pride and patriotism for one's locality, is an emotion toward something more concrete and tangible than the thought of a fatherland. With the development of rapid transportation, the cinema, and the radio, etc., distances have shrunk so that in the course of time the "locality" as well as the concept of locality has broadened itself to cover wider and wider areas for those groups profoundly affected by these developments. Nevertheless, among the greater part of the population, local life and experience are probably still important factors in their consciousness. The problem therefore has been how to make use of local interest and local pride to reinforce allegiance to the national state.

While the attachment to the home locality has always been an important loyalty in the past, the movement for consciously studying, developing, and finally transforming these local loyalties so as to reinforce loyalty to the nation and the national state, has been a movement of a relatively modern period. The origin of this relatively modern interest in local life can be found in the growing interest in the life of the common people on the part of the bourgeoisie and even enlightened elements of the aristocracy at the end of the eighteenth century.¹ Opposed to the artificial, shallow, and extravagant life and culture of the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie turned to the virile and inexpensive life and culture of the lower classes, the "people." Their uncouth simple German speech was a welcome relief from the arti-

Einwirkung auf Verhaltung und Gruppenbildung der Menschen (1925); Hildegard Rockstroh, *Die ländliche Wohlfahrts- und Heimatspflege* (in manuscript) (1926); Arthur Wienkoop, *Heimatkultur* (1913).

¹ Adolf Hauffen, "Geschichte der Volkskunde" (in *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde*, Vols. XX-XXI [1910-11]). Two very interesting essays going into considerable detail. The only historical analysis of *Volkskunde*.

ficial French language of the court or the affected florid German language, incrusted with French idioms. Folk tales and ballads were found to have an artistic freshness unknown to the stilted court poetry. In music, the simple folk melodies began to be appreciated in place of the official court music which was overloaded with artificial ornaments. It was found that peasant cottages could be as beautiful in their way as palaces built on neoclassic lines; peasant costumes were found not only more natural but also more beautiful than the monstrous crinoline and wig. Thus the study of local folk ways was not a conservative force but a factor of protest against the artificial culture of the upper classes.

At first this interest in folk life (*Volkskunde*) was not confined to that of any particular country; it was universal in character. Typical of this character is the collection of folk songs which appeared in 1776 as a result of an appeal made by Herder. Over three quarters of the songs collected were those of foreign peoples. But as a result of the wars against Napoleon this interest in folk life was transformed into interest in German folk life. After 1815 even certain national aspects were pushed into the background and the interest in sectional and local forms of folk life and folk culture was emphasized. Thus Jacob Grimm, in a letter of April 23, 1822, to Werner von Hasthausen, in which he discussed the subject of *Volkskunde*, insisted that "the main thing is that everything be carried on within the limits of each province. Under no circumstances extend your activities beyond your section, your district, over the rest of Germany." Although folk poetry was collected by Hoffmann von Fallersleben, Uhland, and others, the interest in *Volkskunde* and especially in the study of local life and customs (later on named *Heimatkunde*), aroused no general interest.

The movement for the unification of Germany, as well as the more intense national spirit that came about after the unification, developed a more intensive and enduring interest in both *Volkskunde* and *Heimatkunde*. This was caused to a certain extent by a desire especially among the middle classes to study with greater intensity the various forms of German culture as

expressions of the inherent richness of German national life. The many local differences which had helped to keep Germany apart for centuries became now fruitful fields of study of the diversified forms of German cultural life. At the same time the interest in local life was fostered as a counteraction against the destructive influences of the rapidly spreading industrial revolution. The rapid drawing in and proletarization of a large number of workers from towns and especially the country districts, together with the parallel spread of Socialist ideas, became a potent factor in the destruction of interest in the old folk life and folk tradition as well as of the existing feeling of attachment to the original home locality. As a result a movement developed which tried to divert the workers in the cities from Socialist international ideas by attempting to create within them an attachment to their new home locality.

In the post-war period this movement has become stronger and more widespread, as will be shown in the following pages. The increased nationalism as well as the increased revolutionary internationalism have both helped to bring about a greater interest in the study of German folk life and local loyalties. In the former case it has become a means for throwing patriotic Germans who feel disillusioned by the outcome of the war back upon their own country to carry on a more intensive study of its many local beauties. This tendency has been strengthened by the period of inflation as well as by the more recent crisis as a result of which considerable portions of the middle class have not been able to travel outside of Germany as was the case before the war, but have been forced to spend their vacation within the borders of Germany. At the same time, development of a local patriotism and interest in German folk life has been fostered among the lower classes even more than before the war, in order to counteract the international ideals of Communism.

Love for home locality is consciously fostered by a number of bodies. The most important agency for fostering love of home locality among the young is the school. This has been true especially since the new school curriculum of the Republic introduced *Heimatkunde* as a special subject in all schools. "Read-

ers" are published for various cities, while in villages and small towns the instructor generally has to furnish the necessary information. *Heimatkunde* also forms an integral part of the compulsory monthly hikes or excursions under the guidance of teachers. These hikes are generally taken to surrounding points of interest or beauty. Trips are also made to the local *Heimatmuseum* wherever one exists.

The founding of museums to preserve things of local interest is a development likewise of the nineteenth century.¹ One finds the idea mentioned for the first time by Goethe when in 1815 after a journey along the Rhine with Freiherr von Stein he wrote three articles on the art treasures of the Rhine, the Neckar, and the Main. In a letter to the leading ministers of a number of states he suggested the founding of a number of provincial museums (*Provinzmuseum*) in order to develop the love for home locality. This suggestion, however, led to no practical measures, and, although Louis I of Bavaria founded the Germanisches Museum in Nuremberg, this was not exclusively a local museum. Only slowly did the idea of establishing museums dealing with local life gain ground.

The growth of the idea of establishing local museums can perhaps best be studied by following it in some special region, such as the province of Brandenburg. In 1831 the first Society for the History of the Mark Brandenburg was formed, but had little importance. In 1862 a second society was founded. In 1864 Theodor Fontane published his *Märkische Wanderungen* in which he described what have been called "the non-existing beauties of the Mark." In 1865 the first local museum in Muschelberg was founded; in 1874 the Märkische Museum in Berlin. In 1897 there were ten local museums in the Mark; in 1926 about fifty.² In Germany not only each province but practically every county (*Kreis*) now has its local museum. Attempts are also being made to institute village museums.

In 1925 Germany possessed about 940 museums which were

¹ Wilhelm Pessler, *Das Heimatmuseum im deutschen Sprachgebiet als Spiegel deutscher Kultur; Pessler, Unsere Heimatmuseen.*

² Märkische Blätter, *Heimatkundliche Beilage der Oder-Zeitung*, October 3, 1926.

either devoted exclusively to local life and customs or which had sections for this purpose, the former type however predominating. To them must be added about 300 German museums outside of Germany which are of a similar character.¹ Within Germany the various museums have been organized since 1918 into a number of associations (*Museumsverbände*). Similar federations exist in Czechoslovakia and Austria.

These museums are of greater importance than one would assume at first glance, for the type of visitor who uses the museum to spend a rainy Sunday afternoon is gradually dying out. Not alone are various methods used to make the exhibits more vital and interesting but regular visits are made by school children who are taken through the museum in connection with their work on "Heimatkunde." The trips to these museums are then used as themes for school compositions. Grown-up visitors are attracted by various means: for instance, the Museum for History of Hamburg has arranged evenings for folk songs, the Dresden Museum for Folk Art (*Volkskunst*) has reproduced folk festivals of the Erzgebirge, the museum in Halle has reproduced folk dances, folk songs, etc. In some museums Christmas celebrations, choral concerts, etc., are given; old musical instruments are temporarily lent to artists. As a result of these attempts to modernize and popularize local museums, the attendance is rapidly increasing. Some of the museums keep track of the number of visitors; for instance, the Municipal Museum of Altona counted 150,000 visitors in 1924. In 1928 when certain special exhibits were shown in the Märkische Museum in Berlin visitors had to be refused admittance because of overcrowding.

Art museums are coming to be recognized more and more as places by which all of men's nobler impulses can be stirred to love of home, people and fatherland. . . . Whatever you have experienced in your local museum of the meaning of your home locality in history and popular tradition (*Volksstums*) in art and culture will forever remain part of you.²

The dedication of a museum is often found a fit occasion to demonstrate love and devotion to the home community. Thus

¹ Wilhelm Pessler, *Das Heimatmuseum im deutschen Sprachgebiet*.

² *Ibid.*, p. 14.

the Municipal Museum at Guben in the province of Brandenburg was dedicated on February 4, 1913, in a way which remains typical even of republican Germany. The schools were closed at eleven o'clock in the morning and a great parade took place in which the leading patriotic organizations of the community were represented. Arriving at the museum the church trombone corps (*Kirchenbläser-Chor*) played the chorale "Praise the Lord the Mighty King"; a number of speeches were made by representatives of the government and of private organizations which more or less centered around the following theme which a certain Professor Jentsch propounded on this occasion:¹

In the last analysis, the root of interest (for *Heimatkunde*) and of activity in collecting objects (for such a museum), is the feeling of patriotism, at first transmitted through the narrow sphere of local interests. Local museums must be considered with these two purposes in view: to awake affection for the home locality and love for the fatherland.

These museums are supported partly by the state governments, partly by local communities, and partly by private societies. They contain all kinds of objects that relate to the community, the county, or the province. The geological structure of the locality is shown, also the flora and fauna together with such prehistoric remains as the locality may boast of. The museums are generally well supplied with pictures showing the history of the community and contain models of old houses as well as full-sized reproductions of typical rooms of different periods. Local costumes play a very important rôle. Economic products of the community or province are generally well displayed. Mementos relating to men of local historical fame are carefully preserved. Old books, old art objects, etc., which are products of the community here find their place. Because of this, contact is maintained with the local historical, geological, botanical, zöological, art, and *Volkskunde und Heimat* societies. The museums also belong to the Society for German Arts and Crafts which was formed in 1923. This organization attempts to preserve and develop the technique of local as well as rural handicrafts and demands the aid of the state in furthering the marketing of the products.

¹ *Gubener Tageblatt*, February 5, 1913.

Another force which tends to develop a love of native locality and ties it up with national and civic pride is the movement for *Heimatschutz*.¹ This movement which advocates the protection of landscape and local fauna dates back many centuries but has become of national importance only in comparatively recent times. This protection is exercised for several reasons. From an economic point of view the aim has been to maintain the forests in order to make Germany as independent as possible in her wood supply, and also to regulate her water supply. The protection of game and fish has been carried on partly for economic reasons and partly to assure the aristocracy its feudal sport of hunting. From a scientific point of view the purpose has been to preserve rare plants and animals as well as formations of geological interest. From an esthetic point of view the aim has been to prevent a further destruction of the landscape through modern industrial plants and billboard advertising. It is important to remember that love of nature is essentially an urban development; that it is in large measure a result of the industrial revolution and a reaction, for the most part unconscious, against enforced living in closely crowded cities away from field and forest. This esthetic element is made use of for national purposes by continually emphasizing the beauty of the German landscape, of German forests, without mentioning that other countries likewise have scenery of equal and even greater beauty. It is further used to strengthen the love of the home locality by emphasizing every possible bit of natural beauty of the locality even when little exists. In industrial centers, where even the most enthusiastic optimists cannot discover any scenic beauty, attempts are made to make the surroundings more agreeable and so develop a love of locality.

The expression *Heimatschutz* appeared for the first time in

¹ Alfred Biese, *Das Naturgefühl im Wandel der Zeiten* (1926); Wilhelm Bölsche, *Die deutsche Landschaft in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, ed. by Franz Goerke; H. Cowents, *Über nationalen und internationalen Naturschutz* (Rede bei der Internationalen Naturschutzkonferenz in Berlin am 18. November, 1913), (1914); O. Doering, *Heimatschutz* (1908); Erich Ewald, *Das Gesicht der deutschen Heimat* (1928); (Monatsschrift des Vereins für Pflege der Natur- und Landeskunde in Schleswig-Holstein); *Heimatschutz* (Mitteilungsblatt des Deutschen Bundes Heimatschutz); Gertrud Stockmayer, *Über Naturgefühl in Deutschland im X. und XI. Jahrhundert* (1910).

1897 in an article in the magazine *Grenzboten* written by the musician Ernst Rudorff who for both patriotic and esthetic reasons occupied himself very much with the protection of nature. In 1904 the first important book on the preservation of natural monuments (*Naturdenkmäler*) was published by Conventz. In the same year the Saxon League for the Protection of Nature (Sächsicher Bund Heimatschutz) was organized in Dresden. In the other states similar organizations were formed which are now united in a national federation claiming over 100,000 members. This federation has as its purpose:¹

To preserve the outstanding natural and historical features of the German fatherland and to integrate the entire movement for the preservation of German natural scenery. It lays special emphasis on the following aims:

1. The protection of nature, especially of domestic fauna and flora and of geological peculiarities and outstanding scenic features;
2. The protection and care of objects handed down from earlier times, of buildings and movable objects, as well as of street and place names; the care of monuments; the fostering and furthering of traditional styles of architecture in town and country, the furthering of folk art (Volkskunst), of customs, festivals and costumes.

Municipalities have aided in the protection of the landscape. Thus Putzig County agreed to purchase and explore a valuable diluvial sandstone grotto. The county of Kathaus bought a characteristic moraine. The city of Frankfurt on the Oder spent two thousand marks for the protection of birds. Hanover, Bremen, and Hamburg helped to open up a large natural park on the Lüneburg Heath. When in the "Siebengebirge" the quarries threatened to destroy the beauty of the landscape, various cities raised sums to purchase the most beautiful parts; Bonn raised 50,000 marks, Cologne, 100,000 marks, the Rhine provinces, 200,000, etc. In honor of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the accession of the King of Saxony to the throne, the city of Dresden acquired the Dresdener Heath, nearly 250 acres in size, and agreed to keep it as a city woodland. In honor of the silver wedding of the Emperor and his consort, the city of Cottbus bought a forest of seventy-one hectares and christened it "Kaiser-Wilhelm-Augusta-Viktoria-Grove." The National Bureau

¹ From a leaflet distributed by the Deutscher Bund Heimatschutz.

for the Preservation of Monuments (Zentralstelle für Heimatpflege) in Berlin has recently suggested that at patriotic celebrations natural features of scenic interest, called in German *Naturdenkmäler*, be donated. This suggestion has been favorably received and many communities are now trying to establish or maintain such memorials in honor of those who fell in the late war.

In 1906, moreover, a State Office for the Preservation of Works of Nature in Prussia was founded with provincial and district affiliations. Several other states have similar organizations. These places are engaged in making an inventory of all important *Naturdenkmäler* in order to protect them from destruction. They try to influence public opinion by appeals to school children through their teachers and in school excursions: work in conjunction with local and hiking societies; consultation with the clergy, ministries of education, boards of water supply, state geologists and topographers, bureaus of forestry; police authorities and the rural constabulary. Articles about the preservation of natural monuments appear in the art calendars and art magazines; picture post cards are printed; pamphlets distributed to school children and hiking clubs; exhibits in local museums are staged, talks are broadcast on the radio, local "nature preservation" days are instituted, and national conventions are held.

The intensity of the attachment to the home region naturally differs among the various classes of the population, and so it is necessary to make an analysis of the different classes from this point of view. With the peasant, love for his locality is caused mainly by his economic attachment to his land. In the past he has known few places outside his home locality and he feels most "at home" where he makes his living and pays his debts, namely, on his own bit of land. His training and his relatively limited experiences emphasize this further. His attachment to his home locality has a very concrete basis while his attachment to the nation is relatively of a more vague and abstract character. Nevertheless, modern industrial development tends to widen the peasant's horizon, as he makes railroad trips to mar-

ket, follows the rise and fall of prices, finds himself exposed to world competition, listens to tariff propaganda, acquires a radio, goes to the "movies," etc. The younger sons of the peasants who can find no place for themselves in agriculture, often go off to industrial towns to make a living, where their attachment to the old home region becomes greatly weakened.

The situation is somewhat similar for the tradesman and artisan in town and city. Bound to his shop or business, dependent for his economic subsistence upon his more immediate surroundings, his mode of life has furnished and still furnishes a good basis for local patriotism. To be sure, in modern industrial towns, his concept of the place in which he lives is a larger one than that of the peasant. Nevertheless, his dependence on the economic life of the locality is strong enough to create an intense attachment to it and makes him the central figure in the towns for developing a "community spirit" and "civic pride." As his economic independence becomes more and more undermined and his independent position between bourgeoisie and proletariat begins to disintegrate, he either becomes part of the proletariat or, retaining his position as a member of the middle class, he rallies to the defense of his local and traditional system of production and thus often falls back into the traditional "church steeple" attitude toward life. It is, however, among the intellectual strata of the middle classes, which have command of scientific and cultural knowledge, that the systematic interest in *Heimatkunde* is developed most. By means of furthering *Heimatkunde* they hope to reinforce and strengthen national patriotism and, in particular, their own position. Then again the World War and the subsequent inflation period prevented them from continuing their former frequent visits to and contacts with foreign countries. This forced them to center their intellectual energies upon things at home, thus giving *Heimatkunde* a certain new impetus.

The landed proprietor is bound to his locality by economic ties. Added to this are the family traditions which he is forced to uphold. Nevertheless, the actual administration of the estate

is often in the hands of a steward, and the owner himself is often more familiar with the metropolis than with his own fields. On the other hand, it is to his interest to strengthen the local loyalty of the workers on his estate in order to attach them to their place of work. Last of all, the large business man is least likely to be influenced by an attachment to home locality. While his business may be centered in a particular community or district the dependence of his business upon the fluctuations of the national and international market necessarily gives him an economic outlook far beyond that of his local community. Furthermore, his life is not rooted to one particular spot. Traveling for business purposes or for pleasure he often feels quite "at home" in a number of places.

But the attitude of the industrial workers is even more difficult. Not only do they often lack any fixed economic center, but it is difficult for them to develop any love for the place they live in.¹

A large part of their life is spent in factories or in the huge row of tenement houses where they may live in the third or fourth court from the street, their windows grouped about an airshaft from whose cement pavement only a little square of sky is visible. . . . Is it possible to develop a love for one's home locality in a place where all the friendly features of the surroundings in which the child must live are blotted in darkness?

Another leader of the movement for *Heimatkunde* writes on the same problem as follows:²

Born in the cave-like dwellings of these industrial barracks, grown up on the sidewalks of the city, among bare walls and in the shadow of belching chimneys, without any contact with the soil or the folkways that it nourishes, wrestling monotonously for his daily bread among the noisy wheels of factory or in the mine, the worker has never learned to know the magic of the German countryside, the natural and historic beauties of our fatherland. Barred from the enjoyment of German natural and cultural possessions, he has become a stranger in his own land.

This being the case the attempt to develop a love of home locality is centered mainly upon the urban working class.

¹ W. Schoenichen, *Natur und Heimat als Erziehungsmächte für die Industriejugend*.

² Karl Wagenfeld, "Heimatschutz-Volkssache" (in *Heimatschutz*) (Mitteilungsblatt des Deutschen Bundes Heimatschutz, Vol. I, No. 2 [1925-26]).

What shall I say of the importance of local culture and love of home in these times, when a false concept of humanity would uproot us, or the desperate economic situation drive many of us or our children abroad and overseas! How much do we need now the love for the soil of our native home, the belief in its future, and the unshaken hope, that our sons shall not be lost to us, spiritually, but shall return some day to the soil to which their inner life remains forever rooted.

But it is not merely the economic misery and the unfriendly surroundings which are antagonistic to the development of local patriotism among the industrial workers. Due to the fact that large sections are under the influence of revolutionary ideas, their interests are centered upon economic and social struggles at home and abroad rather than upon the development of local pride.

CHAPTER XIV

THE GERMAN AND THE NON-GERMAN

The conflict between the German and the non-German has interesting and important aspects in developing German nationalism and giving it a definite coloring. In Germany this factor has probably affected the national spirit more profoundly and in more diverse forms than is true of the other major countries of Europe. This is due not only to the fact that the national state has come into existence only recently in the history of the German people, but that the national political boundaries have never coincided with the national language and cultural boundaries—a situation which has been aggravated during the post-war period. The problem falls naturally into three phases: the national minorities in Germany, the existence of Germans outside the German frontier, and the interference of foreign nations in German affairs.¹

NATIONAL MINORITIES

Of the minorities existing in Germany only the Poles, Danes, and Lithuanians are minorities in the ordinary sense of the word, for they are linguistically and culturally parts of adjacent national states. The other two minorities, the Frisians and the Sorbs of Lausitz (popularly but incorrectly known as the Wends), are not national minorities in the ordinary sense of the word but are merely surviving elements of two peoples once independent—the Frisians being Teutons, the Wends being Slavs. These various minorities with the exception of the Jews are now organized in the League of National Minorities in Germany

¹ For general works on racial and national questions see: Adolf Bartels, *Rasse und Volkstum* (Gesammelte Aufsätze zur nationalen Weltanschauung) (1920); Hans Günther, *Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes* (1925); Otto Hauser, *Rasse und Politik* (1922); John Oakesmith, *Race and Nationality. An Inquiry into the Origin and Growth of Patriotism* (1919); Franco Savorgnan, "Verschmelzung und gegenseitige Penetration der Rassen und Nationalitäten. Statistische Untersuchungen" (in *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, XXXV [1912], 616-64); Albrecht Wirth, *Rasse und Volk* (1914).

(Verband der Nationalen Minderheiten Deutschlands) which issues the periodical *Kulturwelle*. Each minority has its own economic, political, and cultural organizations to represent its own interest.

The largest minority of all is still the Polish.¹ Although as a result of the war Germany lost all the territory in which the Poles were the majority nationality, there are still about two million Poles living in Germany. In Rhineland-Westphalia and in Berlin a national organization called the "Federation of Poles" exists. Since 1918 the largest portion of the Polish minority consists of industrial workers in Rhineland-Westphalia, Upper Silesia, and Berlin. In those regions where the Poles have lived for centuries—Silesia and East Prussia—they are mainly peasants with average-sized farms. The Masurian Poles, generally called Masurs, who live in the southern portion of West Prussia, have given up or lost their contact with the Polish cultural heritage.

The existence of millions of Poles in Prussia only became a matter that stirred up national antipathies when an attempt was made to Germanize them during the nineteenth century. In turn the Poles, after 1860, began to organize themselves defensively along economic and cultural lines.² The advance of the Poles in Eastern Germany caused alarm among the nationalist elements and strengthened the nationalism of the newly formed Empire. This then led to the measures of Bismarck against the Poles. These repressive policies forced them into closer unity, and this in turn reacted upon the German population, strengthening the national consciousness of the middle classes and the intellectuals, who regarded themselves as the bearers of the supe-

¹ For general works on the Poles in Germany see, among others, Johannes Altkemper, *Deutschum und Polentum* (1910); Ludwig Bernhard, *Die Polenfrage* (1910); *Denkschrift über den dritten Polenaufstand Mai-Juni 1921 im Kreise Hindenburg* (Herausgegeben von den deutschen Parteien und Gewerkschaften des Kreises Hindenburg) (1921); Heinrich Geffcken, *Preussen, Deutschland und die Polen seit dem Untergang des Polnischen Reiches* (ein geschichtlicher Rückblick von dem Standpunkte moderner Staatsethik) (1906); Helmut von Gerlach, *Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Polenpolitik* (1919); Waldemar Mitscherlich, *Die Ausbreitung der Polen in Preussen* (1913).

² For the economic reason of this change see W. Mitscherlich, *Der Einfluss der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung auf den ostmärkischen Nationalitätenkampf* (1910).

rior German culture. The landed aristocracy showed no special hatred for the Poles, merely despising them as workers and as members of an "inferior" culture, for they found them very useful as cheap laborers on their estates. The policy of the government aroused opposition among the Catholics as well as among the Social Democrats; among the former because the Poles were Catholics and supported the Catholic Centre party, among the latter because a part of the Poles in the industrial regions voted Social Democratic and also because the Social Democrats as a principle opposed the cultural oppression of minorities. So it may be safely said that the policy of the Prussian state toward the Polish national minorities both weakened as well as strengthened the national unity of the German state.

During the war the Polish German antagonism subsided, especially after the conquest of Poland, when it seemed probable that a separate Polish state under German control would be established after the hoped-for victory. After the close of the war the loss of large territories to an antagonistic Poland caused a tremendous hatred for everything Polish, a hatred which even exceeded that against France, and which at times led to an open border warfare. This hatred was used and fomented by the reactionary forces as a weapon against the revolutionary forces as well as against those forces supporting the newly erected Republic.

A special problem is presented by the existence of Jews in Germany.¹ Although they number only about one million they

¹ There exists a large amount of literature on the problem of the Jews and anti-Semitism. The following volumes have been found useful: Otto Arnim, *Die Juden im Heer* (eine statistische Untersuchung aus amtlichen Quellen) (1919); F. Bernstein, *Der Antisemitismus* (1926); Friedrich Bloch, *Die Juden in Deutschland, von einem jüdischen Deutschen* (1911); Lujo Brentano, *Der Judenhass* (1924); Constantin Brunner, *Der Judenhass und die Juden* (1919); Constantin Brunner, *Deutschenhass, Judenhass und Judenhass der Deutschen* (1919); Heinrich Coudenhove-Kalerji, *Das Wesen des Antisemitismus* (1923); Neue Jüdische Monatshefte (publisher), *Das deutsche Judentum. Seine Parteien und Organisationen* (1919); Anton Fendrich, *Der Judenhass und der Sozialismus* (1920); Ismar Freund, *Der Judenhass* (ein Beitrag zu seiner Geschichte und Psychologie) (1922); Theodor Fritsch, *Antisemiten-Katechismus* (eine Zusammenstellung des wichtigsten Materials zur Verständigung der Judenfrage) (1892); Theodor Fritsch, *Handbuch der Judenfrage* (1923); Felix Goldman, *Das Wesen des Antisemitismus* (1924); Herzog, Mosse, and Rathenau, *Protest der deutschen Juden gegen den Kommun*

exercise an influence upon the character of the national sentiment which is much greater than is warranted by their number. They speak no language but German, although a small number studies Hebrew mainly for religious purposes. What distinguishes them from the non-Semitic Germans are religious, racial, and cultural differences, but especially those of group tradition. Historical causes have brought it about that the great majority are members of the middle classes. A smaller portion are members of the commercial and bank bourgeoisie. There are, however, very few workingmen and practically no peasants who are Jewish. Politically they tend to support mainly the left wing of the bourgeoisie, especially the Democrats (now the Staatspartei) and the Social Democrats.

In their attitude toward the German state and German culture they can be divided roughly into three groups. The Zionists regard themselves as a real national minority and look to Palestine as their fatherland. Numerically they are insignificant in Germany. At the other extreme there exists another small group under the leadership of the Society of National German Jews (Verband Nationaldeutscher Juden) which continually emphasizes its German national spirit. Thus this group is opposed to the immigration of the Jews of Eastern Europe into Germany for, like the German Nationalists, it sees therein a danger for German culture. The great majority of the German Jews take their stand somewhere between these two extremes. They regard themselves as German citizens but try to maintain, to a certain extent, the Jewish tradition. One of their leading organizations is the Central Society for German Citizens of Jewish Faith (Zentralverein Deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glau-

nismus; Otto Jöhlinger, *Bismarck und die Juden* (unter Benutzung unveröffentlicher Quellen) (1921); Georg Liebe, *Das Judentum in der deutschen Vergangenheit* (1908); Max Naumann, *Vom nationaldeutschen Juden* (1910); Rieger, *Ein Vierteljahrhundert im Kampfe um das Recht und die Zukunft der deutschen Juden* (1918); Jacob Segall, *Die deutschen Juden als Soldaten im Kriege, 1914-1918* (eine statistische Studie) (1922); Werner Sombart, *Die Zukunft der deutschen Juden* (1912); Werner Sombart, *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* (1911); Adolf Sommerfeld, *Der Antisemitismus, eine Rassentheorie* (1920); Alfred Wiener, *Das deutsche Judentum in politischer, wirtschaftlicher und kultureller Beziehung* (1924).

bens). A fourth group of uncertain size might be mentioned which consist of those Jews who seek complete assimilation and who attempt to hide or deny their Jewish ancestry.

A historical survey of the position of the Jews in German society shows that their civil emancipation from the oppression of the old régime is closely tied up with the emancipation of the Third Estate in general and the influence of the French Revolution in particular. But when bourgeois liberalism gave up certain of its political ideas by accepting those of semi-feudal absolutism it also took over a certain amount of the feudal-agrarian, anti-Semitic psychology. During the period of the Empire anti-Semitism pervaded the entire governmental system, especially the army, where it was practically impossible for a Jew to become an officer. In the cultural field anti-Semitism likewise grew up which gradually replaced the anti-French aspect of the German cultural nationalism of the earlier part of the century. Of importance in this movement were Richard Wagner and Langbehn, and the works of Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and Adolf Bartels.

In the political field the anti-Semitism of the Empire became a means for attacking what remained of the liberal ideals of 1848. Advocating Jewish emancipation, and securing Jewish support, these ideals of liberty and democracy were attacked as Jewish, unpatriotic, and foreign to the ideals of the German Empire. But it became more than that. With the growing class antagonism indicated by the rapid rise of the Social Democracy, anti-Semitism began to be used as a lightning rod in order to divert the hatred against the upper classes into a hatred against the Jews. As a natural reaction some of the younger Jewish intelligentsia went over to the Social Democracy.

With the seeming disappearance of class conflicts during the World War anti-Semitism likewise seemed to sink below the surface. The Revolution and the post-war period, however, brought it back in greatly exaggerated form. In order to cover up the defeat of Germany while under the leadership of the old régime, the parties of the right used all possible kinds of accusation against the revolutionary elements in order to discredit

them in the eyes of the nation. The fact that some of the prominent leaders of the revolutionary movement in Germany as well as in Russia were Jewish gave the right a chance to attack the whole revolutionary movement as a tremendous conspiracy of the Jews to mislead the German people and to subjugate them to "international Jewish Marxism."

Anti-Semitism has always been most widely spread among the middle classes of town and country. Moreover, in the chronic post-war crisis it is they who have suffered most from the economic and social disintegration. Disillusioned with the Republic but refusing to follow proletarian leadership, they have been easily turned against the Jewish elements both in the government and in business which have been represented as having had a large share in bringing about their condition.

Anti-Semitism has been able to make inroads even among the German working class. Since a Jewish proletariat is practically nonexistent in Germany, those workers under the influence of the parties of the right have been led to believe that their suffering is due largely to Jewish capitalists.

GERMAN MINORITIES ABROAD

Although the presence of national minorities in Germany since the war (with the exception of the Jews) is exerting very little influence on the nationalism of the Germans, the existence of German-speaking peoples beyond the frontier has become of increasing importance in strengthening patriotism within Germany.¹ As a natural result of its history, the German-speaking population of Europe is not located in one compact geographical

¹ An enormous amount of literature has been produced, especially since the war, on the subject of border and foreign Germans. The following bibliographies have been found useful: Jacob Robinson, *Das Minderheitenproblem und seine Literatur* (kritische Einführung in die Quellen und die Literatur der europäischen Nationalitätenfrage der Nachkriegszeit, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des völkerrechtlichen Minderheitsschutzes) (1926); Gottfried Fittbogen, *Wie lerne ich die Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschen kennen?* (Einführung in die Literatur über die Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschen) (1927); *Das Deutschtum im Ausland* (eine systematische Zusammenstellung der im Gesamtkatalog der preussischen wissenschaftlichen Bibliotheken verzeichneten Schriften, 1900-1923) (1925), 168 pp.; "Führer durch die deutsche Auswanderungsliteratur," supplement to Nos. 5 and 6 of *Wissenschaft, Kunst, Volkstum*.

group. The German-speaking population of the world has been estimated at ninety-four million; thirty-one million live beyond the boundaries of the Reich.¹

The German-speaking people outside of Germany fall into two main groups.² First of all there are those Germans who live in countries adjoining Germany, such as Austria, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Luxembourg, France, Poland, Lithuania, etc., a total of almost fifteen millions. These are a potential factor in developing an irredentist spirit in Germany. Secondly, there are those who live in countries not adjoining German territory. These may be subdivided into three types as follows: There are those living in relatively closed German communities in such countries as Russia, Hungary, Rumania,

¹ Wilhelm Winkler, *Statistisches Handbuch* (1925), pp. 18-23. In considering the figures it must be remembered that Professor Winkler is an outstanding exponent of the movement for strengthening the relationship of the "foreign" and the "native" Germans and therefore tends to keep his figures high. He, however, gives besides his own figures, which are based to a large extent upon census returns, detailed estimates of other investigations.

² The following works are representative of what has been published on the subject: M. H. Boehm, *Europa Irredenta* (1923); M. H. Boehm, *Die deutschen Grenzlande* (1925); G. Boelitz, *Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschthum* (1926); Friedrich Wilhelm Mohr und Walter von Hauff (eds.), *Deutsche im Ausland* (1923); Gottfried Fittbogen, *Was jeder Deutsche vom Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschthum wissen muss* (1924); Hans Fehlinger, *Deutsche in der Fremde* (eine Äbersicht nach Abschluss des Weltkrieges) (1920); Georg von Hassel, *Die Auslandsdeutschen. Ihr Schaffen und ihre Verbreitung über die Erde* (historisch-wirtschaftliche Studie von den Kreuzzügen bis zur Gegenwart); Hans Nawiasky, *Gesamtüberblick über das Deutschthum ausserhalb der Reichsgrenzen* (1926); Paul Rohrbach, *Deutschthum in Not! Die Schicksale der Deutschen in Europa ausserhalb des Reichs* (1926); Walter Schultze, *Deutsche Brüder in Grenzmark und Ausland* (1923); Hermann Weck, *Das Deutschthum im Ausland* (1918); Fritz Wertheimer, *Deutschland, die Minderheiten und der Völkerbund* (1926). The most important magazines on this subject are mentioned in the text of the chapter in connection with the organizations that publish them. The following works deal with special phases of the problem: Andrejewske, *Das Deutschthum in Westpolen* (1919); Bund der Auslandsdeutschen (publishers), *Auslandsdeutschthum und Heimat* (eine Zusammenstellung) (1927); Erich Giersch, *Katechismus für die Sudetendeutschen* (1920); W. Hauff, *Das deutschthum in Belgien* (1915); *Jahrbuch des baltischen Deutschthums in Lettland und Estland* (1929); Hans Martin Johannsen, *Grenzland Schleswig* (Aufsätze zur deutsch-dänischen Frage) (1925); Liber, *Das Deutschthum in Westpolen (Preussisch-Polen): seine Zahl, seine Gliederung, sein Stärkeverhältnis gegenüber Polen* (ein statistischer Beitrag zum deutsch-politischem Problem) (1919); Karl Stephan, *Der Todeskampf in der Ostmark* (1914); Zygmunt Stolinski, *Die deutsche Minderheit in Polen* (1928).

Yugoslavia, etc., who have maintained their national language and character. This ability to maintain their German cultural life has been due mainly to the fact that in past centuries they held an economic and civic position which was higher than that of surrounding nationalities. Then there are those living in foreign countries where the general economic standard is higher than that of the German immigrants and where a loss of German characteristics and a merging into the language and culture of the country is a prerequisite for economic, social, and political advancement. Most typical are the Germans in the United States. In such cases the relationship with the mother country must necessarily be weakened as time goes on, and the maintenance of the native tongue is dependent upon the constant stimulus of new immigrants. The German immigrants in Brazil are a type intermediate between the last two types. And finally, there are those Germans who are sent abroad by the government or private concerns who not alone remain German citizens but expect eventually to return to Germany.

The problem of retaining the German language and culture of the "foreign" Germans centers primarily around those who live just outside the German frontier and secondarily around those living in regions geographically not connected with the fatherland. The former are members of a possible Gross-Deutschland. The latter are a means of strengthening German influence in foreign countries. Both now play an important rôle in strengthening the feeling of national pride within Germany. The importance of "foreign" Germans in border regions adjoining Germany, especially those of Poland and Czechoslovakia, lies in the fact that they create among the Germans at home a resentment in varying degrees to the treatment of these minorities; and the minorities tend to turn to the German state as their protector.

During the early part of the nineteenth century when the outstanding economic and political problem of Germany was that of unification, the German-speaking peoples living outside of

Germany elicited no special interest within the confines of the country.¹

After the victory of Prussia in 1870-71 and the consequent formation of the German Empire, the questions of the Germans left outside of the Empire was still ignored, for the new Empire was too much occupied with the problems of political and economic consolidation. With the expansion of German industries abroad and with the acquisition of German colonies, the interest in the "foreign" German began to awake, but it was the World War which provided the great stimulus. Isolated Germany was supported quite spontaneously by the German-speaking population of the entire world, no matter whether they were German citizens or not. The ties between all German-speaking peoples have been greatly strengthened by the outcome of the war, with its resultant territorial and financial losses to the Empire.

At present there are a host of organizations in Germany which take an interest in maintaining relationships with the "foreign" Germans.² Since the close of the war practically all of them have become federated under the name of German Defense Society (Deutscher Schutzbund). This was founded in 1919 to centralize all propaganda for the coming plebiscites as well as to guard the interests of all border and foreign Germans.

The Schutzbund has over a hundred organizations affiliated with it which hold a convention every year at Whitsuntide, usually in a border district. Contact with the German press as well as with the foreign press is maintained, and an extensive publishing program is carried out. The various organizations affiliated with the Schutzbund include national organizations of the most diverse kinds, and local organizations of border or foreign Germans. Some of the latter already existed before the war and became the kernel of the Schutzbund when it was first organized. They now number sixty and are very active.

¹ See A. Pokrandt, "Aus den Anfängen der Erforschung des Deutschtums im Auslande" (in *Der Auslandsdeutsche* [Stuttgart, 1927], No. 13).

² The material on the various organizations has been obtained mainly from the archives of some of the large organizations as well as from interviews with their officials.

“The Association for Germanism Abroad” (Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland), known generally as the V.D.A., is the largest and most important of the national organizations which endeavor to maintain cultural ties between the Germans abroad and the Germans in the fatherland.

The work of the association is of a twofold nature. It seeks, first, to stimulate among Germans abroad an awareness of their cultural heritage, in order to link them by strong cultural and sentimental bonds to the German national state and its ruling elements. In accordance with the original aim of the association, the support of German schools abroad, especially in the ceded districts, is still its major field of work.¹ The second great task of the association is to stimulate among Germans at home an awareness of the Germans abroad. Its 28 state organizations and 4,500 groups comprising over 2,500,000 members do most of the propaganda work by arranging lectures of all sorts with the aid of the traveling speakers of the association. A special traveling exhibit of pictures, maps, and books serves to furnish a living picture of the distribution and characteristics of the various districts abroad. The press section of the association constantly furnishes news of the foreign Germans to the newspapers of Germany and those published in German abroad. The association also publishes a number of periodicals.

Another organization belonging to the Deutsche Schutzbund which represents the economic interrelation of all German-speaking peoples is the “League of Germans Abroad” (Bund der Auslandsdeutschen); it claims 150 local branches with 120,000 members both at home and abroad. The purpose of the Bund is to obtain the return of, or compensation for, the property of German citizens confiscated by the Allied Governments during the war. Since the value of the confiscated properties was about ten billion marks, the League has had a great economic incentive behind it and has been partly successful in carrying through its aims.

A number of institutes have been established for the purpose

¹ See the interesting compilation and analysis in Paul Rühlmann, *Schulrecht der deutschen Minderheiten in Europa* (1926), 698 pp.

of studying the foreign German as well as to act as centralizing agencies for the activities of various organizations that are dealing with the problem. The most important of these is the "Deutsches Auslandsinstitut" at Stuttgart.

Both Protestant and Catholic churches are likewise factors of importance in maintaining through their various organizations the religious and cultural unity of all German-speaking people.¹ Of importance also is the "Association for German Colonization and Emigration" (Vereinigung für Deutsche Siedlung und Wanderung). The sport and athletic movement is also being used more and more to bind together the various parts of the German-speaking peoples of the world. Not to be forgotten are the German singing societies which are to be found among every German group abroad. The great national song festival which is held every three years is attended by considerable numbers of Germans from abroad.

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

Interference in German internal affairs by foreign nations has been a factor which has more definitely affected the unification of Germany, as well as the development of a national consciousness, than has been the case with most of the major nations of Europe. This is due to Germany's geographical position in the center of Europe and to her lack of natural frontiers, together with the retarded economic development from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of the nineteenth century and the resultant lack of a powerful national government throughout the greater part of her history.

While for many centuries the diplomatic and military interference by the stronger and more unified neighboring nations into the political and economic life of the Holy Roman Empire and the hundreds of German states succeeded in hindering the

¹ Aufhäuser, "Katholikentage und Auslandsdeutschum" (in *Der Auslandsdeutsche* [1925], No. 16); "Das katholische Auslandsdeutschum" (in *Spezielle Revue* [1923], pp. 68-71); *Jahrbuch des Reichsverbands für die katholischen Auslandsdeutschen*; Georg Schreiber, *Auslandsdeutschum und Katholizismus* (1928); Theodor Grentrup, *Nationale Minderheiten und katholische Kirche* (1927); Franz Rendtorff, "Das Auslandsdeutschum" (in *Die Evangelische Diaspora*, Beihefte No. 9).

political and economic unification of Germany, it is doubtful whether this interference helped to rouse a feeling of national consciousness among the politically articulate forces of society. During the first part of the fifteenth century there are indications of a national resentment in the towns against the humiliations which Germany was suffering at the hands of foreign non-German states. This was reinforced at that time by considerable dissatisfaction with the papacy which culminated in the national tirades of Luther and his followers against the former.

It was the control of Germany by foreign nations and especially France which aided in the development of a national consciousness within the German bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century. The outbreak of the French Revolution strengthened not only the bourgeoisie of France but also that of Germany and as a consequence the national consciousness of both. But as the continuous wars of Napoleon and the increasingly heavy inquisitions for men and supplies began to press heavily upon both the bourgeoisie and the peasantry of Germany, the ardor and sympathy for France waned and it was possible for the German rulers and the nobility who themselves possessed little national sentiment to appeal successfully to the growing national sentiment of the bourgeoisie and peasantry in their struggles against the French. In addition to this anti-French sentiment, there developed later on among a part of the bourgeoisie and the middle classes a hatred against Austria, which, as the leader of reaction in Germany, attempted to suppress the liberal ideas of the bourgeoisie and the middle classes and prevent the formation of a united German nation.

Up to the middle of the nineteenth century the movement of the bourgeoisie and middle classes for democracy and national unity sympathized strongly with similar movements in other countries such as France, Austria, Italy, Poland, etc. The outbreak of the revolution in 1848 in France was the signal for the outbreak of the revolution in Germany. Likewise the decline of the revolution in France confirmed the definite overthrow of the revolutionary forces in Germany.

As the German bourgeoisie grew in size and power and still

saw no chance of creating a united Germany, as it had unsuccessfully tried to do in 1848, it was relatively easy for Bismarck to combine the desires for unity with the existing anti-French sentiment which had developed as a result of the various diplomatic intrigues of Napoleon III in Germany to gain the support of the bourgeoisie for the war against France. The military result of this war, together with the unification of Germany, produced not only a great outburst of national spirit but also created a national psychology which was closely interwoven with the definitely anti-French feeling. The character of this sentiment, however, had changed from one of hatred and envy of the French into one of superiority and contempt toward them.

From 1871 to 1914 actual diplomatic and military interference in the political life of Germany naturally ceased. But the relationship of Germany to the various foreign powers had an influence upon the texture of the national consciousness of the various classes. The anti-French psychology continued throughout the period, becoming, however, especially strong at the time of the Morocco crises. The strongest in the hatred and contempt of France were, as usual, the middle classes of the cities, the petty bourgeoisie, while the bourgeoisie and certain non-Socialist layers of the working class came a close second. Among the politically less articulate peasant population this antipathy was naturally weaker. The feeling against France was less marked in the southern and western part of Germany which, like France, was Catholic and "liberal." Furthermore, the contacts of France with these sections during the past had been greater than with Eastern Germany, and many French reforms of the time of Napoleon, among other things the Code Civile, were still in force. The absence of an anti-French complex in Alsace-Lorraine was a well-known fact.

A foreign nation which began to have increasing importance in strengthening national patriotism, especially after 1890, was Russia. The reactions of Germans toward Russia was less a feeling of hatred than a vague fear of a tremendous semi-barbarous empire. This was true of all classes of society with the exception of certain circles of the aristocracy, who saw in the

existence of Russia a guaranty for the maintaining of the semi-absolute régime of Germany. This subconscious fear of Russia pervaded almost all layers of the working class and, to judge from statements of various leading Social Democrats, was an important factor in leading them to vote the war credits in 1914, as they hoped thereby to protect the higher civilization of Germany from the Russian steam-roller.

With the exception of naval circles and certain business interests of Germany, as well as a small layer of the middle classes, the foreign policy of England toward Germany produced, on the whole, no national antipathies among the greater part of the nation. Still the general sympathy in Germany for the Boers in their struggle against England must not be forgotten.

The outbreak of the World War aroused the two main national antipathies—the hatred against France, the fear of Russia—to their highest pitch in practically all layers of the population. What was new was the hatred of England, which soon became the dominant note in the general war hysteria. The war union with Austria-Hungary brought about much closer contacts with both the Austrians and the Hungarians, which in the case of Austria has continued down to the present and has been an important factor working toward the union of Austria and Germany.

As the result of the military victories over the Russian armies in 1916 the fear of Russia which had been such an important factor in cementing the national unity in 1914 gradually disappeared. A feeling of indifference toward Russia began to spread among the ruling classes together with a general sympathy for the Russian people on the part of the lower and a portion of the middle classes. The coming into power of the Bolsheviks naturally strengthened the morale of the revolutionary proletarian elements within Germany at the same time causing a certain feeling of disquietude on the part of the ruling classes. Nevertheless, with the elimination of Russia from the war the middle and upper classes renewed their hopes of ultimate victory over the Allies.

The economic, military, and political subjection of Germany

as a result of the lost war has put an end for the present to the short period of national sovereignty existing from 1871 to 1918. The reparations, which are the chief means for maintaining Allied control, have sustained and fed the war hatreds and have kept alive an intensified national patriotism. This is shown most clearly in the growth of the Fascists, who make use of this tremendous anti-foreign nationalist sentiment as a means of diverting the increasing social hatreds into nationalist channels. For reparations have given the German bourgeoisie a means of shifting the responsibility for the economic, social, and political difficulties of the post-war period upon the Allies, thus enabling this class to appear as the defender of German national interests and national honor.

The country that has done most to strengthen national patriotism in post-war Germany is France, because it has been the most relentless of the victorious nations in demanding the fulfilment of the peace treaty. In addition, France furnished most of the troops of occupation, and it was felt by the Germans that the use of French colored troops for this purpose was an act of special humiliation purposely planned by the French. On the other hand, certain forces exist in Germany which are working toward an economic alliance with France as well as a general policy of conciliation. In the forefront of this movement have been certain German industrialists under the leadership of Arnold Rechberg, as well as the middle parties who on the whole have had control of the government in the post-war period.

Poland is a country which has succeeded in arousing perhaps even more contempt and hatred than France, for it was through the creation of an independent Poland that Germany suffered its greatest territorial losses. While the Communists have strong sympathies for the struggle of the Polish working class, their hatred against the bourgeoisie régime in Poland is heightened by the fact that Poland is the strongest and best-armed neighbor of Soviet Russia.

The feeling of hostility against England has diminished considerably since the war period, due to the differences between England and France over the treatment of Germany, which has

produced the feeling that the former is more considerate of German interests.

Czechoslovakia also contributes its share in accentuating German nationalism, since it contains several million Germans who live along the German border and whom it is attempting to turn into Czechs. The feeling toward the neighboring nations who were neutral during the war is one of friendliness, especially toward Sweden which has done much charitable work in helping to alleviate the social misery of the post-war period. The feeling toward Denmark, however, is not especially friendly due to the loss of the Northern Slesvig Zone on the part of Germany.

The attitude toward the United States has varied considerably since 1918. The disappointment in regard to President Wilson's fourteen points developed into an antagonism against America which was tempered among those layers of the population which received economic assistance from friends, relatives, or aid organizations in America. With the breakdown of Germany's finances in 1923 America began to be looked upon as a savior who would lead Germany out of her financial difficulties, and the Dawes Plan was hailed by the middle parties as a means of pulling Germany out of the economic hole into which she had drifted. With the consequent rationalization of industry American industry has become the model and ideal for the German industrialists, an attitude which is shared by even the Social Democrats. Upon the Communists this has had the opposite effect, for they have insisted that the assistance given by American capital would not alleviate German conditions, but on the contrary would bring about an alliance of German and American capitalism and turn Germany into an economic colony of America. The Nationalists and especially the Fascists are also antagonistic to the United States, though mainly for the general purpose of diverting internal antagonisms into external ones.

Fascist Italy plays an important rôle in its effect upon German nationalism. As the most outspoken exponent of the reactionary forces in Europe it has gained the sympathy of the Nationalists and "Nazi" elements of Germany to whom Fascism is the ideal form of government. On the other hand, it has served

to strengthen the revolutionary proletarian forces within Germany in their attempt to prevent such conditions in their own country.

The existence of Soviet Russia has had the effect of increasing internal antagonisms in Germany due to the fact that, on the one hand, the morale and fighting power of the Communists are strengthened while, on the other hand, all the other parties have been brought into a more definite "national front." To the German bourgeoisie and aristocracy Soviet Russia is the constant symbol of its own destruction. But it is more than a symbol, it is the powerful ally of all the revolutionary proletarian forces within Germany and thus "interferes" continually in the economic and political life of the nation. As a result the German bourgeoisie has been drawn closer to that of the other powers of Western Europe. The only factor that tempers the hatred against Russia is the hope of the German bourgeoisie that Russia will provide a large market for its industrial products. So far this hope has been fulfilled only to a slight extent.

One of the most aggressive forces in the anti-Soviet front is the Social Democracy. Although the leaders of the Social Democracy and the free trade-unions know that an overthrow of the Soviet régime of Russia would greatly weaken the Socialist as well as the Communist labor movement of Germany, they are so tied up with the existing régime and are engaged in such a bitter struggle with the Communists at home, who are trying to win the workers away from the national ideology of the former, that the antagonism naturally is transferred to the much stronger Communist power, Soviet Russia.

CHAPTER XV

PRESS, RADIO, AND FILM

THE PRESS

With the invention of the printing press a method of disseminating ideas came into existence which has gradually diminished the relative importance of the spoken word. While the latter is not to be underestimated at present as a means of spreading ideas—and in fact its importance has again increased with the advent of the radio—the printed word has on the whole become the most important means of spreading ideas in modern times. This is due not merely to the widespread use of printed matter but also to the peculiar authority of the printed word.¹

While books, pamphlets, periodicals, and leaflets very often have great value for spreading ideas, the newspaper is undoubtedly the most important agency, because with an automatic regularity it hammers its message into the heads of its readers and creates in them a complex of ideas from which they can escape only with the greatest difficulty. Because of this fact the daily press was early recognized as an important agency in the spread of political ideas and has since proved an invaluable aid in the development of national and civic loyalties.

The establishment and development of newspapers have been closely connected with the development of the bourgeoisie.² In

¹ Julius Goldstein, "Die Presse" (in *Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialforschungen*, LI [1924], 367).

² For the history and characteristics of the German press see, among others: Ludwig Salomon, *Geschichte des deutschen Zeitungswesens von den ersten Anfängen bis zur Wiederaufrichtung des Deutschen Reiches* (3 vols.; 1906); F. Bruckmann, A. G. (publisher), *Die Zeitung, ihre Entwicklung von den ersten Anfängen bis heute, 1809-1914* (1914); M. Wittwer, *Das deutsche Zeitungswesen in seiner neueren Entwicklung* (1914); Dr. Strahlmann, *Geschichte der Presse Nordwestdeutschlands* (1920-21); Alfred Oehlke, *100 Jahre Breslauer Zeitung, 1820-1920* (1920); Leonhard Müller, *Geschichte der Breslauer Zeitungen* (1907); Karl Jaeger, *Von der Zeitungskunde zur publizistischen Wissenschaft* (1926); Friedrich Mönckmeier, *Die Rhein- und Moselzeitung* (ein Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der katholischen Presse und des politischen Katholizismus in den Rheinlanden) (1912); Karl Schottenloher, *Flugblatt und Zeitung* (ein Wegweiser durch das gedruckte Tages-

Germany they first arose to further the commercial interests of this class and were modeled after those of the more highly developed bourgeoisie of both England and France. The oldest German newspaper, founded in 1609 and still current, is the *München-Augsburger Abendzeitung*. The intelligence sheet, originating in France, first arose in Hamburg, where "Notifikationen" and "Advertissements" appeared in 1637. The newspapers appearing at about this time in Nuremberg, Rostock, Brunswick, Hildesheim, etc., were also modeled on the commercial intelligencer. The capitals of the numerous German states were fertile ground for the establishment of official newspapers.¹

While the bourgeoisie and its press declined in the latter part of the seventeenth century, the revival of the former during the next century led to a similar revival of the latter. It became now more than before a means of expressing the political and cultural interests of the bourgeoisie in its struggle against the aristocracy.

This rôle of the press was already recognized by Frederick William I of Prussia who, upon his succession to the throne, forbade all newspapers "because the populace should not reason." Somewhat later he permitted them to reappear but only under the strictest censorship.² Frederick the Great, however, employed the press assiduously to win public opinion for his foreign policy. He wrote a number of newspaper articles himself while he had others written in accordance with his instructions, and still other articles were at least prompted by him. He made use of the censorship just as his predecessors had done. In addi-

schrifttum) (1922); Ludwig Salomon, "Zeitungen" (in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, Vol. VIII [1911]; Robert Brunhuber, *Das deutsche Zeitungswesen* (1908); Josef Kürschner, *Handbuch der deutschen Presse*; Karl Bücher, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Zeitungskunde* (1926); Karl Bücher, *Die deutschen Zeitschriften und die Entstehung der öffentlichen Meinung*; Max Carr, *Parlament und Presse* (ein Beitrag zum Prinzip der parlamentarischen Öffentlichkeit) (1908); Albert Haas, *Das moderne Zeitungswesen in Deutschland* (1914); Herman Diez, *Das Zeitungswesen* (1910); Max Garr, *Die wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen des festländischen Zeitungswesens* (1911); Emil Dovifat, *Die Zeitungen* (1925); Wilhelm Schwedler, *Das Nachrichtenwesen* (1925); Frankfurter Sonntagsdruckerei (publishers), *Geschichte der Frankfurter Zeitung, 1856-1906* (1906).

¹ Hugo Buschmann, *Die deutsche Lokalpresse* (1922).

² Herman Dietz, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

tion to forbidding articles which he disliked, he often forced the papers to print others which defended his interests.¹

During the Napoleonic wars the importance of the press for swaying public opinion was recognized both by Napoleon and his opponents, and various methods were used in order to keep unfavorable news out of the papers or to color it as desired. In 1805 the *Kölnische Zeitung* was founded by Marcus Dumont who in spite of his anti-Napoleonic policy managed to publish his paper successfully throughout the Napoleonic period. Another representative of the national bourgeoisie was Josef Görres, who founded the *Rheinische Merkur* immediately after the retreat of Napoleon from the Rhineland. This paper was the first important paper which ardently propagated the idea of German freedom and unity and as a result was suppressed by the Prussian government in 1816.²

The general political reaction that set in after 1815 naturally affected the press. The censorship against all liberal bourgeois ideas was so rigid that many papers tried to keep out as much political news and comment as possible in order to avoid constant interference on the part of the government. After 1830, however, a change set in. An increasing number of newspapers were founded. But more important, in spite of the censorship, the papers began to express to an increasing degree the political demands of the rising bourgeoisie, among which the demand for the freedom of the press played an important rôle. To the bourgeoisie the rule of the aristocracy meant censorship and control of the press just as the rule of the bourgeoisie signified to them freedom of the press. This struggle took its sharpest form in Southern and especially Western Germany where the bourgeoisie was relatively stronger than in other sections of the country. This same period also witnessed the foundation of a number of information service bureaus.

During the revolution of 1848 the press played an important

¹ Franz Etzin, "Die Freiheit der öffentlichen Meinung unter der Regierung Friedrich des Grossen" (in *Forschungen zur brandenburgischen und preussischen Geschichte*, XXXIII, Part I [1920]).

² Emil Dovifat, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-18.

rôle in voicing the demands for democracy and national unity which the various sections of the bourgeoisie and the middle classes tried to achieve. Hundreds of new papers appeared as if overnight, some of them lasting only a few weeks. After the failure of the revolution, reaction set in again, and the struggle for the freedom of the press became once more a slogan in the general struggle of the bourgeoisie for democracy and national unity. This was especially marked in the decade previous to the Franco-Prussian War.¹

With the unification of Germany and the subsequent acceptance of the new Empire by the bourgeoisie, the press became a potent factor for the disseminating of the idea of national and monarchical loyalty. The period from 1871 to 1914 showed a considerable increase in the number of papers (2,500 in 1865; 3,534 in 1912).² This increase was, however, not as rapid as the increase of the population, for in 1885 there was one paper for each 14,731 inhabitants while in 1914 there was only one for each 15,381.³ This, however, was more than counteracted by the increase of circulation of the average paper which rose from 3,069 in 1885 to 4,221 in 1914.⁴

Practically the whole press of pre-war Germany was an agency for developing civic and national loyalty, for it was almost exclusively in the control of those forces propagating national and civic loyalty. This comes out clearly in Table I.⁵ What stands out in this table is that about half of the papers were listed as being affiliated with no party at all. This, however, did not mean that they were not reliable agencies in dominating patriotic ideas. Most of them belonged to the category known in Germany as the "Generalanzeigerpresse" which consists of

¹ Otto Bandmann, *Die deutsche Presse und die Entwicklung der deutschen Frage 1864–1866* (1910).

² The statistics concerning the number of newspapers together with their circulation are not very reliable. As a result the various authorities differ considerably in their data. Thus Bücher gives 4,221 papers as existing in 1914. These discrepancies exist even in the present day statistical compilations of the press.

³ Gerhard Muser, *Statistische Untersuchungen über die Zeitungen Deutschlands, 1885–1914* (1918), p. 17.

⁴ Gerhard Muser, *ibid.*, pp. 58–61.

⁵ Alfons Nobel, *Handbuch der Politik*.

newspapers established essentially as a business proposition and which try to cater to as many political and economic groups as possible in order to increase their business.¹ This forced them to take a somewhat neutral position in regard to party politics. Their "neutrality," however, generally favored the parties of the right, for they always took a definitely hostile attitude toward the enemies of the state, the Social Democrats, and sometimes even toward the bourgeois radicals. These papers were practically all ardent supporters of the existing régime and became important in the identification of nationalism with the institution of the monarchy.

TABLE I

YEAR	CONSERVATIVE		LIBERAL		CATHOLIC		SOCIALIST		NON-PARTY	
	Number of Papers	Per Cent	Papers	Per Cent	Papers	Per Cent	Papers	Per Cent	Papers	Per Cent
1898.....	807	21.1	556	19.5	318	9.5	54	1.6	1,502	45.0
1907.....	771	24.6	590	18.9	410	13.1	65	2.1	1,292	41.3
1913.....	910	22.6	584	14.4	476	11.6	87	2.2	1,988	49.2
1917.....	489	16.8	493	16.9	400	13.2	77	2.7	1,450	49.8
1925.....	719	24.2	126	5.6	380	12.4	142	4.5	1,635	51.0

Besides utilizing that section of the press that was favorable to it, the government censored that section which was antagonistic to it. Before the World War it was primarily the Social Democratic press which suffered under the censorship. It is unnecessary to point out here the countless cases in which Social Democratic newspapers were prosecuted for *lese majesty* or treason. Socialist newspapers were even convicted for printing objective reports of parliamentary and court proceedings, allegedly because these news items were "outside the editor's legitimate interests." In fact, the Social Democratic press developed a regular defensive weapon against these prosecutions. Each newspaper had a "jail editor" who assumed legal responsibility for the contents of the paper and who spent a considerable part of his time serving the prison sentences that were passed against the editorial board.

¹ Walter Hammer, *Die Generalanzeigerpresse Preussens* (1911).

Besides its negative form of control the government tried various positive methods to use the press to further its own interests. Bismarck realized the significance of the press just as Frederick the Great had done.¹ He made use of the press from the time that he helped to found the *Kreuzzeitung* and aided it by regular contributions from his pen down to the concluding period of his campaign against the young Kaiser's new policy. The effectiveness of his use of the press was manifested in the Ems Telegram, the diary of Moritz Busch, and numerous minor examples. In 1886, when relations with Russia were strained because of German sympathy for Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, Bismarck spent an entire night telegraphing to the German press in the most urgent manner and actually succeeded in affecting a right-about face of public opinion within twenty-four hours. This incident is vouched for by Walz, who participated in these efforts.² This policy has been followed by his successors and has become an established custom.

Of great use to the government in influencing public opinion was its close contact with news distribution bureaus and with the official and semi-official press of the country. The official papers were those which were published by the Imperial government as well as the governments of the various states, and contained all the official announcements of the government. The Prussian district gazettes (*Kreisblätter*) were also official, in so far as all local official orders and announcements were published through these gazettes, thus requiring all local authorities to read them. Besides these, there existed a semi-official press. These papers were private news enterprises which, however, were in constant contact with the government, regularly obtaining authentic official views on the events and questions of the day and shaping their political viewpoint accordingly. There were various shadings in this category. The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* always put all its news columns at the disposal

¹ Eduard Schulz, *Bismarcks Einfluss auf die deutsche Presse, Juli 1870* (1910). Contains also "Tabelle zur Orientierung über die Verbreitung der Weisungen Bismarcks in den einzelnen Blättern."

² Paul Eltzbacher, *Die Presse als Werkzeug der auswärtigen Politik*, pp. 22-23.

of the Cabinet and always supported the government's stand-point on all political questions.

The government also made use of the correspondence bureaus to transmit its views to the press of the country. Thus before the revolution the Prussian Ministry of the Interior had a Royal Publicity Bureau which published the *Berliner Korrespondenz*, a daily official correspondence sheet intended for the daily newspapers, and sent them to use as they saw fit. It contained primarily official news, government documents, editorial comments on legislative bills and political plans of the government, together with occasional polemics against the Opposition press.

The German Foreign Office, like the Ministry of the Interior, had its Intelligence Division. The director of the Intelligence Division of the Foreign Office was also the Imperial chancellor's chief of press. In the decade before the World War this division gained importance as a source of information for the chancellor on press matters. As a rule, valuable news was given only to newspapers which supported the Cabinet.

Although the government had no news agency of its own it stood in very close contact with Wolff's Telegraph Bureau. The government furnished reports and telegrams to WTB free of charge and gave its dispatches priority over private telegrams but required the agency to send all government news to all its subscribers. And if one remembers that this agency had a practical monopoly of foreign news one can realize its extraordinary importance in the dissemination of ideas favorable to the government.

Just as the press became an important agency of the bourgeoisie in the struggle for its own emancipation, so it also played and still is playing an important function for the proletariat in its struggle for political and economic power.¹ The growth of the Social Democratic press of the pre-war days came only as a result of a bitter struggle against the overwhelming quasi-

¹ See, among others: Ludwig Kantorowicz, *Die sozialdemokratische Presse Deutschlands* (eine soziologische Untersuchung) (1922); Ernst Drahns, *Zur Entwicklung und Geschichte des sozialistischen Buchhandels und der Arbeiterpresse* (1913).

monopolistic power of the non-Socialistic press and consequently was a slow process. The acquisition of every new subscriber was an important advance for the Socialist cause, for subscription to a Socialist paper meant a break with old traditions and an introduction into a new realm of thought antagonistic to the existing régime. Furthermore, the subscription to a Socialist organ meant public announcement of one's Socialist beliefs and as a result ostracism by all nationally minded groups. Then again most Socialist papers made no appeal to the general interest of the public but were written from the point of view of the party member. Thus the family of a Socialist often preferred to subscribe to a non-Socialist paper because it contained more things of general interest to them. And finally, because of its Socialist doctrines, business people were less apt to advertise in a Socialist paper. Thus in 1892 only 8 per cent of the cost of printing the *Vorwärts* was covered by advertisements. This had, however, increased to 45 per cent by 1914.¹ Because of these factors the growth of the Social Democratic press did not keep pace with the growth of the Socialist votes at the elections. Thus in 1912 the Social Democratic press represented only 2.2 per cent of the total press of Germany while the Social Democratic party received 34.8 per cent of the total votes.² This showed that the economic and social forces of the time were strong enough to counteract a great deal of propaganda on the part of the nationalistic press. The most important methods for disseminating Socialist propaganda were by means of pamphlets, leaflets, meetings, demonstrations, and oral discussions among the workers in the factories.

With the outbreak of the war, the entire press, from the Socialist to the Conservative, fell into line in defense of the fatherland.³ It was the press more than any other agency which

¹ Kantorowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³ For the war period see, among others: W. Nicolai, *Nachrichtendienst, Presse und Volksstimme im Weltkrieg* (1920); *Handbuch Deutscher Zeitungen* (1917; Bearbeitet im Kriegspresseamt von Rittmeister a.D. Oskar Michel, mit Nachtrag, 1918); A. Meister, *Die deutsche Presse im Kriege und später* (1916); Karl Bücher, *Unsere Sache und die Tagespresse* (1915); Graven, *Praktische Erfahrungen im praktischen Unterricht* (Vortrag) (Kriegspresseamt, 1918); Georg Schweitzer, *Das Nachrichtenwesen im Kriege*

was used by the state and the patriotic forces to keep up the national morale as long as possible. And the government tried everything possible to increase its control over the press. The supply of news was monopolized by the Supreme Army Command and its press sections in the several general command areas. All dispatches were centralized in the Censorship Office of the High Command of the Mark and in the official War News Bureau (Kriegspresseamt). The latter was created as a kind of general war information service bureau, being under the command of the chief of general staff of the Field Army. In addition, there existed a regular information service for the use of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Navy Department, as well as information bureaus at the War Ministries of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg, and at the different ministries of the other German states. Finally, press divisions were established by the various military authorities of the occupied territories.

The most important center for distributing government propaganda was, however, the aforementioned War News Bureau which furnished the press, the military and civil authorities, as well as various private organizations and individuals, with pamphlets, leaflets, manuscripts, posters, cards, etc. In addition, it brought out the tri-weekly *German War News* (*Deutsche Kriegsnachrichten*), intended mainly as a news service for the press. It also published the *German War Weekly* (*Deutsche Kriegswochenschau*), which was of a more popular nature, and supplied information to speakers and writers to be used in their propagandist activities.¹ Toward the end of the war, Hindenburg and Ludendorff directed their attention in an increasing degree to the War News Bureau in order to help bolster up the waning spirit of patriotism. Its activities were extended and it was considered an indispensable arm of the government in combatting the growing war-weariness.

(1916); Friedrich Leiter, *Die Zeitung im Kriege und nach dem Kriege* (1915); Friedrich Bertkan, *Das amtliche Zeitungswesen im Verwaltungsgebiet Ober-Ost* (1928); M. Gottlieb, *Weltkrieg und Zeitungswesen* (1922); H. Thurston, *The German Press Propaganda* (1917).

¹ *Deutsche Wirtschaftspropaganda*, pp. 17-18.

To gain a more direct contact with the various newspapers of the country regular press conferences were established in August, 1914, by the government. At these conferences representatives of the government were present who gave information concerning the economic, political, and military situation to the representatives of the press. These press conferences proved very successful and have been continued in the post-war period.

Besides this positive form of influencing the press, the negative form of censoring all news played an important rôle in keeping all undesirable news from the nation. This work was centralized in the chief censorship section of the War News Bureau, the actual censoring, however, being carried out by the various local, military, and civil authorities. Foreign news as well as foreign newspapers were received only by the War News Bureau and were then relayed to the press in a digested patriotic form. The control was so severe that even the official directing communication between the government and the press, Dr. Otto Hammann, at that time director of the Intelligence Division of the Foreign Office, was kept for months in the dark by the Army Command as to the outcome of the Battle of the Marne. As time went on the regulations and instructions grew more complicated and contradictory so that finally the chief censorship section of the War News Bureau published a censorship book in March, 1917, which was sent to all newspapers. In this handbook, marked "Confidential," the editors were instructed as to what might and what might not be written. Advice was also given upon how to "improve" and "supplement" unfavorable dispatches.¹

An additional type of pressure was used against opposition papers. In view of the paper shortage, the government threatened to cut off the supply of paper if the opposition or pacifist policy continued in spite of the government's warnings. In addition, editors who criticized governmental measures too severely were threatened with being drafted into the army.

¹ See also Kurt Mühsam, *Wie wir belogen wurden* (1918), p. 30. The above-mentioned censorship book, parts of which are reprinted in the book of Mühsam, is a very important as well as interesting document. It is a printed evidence of the fear that the government had of allowing unfavorable news to be spread by the press as well as of the minute care with which it tried to mold the mentality of the nation.

By these measures the country was kept in a state of ignorance as to the real situation. In fact, the censorship was so effective that for several days after the revolt of the sailors in Kiel on November 2, 1918, none of the newspapers dared to print a word of the matter. The continual censorship of even the most unimportant news gradually became very irritating even to the most patriotic editors.

Of some importance especially during the latter part of the war were the army papers issued by the soldiers of the various army units.¹

Immediately after the breakdown of the German Empire in 1918 the newly established Socialist government found itself with practically no support except from its own party press.² The great mass of the press which was in the hands of big business or the agrarians carried on a policy of open or indirect hostility to the Provisional Socialist government. The Socialists tried to make use of the press divisions of the old government to carry on their propaganda. At the same time they founded the semi-official *Parliamentary-Political News (Parlamentarisch-Politische Nachrichten)* as a kind of news service for carrying on propaganda in favor of the new régime. It was only when the Social Democracy demanded the convening of the National Assembly that the government could count on the direct support of the press of the Democrats and the Centre. The opposition of the nationalist press against the new régime was, however, of a limited character, for it was merely an opposition against the anti-conservative ideas and policies of the new régime. This came out clearly when the suppression of the revolutionary

¹ Such papers had already existed during the war against Napoleon as well as during the Franco-Prussian War but had been rather insignificant in size and circulation. For newspapers in German prison camps see: *Die Zeitung im deutschen Gefangen- und Interniertenlager* (eine Bibliographie von Stefan Wangart and Richard Hellmann) (1920).

² For the post-war development see, among others: Muenzer, *Öffentliche Meinung und Presse* (1928); Leo Lania, *Nideta, Die Fabrik von Nachrichten* (1927); Theodor Heuss, "Die Presse" (in *Teubners Handbuch der Staats- und Wirtschaftskunde* [1924]); Herman Fuchs, *Die Pressefreiheit der Gegenwart und die Entwicklung des Zeitungswesens seit Ausbruch der Revolution* (contains a bibliography of the newspapers of the Revolution); *Handbuch des Vereins Arbeiterpresse* (1927).

movement of the workers found whole-hearted support among the national press. This helped to give the new government a much greater support from the nationalist elements than would have been the case otherwise, at the same time drawing the former farther to the right. Thus the new régime could count upon the whole press in Germany for support in its struggle against Communism. This came out clearly in the formation of the Central Bureau for News Service (Reichszentrale für Heimatdienst) which was founded ostensibly for the purpose of carrying on propaganda for the new régime but which actually centered its activities around the fight against Bolshevism and which found support among the press of the right.

At the same time the new government tried to make use of the various official propaganda centers which it had inherited as part of the bureaucratic machine from the old régime. While the War News Bureau and its censorship boards were abolished, the old Press Division of the Imperial government was retained and became an independent body. Its purpose was and still is to influence the press in favor of the existing government. Due to the sensitiveness of the political situation since the war as well as to the increased importance of the press, it has become customary to appoint a new director of the Press Division with each change of the Cabinet. The direct contact with the press is maintained through the weekly or bi-weekly press conferences established at the beginning of the war. The former relationship of the government with the Wolff Telegraph Bureau (WTB) has been retained.

Though the government abolished the War Censorship Division it nevertheless carried on a policy of suppressing revolutionary organs of the Communists and Independent Socialists. This policy has been maintained down to the present, and all Communist papers can give evidence of numerous temporary suppressions when their attacks against the government have become violent. This policy has also been carried on against some of the papers of the extreme right that have been propagating the overthrow of the Republic, though the number of suppressions in this case has been considerably less.

The papers which had been owned directly by the government before 1918 have been retained by the Republic and edited with the aid of the former personnel. These were the official gazettes which, however, have relatively little influence in molding public opinion. The *Deutsche Reichs- und Preussische Staatsanzeiger* is an official daily, which also contains a non-official section, but even in the latter it confines itself to a more or less objective reporting and publication of authentic material. The official dailies of several of the states possess more of the character of the general newspapers such as the *Dresdner Journal* in Saxony, the *Württemberg Staatsanzeiger*, the *Karlsruher Zeitung*, the *Weimarer Zeitung*, the *Anhaltische Zeitung*, and so forth. While the local official gazettes cannot be considered newspapers, Baden however has created a sort of journalistic hybrid in the so-called *Official Announcer*, which complies with the government's requests for journalistic support of its policies. The numerous district gazettes which printed official news continue to do so and receive financial support from the republican régime, even though they support the parties of the right rather than those of the middle. There also exists as before the war a semi-official press which consists of the leading papers of those political parties which form the government. Since the political composition of the government has varied considerably since 1918, that portion of the press which might be considered semi-official has changed correspondingly. Of the political press, that of the "Nazis" or Fascists is led by the *Völkische Beobachter* published in Munich, the headquarters of the Fascists. In Berlin the *Deutsche Zeitung* is closely allied to the Fascist movement.

The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* is the central organ of the Agrarian League while the *Kreuzzeitung* continues the aristocratic traditions of the Conservatives. Both are tied up with the Nationalist party. The latter as well as the People's party are supported in Berlin by the *Lokal Anzeiger*, *Tag*, *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* (the organ of big business), and the *Tägliche Rundschau*. The *Kölnische Zeitung* and the *Badische Presse*, to say nothing of the numerous small city and local papers of Middle and

Eastern Germany, give the parties of this persuasion their largest support. The Bavarian People's party still co-operates with the right, and its *Bayrischer Kurier* sets the pace for a series of influential newspapers in the smaller towns and open country of Central and South Bavaria. The *Deutsche Stimmen* is at the head of the reviews.

The democratic tendency is comparatively overrepresented among the important newspapers of Germany, but the lesser papers are seldom democratic. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, *Vossische Zeitung*, and the *Berliner Tageblatt* lead the German press in news-service and prestige. The democratic reviews are read by the left and by the center. They include *Der Demokrat*, *Das Demokratische Deutschland*, *Die Hilfe*, *Das Neue Deutschland*.

The Catholic party is underrepresented in newspapers of the first magnitude although the religious press at its disposal is of considerable importance. The *Germania* of Berlin and the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* are the most widely known dailies. The periodicals are *Das Zentrum*, *Hochland*, *Historisch-Politische Blätter*.

The Socialist press is a powerful adjunct of the party. It includes the *Vorwärts*, the *Chemnitzer Volksstimme*, and perhaps 130 lesser papers. The reviews are excellent and include the *Neue Zeit*, the *Glocke*, and the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*. Just as the Centre party has access to the Catholic press, so the Socialists can influence most of the trade-union press.

The Communists have about forty papers of which the *Rote Fahne* of Berlin is the most important. The *Welt am Abend* is a non-official Communist evening sheet which has the largest circulation of all evening papers of Berlin. *Die Internationale* is the official review.

The majority of papers which are listed as non-political are just as before the war of a definitely national sentiment. A large part of the press has thus gotten into the hands of a relatively small number of business concerns who make use of them to spread their own political propaganda. The most powerful business group among these papers is the Hugenberg concern which has succeeded in obtaining control of a large part of the so-called neutral press and has forged it into a powerful weapon for de-

veloping a national and quasi-fascist ideology. It is Hugenberg's objective to use his newspapers to form a firm right bloc under the leadership of the large land owners and the big industrialists in order to secure unchallenged political power for the right parties.

The Hugenberg concern exercises its influence upon the Berlin press through the August Scherl Publishing Company.¹ The most important daily published is the *Berliner Lokalanzeiger* with a circulation of over a quarter of a million. Hugenberg's influence on the provincial press is exercised through the Vera Publishing Company (Vera Verlagsanstalt), which organized the Wipro (Wirtschaftsberatung der Provinzpresse) Business Advisor to the Provincial Press. The Wipro publishes two principal matrix correspondence services, one version for "non-partisan" papers and the other for newspapers of the right. In this form Hugenberg controls more than half of the provincial press.

Further means of influencing the press of the country is possessed through control of the Telegraphen-Union (TU). In 1924 it received a governmental concession giving it the same rights as Wolff's Telegraph Bureau.

Another form in which Hugenberg exerts his influence upon the press is through the Ala Advertising Corporation (Ala Anzeigen Gesellschaft). This was formed by Hugenberg just before the outbreak of the war for the purpose of placing advertisements of German business concerns in those newspapers, both at home and abroad, which maintained an editorial policy favorable to these concerns.

Rudolf Mosse and the Ullstein Brothers² are two important newspaper concerns of a somewhat more liberal character, supporting the present régime. Their influence is, however, considerably smaller than that of Hugenberg, especially in the provinces.

A recent research shows that the number of pages of the aver-

¹ The material on the Hugenberg Trust has been taken mainly from Ludwig Bernhard, *Der Hugenberg Konzern* (1928).

² Ullstein (publisher), *Fünzig Jahre Ullstein* (1877-1927).

age daily paper in Germany is 10.2; the largest number is 24.0; the smallest, 2.2.¹ Thus German newspapers are much smaller than American ones, and they are half as large in format as the American, and use larger type. Consequently, they are read more completely and each article exerts greater influence upon the reader. The paper is generally made up so that the reader goes through most of it and does not confine himself to any special part of the newspaper. In addition, the German newspapers are not as sensational as the newspapers of certain other countries, due largely to the fact that they are read more by subscribers than by chance street-buyers.

For a direct form of national propaganda the news section is of course the most important one. Since the war it has become the voluntary policy of all nationally minded newspapers to suppress or to minimize such news as shows Germany in a bad light. Thus one reads little in German papers of German propaganda abroad. One also reads little, in these papers supporting the government, of dishonesty, inefficiency, etc., for which the latter can be held responsible. If, however, an event becomes too widely known to be concealed in this manner an endeavor is often successfully made to "write it to death," i.e., the reader is served with so much news and often of so confusing a nature that he becomes tired and disinterested in the matter. A few examples of the employment of this technique are the following: the Liebknecht murder, the Rathenau trial, the Hitler Putch, the Barmat trial, etc. The trial of Barmat and his accomplices was, likewise, dragged out for such a long period and so many witnesses were called (over 800 volumes of documents being presented), that when the court finally convicted the defendants the whole subject received relatively scant notice in the press.

Besides the general news columns German newspapers usually contain a number of informative articles written by more or less prominent persons, such as university professors, members of the Reichstag as well as various state diets, public officials, army officers, business-men, etc. These take up political problems in great detail and in a more thorough manner, thus fill-

¹ Hans Traub, *Zeitungsverlag*, No. 26, July 1, 1927.

ing a want catered to in America by the numerous magazines. This also explains to some extent the very small number of magazines in Germany. There are two methods of influencing the reader of this section of the paper. In using the indirect method the material is represented in such a way as to bring out the national point of view. In using the divertive method the material is printed merely for the sake of entertainment which helps to distract the reader from important problems of the day.

The non-political part of the newspaper is also made use of in developing civic and national loyalty. This part of the paper which includes short stories, serial novels, feuilleton, sport news, radio and movie news, women's section, youth section, etc., attracts new readers who need not be especially sympathetic to the political attitude of the paper. In the latter case it is possible gradually to win over the reader to a different political viewpoint without his being conscious of the process and methods used.

After having analyzed the methods and means by which the press spreads national patriotism, it is necessary to correct the popular opinion concerning the importance of the press as a molder of public opinion. In the 1912 elections the Social Democratic party received 34.8 per cent of the total popular vote while it owned only 2.2 per cent of the total number of newspapers in the country. In the elections of 1930 the Social Democrats received about 24 per cent of the popular vote while they owned only 5 per cent of the press of the country. The Communists received about 13 per cent of the vote while they owned a little over 1 per cent of the papers. These figures seem to show that the national and nationalist propaganda of a great part of the press has a limited influence upon the political views of a considerable portion of the working class.

THE RADIO

The radio, like the press and the film, has become an important agency for developing civic and national loyalty in Ger-

many.¹ Radios are not quite so common as in the United States, on account of their relatively higher costs as well as the monthly government tax of fifty cents. On the other hand, the radio, like many other phases of German cultural life, has come under the paternal guidance of the state. Soon after the spread of its popularity the federal authorities established a government monopoly of sending stations. This is operated by means of an independent mixed company—the Federal Radio Company (Reichs-Funk-Gesellschaft), of which the Federal Post Office Department owns 51 per cent of the stock. There are, furthermore, nine subsidiary concerns, each with a number of smaller associated sending stations, which are controlled by the Federal Radio Company by a similar 51 per cent ownership of stock. Aside from this network of sending stations there exists the "German Wave" (Deutsche Welle) at Königswusterhausen, not far from Berlin, which can be heard all over Germany and which is under the direct control of the government.

To prevent the radio from being used for anti-governmental propaganda a series of political control committees (*Kontrollausschüsse*) has been set up for the various sending stations. One member of each committee is appointed by the federal government, the rest by the government of the state in which the station is located. Each station must obtain the approval of its respective committee before broadcasting "political" news. The policy of these committees is determined by a series of *Richtlinien* that has been formulated by the federal government. The interpretations of these *Richtlinien* vary, since the personnel of the committees depends upon the political composition of the various state governments. It is, however, obviously impossible to broadcast any criticism of, or attack on, the government.

In analyzing the programs one finds that the greater part is devoted to music. Lectures on various educational topics are

¹ Outside of technical books and treatises little material has appeared on the development of the radio in Germany. The Reichsrundfunk Gesellschaft has published a series of shorter studies and reports among which the following have been used: Bredow, *Vier Jahre deutscher Rundfunk*; Giesecke, *Entwicklung und Aufbau des deutschen Rundfunks* (1928); *Rundfunk und Landwirt* (1927). The following magazines have been of value: *Funk*; *Der aktive Radiogenosse*; *Die Rundfunkwoche*; *Der Funk Bastler*.

likewise of considerable importance. In the realm of music one hears military marches, patriotic songs, folk songs, etc., and each daily program at Königswusterhausen is closed by playing "Deutschland über Alles." Moreover, the national note is often present in lectures on art, literature, and even science. Not that the achievements of other nations are derided, they are merely disregarded while German achievements are lauded and over-emphasized. When German warships or transatlantic liners have been launched, as when the airplane "Bremen" succeeded in reaching America, or the "Graf Zeppelin" made its trip to America, these feats were broadcast in such a way as to show the superiority of German science, of German engineering, and of the German spirit in general. This general method of exaggerating German achievements is naturally reflected in the radio programs. Juvenile hours have even been used to inform children that the eagle is a German bird, the fox a German animal, and the oak tree a German tree.

German radio programs are notable for the absence of political discussions. Proposals to broadcast the sessions of the Reichstag have been defeated on several occasions. Conventions of political parties are not permitted on the radio, and campaign speeches by representatives of various political parties are also barred. In other words anything pertaining to internal political antagonisms is kept out of the radio programs. On the other hand, political events of a patriotic nature are broadcast, such as speeches of the chancellor, the president, and other government officials. At the same time a direct attempt is made to divert the interests of the audience from political antagonisms by giving over a large part of the programs to "entertainments" and to general educational topics. It is hoped that by ignoring the disruptive forces of society and by giving the public entertainment the common national psychology will be stimulated. This technique is of some importance in judging the value of the radio as a factor in weakening internal dissensions.

The radio in itself has the ability to weaken or strengthen patriotism. On the one hand, radio waves know no artificial political boundaries and are thus a means of breaking down

such boundaries. A person with a good radio set in any part of Germany cannot help hearing the bigger stations of the neighboring countries such as England, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Russia, etc. On the other hand, because of the language barrier he can understand only the musical part of the program. The existence of the different national languages which he does not understand throws him for thought transmission back upon the narrower limits of his own language group and thus tends to strengthen his national language consciousness, if not his national pride. But most important of all, the radio presents to all the classes within a given country, such as in Germany, an identical program. This tends to standardize the thought content of the nation by disregarding differences in class, religious, and regional ideology. The success of this tendency depends, however, upon the mentality of the audience. Since the organizers and performers of the radio programs come mainly from the middle and upper classes the programs naturally reflect the national and social mentality of these classes. It is therefore among these classes the radio has its strongest and most undisputed influence. This is also true of its effect upon the peasantry, although limited by the smaller number of radio sets in the rural districts. Furthermore, as observed before, the peasantry is not "national-conscious" in the sense that the urban middle classes are.

On the other hand, it is just this type of program that has led to an antagonism on the part of the radical section of the working class toward the radio, because the latter does not take its interests and views sufficiently in account. The Socialists have secured some concessions, but the Communists have not been able to use the radio to express their views on labor or any other issues.

It must be added that to the nationalistic elements of the population the radio has had, so far, too much of a neutral and republican character. These elements insist that the radio be used much more than heretofore to propagate the German patriotic ideal and that it become to a greater extent than heretofore an organ of nationalist political propaganda.

THE FILM

The motion picture has come to be an important agency in fostering national consciousness in Germany.¹ Unlike the radio, the film is not a government monopoly; the government has left the production and distribution of films wholly in the hands of private capital. In consequence, the forces controlling the film, like those controlling the press, have utilized it as a means of spreading their attitude toward the state and nationalism. By far the largest film production and distribution company of Germany is the Ufa. This fact is of great importance for the problem of civic training, since the Ufa is in the hands of Alfred Hugenberg, who besides controlling the nationalist press is one of the leading industrialists of Germany and head of the Nationalist party with definite Fascist tendencies. The Ufa was formed toward the end of the war by leading industrialists upon the suggestion of the government and the military command for the purpose of combatting the rapidly increasing war-weariness of the people of the Central Powers.

Immediately after the revolution, the Ufa, which had remained in the hands of its former owners, became an unwelcome ballast to the new government since it was openly hostile to the new régime. Backed financially by the Deutsche Bank the Ufa directors did not give up their nationalist and reactionary aims. At first this manifested itself only indirectly. A series of pictures like "Anne Boleyn," "Madame Dubarry," "Henry

¹ No systematic study exists on the rôle of the film in developing the national spirit. The press of the left occasionally carries short releases which, however, generally deal only with individual films. The following volumes have been used in this study: Alexander Jason, *Der Film in Ziffern und Zahlen, 1895-1925* (1925); Fr. Lembke, *Das Kino im Dorf*; Wilhelm Münzenberg, *Erobert den Film* (1925); Norbert Freiherr von Grünau, *Die finanzielle und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Filmindustrie in Deutschland* (1923); Walther Pahl, *Die psychologischen Wirkungen des Films unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer sozialpsychologischen Bedeutung* (1926); Zentralverband der Filmverleiher Deutschlands, *Handbuch des Filmverleihs* (1925); Albert Hellwig, *Die Grundsätze der Filmzensur und der Reklamezensur nach den Entscheidungen der Oberprüfstelle* (1923); Konrad Lange, *Das Kino* (1920); F. Emmel, "Film und Volk" (eine Denkschrift an das Reichsministerium des Innern und der Filmindustrie) (in *Preussische Jahrbücher CCVII* [1927], 164-88); Emilie zur Altenloh, *Zur Soziologie des Kinos* (Die Kinounternehmung und die sozialen Schichten ihrer Besucher) (1914); *The Film Daily Year Book*.

VIII," etc., was produced in which the history of the Allies was presented in an unfriendly light. These were then followed by films openly nationalist in sentiment such as "Fredericus Rex" and the "Nibelungen" which incidentally also proved financial successes. In 1922 the Ufa passed into the hands of Hugenberg who since then has used it to further his nationalist aims. At the same time he has succeeded in gaining control of other companies such as the "Phoebus" and the "Deulig." The Ufa has furthermore extended its influence by the establishment of a series of moving picture theaters which exhibit films produced by other companies as well as by the Ufa. Charges have been made that the Ufa theater censors films which cast ridicule on the old régime.¹

The cinema can, however, be utilized only to a limited extent to develop and strengthen national consciousness by direct national propaganda, since a large portion of the films shown in Germany is imported, especially from the United States. In 1923 about 60 per cent of the feature pictures were imported. Various government measures have reduced this proportion, so that in 1930 only 40 per cent of the new films were of foreign manufacture. Thus of the 264 new films (137 sound, 127 silent) passed by the Censor Bureau, 162 (93 sound, 69 silent) were produced in Germany, 60 (25 sound, 35 silent) in the United States, and 42 (19 sound, 23 silent) in other countries.²

Besides the foreign pictures there is a certain percentage of "neutral" German pictures which have no direct national tendency in them. Thus over half of the pictures can be classified under the category of "divertive" propaganda. These are of importance in taking the minds of the population from the misery and suffering of the post-war period.

The rest of the pictures, however, try to make up for this deficiency. While there are practically no films which try to make direct propaganda for the Republic, there are many patriotic pictures which attempt to glorify the "good old times" of monarchy and militarism. This is accomplished by a direct

¹ Carl Bretz, "Fatum der Ufa" (in *Berliner Tageblatt*, April 6, 1927).

² *Lichtbildbühne*, April 25, 1931.

and indirect method. Under the direct method come various dramas such as "The World War," "Our Emden," "The Sunken Fleet," "U-Boat 9," "The Naval Officer," and "The Red Ace" (this showing the life and death of the famous war flier, Manfred von Richthofen). Of a similar nature are such historical films as "Fredericus Rex," "Der Alte Fritz," both dealing with the life of Frederick the Great; "Bismarck," "Waterloo," "Potsdam, the Fate of a Royal Palace." The picture "Queen Louise" was advertised to the trade as "a patriotic film but without political tendencies, a German film for every German."

The second type of film tries to appeal mainly to those whose feelings range from a lukewarm indifference to moderate hostility toward the old régime. This type propagates the nationalist idea by means of sentimental and humorous subjects as: "A Soldier's Life Is a Merry One." The military and civilian life of the past is portrayed in a humorous and highly favorable light. Of the military comedy "Kuzmarek," the newspaper, *12 Uhr Mittag*, wrote: "What did the public do? It cried: 'Oh what fun to be a soldier!'" Officers not only fall in love with servant girls but even marry them; officers and their attendants seem to live together as chums—having common drinking bouts, etc. Other impossible situations are presented; all for the purpose of trying to show that the past was not bad at all, that, in fact, most people had a much better time than they have at present.

Moreover, the news reel must not be forgotten. Practically each one of them contains something which will appeal to the national spirit of the observer. The launching of a German vessel, whether naval or commercial, the parade of some nationalist organization, scenes from patriotic celebrations—all furnish such an appeal. Pictures of Hindenburg play an important rôle, and during the past few years hardly any news reel was complete without a picture of Hindenburg laying a cornerstone of some building of national importance, or attending some celebration at a children's home, etc.

To counterbalance the nationalistic effect of these pictures upon the working class, an increasing number of Russian pic-

tures, many of a revolutionary trend, have been shown since 1925. Of these "Potemkin" undoubtedly has had the widest showing.¹ Other films of a similar nature are "Ten Days That Shook the World," "The End of St. Petersburg," "Ivan the Terrible," "His Warning," "China Express," "Storm over Asia," etc. Russian comedies have also appeared with considerable success. Some German pictures with radical tendencies, such as "The Song of Life," Hauptmann's "The Weavers" as well as "Schinderhannes" (treating of the revolt of the peasantry in the Rhineland against the allied forces of the Napoleon-ic army and the German bureaucracy), have likewise had successful results.

The government limits its activities to maintaining a control over all the films, so as to eliminate, in whole or in part, those pictures which "may endanger the safety of the State." During the war a censorship was naturally established, but this was done away with by the revolution. With the growth of the re-action the government found it advisable to reinstitute a censorship against anti-government films, as well as those which appealed to the lax sex standards of the time. In 1920 a government film bureau was established with the right to censor all films shown in Germany. There are at present two boards of censorship (*Prüfungsstelle*), one in Berlin and the other in Munich. Protests against the decisions of the *Filmprüfstelle* can be brought before a board of appeals (*Oberprüfungsstelle*), whose decisions are final. A series of general regulations has been set up by the government for the censors. Thus a film is not accepted if examination shows that its performance "is likely to injure German prestige or to endanger the relations of Germany with foreign governments." Likewise, a film is to be prohibited if it menaces law and order through an appeal to criminal action, if it ridicules religion or religious institutions, or if it produces a coarsening or immoral effect.

Most of the films so far prohibited, in whole or in part, have been objected to on moral grounds; only a small portion has

¹ According to the distributing corporation handling this film about five million people saw the film from April, 1926, to April, 1928.

been banned because of political antagonism to the existing state.¹ On the whole, the boards of censorship, especially the one in Munich, have been very tolerant toward nationalist films; only when the antagonism has been too obvious has the censorship intervened. Such nationalist films as have been prohibited, have been done mainly for fear of offending foreign governments. For example, "Under the Cross" was considered likely to offend Poland; while "The Disgrace on the Ruhr" and "The Plight of the Ruhr Railroadmen" were felt to be too bitterly anti-French to be used during the invasion of the Ruhr. On a more recent occasion (1928), a film showing a parade of the Stahlhelm, the nationalist military organization, was prohibited for the following reasons: "The participation of officers of the old army, who review the goosestep parade; the parade itself; the presence of flags and regimental standards of the old régime, which the Stahlhelm uses; the use of field kitchens; the old uniforms, etc." One must avoid the impression that "the Stahlhelm, although unarmed, could easily be turned into an armed body trained along military lines for future contingencies."

With the coming of the Russian revolutionary films the censorship has increasingly turned its attention to this field. It has often made considerable cuts of those portions of the film which it has deemed dangerous to the internal peace of the country. Thus the film "Potemkin" was cut, then prohibited, but finally after many struggles released in practically its original form. Certain German films of radical or even pacifist tendencies have been likewise cut or prohibited by the censor. The outstanding example is the decision of the censorship bureau in regard to "All Quiet on the Western Front."

It is difficult to determine to what extent the film helps to strengthen the civic and national consciousness of the various classes of society. The openly nationalist and reactionary films are of value in reinforcing the already existing nationalist sentiment found mainly among the upper and middle classes and certain strata of the proletariat. In radical working-class centers such films are sometimes boycotted, sometimes greeted with

¹ See the list of prohibited films in the *Filmjahrbuch*.

jeers, the intensity of which is in direct proportion to the tenseness of the political situation. Here it may be added that the relatively high price of admission prevents the ordinary worker and his family from attending the "movies" as often as would the American workingman. On the other hand, his emotional reaction is probably more intense to those pictures he sees.

The rural population while being national in sentiment is less subtle in its reaction. It has a less definite political attitude than the city population and, when it does attend the "movies," it is willing to accept almost anything which diverts it from the rather monotonous life of the village. The question, however, remains open whether, due to the smaller number of propagandistic forces which influence the rural population, the latter is not influenced more thoroughly by one nationalist picture than the city population by a dozen. Russian films are rarely shown in the rural sections.

The so-called neutral films, like all other forms of non-political entertainment, can serve and have served in Germany to weaken the disruptive forces of society. This form of divertive propaganda must not be underestimated especially during periods of intense political crises. In such cases patriotic films only help to arouse the hostility of the radical part of the population. On the other hand, neutral films have the tendency to weaken at least temporarily the bitterness against existing conditions and thus to relax the tense mood prevailing at the time.

CHAPTER XVI

NATIONAL SYMBOLISM

By ISIDOR GINSBURG

This is an attempt to examine the rôle which symbolism plays in the development of German civic and national loyalties. A proper interpretative presentation requires first a brief estimate of the rôle of symbolism in society, and second a consideration of how the dominant symbols of present German society have arisen to play that rôle.

For our purposes, symbols, whether slogans or emblems, are those objects and expressions which exert influence in social life through the emotional content which they have acquired. They are, as it were, the "projected patterns" of ideas,¹ and serve to focus emotional response. Like a switch which releases a current to do certain work, a symbol releases powerful emotions which establish favorable or unfavorable mental sets toward various social objects. Symbolism becomes socially important through the habit-forming tendencies of the mind, for the mind undergoes experience and organizes itself with reference to indicators of the social world outside. These indicators are concepts or more popularly stereotypes, to which it develops habitual responses. As the stereotype becomes familiar, a word, a phrase, a melody, or an object becomes sufficient to evoke the stereotype and the emotional response associated with it. Where individual experience or social training has resulted in endowing the concept or stereotype evoked with a strong emotional tone, the mind takes a short-cut, the concept itself tends to be minimized, and the stimulus is now a symbol within our meaning. A conditioned response has been perfected. Social attitudes in this way boil themselves down to key words, phrases, tunes, or objects which we call symbols; but it is, of course, impossible to say at what point, for example, the word "democracy" ceases

¹ F. S. Chapin, *Social Change*, p. 20.

to be an abstraction or an ideal and becomes a slogan or key word. As the symbol becomes invested with emotional power, this emotion may be applied to the things to which the symbol is connected. Those who have acquired a favorable response to "patriotic" have a tendency to regard everything called patriotic as good, everything called unpatriotic as bad. Symbols by evoking favorable or unfavorable responses thus become labels of approval or disapproval which need bear no intrinsic relation to the nature of the things labeled. Indeed, they open up a whole field of thought in which the steps are related to each other not by the careful contrast of syllogistic premise but by accidental or purposive association or conditioning. This is a field of mental activity of considerable importance, for the ease with which associations may be formed makes the process largely an unconscious one, while it remains very difficult to uncover illogical associations which may have been made under stress of strong emotion.¹

Like other symbols, the objects, words, and phrases which become social and national symbols easily free themselves from the circumstances out of which they have evolved, and develop along lines of their own—lines which in this case tend to follow the social process. Beginning as ideals or yearnings, programs become phrases, slogans, or symbols of aspiration for desired changes, and undergo a certain augmentation of influence until struggle is precipitated. Becoming now slogans of conflict, they touch off tremendous charges of emotion, until, used again and again, symbol and emotion become almost indistinguishable. Should the struggle die down or achieve only a trifling success, the emotional power behind the symbol undergoes diminution; the symbol may become one of shame and failure, and be discarded, perhaps to be taken up by another class. Thus the slogan "liberty" was dropped after 1848 by the German bour-

¹ F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*; R. M. Eaton, *Symbolism and Truth* (1925); J. K. Folsom, *Social Psychology* (1931); H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (2d ed., 1931); R. Mayreder, *Der typische Verlauf sozialer Bewegungen* (2d ed., 1926); C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning* (1923); S. A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics*; A. N. Whitehead, *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect* (1927).

geoisie; but it passed to the working classes, for whom it still embodied a vital aspiration.

Where the demands of an important class remain unfulfilled, and the symbol still retains great potency, the powers in command may choose the expedient of partial concession to the demand, sometimes giving questionable or even perverted meaning to the symbol. This can the more easily occur in that the symbol, born of struggle, must be brief rather than explicit. By offering an emasculated substitute for the original demand, ruling forces in the state are in a position to neutralize the power of the symbol to command emotional allegiance; or by capturing the symbol, to enlist an anti-state emotion in support of the state; while the exponents of the new, deprived of their symbols, are placed in a negative and carping position. This was the case when the Social Democrats so bitterly opposed Bismarck's social insurance measures.

But should a great social conflict result in success, the symbols become symbols of victory and achievement. Glorified by the triumph of "justice," and filled with emotional, moral, and even mystic value, they are given a new lease of life. They are no longer symbols against the state, but the emotional power they have acquired through struggle and victory is now used to tie the lower classes to the new social and political order which has been achieved. Thus the symbols which drew life and breath from the struggle for bourgeois control of the state now live largely by artificial respiration from the state under bourgeois control. No longer is their significance inherent in the social, economic, and political strife of the time; the mind of the governed classes must be deliberately conditioned. The association of symbol and emotion is now established, not by the discipline of struggle toward a new righteousness, but by the discipline of systematic training toward a righteousness that prevails.

Almost the whole technique of civic and national propaganda centers around this problem of conditioning the minds of the masses to the institutions which are at once the essence and the symbols of bourgeois society and the bourgeois state. First of all,

the symbols of the state must be impressed upon the easily susceptible minds of the young, from which it is very difficult to dislodge them. To this end are employed not only slogans but personalities and concrete objects, as emblems upon which the young and the less imaginative may focus their emotions. Arising from the love of familiar objects, and from the primeval love of field and forest, a glamor is made to surround the home locality and the landscape—a glamor naturally heightened where historic spots objectify the exalted traditions of the past, and easily transferred to the state as the unifying and protective symbol of the region, and as the present symbol of the glorious history and traditions of the people. Here are also brought into play not merely the emblems of the state, such as flag, seal, anthems, person of the ruler, but also that personification of self-idealization, the myth-evoking national hero, who, endowed with more than human qualities, furnishes standards of conduct and self-sacrifice which are definitely in support of state and society.¹ Not merely the national hero and the historic scene, but the whole of the national tradition is so presented that the state is at once the bearer, the point of convergence, and the culmination of the strivings and traditions of that symbolic entity, the nation.

Nor do the efforts of the state cease with the young. Practically all the activity of the state helps to popularize the national and social symbols. There are, of course, the more formal emblems. The governmental official wears a certain uniform; coins and postage stamps bear the state insignia; there are public buildings and monuments. More important by far is the fact that every time the individual comes into contact with government it is through some visible concrete person, institution, or organ which symbolizes that invisible, intangible, but very real and powerful institution, the state. While certain of its symbols are widely prevalent, others impress not by repetition but by solemnity or rarity; thus a certain hymn is played only in memory of those who died in the war. The major symbols of

¹ H. Oncken, *Wie ehrt ein Volk seine grossen Männer?* (1915); R. Hessen, *Deutsche Männer* (1912).

the state become indeed the objects of an elaborate ceremonialism; the flag or the person of the ruler, honored on every state occasion, is surrounded with a whole ritual of observances. This ritualism is given added weight by the participation of the highest officials of the political and religious life of the nation. Its whole purpose is to inculcate awe and reverence for the national symbols, and, by association, for the state. Next, the state itself is made a symbol for various ideals—justice, humanity, honor—while the highest ideals of man, by the loose logic of symbolism, become in turn symbolic of the state, until by transfer and retransfer we are finally brought to the ineffable reaches of nationalistic mysticism, in which the state becomes for Hegel and his followers at once the divine expression of the *Zeitgeist* and the consummation of human good.

Turning now to consider in more specific detail the rôle of symbols in developing civic and national loyalty in Germany, we find ourselves dealing with a symbolism evolved by the bourgeois national state. There is a close correspondence between these symbols and the various stages of bourgeois development. For the bourgeoisie, having helped the monarch toward absolutism in its fight against feudal institutions and feudal control, abandoned absolutism as it gained strength and sought liberty and *laissez faire*. Its supremacy established, it has moved on from liberty to authority, to restraint, and even to repression in proportion as it has felt itself threatened by the rise of the industrial masses. The symbols of bourgeois state and society have closely mirrored these changes.

In the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the feudal aristocracy, the bourgeoisie in the larger states found an ally in the prince, who was merely the strongest of the feudal lords and who as ruler sought to increase his control over the other feudal nobles. The new institutions which the ruler developed became symbols of the princely strength; and these, together with the older feudal trappings, combined to make up the symbolism of the absolutist state. The monarch became the master-symbol of justice, law, and order, as against the injustice, lawlessness, and disorder of the feudal régime. In the struggle of the prince

for supremacy, the bourgeoisie accepted and even fostered the tendency to set him apart from other nobles in every way. This may be seen in its purer form in England and France. Here the king came early to be the symbol of state authority; he was the dispenser of royal justice; he maintained the king's peace upon the king's highway; he owned all the land of the kingdom, others holding in fee from him. Anointed by the church, his person and position were sanctified by God. In Germany, the existence of a weak Emperor complicated matters, until the virtual destruction of both the bourgeoisie and the Empire in the seventeenth century left the field clear for the rise of the local absolutisms of the eighteenth. Here, as elsewhere, absolutism resulted in the glorification of the person of the prince and everything that pertained to it. The crown, the scepter, the throne, the princely robes, the princely presence, the prince's court, his standard, his palaces, his seal, the eagle or other emblem, the princely coat of arms—all were of special significance down to the princely walking stick and the princely hounds. Decorations were coveted as visible emblems of the prince's personal cognizance of the wearer. The ruler himself and all his psychological extensions became symbols of the state, popular with the bourgeoisie and the lower classes because they exemplified the objects for which these classes had striven in opposition to the landed aristocracy. Against this class the words "royal," "electoral," "princely," became symbols evoking the loyalty of the bourgeoisie. In Prussia and in Germany, where monarchy continued down to 1918, monarchical and princely symbolism remained potent in appeal to bourgeois society. We shall see, indeed, that the alliance between bourgeoisie and monarchy became increasingly marked.

In addition to the ruler as the great symbol of the state, with the lesser symbols clustered about, there was the whole machinery developed around the crown and through which the ruler's word was made law. This was especially true in Prussia. First and foremost, there was the army and a whole host of symbols connected with the military service: the uniform, the helmet, the sword of the officer, the standards, both royal and

regimental, and the whole set of ideals and attitudes inculcated by and useful to this military machine—courage, discipline, obedience, devotion to duty, self-sacrifice. Loyalty to the king as commander in chief (*Oberster Kriegsherr*) was, of course, essential. Military traditions, especially the glorious victories of the Prussian army, were constantly emphasized, and names like Rossbach and Leuthen became symbols of military achievement. The soldier was brought into contact with a conglomeration of objects, concepts, and slogans, and an important part of his training consisted in developing by thorough drill an immediate motor and emotional response to these symbols. Where universal military training subjected a large mass of the population to such conditioning, as was to be the case in Germany, the effect was obvious. In the aristocratic officers' corps, the traditions of honor and courage were taken from feudalism itself, and zealously fostered by insistence upon dueling and its code, so that the "honor of an officer" became itself a symbol. The value of all these symbols was first to insure the loyalty of the army to the king; second, to promote the cohesiveness of the army and make it a more efficient military machine; third, to keep it on a psychological plane at least equal to that of the aristocracy from which it must attract its leaders; fourth, to evoke a pride in and affection for that army among the people who must pay for its support. And finally, the army was itself a symbol of the greatness and strength of the monarch—and of the power of the growing bourgeoisie.

A special aspect of the military arm of the prince was the police; indeed, the original German expression for absolutist administration is *Polizeistaat*. While the term is itself one of absolutism, the police as we know them grow partly out of the night-watchmen of the medieval towns, whose duty it was to prevent brawls and protect the property of worthy burghers. With the formation of a state police, the police uniform, the police saber, the police station—in short, the entire daily contact of the police with the general population—developed insignia of the princely authority and impressed that authority upon the minds of the lower classes.

Besides the army, the other important arm of the king's service to be developed was the bureaucracy. While the army was in the absolutist state a stronghold of the aristocracy and remained so down to 1918, the bureaucracy, whose function it was to carry on the business of the state, was drawn largely from the bourgeoisie and tended to develop a bourgeois spirit. This is true despite the fact that the upper offices were usually reserved for the aristocracy. Thus, where the "honor" of an officer referred chiefly to his courage, the "honor" of a civil servant (*Beamtenehre*) referred chiefly to his honesty; there the army emphasized personal pride and honor, the bureaucracy tended to negate personal feelings and emphasize objectivity (*Sachlichkeit*); where the army placed great emphasis on discipline as its psychological cornerstone, the bureaucracy sought rather to emphasize systematic endeavor (*System*). To be sure, the bureaucracy was just as loyal as the army to its uniform, to its duty, to the person of the monarch, and to the absolutist state. But the functions which it was called upon to perform (its first task had been to manage the ruler's estates) required an understanding of finance, accounting, administration, and other matters which to some extent had to be borrowed from bourgeois experience, and which kept the bureaucracy in practical and psychological contact with the bourgeois world. Indeed, by introducing the technical necessities of capitalist economy, such as a sound currency, a postal system, corporation and banking legislation, railroads, telegraphs, and so on, the bureaucracy was to pave the way for the great expansion of the bourgeoisie.

In return, the bourgeoisie developed attitudes favorable to the various aspects of the bureaucracy. First of all, to place the bureaucracy on an equal psychological plane with the aristocracy which it must combat, it was given social prestige second only to that of the army. This prestige was not only of significance in society but helped to develop among the bureaucracy itself the high ideals of *Beamtenehre* (the honor of an official). This was the easier in that the psychological values taken over from bourgeois life and developed by the bureaucracy in its service to king and state were among those most prized by the

bourgeoisie. Honesty, devotion to duty (*Dienstpflicht*), freedom from bias or prejudice (*Sachlichkeit*), and the famous German efficiency, which in Germany is connected most intimately with the bureaucracy—all became symbols. And the bureaucracy itself (*Beamtentum*) with its administration of affairs (*Verwaltung*) became the great symbol of the paternal state, extending aid and guidance to the growing bourgeoisie thoughtfully, equitably, without passion or prejudice.

Thus in moving from feudalism toward capitalism the bourgeoisie came to a halfway station, absolutism, and around this camp along the way it hung a whole mass of emblems pertaining to the prince, the army, and the bureaucracy. In the prince, the disunion of feudal society had become bourgeois union; in the army, the disorder of feudal society had become the order of the bourgeoisie; and in the bureaucracy, the wasteful anarchy of feudal government had become the prudent administration of bourgeois social and economic life. To each of these three elements, therefore, adhered the affection, the devotion, and the gratitude of the bourgeoisie. In turn, the princely person, the army, and the bureaucracy were each central symbols about which clustered an untold mass of lesser symbolic values, as each of them became significant in the struggle for the essential conditions of bourgeois society.

In thus rallying to the rulers, the weak German bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century moved not along national but along local lines. The rising power of the local prince produced, therefore, not nationalism but provincialism. The local courts of Germany had fallen under the political and cultural guidance of the more advanced French monarchy; and for more than a century after Westphalia, they were to ape the language, the literary norms, the manners, the licentiousness, of Versailles. Only in the last quarter of the eighteenth century did the German bourgeoisie, stimulated by the example of the English and the French, begin to espouse symbols of nationalism and freedom. But since this class was relatively weak, its symbols did not at first take a political form, but made their appearance rather as cultural shibboleths. From the cultural sphere, it passed through an

awakened literary consciousness to nationalism as a political and economic demand, and to demands for other political and economic changes. As each of these fields was reached, new personalities, new slogans, new concepts were added to those just developed to symbolize the demands of the growing bourgeoisie. In this way purely cultural concepts developed into symbols of political and economic strivings.

This is not the place to disentangle the many strands of German cultural development. Broadly speaking, this period found German cultural life coming under the dominance of certain watchwords: nature and naturalism, the natural, unspoiled life of the people, and, by easy transition, the people or the nation. Rousseau's formula, "back to nature," served as a battle cry of the German bourgeoisie against the Frenchified formalism of the courts and court poets, and the Latinized pedantry of the schools. In the process, *Deutsche Dichtung* (German poetic accomplishment in all its manifestations) was to become the great symbol of affirmation. Lessing, the young Goethe, the young Schiller, the whole "storm and stress" movement which they led, were thus not merely figures demanding free and natural expression and a new literary style and content. In their denunciation of the old, and in their direct appeal to the emotions of the middle classes, their names, their themes, their principal characters, became symbols of a heightened self-respect on the part of the German bourgeoisie as against the contempt meted out to them by the aristocracy.

While the new movement gave way for a time to a classic revival, it was to reappear transformed in the complex Romantic movement at the turn of the century. The French Revolution had been greeted in Germany with acclaim. "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" became symbols of great import to the German middle classes, retaining their influence throughout the Terror, the reaction, and the rise of Napoleon. Indeed, the Romantic movement may in some of its phases be considered a psychological escape from this discord between the new symbol and the old reality. The flight of the Romanticist writers from the present into the past, into the supernatural and mystical, into a

fantastic medievalism, may be regarded as symptomatic of the undeveloped and unorganized German bourgeoisie, which, relinquishing its allegiance to absolutism, was as yet unwilling and unable to guide its craft into the full current of revolution. Perhaps the most important result of this flight from the present—which was also a flight from the accepted symbols of the present—was the impulse now given to Herder's ideas of cultural nationalism. The Romanticists discovered again the folk songs and other manifestations of popular fantasy. *Volksdichtung*, meeting a great need, became a popular slogan of the bourgeoisie; and all expressions of the poetic imagination of the people were eagerly sought out and extolled. Turning sheer around from its customary habit of copying aristocracy, the German bourgeoisie now tended to identify itself with the common people. In folk lore, in folk songs and ballads, in the folk books of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in folk legends, folk sayings, folk festivals, and folk costumes it found a whole series of achievements which it hailed with delight and which became symbols to prove its greatness. The German bourgeoisie was cementing that same unconscious alliance with the peasantry which the French bourgeoisie had made.¹

Absolutism, with its centralizing tendencies directed against the localism of feudal society, was no longer a symbol full of meaning. Under the impetus of the French Revolution, the reaction of the growing German bourgeoisie to petty absolutist centralization was nationalism. It rejected the principle that the state was the king or prince, guided by the aristocracy, in favor of the principle that the state was the whole people. But under the crushing blows of Napoleon, German nationalism was drawn from opposition to the princes and the old régime, and

¹ R. R. Ergang, *Herder and German Nationalism* (1931); K. Francke, *Social Forces in German Literature* (1896); G. P. Gooch, *Germany and the French Revolution* (1920); C. J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (1926) and *Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (1931); R. Haym, *Die romantische Schule* (2d ed., 1906); F. L. Jahn, *Deutsches Volksthum* (1810); W. Scherer and O. Walzel, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur* (3d ed., 1921); A. Stern, *Einfluss der französischen Revolution auf das deutsche Geistesleben* (1928); O. F. Walzel, *Deutsche Romantik* (5th ed., 1920); T. Ziegler, *Die geistigen und sozialen Strömungen Deutschlands im 19ten Jahrhundert* (1916).

received a definitely anti-foreign cast. *Vaterland*, *Deutsche Nation*, *Deutsches Volk*, *Deutsches Land*, now became the central symbols; Arndt, Uhland, Körner, and Hölderlin sang songs of German pride and emphasized the spiritual unity in the fatherland of all Germans. Led by Jacob Grimm, a whole host of figures delved into the various manifestations of the German genius (*Deutsches Wesen*); the German language and folk literature were now recognized as national, and the word *Volk* itself came now to mean not merely the people but the nation. For the first time since before the Reformation, German nation and German fatherland had become proud and moving titles.

But it was not enough that the inner poetic nature of the German soul had been discovered and all these facets of the *Deutscher Volksgeist* had become symbols of spiritual unity. It was time now to discover and reveal in action the German character; and this Fichte set out to do in his *Addresses to the German Nation*. The very title emphasized that spiritual unity the emotional force of which was to be used in the struggle for political unity. The patriot capturing the philosopher, Fichte stressed the great advantages of those who spoke the living German language over those who spoke the "dead language" of the Latin peoples. He went on to analyze German personality. He found that the German possessed simplicity (*Einfalt*), spirituality (*Geist*), earnestness (*Ernst*), zeal (*Eifer*), loyalty (*Treue*), and that untranslatable quality, *Gemüt*. The fine traits thus discovered in the German character were to become ideals of individual and national conduct and symbols of national unity and steadfastness. To justify the claims of Germany to greatness, the Romanticists sought and found in the German past a whole series of inspiring symbols—the *Minnesinger*, the *Meistersinger*, the unity of the medieval empire, the great Emperor Frederic Barbarossa, who would some day rise again to lead the German people against oppression, the free city republics of the Middle Ages, the free Imperial knights of the Reformation. All German political and cultural history, in fact, and all German imaginative literature (*Dichtung*) became an arsenal out of which were drawn countless symbols to prove the past achievements of the

German people, and stir them to renewed greatness under a new leadership—in which the bourgeoisie were to participate. German scholarship in history, mythology, philology, jurisprudence, and a dozen other branches became the handmaidens of German bourgeois patriotism.

The nationalism originally developing against the aristocracy and the old régime was directed against Napoleon's invasions, and, linked up with the old loyalties, experienced a tremendous expansion. But although still loyal to its rulers, Germany's growing nationalism allied itself with a master-slogan borrowed from the French Revolution and of tremendous import to the German bourgeoisie for the next half-century—the cry for freedom. In the non-political minds of German intellectuals, this concept became somewhat mystic; Fichte, for example, spoke of a free national republic in which people and princes should be united.¹ Freedom was, indeed, a basic factor in the new Germany which was to be created; the Prussian monarchy had risen phoenix-like to a new greatness and popularity through the liberal reforms of Stein and Hardenberg. The first war of the German states against the symbols and armies of the French Revolution had been not at all popular. But by this time the new demands and symbols had captured the German bourgeoisie; and by using the term *Freiheitskrieg* (war of liberation) German leaders were able to arouse national enthusiasm as never before. Indeed, these wars serve as an excellent example of how a ruling caste using symbols of great potency could thereby harness to its own purposes powerful emotions that were fundamentally opposed to it. Thousands of patriotic Germans perished in the wars of liberation for a freedom which had never been defined, for the realization of promises which few of the ruling caste ever meant to fulfil.²

With the defeat of Napoleon, however, the princes at once dropped these dangerous symbols of nationalism and freedom

¹ B. Bauch, *Fichte und der deutsche Staatsgedanke* (1925).

² H. Delbrück, "Neues über 1813," *Preussische Jahrbücher*, July, 1914; F. Schnabel, *Deutsche Geschichte im 19ten Jahrhundert*, Vol. I (1929); F. Mehring, *1813 bis 1819* (1913); F. Meinecke, *Weltherrschaft und Nationalstaat* (6th ed., 1922).

which had thus been perverted, and again put forward the old symbols of absolutist particularism. The bourgeois master-symbols of nationalism and freedom were now regarded as definitely anti-state; poets of nationalism and freedom were dangerous characters. We need not repeat the story of Metternichian reaction. But although agitation was held in check, the growing bourgeoisie from 1815 to 1848 brought the central symbol, freedom or liberty, from the cultural to the economic and political sphere, gave it specific content, and secured certain important gains. As this class strove to emancipate itself and secure the basic conditions for rapid growth, bourgeois liberty or freedom came to mean not merely liberty of the person, freedom of speech, press, assembly, instruction. It meant also freedom of industry and commerce, freedom of contract, freedom to buy landed estates, freedom thus to move from one social class to another. Property especially must be free from arbitrary seizure by the state. To guard their freedom, the bourgeoisie demanded that these liberties be consolidated in a bill of rights; and from this it was but a step to demand parliamentary government with cabinet responsibility. In fact, the whole series of checks which the English had developed against absolutism, and which the French Revolution had adopted, now became for the weaker German bourgeoisie a series of symbols. About them the business men centered their demands and their efforts; in them the poets and the students, seeking cultural ends through political means, saw the realization of their dreams for the liberation of the German soul.

In one state or another, especially in Southern Germany, where the bourgeoisie was further developed and the French Revolution had exercised greater influence, many of these demands for political and economic freedom were granted in greater or lesser degree. But the demand for unity made the symbols of nationalism equally important. Turning from the powerless German Federation under the domination of reactionary agrarian Austria, the bourgeoisie welcomed the economic unification of the German nation in the Prussian Zollverein. The growing economic and political support for German national unification

was accompanied by an ever growing spiritual and cultural support. The blood of German soldiers had been spilled on the field of battle for the symbols of German national unity, and had given them mystic value. While political agitation could be forbidden, it was impossible to suppress the cult of *Volksdichtung*, based as it was upon the entire cultural life of a people. Nor was it now possible to deprecate the language which Herder and Fichte had hailed as the living spirit of a great free people and in which Goethe and Schiller had written. Besides, a great enthusiasm had arisen for all the regions hallowed by the romantic past of Germany or by the new romantic love of German scenery, and such rivers as the Rhine, the Neckar, the Saale; such regions as the Schwarzwald, the Thüringerwald, the Böhmerwald; such mountains as the Harz; such cities as Aachen, Frankfurt, Munich, Dresden, Nuremberg, Weimar, Cologne, the Hanse towns; such places as the Wartburg and Heidelberg—all became sentimentalized in song and story. Each became a mecca for patriotic Germans, convinced that no country could rival Germany in historic associations and scenic attractions. And each became a symbol of German national greatness and that national political unity which must one day be achieved. About these symbols of the *Volk*, of nationalism and national tradition, the poets continued to weave their spell. At this source the scholars drank a draught of intellectual and moral enthusiasm the effects of which have not yet died away. History, philology, philosophy, comparative jurisprudence—indeed, every active branch of the social disciplines—was vitally affected by the evolution and acceptance of new social symbols which served as the psychological bases of a new social, economic, political, cultural, and ethical order.

Perhaps the chief single contribution of the time from our point of view was Hegel's glorification of the state. If, as Treitschke says, Kant had regarded the attainment of bourgeois order as the goal of civilization, and Fichte had likewise extolled the state, Hegel "regarded the state as the actualization of the moral ideal, as the realization of the ethical will," according to this institution "an omnipotence . . . which it had

never possessed since the Christian world had recognized the right of the individual conscience."¹ More than any other thinker, Hegel created the intellectual basis for the state which the German bourgeoisie of the time required. The cult of the state which he popularized was to form for the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia a powerful new element, which, planned at first as a progressive ideal, was to become, even with Hegel himself, a symbol of reaction and a means of glorifying the status quo.

The acceptance of Hegel's emphasis on the state was due, however, less to his profound thinking than to the fact that it corresponded to the changing attitude of an important section of the bourgeoisie. The larger states of Germany had shown a remarkable adaptability to the ideals and symbols of the new régime. Beginning with Stein and Hardenberg in Prussia and Montgelas in Bavaria, as we have seen, a policy of gradual concession to the substance of the new demands was carried on, sometimes resulting in the capture of the symbol. The "freeing" of the peasantry, the erection of the Zollverein, the securing of the essential conditions of capitalist enterprise, all contributed to a feeling on the part of a large portion of the immature bourgeoisie that its future was secure in the hands of the existing state, and to the acceptance of this state.

While the Revolution of 1848 was in large measure an attempt to realize the great ideals and symbols of freedom and unity, the majority of the Frankfurt Assembly sought to accomplish this entirely on the basis of the existing states, making no effort to seize power. The monarchs who had granted concessions before were now invited to submit to constitutional changes which were not intended to endanger them, but which would insure bourgeois control through the achievement of bourgeois liberty and bourgeois union. Due allowance may be made for the comparative weakness and political inexperience of the bourgeoisie and the difficulty of its problem. But there was also a new and important cause for bourgeois moderation: the fear of a

¹ H. Treitschke, *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century* (tr. by C. and E. Paul), IV, 572-73.

new class and a new radicalism. A series of warning occurrences had become signals of danger, not only to the state, but also to the bourgeoisie—the Terror in France, the Chartist movement in England, the strike of the silk weavers in Lyons, the riots of the weavers in Silesia, the March Days in Berlin, the June uprising of the workers in Paris, the September uprising in Frankfurt. All these threats to the existing social order, all these scenes of violence and bloodshed, carried home to the bourgeoisie the fact that bourgeois development brought in its train the development of a proletariat—propertyless and dependent upon them for a livelihood, but without an economic stake in the existing order, and impelled by economic and political impotence and despair to use violence or the threat of violence to improve its condition.

With the failure of the Frankfurt Assembly and the Revolution, the symbols of *Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit* were greatly dimmed. In quest of liberty, thousands left for America, where they were to come under the spell of symbols strikingly similar to those left behind. Such slogans as "Save the Union," "Free the Slaves," were to draw many German immigrants into the ranks of the Union Army in our Civil War.

The great economic prosperity of the following quarter-century caused a considerable expansion in the wealth, size, and power of the German bourgeoisie, and this, together with the new Prussian constitution of 1850, kept it, on the whole, economically and politically content. Even in Prussia it enjoyed the semblance of a coruling position in the state with the aristocracy, while its basic economic needs were being provided by the bureaucracy. The quarrel between Bismarck and the Prussian Parliament from 1862 to 1866 was a quarrel over political control; but the bourgeoisie had no intention of taking matters into their own hands through rebellion. And, while Bismarck was trampling political rights underfoot, he was laying plans for the rejuvenation of the national ideals. It was hardly an accident that he sought, in 1864 and 1866, to reawaken German national sentiment by means of Schleswig-Holstein. For these provinces had become stirring national symbols in 1848, when

contributions had poured into Frankfort to build a fleet to protect them.

By 1866 Bismarck had succeeded in tearing apart the two great symbols of nineteenth-century Germany. National unity had been carried to swift victory over Austria, and the Prussian Parliament celebrated by surrendering to Bismarck. *Freiheit* as a symbol had passed from the field, since the bourgeoisie no longer needed it to attain its objectives. Instead, the king and the army, until then often regarded as symbols of tyranny and restraint, became the new symbols of national unification. Victory over France followed soon. With the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles, the symbols of German nationalism were combined with those of the semi-absolute Hohenzollerns. The bourgeois songs of nationalism, *Deutschland über Alles*, *Die Wacht am Rhein*, written during the national agitation of the forties, became popular among all classes. The Prussian monarch became the *Deutscher Kaiser*—the German Emperor; while Bismarck and his “Blood and Iron” policy became the great symbols of the longed-for achievement of German unity.

Official emblems were at once adopted for the Empire. The black and white of Prussia was fused with the red and white of the Hanseatic League to make the new *Schwarz-Weiss-Rot*. The new Imperial eagle was the Prussian eagle writ large, bearing on its breast a shield with the Prussian eagle grasping ball and scepter, while the Imperial eagle had empty claws. With some small concessions to the other reigning princes of Germany, and to the bourgeoisie, the official symbolism of the Empire was taken largely from semi-absolutist Prussia. The absolutist symbolism which centered in the king and the symbols of the army and the bureaucracy were now fused with the great cultural and national traditions of the German bourgeoisie to form the symbolism of the new German national empire.¹ The democratic ideal was not entirely ignored; while retaining the Prussian

¹ C. von Puttkammer, “Die Wiedererstärkung des deutschen Volkstums u. das Fest der Deutschen im Jahre 1900” in *Jahrbuch für das Volks- und Jugendspiel* (1898); E. Kiick und H. Sohnrey, *Feste und Spiele des deutschen Landvolks* (1909); J. Schrammen, *Nordisch-Germanische Götter- u. Helden sagen* (1884).

three-class system, Bismarck provided that the Reichstag be chosen by universal manhood suffrage. With all its monarchistic and aristocratic trappings, however, the Empire was to become primarily the national Empire of the German bourgeoisie. True, the aristocracy remained in control; true, the monarchist symbolism remained the same; but while industry carried the bourgeoisie ahead with seven-league boots, the basis of the aristocracy, agriculture, moved slowly. Abroad and at home the government and the symbols of the semi-absolutist Empire became more and more the government and symbols of the bourgeoisie. Almost the whole foreign policy of Germany from 1890 on was conducted to secure new markets, new scope, new opportunity for the bourgeoisie in its competition with the bourgeoisie of other nations. The growth of the German navy and the acquisition of German colonies, which aided the extension of German commerce and authority throughout the whole world, became in the eyes of a large portion of the people symbolic of the growing influence, strength, and moral worth of the nation.

Impelled thus by the securing of its economic necessities, by national unification, by certain political concessions and by fear of the working class, the bourgeoisie made its peace with Prussian semi-absolutism. The second stage of bourgeois development could now proceed; not, as in England or France, under the symbol of freedom, but at any rate under the symbols of order, efficiency, and authority, which would prevent a proletarian uprising.¹

In accepting the renewed semi-absolutism in symbol and essence, the German bourgeoisie broke with the program and symbolism of liberalism, which had, in the main, kept the working classes allied to them. To the bourgeoisie and the middle classes the Empire offered much; but to the new industrial proletariat, which became a pit into which sank the declassed members of pre-capitalist social groups, the Empire brought little. In the discarded symbols of bourgeois liberalism and democracy, and in the new Marxian Socialism—hybrid children both of the

¹ W. H. Dawson, *The German Empire: 1867-1914 and the Unity Movement* (2 vols., 1919); J. Hohlfeld, *Geschichte des deutschen Reiches, 1871-1924* (1924).

French and Industrial revolutions—the growing masses of Germany found ideas, programs, and symbols to express their strivings and dissatisfaction. From its amalgamation in 1875, the German Social Democracy built up its organization until by 1914 it was the largest and most active party in the Empire. An ever growing portion of the German working class rallied to the red flag and the Internationale, and responded to such watch words as the proletariat, the toiling masses, "Workers of the world, unite!" surplus value, class struggle, expropriation of the expropriators, and the other current slogans of the Social Democracy. Men like Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Liebknecht, Bebel, Kautsky, and the forerunners of Socialism became class heroes, *das Kapital* and the Communist Manifesto the new gospels.¹

The seemingly irresistible growth of the Social Democracy, despite the frantic efforts of Bismarck, brought a twofold development. Outside the party, the augmentation of the Socialist symbols was a large contributing factor in the development of non-Marxian or even anti-Marxian ideals and symbols of socialism and social change. Led by von Ketteler, by the Socialists of the chair, and finally by Bismarck, the ruling classes sought to substitute a kind of State Socialism for the ideals and symbols of Marxian Socialism. By 1914, Germany had the most advanced social legislation in the world, and the most extended system of municipal and state-owned enterprise; while practically every political party had put forth a program of social change. The semi-absolutist Hegelian bourgeois state had become socio-paternalistic as well; but it remained the state of the bourgeoisie.

The symbols borrowed from or advanced as counter-symbols against the Social Democracy were obviously stripped of their Marxian import. But within the party itself the symbols of Socialism underwent a subtle change in significance. From its inception the Social Democracy had carried on a policy of opposition to the semi-absolutist bourgeois state, and its symbols

¹ Fr. Mehring, *Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie* (12th ed., 4 vols. in 2, 1922); A. Bebel, *Aus meinem Leben* (3 vols., 1910-14); H. Peus, "Zur Maifeierfrage" in *Sozialistische Monatshefte*, September, 1909; F. Giovanoli, *Die Maifeierbewegung* (1925); F. Wendel, *Die rote Fahne* (1927).

came to stand at once for opposition to bourgeois society and the bourgeois state. As the movement grew into a functioning political party of considerable size, the temptation became ever stronger to drop the anti-state attitude and become merely an anti-governmental party.¹ We can but suggest here some of the many factors at work to cause this change: the improved conditions which the organized portion of the working classes managed to win with the enormous expansion of German industry; the vast machinery of the new Empire, directed at the inculcation among proletarian youth—through school, army, bureaucracy, church, press, literature, etc.—of a reverence for the symbols of the state; the increasing participation of the party in local and provincial governing bodies, which gave it training in administration of bourgeois governmental machinery and a share in bourgeois political responsibility. At the turn of the century, the Revisionists had sought to express the new orientation: the symbols of Marxian Socialism must be dropped, and the party must work for concrete reforms. "The goal," cried Bernstein, "is nothing, the movement is everything." In the struggle that ensued, the Revisionists were defeated, and the symbols and program of "orthodoxy" triumphed. But underneath the Marxist phraseology, the rejected ideas of Revisionism were already being followed, until the party came to a virtual acceptance of the bourgeois state and its symbols. Revolutionary Marxism was moved into the background, where it was kept alive by the loyalty of left-wing leaders and masses; although Socialist symbols still held the stage, the center was now occupied by the symbolism of democracy, freedom and reform. For the Social Democracy, regarding itself the heir of 1848, held that the inherited symbols of bourgeois liberty must be fulfilled as the prerequisite of Socialism. This attitude in 1918-19 was to turn the revolutionary ideals and symbols of 1848 into shackles of social reaction; but even before the war it paved the way for a new kind of social patriotism. While the Kaiser was still unacceptable—as incompatible with the sym-

¹ Cf. C. J. H. Hayes, "History of German Socialism Reconsidered" in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, October, 1917.

bols of democracy—the Social Democratic leaders and a large share of their followers had come, consciously or unconsciously, to accept the German bourgeois state and German nationalism, and to link the symbols of German bourgeois nationalism with their own. This became ever more apparent with the increasing fear of military encirclement expressed by German leaders after 1905. The workers must protect Germany from attack because it had the best social legislation in the world. They must protect the nation which had the strongest Socialist and labor movement. The German bourgeois state must thus be protected because it was closest to Socialism—that is, to the destruction of the bourgeoisie. The symbols of Marxian Socialism, originally a revolutionary doctrine attracting those who sought the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, had become a means of winning them to the defense of the bourgeois state.¹

These contradictions, clearer today, had in 1914 impressed only the extreme left wing of the movement. The war found the Social Democracy, after a few peace demonstrations, as ready as any other party to respond to the great slogan, "The Fatherland in danger." The voting of the war credits in 1914 marked the definite and open acceptance by the Social Democrats of the symbols of the German Imperial national state as superior to their own, which were put aside as merely "party" symbols. A *Burgfrieden* (peace in the citadel) was swiftly arranged. From now on Socialists loyally rose for and sang "Heil Kaiser Dir," and cheered the Kaiser. In this time of national danger, when countless Social Democrats were in the trenches, the field gray, the steel helmet, the Iron Cross, in fact, the whole paraphernalia and symbolism of the military, aroused among Socialists emotions not of a negative but of a positive nature. Things formerly denounced as symbols of militarism now became for a time means of attaching the proletariat to the army and to the state. Down to 1918, the right and middle elements of the party supported loyally whatever government was in power, forcing out in 1915 those elements which in the following year formed the Independents, and which sought peace without annexations or

¹ P. Kampffmeyer, *E. Bernstein und der sozialistische Aufbau* (1930).

indemnities. Only a small group, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, advocated revolution; but their activities were underground and they had little influence. In 1918, however, the increasing mass dissatisfaction with the war found a vent. The Russian Bolshevik Revolution had evoked among a portion of the working classes a tremendous enthusiasm, and supplied a program and a symbolism—in large measure the reinvigorated symbolism of Marxist Socialism—of incalculable emotional power. The outbreak of rebellion at Kiel, and the formation of a Workers' and Sailors' Council, set fire to the whole country. Workers' councils were formed, while the men at the front were invited to elect their own. Following the example of Russia, ten thousand nameless workers took the lead in forming new local councils which seized power, while on all sides the cry arose, "All power to the Soviets!" The Kaiser fled, while the bourgeoisie, which had immolated itself politically on the altar of semi-absolutist despotism, was stupefied by this loss of its great central symbol. The Socialist and Independent Socialist leaders, who had long gained support by attacking such feudal and absolutist remains of the bourgeois state, at once took charge of the government. The masses had taken over the symbols of the Russian Revolution, but had not absorbed the anti-bourgeois state teachings of Marx and Engels which Lenin had expounded and applied in Russia. Unable to head off the Revolution, the majority Socialists nevertheless managed quickly to secure control and to persuade—or force—the councils to dissolve. Uprisings of the left were put down with the ready support of reactionary troops. For the symbols of the Russian Revolution, and dictatorship of the Proletariat, were offered the symbols of bourgeois revolution and democracy. The slogans, "National Assembly *versus* Dictatorship" and "Democracy *versus* Dictatorship," arose, and the National Assembly (shades of 1848!) became the ark of German liberties. About it every group supporting the bourgeois state, from the Socialists all the way to the Nationalists, could be rallied to oppose a proletarian dictatorship, with its threatened destruction of bourgeois society.

The position of the Social Democracy in control was a painful one. Having long rejected the idea of achieving socialism through the violent destruction of bourgeois society, it found itself defending bourgeois society by violence against the radical section of the proletariat. Having espoused the symbols of bourgeois freedom as the road to Socialism, it clung to and extolled symbols once revolutionary at a time when, historically speaking, they might be called symbols of reaction. But after rejecting proletarian dictatorship in favor of the National Assembly, the Social Democracy found itself in the minority, and was forced to share its control with Democrats and Centrists. From the point of view of the more radical element, the Social Democracy had killed the revolution by a counter-revolution.

The weaker left wing, in opposition to the National Assembly and the symbols of republicanism had sought to rally the workers to the symbols of proletarian dictatorship. Their efforts failed; Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were shot down, to become martyrs and symbols for the Spartacist and Communist movement. Strikes in the Ruhr and elsewhere were put down by force. The Independent Socialists, seeking to combine the symbols of democracy and liberty with those of Communism, were unable long to continue with their feet set in two directions. They soon split, part going over to the Communists, the rest returning to the Social Democracy. With the failure of the Hamburg uprising in 1923, the revolutionary impulse among the Communists passed from the surface, though its presence and readiness were still in evidence. Active politically, the party experienced a steady growth, until in 1930 it secured over four million votes. The failure of the German republic to secure substantial gains for the workers, together with the chronic crisis and unemployment since the war, has been placed in sharp contrast to the gains made by workers in Soviet Russia, and has produced a continuous augmentation of the influence of Communist symbols. Lenin by his writings and revolutionary leadership had rescued Marx from the Social Democracy to be the prophet of Communism, the new dispensation of Socialist thought and achievement. The whole paraphernalia of Marxian

symbolism had become rather emaciated under the Social Democracy to fit its program of a gradual approach to Socialism. The Communists now took it over and filled it full of the red blood of revolutionary agitation. The red flag, the Internationale, the revolution, the toiling masses, the dictatorship of the proletariat, became master symbols, with a host of lesser symbols ranged about, all with their significance revived and their old antagonism to bourgeois state and bourgeois society fully restored. The Socialists sought indeed to carry some of their symbolism over into the state, as they moved from a "state-denying" to a "state-affirming" attitude; but they have not been entirely successful. For much of the symbolism of Marxian Socialism has become the symbolism of Soviet Russia. Indeed, "Red Russia," or "Räte-Russland"—Soviet Russia—has become a central symbol of tremendous appeal, while the whole symbolism of the new order in Russia has come to occupy an important place in the agitation and the affections of the Communist movement. The hammer and sickle, the red star, the Soviets, the Revolution, the Third International, Lenin, Stalin, the Five-Year Plan, etc.—all these emblems, slogans, and personalities serve but as the outward symbols of a movement whose declared purpose is to win away allegiance from the symbols of bourgeois domination and bourgeois society, to create loyalty for a new proletarian classless society.

The triumph of the symbols of democracy in 1919 enabled the Weimar Constitutional Assembly to strip the semi-absolutist aristocratic façade from the German bourgeois state and substitute for it the symbols of 1848. Monarchy was abolished, and palaces became museums. For the black, white, and red of the empire was substituted the black, red, and gold of 1848. The Imperial eagle was stylized into a republican bird. The new republican constitution, born under the active threat of proletarian revolt, carried the most democratic provisions of any in existence, together with a certain amount of socialist phraseology; but it also made provision for dictatorship. For it there was little of the joyous emotion of a triumphant class achieving the fulfilment of powerful symbols endeared to it through years

of struggle. Even in 1848 the Republic had been espoused by only a small minority; as late as 1910, Rosa Luxemburg's proposal for a republican plank in the Socialist platform had been dismissed.¹ The Constitution marked not the triumph of a new era but the collapse of the old. The symbols chosen for the new régime through compromise had long lost their vitality, while the old symbols of the Empire were even dearer than before to many who had remained loyal throughout war and Revolution. But even more of the perquisites of German national glory were stripped from Germany by the peace treaty. The army, symbol of German strength and unity, was reduced to a force of 100,000. The navy, the merchant marine, the overseas possessions, all of them proud insignia of the expansion of German influence, passed from German hands. Important parts of German territory were occupied or taken away. The geographic unity of Germany was destroyed; her national sovereignty impaired. The pivot of European diplomacy had become a subject nation paying tribute to her conquerors.²

If for the Right the Republic which accepted the treaty became a symbol of national dishonor, the failure of the Kapp Putsch showed that the Empire and its symbols no longer held the German masses in thrall. But the continued economic crisis since the war, and the growing strength of the Communist party, have revealed alarming weakness in the symbols of democracy and liberalism with which the Republic is decked out. Even before 1914, as already mentioned, it was by symbols of social concession that the Empire sought to win the working classes. This tendency has continued. The existence of Soviet Russia not merely stimulated the development of a strong Communist party in Germany, but it has exercised a dominant influence—positive or negative—on non-Communist thought along economic, social, and political lines. Under the magnetic force of

¹ Rosa Luxemburg, *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. IV, Part 6.

² E. David, *Um die Fahne der deutschen Republik* (1921); W. Erman, *Schwarzrotgold und Schwarzweissrot* (1924); E. Jäger, *Schwarzrotgold in der deutschen Geschichte* (1924); A. Rosenberg, *Entstehung der deutschen Republik* (1929); G. P. Gooch, *Germany* (1925); F. F. Blachly and M. E. Oatman, *Government and Administration of Germany* (1928); E. Luehr, *New German Republic* (1929).

the Soviets, a spell especially powerful in view of economic conditions, bourgeois society and the bourgeois state have moved on to what bids fair to be the third stage of their development. This stage is characterized by an attempt to produce a strongly marked social cohesion—under duress, if need be—through greater emphasis upon nationalism and greater emphasis upon socialistic measures of one kind or another, in order to preserve the status quo. Bourgeois liberalism has lost its appeal even to the bourgeoisie. This is clearly to be seen in certain activities of the Republic; it becomes clearer still in the activities of the Fascists or “Nazis.”

In contending with the anti-bourgeois forces of the left which have revived and intensified the meaning of the symbols of Socialism, and with the anti-proletarian forces of the right, which have annexed many symbols of the old régime, the Republic is at a loss. For a time the symbols of 1848 and of democracy were played up; but this has met with relatively little enthusiasm. Similarly, “Constitution Day” is a day of celebration for the government and the middle parties rather than for the nation. Nevertheless a concerted effort is made to link the Republic to the national tradition, and to make it the present representative of the German nation. The expression “Deutsches Reich” has been retained, but it is interpreted to mean not the German Empire but the German Commonwealth. An attempt has been made to revive the navy. The new Reichswehr was linked in every possible way with the past glories of the German army. The new regiments received the names of famous regiments of pre-war days, and to them have been transmitted the flags, the traditions and the prestige of the old army. The presidents, Ebert and von Hindenburg, have been of considerable value in attaching to the Republic, first, the working class, then, middle and some upper class elements.¹ More important still, the Republic has inherited the whole power, prestige, and machinery

¹ F. Ebert, *Schriften, Aufzeichnungen, Reden* (2 vols., 1926); F. W. Schaafhausen, *Hindenburg Vater des Volkes* (1931); G. Schultze-Pfaelzer (tr. by C. R. Turner), *Hindenburg* (1931); R. Weterstetten and A. M. K. Watson, *Biography of President von Hindenburg* (1930).

of the Hegelian state which the past century had so glorified. The state itself; the material evidences of state activity, and the whole personnel of the administrative services, enormously expanded since 1918—all have now become symbols of the new bourgeois Republic. As such they have helped to carry over allegiance from the old to the new, and to emphasize the continuity of the new Republic with the old Empire and its symbols of national greatness.

The new Reich has, however, advanced beyond the old one in regard to social legislation; and, indeed, the Socialists, who now affirm rather than negate the state, have taken to calling the republican régime the Social State (*Sozialstaat*), and to regard it as the forerunner of the true Socialist state. It is not necessary here to enumerate the changes in social legislation since 1918; it should be pointed out, however, that the new trade-union privileges, the works' councils, and the extended social insurances have been of considerable assistance in enabling the bourgeois Republic to stand as the friend of the workman. Their effect has, however, dwindled as political and economic stress has cut them down. There has also been a rapid extension of state and municipal socialism—the more so in view of the post-war scarcity of private capital—so that such things as municipal electric plants and municipal laundries often reach intimately into the daily life of the masses. All these protective measures and services have become symbols taken by the bourgeois Republic from Socialism and used to combat the danger of a proletarian uprising.

In addition to presenting the Republic as the protector of the lower classes, the ruling forces have sought to combat the Communist doctrines of class warfare (and, to a lesser extent, the Fascist demands) by laying great stress on the symbols of cultural nationalism. This is an attempt to impress upon the lower classes the oneness of all Germans. In school and church, in press and over the radio, in local museums and through the study of *Heimatkunde*, the ideals and the symbols of the Romantic awakening of German national consciousness are emphasized, and the German student comes out of the school sys-

tem convinced of Germany's cultural supremacy over all other nations. In the Youth Movement, the love of German land and landscape experiences enthusiastic revival. All this emphasis on nationalism works, of course, less against the Fascists than against the Communists, for while the "Nazis" seek to destroy the Republic, they aim not to destroy but to glorify still further the German national state and its symbols. The Communists, on the other hand, seek to destroy not merely the Republic but bourgeois society as well, and to replace militant nationalism with militant internationalism, relegating nationalism to the cultural sphere.¹

Fascism, or Hitlerism, is, indeed, merely an extreme expression of the bourgeois state policy of combatting Communism by means of socialistic measures and emphasis on the oneness of all Germans. Starting from the growing post-war disintegration of the middle classes, which were once economically secure, German Fascism has sought to utilize their plight not against but in favor of the bourgeois state. Indeed, it actually strives to heighten their resentment by diverting it into the well-established emotional channels of antagonism to foreigners, to Jews, to democracy, to Socialism, and to the threat of Communist expropriation of private property. Since the middle classes have in many instances been proletarianized, retaining little but the shreds of their former social superiority over the working classes, Fascism may be called the supreme example in recent political life of the maxim "divide and rule."²

The welter of monarchist and reactionary movements, which arose after 1918 to champion the ideals and symbols of the old régime in hostility to the revolution, has resolved itself largely into the National Socialist Labor party. As its name indicates, this Fascist party, called the "Nazis," and led by Adolf Hitler, combines the symbols of nationalism with those of socialism. It aims to seize power, and until recently did not hesitate to advo-

¹ E. Diesel, *Germany and the Germans* (1931); E. Müller, *Bolschevismus, Faschismus oder Freistaat* (1931).

² E. Czech Jochberg, *Hitler eine deutsche Bewegung* (1930); A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Vol. I (1925), Vol. II (1927); A. von Koerber, *A. Hitler, Sein Leben, seine Reden* (1928); W. Lewis, *Hitler* (1931); L. Wilser, *Das Hakenkreuz* (1922).

cate revolution in order to establish a "national dictatorship" for "national liberation." In its combination of the appeals of nationalism and a perverted Socialism, by far the greater emphasis has been given to the former. The central symbol in this is less the German nation or the German *Volk* of the Romantic period of nationalism, than a projected mystical idealization of the original freshness, courage, and vigor of the early Aryans. The characteristic emblem is the swastika (*Hakenkreuz*), presumed to be peculiar to the Aryans. In its "pure" Germanism, the movement regards itself as the sole rightful heir to the pre-war German national state, and seeks to annex its symbols. It aims to present itself as the only party which really represents the whole German people and their glorious traditions, as opposed to the parliamentary hucksters of other parties. Until recently, Parliament was to be brushed aside and a dictatorship established by non-parliamentary means. This was to usher in a "Third Empire," which should insure the triumph of the German national cause and remove from the Teutonic shield the blemishes left by foreign influences. The present parliamentary Republic, with its symbolism of liberalism and democracy; the Socialist and Communist movements, with their symbolism of internationalism and class struggle; the domination of Germany by foreign bankers—all furnish to the Fascists a series of negative symbols. These have been labeled with the damning epithet "Jewish"—the Jewish Constitution, the Jewish Republic, Jewish Marxism, Jewish internationalism, Jewish capitalist greed. Anti-Semitism thus becomes a channel for draining off all class hatreds, and arriving at a pure united Germanism. France, as the "hereditary enemy," becomes also a great negative symbol, responsible for those insults to German nationalism which have become badges of national humiliation: the Treaty of Versailles, reparations, the Ruhr invasion, the occupation of the Rhineland by African troops. But above all those looms international Communism, a deadly enemy to be destroyed root and branch.

For the performance of this task the Fascists offer to the German people their flag, their shock troops, and their ideal of a

Third Empire. They have not only created a symbolism of their own but have cleverly adapted to their own ends whatever national local and class symbols are available. The promised Third Empire is to combine the glories of the medieval Empire with what seems to post-war Germany the unbelievable prosperity of the Hohenzollern Empire. In the new Reich there are to be no class antagonisms, but the friendly understandings and adjustments of a functional state (*Ständestaat*) in which each class is to occupy its proper place, all bowing in proper reverence to the central authority, the German Fascist state. The issue of monarchism is carefully avoided, although sons of the former Crown Prince are active in the party. The "shock troops," planned until recently as the army of the Fascist revolution, with their brown uniforms, their red and black arm-bands, their Fascist salute and greeting, have a symbolism of their own and have been trained in the military tradition and discipline of the pre-war army. The Fascist flag—a black swastika upon a ball of white in a large field of red—is a subtle combination of the black, white, and red of the Imperial flag with the red flag of Socialism. Their slogan, "National and Social Liberation," crowds into four words the symbolic appeal of three great strains of German tradition.

The National Socialist Labor party devotes a goodly share of its time and attention to the task of winning over the working classes, but with comparatively little success as yet. Where for middle-class audiences the national symbols and aims are emphasized, for working-class audiences emphasis is put upon the social and socialistic aims and symbols of the party. The slogan "Work and Bread," the demand for better care of the aged, the use of Marxist phraseology, and other devices are resorted to in order that the Fascists may present themselves as the party of the German working masses, fighting the dominance of alien capitalism and alien greed. The Fascist flag, represented to the middle class as black, white, and red, is represented to the proletariat as the red flag of German brotherhood. Speeches and literature addressed to the working class abound in Marxian

phraseology, until one rubs one's eyes in wonder at a Marxist jargon so completely addled.

In their violent denunciation of France, Jews, the Republic, the Socialists, the Communists, even at times the Catholic church, extreme measures of repression are promised against these enemies of Germany. The positive program of the Fascists remains, however, vague. In 1931 a startling change in policy occurred when Hitler placed himself and his party on the basis of legality and disavowed any intent to use violence to capture the state. This action followed soon after the amazing increase in Fascist representation in the Reichstag won in the elections of 1930. Whether Hitler can with these new tactics keep his party intact, or whether this dropping of the symbol of revolution will cause him to lose any considerable following was not evident.

In either case, his entry into governmental power, however effected, would be a prelude to increasingly severe measures of repression directed against the Communist elements, of which Chancellor Bruening's legal dictatorship was but a foreshadowing. These measures of repression may be accompanied by even more concessions in social legislation and socialistic enterprise, and a greater emphasis on nationalism by the bourgeois state.

In conclusion: Symbols are key words or key objects evoked by specific needs, and about which social attitudes may cluster, so that it is possible to outline the history of a people in the development and accretion of its symbols. Our attempt to examine the symbols of the German people of today from the historico-economic point of view reveals what may be called three great stages in the development of the bourgeoisie. The struggle against feudalism was fought around the central symbol of the princes, until the rulers became absolute. The struggle against absolutism was fought around symbols of liberty and the nation, but was settled when the bourgeoisie, having won its essential economic demands, dropped the symbols of liberty as the monarchy accepted the symbols of nationalism. The third stage is the struggle against the steadily rising pressure of the proletariat

for the control and fruits of industrial society. For a time the symbols of an intensified nationalism and of socialistic concessions, plus the use or threat of force, may cover the yawning gap between the ruling and the ruled classes. Whether the bourgeoisie by these means can develop a symbolism powerful enough to perpetuate its control of German society, provides an issue the decision of which will be a landmark in social history.¹

¹ NOTE.—This chapter was written and set up before the “national resurgence” that followed Hitler’s assumption of power in January, 1933. While further illustrations might be drawn from events since that time, it may be said generally that they have not affected the validity of the principles here laid down.

CHAPTER XVII

CONCLUSION

After having treated separately in detail, the various factors affecting civic loyalty and national sentiment in Germany, it will be worth while to summarize the findings. It has been pointed out at the outset that the citizen (*Bürger-bourgeois*) and civic training (*staatsbürgerliche Erziehung*) are products of the rise of the bourgeoisie (*Bürgertum*). In the feudal state there were no citizens; feudalism knew only rulers and subjects. The struggle for civic rights arose as a result of the desire of the bourgeoisie to establish an economic, social, and political order which would permit the fullest expression of its interests. Therefore, civic training during the period of the ascendancy of the bourgeoisie meant a training for the strengthening of the bourgeoisie in its struggle against feudal society and later on against the feudal elements of the absolute or semi-absolute state. After the bourgeoisie had, however, largely achieved its aims and had transformed the former state and society into a bourgeois state and society (*bürgerliche Staats- und Gesellschaftsordnung*), civic training became a means by which it could maintain its power.

With the rapid rise of capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, bourgeois society was immeasurably strengthened. But at the same time the necessary condition of its development produced a large and growing industrial proletariat. By its very position in society, this class is, however, unable to enjoy in practice the basic right of bourgeois society, namely, ownership of, and income from, private ownership of the means of production. That is, the proletariat is in practice prevented from obtaining the economic status for which the bourgeoisie had struggled, and which distinguished the bourgeois-citizen from both lord and subject in the feudal age. Thus the industrial proletariat is only a pseudo-citizen. It was consequently among this class that Socialism developed, seeking a new social

order which could be achieved only by the destruction of the existing bourgeois régime.

Thus Socialism attempted to break down among the workers allegiance to the national bourgeois state and to develop in its place a new allegiance to the international working class and a future Socialist society. As Socialist propaganda began to show success a more conscious effort was made among the bourgeoisie to counteract this by a more intensive propaganda for the national state. In fact, in its attempt to combat the spread of Socialism the bourgeoisie under the Empire was willing to compromise its original political ideals of liberalism and democracy with those of the semi-absolutist state. These efforts to develop a more intensive nationalism were directed, on the one hand, toward breaking down the new international class loyalty which was being developed by the Social Democrats and to substitute in its place loyalty to the German Empire. On the other hand, they were directed toward intensifying the national loyalty among those elements of lower and middle classes which had so far been immune to Socialist ideas but, as the continuous increase of Socialist votes seemed to indicate, might eventually join the ranks of the enemies of the state.

The outbreak of the war showed, however, that the great majority of the Socialists still possessed a loyalty to the existing national state which was stronger than their loyalty to the international proletariat. As the war continued, however, the former opposition against the existing order on the part of the Social Democratic workers again began to assert itself. A conflict set in between the two loyalties which became stronger and stronger as time went on. A small group of Socialists came out definitely against supporting the German government in the war; its purpose was to "transform the imperialist war into a civil war." These elements adhered to the Spartacus group and other smaller organizations. Among a larger portion of the Social Democratic workers a conflict existed between loyalty to class and loyalty to nation, a conflict which continued until even after the war. This section found its political expression in the Inde-

pendent Social Democratic party, which from the point of view of our study was an expression of these conflicting loyalties. It was not until 1920, after the revolution, that the conflict resolved itself, the majority of this party joining the Communists, while the rest of the party returned to the Social Democratic party.

Since the war the Communists represent the embodiment of those forces among the working class which are seeking to destroy allegiance to the existing state and society, and attempting to build up an allegiance to a new social order as exemplified by Soviet Russia. In fact, the existence of Soviet Russia has made it possible for the Communists in the post-war period, unlike the Social Democrats in the pre-war period, to point to a concrete example of a proletarian state, to which they attempt to develop an allegiance which supersedes all national prejudices and allegiances. The activities of this party reach out into all fields, and have increased in size and scope as the post-war crisis has grown in severity. The party tries to gain adherents by organizing a revolutionary opposition in all Social Democratic organizations such as the trade-unions, workers' co-operatives, sport and gymnastic societies, freethinkers, singing societies, etc. In fact, it attempts wherever possible to utilize any opposition movement where workers are to be found. Besides that, the Communist movement has its own military organization, the "Rotfrontkämpfverbund" (now suppressed), youth sections, children's groups, as well as relief organizations of various types. The most important means of furthering these revolutionary ideas lies in the initiation and support of economic, social, and political struggles not merely among the industrial proletariat but also among the agricultural workers, the poorer peasants, and even among the proletarianized middle classes. The specific means used are strikes, demonstrations with flags, banners, placards, and music, as well as public meetings. Special stress is laid on informal discussions with individual workers in the factories. In the same way much importance is placed upon the publication of newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, and leaf-

lets. Books of all kinds, written from a revolutionary point of view, also play a rôle in developing a more thorough understanding of the purposes of the movement.

To counteract the growing activities and influence of the Communists, various forces of bourgeois society and state have increased the intensiveness of civic training in the hope of winning back those who have accepted the tenets of international Communism and of reinforcing the national loyalty of those elements among the middle and lower classes whose difficult living conditions tend more and more to weaken their faith in the existing régime.

Of prime importance has been, of course, the physical power of the state as exercised through the army and police. When other methods have failed, the army and police have been used on numerous occasions to preserve the law and order of the existing state and society. These physical forces, of course, are used only in emergencies; their value in normal times lies in the fact that their mere existence impresses the lower classes with the actual physical power of the state. Besides the army and the police, the private military organizations, such as the Storm Troops of the "Nazis," the Steel Helmets of the Nationalists, and the Reichsbanner of the middle parties, serve to impress upon the lower classes in general and the Communist elements in particular the extent of the physical power of bourgeois state and society. At the same time the members of these organizations receive an intensive training in national patriotism.

The power of the state is buttressed by the civil organs of government with their far-flung activities—the courts, the general administrative bureaucracy, the schools, state business enterprises, etc.—and by the affiliation with the state of all kinds of private organizations. Thus, beyond the actual physical force represented by the army and police, the state exerts a tremendous coercive power through the vast state apparatus, the semi-official bodies, and the numerous private organizations tied up in various ways with the government. This control and influence of the state apparatus upon the daily life of the citizen has increased tremendously on the post-war period.

Moreover, the ruling elements of bourgeois state and society have made various political and economic concessions, both real and apparent to the lower and middle classes in order to counteract disaffection arising out of their objective conditions. Thus the state has not merely carried out various types of social insurance and social welfare work but has openly favored the development of a "labor aristocracy" which would feel that it had certain interests in upholding the existing régime. The development of this stratum of better-organized and better-paid workers helps to break up the unity of the working class, thus weakening its opposition against the state. It has also been the policy of the state to counteract the disintegrating forces among the middle classes in order to preserve a "buffer group" between bourgeoisie and proletariat.

National loyalty is fostered systematically and consciously by a whole network of organizations. Of prime importance are the various political parties (with the exception of the Communists) which reflect the various shades of nationalism, and which attempt to politicize all the different activities of the nation. Since the economic demands of the bourgeoisie were largely satisfied through concessions won on other than parliamentary and party grounds, the bourgeoisie has never been remarkably keen for the development of parliamentary democracy. Furthermore, the growth of the Communist party in recent years has provoked a strong impulse to abandon democracy in favor of dictatorship.

Until rather recently the schools of Germany laid little emphasis upon specific instruction in the political institutions of the country. The absolute and semi-absolute governments were suspicious of reference to these matters, and sought to protect themselves by withholding attention from them, and by relying upon dynastic and general cultural loyalty. Beginning about 1890, stress came to be laid upon conscious inculcation of nationalist sentiment. This was mainly in response to the growing influence of the Socialists over the youth. Since the war, the textbooks cannot be said to be strongly pro-republican, or definitely anti-monarchical. Emphasis is put upon national unity,

national freedom, and the cultural attainments of the German people. The history of other countries is understressed. Since the textbooks are less important than the teachers, and the teachers are mainly saturated with the attitudes of the old régime, loyalty to the present form of government is often not included in the inculcation of loyalty to the German state and nation. Although there is less basis for resentment than before the revolution at the use of the schools for the perpetuation of class differences, high tuition rates assist in keeping the advanced educational facilities of Germany mainly at the disposal of the wealthier elements.

In Germany everyone is born into the church as well as into the state, receiving religious education in the state schools according to the affiliation of the parents. The adult pays church taxes which are collected by the state, and the only way to avoid this obligation is to pay a fee and resign from the church. The financial dependence of the church on the state creates a strong vested interest in supporting the state. The Protestant church of Prussia was so tied to the monarchy that the flight of the Hohenzollerns and the establishment of the republic left the church in much confusion. The clergy have been centers for the diffusion of anti-republican sentiments. The Catholic church has drawn its strength from south Germany and from the liberal Rhineland, where anti-Prussian and anti-centralizing tendencies prevailed. Although loyal in the world war, the Catholics supported the peace move of the pope in 1917, enraging the monarchists and nationalists. In the post-revolutionary years the Centre party has readily adhered to the new form of government. Since all the churches emphasize the value of the individual soul and of neighborly community relations, the church is valued by the beneficiaries of the present property relations of society as a powerful anchor of the prevailing system, and is accordingly denounced by the radicals.

The youth organizations of Germany are of recent origin, rising near the end of the last century. They are supplementary aids to the schools in spreading the principles of German culture and of the German state. They are engineered by the po-

itical parties as recruiting auxiliaries, and conform to the main political divisions of German life.

The sectional divisions between Northern, Southern, and Western Germany are preserved by many circumstances and organizations, and not infrequently impair the unity of the state. Localism is rather a state-supporting than a state threatening influence, since the attachments to the neighborhood are generalized to the national territory about as readily as to the major sections of the country.

Polish and Jewish minorities have heightened the self-consciousness of the nation. After the Prussian Poles showed their sympathy with the Polish revolt of 1830-32, and Prussia began to attack their culture, the ensuing conflict sharpened the antagonisms of all concerned. Since the Poles were Catholic, and to some extent Socialist wage-earners, the repressive policy created a backfire which partially weakened the Prussian and later the German state. An independent Poland, profiting from territory claimed by the Germans, has been greeted since the war with the angry irritation of one whose "inferior" has now become an "equal." Taking shape slowly in the course of the last century, the anti-Jewish movement grew in Germany. The absence of Jews among the wage-earners created an opportunity for certain elements to undertake to divert labor and middle-class discontents against the Jewish "exploiters" and away from "capitalism." The million Jews have been singled out since 1918 as scapegoats for disgruntled military, monarchist, and anti-Marxist groups.

After the unification of Germany, attention began to be paid to the Germans who had emigrated abroad, and it was sought to keep them culturally bound to the fatherland. The war created many German minorities in contiguous territory and heightened the awareness of the existence of German settlements in Eastern Europe. The desire to possess a cultural and political wedge abroad led to the renewed cultivation of Germans across the seas.

One of the profound provocations to the growth of German national sentiment has been foreign interference in German af-

fairs. In some measure the Reformation was a movement against the foreigners represented by the pope and his representatives. Later, French intervention and intrigue in the affairs of German states and principalities was the target of outraged sentiments. The losses imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, the obvious subordination of Germany to foreign military control and to foreign reparation demands, have been standing incitements since the war. In spite of certain tendencies toward a pro-Russian orientation for diplomatic and business reasons, the upper classes are fearful of the influence of the Soviets upon the wage-earners of the country.

The press was valued highly by the national and liberal elements in their early struggles against absolutism. With the changed position of the bourgeoisie in the state, the press has become one of the chief propaganda agencies for the maintenance of the status quo.

The radio is used to emphasize national unity by featuring cultural achievements rather than political differences. The film has been utilized conspicuously as a medium of monarchist propaganda against the Republic, but its influence, in common with other media of communication, is overwhelmingly pro-state.

The struggle against feudalism was fought around symbols of liberty and of the nation. When the bourgeoisie won its main economic objectives, it became loyal to the monarchy which accepted nationalism. The present situation is characterized by the struggle against the symbolism of those who challenge the established order in the name of the proletariat, and involves an intensified nationalism.

It must be remembered that all the forces at work strengthening nationalism and civic loyalty are fostered by private organizations and the state alike. But even in the case of the former, the state is almost always present. It attempts to tie up almost all organized private activities to the state apparatus by making such organizations semi-official bodies, by giving them financial aid, by drawing them into governmental activities in advisory capacity, or in some other way arranging a working agreement

with them. In other words, even if the state is not omnipotent it is at least omnipresent.

The question now remains: How effective has civic and national training been in Germany? To what extent has it been able to develop loyalty to the national bourgeois state? Before the war the growing power of the Social Democracy, which by 1914 had gained the support of one-third of the electorate of the country, showed that the direct control of the state-supporting forces over society was steadily diminishing. However, civic training proved more successful than appeared on the surface, for loyalty to the German nation was abundantly manifested when the war broke out. The war period and especially the post-war period have crystallized the revolutionary Communist movement which sets out to destroy much more systematically and with greater effectiveness loyalty to the national bourgeois state, and to develop a basic allegiance to the international proletariat and to the Soviet Union as the fatherland of the working class. Thus the more intense civic and national propaganda of the post-war period has not only failed to gain the complete allegiance of the lower and middle classes but, as election returns show, the growing economic, social, and political crisis of this period has been gradually increasing the number of those whose loyalty to the existing régime is gradually disappearing and who are developing a new loyalty, a loyalty to Communism. This post-war crisis has likewise affected the middle classes who are increasingly losing loyalty to the present form of state, the parliamentary Republic. However, their disloyalty has been prevented from going too far by the leadership of the "Nazis" which has succeeded, for the present, in diverting the spirit of rebellion into supernationalist channels.

The problem of civic training has thus been thrown sharply into relief by post-war developments. It is becoming increasingly important as the crisis becomes more intense and tends toward the further disintegration of bourgeois state and society. The growing movement for more intensive patriotic training is, therefore, no merely "academic" campaign for civic ideals in general and German nationalism in particular. It is, on the con-

trary, a very real struggle on the part of a disintegrating society, and of a state with weakened loyalties, for its very existence in the face of forces leveled at its destruction. Thus, while civic training and loyalty to national ideals were at one time offensive weapons of a rising bourgeoisie against a decaying feudal order, they have now become the defensive and repressive weapons of a state and society which is trying to maintain itself in the face of the offensive attacks of the proletariat.

Hitler and Fascism have triumphed in Germany! The “Nazis” have taken the offensive in capturing the machinery of state for the purpose of repressing the attacks of the proletariat. Civic training of a supernationalist character, a culmination of the developments of the last decades, is the order of the day! The effectiveness of this training will depend upon whether the “Nazis” can solve the economic crisis which brought them into power. If they can do this, well and good. If they cannot, they will be confronted by a new and more powerful alignment of just those forces of social revolt which they have been called in to suppress.

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